Opinion

Cayenne v. Tobyhanna Township, PA

Court
District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Sep 30, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 35.0%

noting that a separate statement that is not responsive to movant's statement “is neither contemplated nor permitted by the Local Rules”

How later courts described this case

  • noting that a separate statement that is not responsive to movant's statement “is neither contemplated nor permitted by the Local Rules”
  • “[w]hen a police officer has received a reliable identification by a victim of his or her attacker, the police have probable cause”
  • “If Plaintiffs have not proffered evidence sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to all five prongs, their malicious prosecution claim must fail as a matter of law.”
  • trooper entitled to qualified immunity where probable cause existed for arrest

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSIAH CAYENNE,

Plaintiff, CIVIL NO. 3:23-CV-01543

v.

(LATELLA, M.J.)

DETECTIVE JOHN BOHRMAN,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter stems from a 2019 incident, where a Mount Pocono

West High School student reported that a fellow student, the Plaintiff,

Josiah Cayenne, sexually assaulted her on a school activity bus.

Following that report and a preliminary investigation, school officials

referred the matter to local law enforcement. Ultimately, the Mount

Pocono Regional Police Department filed criminal charges against

Cayenne. Cayenne entered into a plea agreement, pleading guilty to

corruption of minors and was sentenced to one year of probation. He

filed an appeal, and the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed his

adjudication of delinquency based upon the language of the

Pennsylvania statute criminalizing the corruption of minors.

Cayenne then initiated this federal lawsuit against five

defendants. Following an amended pleading and multiple motions to

dismiss, the sole remaining defendant is Detective John Bohrman

(“Detective Bohrman”). Detective Bohrman has filed a motion for

summary judgment, which is ripe for disposition. For the reasons set

forth herein, his motion will be granted.

1. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint on

September 15, 2023 against Defendants Tobyhanna Township, PA,

Coolbaugh Township, Chief of Police Chris Wagner (“Chief Wagner”),

Detective Bohrman, and Dean Nick Morrell (“Dean Morrell”). (Doc. 1).

On March 27, 2024, Defendants Chief Wagner and Detective Bohrman

filed a Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 14). Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to

file an amended complaint on April 12, 2024. (Doc. 16). Magistrate

Judge Carlson entered an Order on April 15, 2024, granting Plaintiff’s

motion to amend and dismissing Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as

moot. (Doc. 18). Multiple motions to dismiss were subsequently filed by

Defendants. First, Defendants Detective Bohrman and Police Chief

Wagner filed a Motion to Dismiss on April 17, 2024. (Doc. 20). Dean

2

Morell then filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 10, 2024. (Doc. 22).

Finally, Defendants Tobyhanna Township and Coolbaugh Township

filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 14, 2024. (Doc. 23). Plaintiff again

filed a “Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint” on May 28, 2024.

(Doc. 31). Magistrate Judge Carlson denied Plaintiff’s second Motion

for Leave to File Amended Complaint without prejudice due to

Plaintiff’s failure to follow Local Rule 15.1. (Doc. 35). On June 3, 2024,

the parties consented to have Magistrate Judge Carlson conduct all

further proceedings.1 (Doc. 34). On June 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed a new

“Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint” (Doc. 36), which was

again denied without prejudice due to Plaintiff’s failure to comply with

Local Rule 15.1. (Doc. 37).

1 This matter was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Caraballo on January

30, 2025 and subsequently reassigned to the undersigned Magistrate

Judge on June 10, 2025. On June 24, 2025, we issued an Order

notifying the parties that the matter was transferred to the

undersigned on June 10, 2025 and that we intended to continue to

exercise the jurisdiction previously consented to by the parties. (Doc.

61). We provided the parties with an opportunity to object to our

continued exercise of jurisdiction. (Id.). No such objections were filed.

3

On August 5, 2024, Magistrate Judge Carlson entered a

Memorandum and Order granting Defendant Dean Morell’s Motion to

Dismiss. (Docs. 39, 40). On that same date, he also entered a

Memorandum and Order granting Defendants Tobyhanna and

Coolbaugh Townships’ motion to dismiss. (Docs. 41, 42). The following

day, Magistrate Judge Carlson granted in part and denied in part Chief

Wagner and Detective Bohrman’s Motion to Dismiss. (Docs. 43, 44).

More specifically, he granted Chief Wagner’s Motion to Dismiss in full

and granted Detective Bohrman’s Motion to Dismiss with respect to the

intentional inflection of emotional distress claim but denied the motion

in all other respects. (Doc. 44). Further, he ordered Plaintiff to “submit

a more definite statement of his remaining claims against Detective

Bohrman within 30 days.” (Id.). Plaintiff did not comply with that

portion of the Court’s Order.

On October 7, 2024, Detective Bohrman filed an Answer (Doc. 48)

to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 19). On January 30, 2025,

Detective Bohrman filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and filed a

supporting brief the following day. (Doc. 55, 56). On February 28,

2025, Plaintiff filed an Answer to the Statement of Facts and a brief in

4

opposition to Detective Bohrman’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

(Docs. 57, 58).

2. UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

The following facts are taken from the Detective Bohrman’s

Statement of Material Facts and Plaintiff’s Answer thereto.2 On May 8,

2 Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, we accept as true all undisputed material

facts supported by the Record. Where the record evinces a disputed

fact, we will take notice. On this matter, however, we are compelled to

remind both parties of their respective obligations to comply with the

Local Rules. Local Rule 56.1 sets forth the procedure for filing a motion

for summary judgment. In relevant part, it states:

A motion for summary judgment filed pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, shall be accompanied by a separate, short

and concise statement of the material facts, in numbered

paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there is

no genuine issue to be tried.

M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1. Detective Bohrman filed a “Motion for Summary

Judgment,” which consists of 22 numbered paragraphs including both

conclusions of law and statements of fact. The factual statements

include citations to the Record. Plaintiff apparently construed this

filing as Detective Bohrman’s statement of material facts, as the

Answer he filed correlates with the paragraphs in the “Motion for

Summary Judgment.” (See Doc. 55). We will also construe the “Motion

for Summary Judgment” as Detective Bohrman’s statement of

undisputed material facts. Additionally, in his brief, Plaintiff included

a section entitled, “Factual Circumstances.” (Doc. 58 at 3). While the

facts in this section included citations, the documents cited to were not

(footnote continued on next page)

5

2019, Plaintiff and his classmate, A.A.3, were riding an activity bus

together from an afterschool club back to the community where they

both lived. (Doc. 55, ¶2; Doc. 57, ¶2). Plaintiff and A.A. sat together in

the same seat. (Doc. 55, ¶3; Doc. 57, ¶3). A.A. sat next to the window

and Plaintiff sat in the aisle seat. (Id.). The bus was full of other

students. (Id.). Plaintiff put his arm around A.A., touched her breast,

and then put his hand inside of her pants and penetrated her vagina

with his fingers multiple times. (Doc. 55, ¶4; Doc. 57, ¶4).

attached as exhibits. And in any event, Local Rule 56.1 does not permit

the non-moving party to file an additional statement of material facts

that does not respond to the moving party’s statement. See Farmer v.

Decker, 353 F. Supp.3d 342, 347 n.1 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (disregarding non-

movant's additional statement of facts for non-compliance with Local

Rule 56.1); Barber v. Subway, 131 F. Supp. 3d 321, 322 n.1 (M.D. Pa.

2015) (noting that a separate statement that is not responsive to

movant's statement “is neither contemplated nor permitted by the Local

Rules”); see also, e.g., Rau v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 793 F. App'x

84, 87 (3d Cir. 2019) (upholding district court's decision to strike

counter statement of facts under Local Rule 56.1).

3 Given the very sensitive nature of the underlying circumstances giving

rise to Plaintiff’s arrest, the parties have consistently referred to this

party as A.A. in order to protect her identity. We will do the same.

6

The following day, May 9, 2019, A.A. gave a statement school

resource officer Jason Wile (“SRO Wile”), stating:

I was sitting on the inside of the seat and talking

to my friend and he wrapped his arm around me

and started touching my breast then he touched

inside my pants while on the bus and he was

fingering me until he had to get off the bus. He

never asked me to do it I froze that’s why I didn’t

tell him to stop. I normally don’t sit with him. I

believe his name is Josiah.

(Doc. 55, ¶7).4

4 We note that Plaintiff denied in part and admitted in part this fact.

(Doc. 57 at ¶7). However, Plaintiff does not indicate whether he admits

or denies that A.A. provided that statement to the school resource

officer. (Id.) Rather, he admits that “he did touch A.A.’s vagina and

breast.” Plaintiff then provides his version of the events that occurred

on May 8, 2019, maintaining that the encounter was consensual. (Id.).

Local Rule 56.1 provides, in relevant part, that “[a]ll material facts set

forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be

deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement required to

be served by the opposing party.” M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1. Here, Plaintiff

did not provide a citation to any evidence in the record controverting

Detective Bohrman’s assertion that A.A. provided the quoted statement

to SRO Wile. (See Doc. 57, ¶7). Accordingly, that fact – but not the

substance of the statement – will be deemed admitted. See Ullrich v.

U.S. Sec. of Veterans Affairs, 457 Fed. App’x 132, 137 (3d Cir. 2012)

(finding the district court properly deemed facts admitted where

opposing party failed to properly dispute them).

7

Also on May 9, 2019, Plaintiff was called to the assistant

principal’s office, where he met with Dean Morrell. (Doc. 55, ¶5; Doc.

57, ¶5). Plaintiff gave a written statement at that time, which was

signed by both Dr. Morrell and Plaintiff, who reviewed the document

together. (Id.). Plaintiff does not dispute that he touched A.A.’s breast

or penetrated her vagina. (Doc. 55, ¶6; Doc. 57, ¶6). He admitted to

doing so in the written statement that he provided to Dr. Morrell and

affirmed the same in his deposition on January 2, 2025. (Id.).

However, Plaintiff maintains that the contact was consensual. (Doc. 55,

¶8; Doc. 57, ¶8). He asserts that A.A. consented to all of his touching

before it occurred. (Id.).

On August 18, 2019, Detective Bohrman executed an affidavit of

probable cause seeking an arrest warrant for Plaintiff, alleging that

Plaintiff had committed delinquent acts of aggravated indecent assault

without consent, indecent assault without consent of other, and open

lewdness. (Doc. 55, ¶9; Doc. 57, ¶). The Affidavit of Probable Cause

includes the statement that A.A. provided to SRO Wile as well as the

statement that Plaintiff made to the Dean Morrell. (Doc. 55, ¶10; Doc.

57, ¶10). On January 1, 2020, the Monroe County District Attorney’s

8

Office filed a petition alleging Plaintiff’s delinquency for the offenses of

aggravated indecent assault without consent, indecent assault without

consent of other, and open lewdness. (Doc. 55, ¶11; Doc. 57, ¶11).

On July 7, 2021, Plaintiff executed a four-page written “admission

colloquy,” admitting to corruption of minors, a first degree

misdemeanor. (Doc. 55, ¶12; Doc. 57, ¶12). After an adjudication

hearing, during which the Court conducted an oral colloquy, the Court

accepted Plaintiff’s admission, finding that it was voluntarily made.

(Doc. 55, ¶13; Doc. 57, ¶13). In exchange for Plaintiff’s admission, the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania agreed to nolle prose the original

charges. (Doc. 55, ¶14; Doc. 57, ¶14). In accordance with the

Pennsylvania Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure, before accepting an

admission, the court must ensure there is a factual basis for the

admission. (Doc. 55, ¶15; Doc. 57, ¶15). Accordingly, the court noted

the following as the factual basis for Plaintiff’s admission: “this juvenile

[Plaintiff] and another juvenile [A.A.] were on a bus and there was

sexual contact, which the victim [A.A.] indicated that it [sic] was

unwanted.” (Id.). The Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated and

reversed Plaintiff’s adjudication of delinquency because a “child,”

9

according to the statutory language, is incapable of committing the

crime of corruption of minors where the statute requires the perpetrator

to be at least 18 years old. (Doc. 55, ¶16; Doc. 57, ¶16; see also Doc. 55-9

at 17). At the time of the alleged assault, Plaintiff was fifteen years old.

(See Doc. 55-9 at 14-15).

3. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Summary Judgment

A court may only grant a motion for summary judgment when

“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is

“material” only if it might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute of material fact

is “genuine” if the evidence “is such that a reasonable jury could return

a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court must view

the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw

all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Jutrowski v. Twp. of

Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 288 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Scheidemantle v.

Slippery Rock Univ. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 538 (3d

10

Cir. 2006)). The court’s role in deciding a motion for summary

judgment is not to make credibility determinations, weigh evidence, or

draw inferences from facts. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Rather, the

court must “simply determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial.” Id.

The party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion,”

and demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of any material

fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant

makes such a showing, the non-movant must go beyond the pleadings

with affidavits or declarations, answers to interrogatories, or the like to

demonstrate specific material facts which give rise to a genuine issue.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The non-movant must

produce evidence to show the existence of every element essential to its

case, which it bears the burden of proving at trial, because “a complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving

party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex,

477 U.S. at 323. Additionally, “[i]f a party fails to properly support an

assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of

11

fact as required by Rule 56(c),” the court may “consider the fact

undisputed for purposes of the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); see

also Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 613-14 (3d Cir.

2018).

B. Section 1983

Plaintiff has alleged violations of his constitutional rights and

filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 states, “Every person

who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage...subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen ...or any other

person...to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, will be liable to the party

injured.” Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a

method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts

of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it

describes.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 749 n. 9

(1999) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 144 n.3 (1979)). To

prevail in an action under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a

violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person

12

acting under color of state law. Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d

Cir. 2000); Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1993). “Action

under color of state law ‘requires that one liable under § 1983 have

exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only

because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state

law.’” Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep't, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir.

2011) (quoting Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir.1998)).

4. DISCUSSION

Following Judge Carlson’s August 6, 2024 Memorandum and

Order, two claims remain against Detective Bohrman: false arrest and

malicious prosecution. (Docs. 43, 44). Detective Bohrman has moved

for summary judgment, asserting that summary judgment is

appropriate as to both claims and alternatively, that he is entitled to

qualified immunity. (Doc. 56 at 1-2). Given the “importance of

resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in

litigation,” we will first address qualified immunity. Saucier v. Katz,

533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled in part on other grounds by Pearson

v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 233 (2009).

13

A. Qualified Immunity Standard

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials

from liability for civil damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.

“Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to

hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly

and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and

liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Id. Qualified

immunity “provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent

or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.

335, 341 (1986). “Thus, so long as an official reasonably believes that

his conduct complies with the law, qualified immunity will shield that

official from liability.” Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir.

2012) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244).

Qualified immunity shields officials from liability for civil

damages brought pursuant to section 1983 “so long as their conduct

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.” Bland v. City of

14

Newark, 900 F.3d 77, 83 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577

U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). The official seeking qualified immunity has the

burden of establishing their entitlement to the affirmative defense.

Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 288 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Reedy v.

Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 223 (3d Cir. 2010)). To determine whether an

official is entitled to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity for a

section 1983 claim, a court must determine (1) whether the official

violated a constitutional right and, if so, (2) whether the right was

clearly established. Saucier, 533 U.S. 194. The court is not required to

conduct these inquiries sequentially. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 239-41.

However, if the court chooses to address the alleged constitutional

violations, analysis of the merits for purposes of summary judgment

merges with analysis of the deprivation of federal rights for purposes of

qualified immunity. See Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 299–300 (3d

Cir.2000); Russoli v. Salisbury Twp., 126 F.Supp.2d 821, 838–41 (E.D.

Pa. 2000); see also Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 122 (3d Cir.

1996) (“[C]rucial to the resolution of [the] assertion of qualified

immunity is a careful examination of the record . . . to establish . . . a

15

detailed factual description of the actions of each individual defendant

(viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff).”).

1. Plaintiff Failed to Establish a Constitutional

Violation with Respect to False Arrest.

Detective Bohrman maintains that he is entitled to qualified

immunity because Plaintiff cannot establish the violation of a federal

right. (Doc. 56 at 14). He maintains that he had “ample probable cause

to justify both the arrest and prosecution of Cayenne, in the form of the

victim’s statement, as well as a statement from Cayenne himself.” (Id.).

As to probable cause, earlier in Detective Bohrman’s supporting

brief, he notes that A.A. gave a statement detailing the sexual assault.

(Id. at 9). Detective Bohrman asserts that this alone could establish

probable cause. (Id.). Additionally, he asserts that his affidavit of

probable cause also included notes on Plaintiff’s interview with Dean

Morrell and Plaintiff’s statement.5 (Id.). Detective Bohrman argues

5 In support of his claim that probable cause exists, Detective Bohrman

also points to a video of the incident. Detective Bohrman did not

include any facts regarding the videotape in his statement of material

facts and so, we will not consider them. (See Doc. 55) (Plaintiff’s Motion

(footnote continued on next page)

16

that “[t]he undisputed material facts of record demonstrate that

probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff.” (Id. at 7).

Plaintiff maintains that summary judgment is not appropriate as

to his false arrest claim, stating, “[c]learly there is a genuine issue of

material fact, as to whether there was probable cause supporting

Detective Bohrman’s arrest of Plaintiff.” (Doc. 58 at 15). Plaintiff

asserts that he and A.A. were high school classmates who provided

different accounts of a sexual encounter. (Id.). While Plaintiff

acknowledges that A.A. told police that “she did not consent to being

digitally penetrated and groped by Plaintiff, this is belied by the fact

that she never told him to stop, offered no physical resistance and did

not plead for help.” (Id.). Rather, Plaintiff maintains this conduct was

“consistent with Plaintiff’s claim that he sought her permission before

being intimate.” (Id.). Additionally, Plaintiff claims that “[i]n the

for Summary Judgment, which, as noted supra, we will construe as his

statement of material facts); see also Ismail v. Honeywell International,

Inc., No. 1:21-CV-00143, 2024 WL 3033985, *7 n.5 (M.D. Pa. June 17,

2024) (“This assertion is not included in the statement of material facts,

and, accordingly, we will not consider it.”)

17

affidavit of probable cause, Detective Bohrman attested that there was

a videotape which corroborated the claims of A.A. However, that

videotape was never provided to Plaintiff’s counsel, and was not

available for Plaintiff’s adjudicatory hearing.” (Id.).

In a § 1983 claim based upon false arrest, the proper inquiry is

“whether the arresting officers had probable cause to believe the person

arrested had committed the offense.” Dowling v. Philadelphia, 855 F.2d

136, 141 (3d Cir.1995). The Third Circuit has described the procedure

for an officer seeking a warrant on the basis of probable cause as

follows:

First, the officer swears to an affidavit containing

a summary of the events that she believes give

rise to probable cause. In doing so, the officer ‘is

not free to disregard plainly exculpatory evidence,

even if substantial inculpatory evidence (standing

by itself) suggests that probable cause exists.’

Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 790 (3d Cir.

2000) (quoting Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646, 650

(8th Cir. 1999)). Second, the officer presents

the affidavit to a neutral magistrate, who

conducts his own independent review of the

evidence to determine whether it does, in fact,

establish probable cause, and, if so, issues

a warrant.

In this way, our system protects the public from

the harm caused by criminals as well as the harm

18

that would result if no process were required to

obtain a warrant; it allows officers to pursue

leads zealously while also ensuring that an

arrest warrant will issue only if ‘a neutral and

detached magistrate’ agrees with the officer

that probable cause exists. Id. at 787 (‘[A]n

uninterested party is presumably better suited to

review and evaluate the facts than an officer

pursuing a lead.’); see United States v. Leon, 468

U.S. 897, 913-14, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677

(1984) (‘[T]he detached scrutiny of a neutral

magistrate... is a more reliable safeguard [against

Fourth Amendment violations] than the hurried

judgment of a law enforcement officer....’)

(quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9,

97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977)). If,

however, the officer does not provide the neutral

magistrate with an accurate affidavit of probable

cause, the protection afforded by the magistrate's

review is lost; the magistrate will be unable to

assess the circumstances for probable cause

because he will not know what those

circumstances actually are.

Dempsey v. Bucknell University, 834 F.3d 457, 469 (3d Cir. 2016).

Accordingly, to state a claim for false arrest based on a warrant,

the plaintiff must establish that the defendant: (1) “knowingly and

deliberately, or with reckless disregard for the truth, made false

statements or omissions that create a falsehood in applying for a

warrant;” and (2) that “such statements or omissions are material, or

necessary, to the finding of probable cause.” Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d

19

781, 786–87 (3d Cir.2000) (quoting Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396,

399 (3d Cir.1997)).

Here, Plaintiff does not specifically allege that Detective Bohrman

“knowingly and deliberately, or with reckless disregard for the truth,

made false statements or omissions” in his affidavit of probable cause.

See Wilson, 212 F.3d at 781. However, Plaintiff does allege – with no

citation to the record – that “[i]n his affidavit of probable cause,

Detective Bohrman attested that there was a videotape which

corroborated the claims of AA.” (Doc. 58 at 15). While we could

construe this as an argument that Detective Bohrman made a false

statement in the affidavit of probable cause, Detective Bohrman

included no such attestation. Plaintiff’s contention is demonstrably

false as Detective Bohrman attached a copy of the affidavit of probable

cause as an exhibit to his Motion for Summary Judgment. (See Doc. 55-

20

6 at 2). Nowhere in that document does Detective Bohrman reference a

videotape of the incident. (Id.).6

6 We note that Plaintiff raises arguments about the videotape on three

occasions in his opposition brief with no citation to any record evidence.

(Doc. 58 at 16, 19, 21). Such arguments are insufficient to overcome a

summary judgment motion. See Wright v. Dallas School Dist., No. 2007

WL 9775650, 2007 WL 9775650 (M.D. Pa. July 5, 2007) (“[t]o overcome a

motion for summary judgment, it is the plaintiff’s burden of presenting

specific facts, with specific reference to the record.”) While, as noted

supra, we declined to consider the arguments advanced by either party

regarding the videotape, based upon the record evidence regarding the

videotape that we have reviewed, we are satisfied that consideration of

such arguments would not have changed our analysis. The existence of

probable cause is central to our analysis regarding whether Plaintiff

established a constitutional violation as to both his false arrest and

malicious prosecution claims. Detective Bohrman testified that he never

saw the video. (Doc. 56-8 at 13:21-22). He testified that Dean Morrell

and SRO Wile watched the video and reported that because of the angle

and the location on the bus where A.A. and Plaintiff were seated, they

were only able to see that the two did, in fact, sit together, and that

Plaintiff did put his arm around her. (Id. at 14:5-14). Dean Morrell and

SRO Wile reported that was all they were able to see on the video. (Id.

at 13:16-17). There is no evidence that either party has pointed to that

suggests the video footage could be characterized as exculpatory. In any

event, Plaintiff has not argued that Detective Bohrman omitted this

information from his affidavit of probable cause. Rather, he erroneously

argued that Detective Bohrman “attested that there was a videotape

which corroborated the claims of AA.” (Doc. 58 at 15). Thus, even if we

were to consider the parties’ arguments regarding the videotape, it would

not change the probable cause analysis.

21

Rather, the parties do not dispute that Detective Bohrman

included both A.A. and Plaintiff’s versions of events in his affidavit of

probable cause. (Doc. 55, ¶¶10; Doc. 57, ¶ 10) (stating that the affidavit

included both A.A.’s statement to the school resource officer and

Plaintiff’s statement to the dean of students). As Detective Bohrman

correctly pointed out, A.A.’s statement alone was sufficient to establish

probable cause.7 The Third Circuit’s rule provides that “statements of a

7 Detective Bohrman asserts that he executed an affidavit of probable

cause, alleging Cayenne committed the following acts: aggravated

indecent assault without consent, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125(A)(1); indecent

assault without consent of other, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(A)(1); and open

lewdness, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5901. (Doc. 55 at ¶9). The affidavit of probable

cause does not specifically reference these (or any) offenses. (See Doc.

55-6). However, Plaintiff does not dispute Detective Bohrman’s

statement. (Doc. 57 at ¶9). 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125(A)(1) provides that “a

person who engages in penetration, however slight, of the genitals . . . of

a complainant with a part of the person’s body . . . commits aggravated

indecent assault if . . . the person does so without the complainant’s

consent.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(A)(A) provides that “a person is guilty of

indecent assault if the person has indecent contact with the

complainant . . . and . . . the person does so without the complainant’s

consent. Finally, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5901 provides that “a person commits a

misdemeanor of the third degree if he does any lewd act which he

knows is likely to be observed by others who would be affronted or

alarmed.”

22

victim witness are typically sufficient to establish probable cause in the

absence of independent exculpatory evidence or substantial evidence of

a witness’s own unreliability that outweigh[s] the probable cause that

otherwise exists.” Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 477-78 (internal quotations

and citations omitted); see also Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 818

(3d Cir. 1997) (“[w]hen a police officer has received a reliable

identification by a victim of his or her attacker, the police have probable

cause”), abrogated on other grounds by Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199,

209-11 (3d Cir. 2007).

Neither party has pointed to any “substantial evidence” in the

record of A.A.’s unreliability or to any “independent exculpatory

evidence.” The only evidence inconsistent with A.A.’s statement was

Plaintiff’s statement, asserting that the encounter was consensual. But

Plaintiff’s statement disputing A.A.’s account of the interaction does not

negate the probable cause established by A.A.’s statement. See Forde v.

Home Depot, No. 11-5823, 2011 WL 6372090 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2011)

(“A policeman . . . is under no obligation to give any credence to a

suspect’s story nor should a plausible explanation in any sense require

the officer to forego arrest pending further investigation if the facts as

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initially discovered provide probable cause.”) (quoting Criss v. City of

Kent, 876 F.2d 259, 263 (6th Cir. 1988)); Anderson v. Gaga, No. 11-528,

2013 WL 3242445, *3 (W.D. Pa. June 25, 2013) (quoting Pearson v.

Lorancaitis, No. 3:09-cv-1641, 2012 WL 162355 (D. Conn. Jan. 19, 2012)

(“a finding of probable cause is not foreclosed where a police officer is

presented with different stories from an alleged victim and an

arrestee.”)).

Because there is no genuine dispute as to whether Detective

Bohrman “knowingly and deliberately, or with reckless disregard for

the truth, made false statements or omissions that create[d] a falsehood

in applying for a warrant,” probable cause existed and Plaintiff cannot

establish a constitutional violation. Accordingly, Detective Bohrman is

entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s false arrest claim. See

Ward v. Noonan, 147 F.Supp.3d 262, 287 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2015)

(trooper entitled to qualified immunity where probable cause existed for

arrest); Giacalone v. Northeastern Pennsylvania Insurance Fraud Task

Force, No. 3:11-CV-01647, 2013 WL 12145004 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2013)

(defendant entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff failed to

make out violation of constitutional right where probable cause existed).

24

The failure to establish a constitutional violation also requires a

finding that Detective Bohrman is entitled to summary judgment with

respect to Plaintiff’s claim of false arrest.

2. Plaintiff Failed to Establish a Constitutional

Violation with Respect to Malicious Prosecution.

Again, Detective Bohrman argues that he is entitled to qualified

immunity because he had “ample probable cause” to justify the

prosecution of Cayenne, and so, Plaintiff cannot establish a

constitutional violation. (Doc. 56 at 14). Earlier in his supporting brief,

Detective Bohrman argues in more detail that the existence of probable

cause vitiates Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim. (Id. at 12-13).

Additionally, Detective Bohrman again makes arguments about the

videotape.8 (Id. at 12). Detective Bohrman also argues that Plaintiff

failed to allege the role that Detective Bohrman may have played in the

prosecution, and in any event, “Assistant District Attorney Matthew

Bernall made the decision to file charges against [Plaintiff.]” (Doc. 56).

8 For the reasons set forth supra in note 5, we will not consider these

arguments.

25

Finally, Detective Bohrman argues that the criminal proceeding did not

end in Plaintiff’s favor. (Doc. 56 at 13). Detective Bohrman argues that

Plaintiff “entered a voluntary admission to the crime of corruption of

minors.” (Id.). While the Superior Court ultimately reversed and

vacated that adjudication of delinquency, Detective Bohrman argues

that neither the Superior Court nor Plaintiff disputed the factual basis

of the admission. (Id.).

In response, Plaintiff argues, “Detective Bohrman initiated the

criminal proceedings against him by swearing out a false affidavit of

probable cause for his arrest then subsequently arresting Plaintiff.”

(Doc. 58 at 18). He further maintains, “[t]he prosecution against

Plaintiff culminated in the Plaintiff’s misdemeanor conviction being

vacated by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania after it was clear that

Plaintiff was arrested without probable cause as evidenced by the

proceeding section.” (Id.).

It is well-settled that “[t]o prove malicious prosecution [under §

1983]. . . a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendants initiated a

criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in plaintiff's

favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the

26

defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the

plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty

consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal

proceeding.” Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir.

2003). To prevail on a claim of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must

satisfy each element. McCormack v. Livergood, 353 F.Supp.3d 357, 365

(M.D. Pa. 2018); Ward v. Noonan, 147 F.Supp.3d 262, 281 (M.D. Pa.

2015) (“If Plaintiffs have not proffered evidence sufficient to create a

triable issue of fact as to all five prongs, their malicious prosecution

claim must fail as a matter of law.”)

As set forth supra, there is no genuine dispute of material fact

regarding whether probable cause existed for Plaintiff’s arrest.

Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional violation with

respect to malicious prosecution. See McCormack, 353 F.Supp.3d at 365

(plaintiff must satisfy each element to establish malicious prosecution).

Detective Bohrman is therefore entitled to qualified immunity with

respect to this claim.

Further, because Plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional

violation with respect to his malicious prosecution claim, it necessarily

27

follows that Detective Bohrman is entitled to summary judgment as to

this claim as well.

5. CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons set forth herein, we will grant Detective

Bohrman’s Motion for summary judgment.

An appropriate Order is filed simultaneously with this

Memorandum.

Dated: September 30, 2025 s/ Leo A. Latella

LEO A. LATELLA

United States Magistrate Judge

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Cayenne v. Tobyhanna Township, PA | Frix