Jones v. Wetzel

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SHAMEL JONES

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 22-1190

JOHN WETZEL, et al.

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Rufe, J. September 30, 2025

Pro se Plaintiff Shamel Jones filed suit against Defendants Superintendent John Wetzel,

Secretary George Little, and Mailroom Supervisor Kelly Long (together, the “Commonwealth

Defendants”) and FedEx Shipping & Mail Carrier Handling Services. The Commonwealth

Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the merits and based on qualified immunity.

For the following reasons, the motion will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

The parties did not submit a joint stipulation of material facts. As such, the pertinent facts

here are drawn from Plaintiff’s complaint and the parties’ briefs, as well as the transcript of

Plaintiff’s deposition. Where the facts are disputed, they are viewed in the light most favorable to

the Plaintiff, as the non-moving party.

In June 2021, Jones, then an inmate at State Correctional Institution-Phoenix (“SCI-

Phoenix”), signed paperwork indicating that he would receive institutional support to be

removed from the Restricted Release List (“RRL”) to the general population if he completed the

Department of Corrections’ (“DOC”) “4-Phase Step Down Program.”1 Jones completed the

program by December of 2021.2

In March of 2022, Jones was called to the Inmate Property Room at SCI-Phoenix so his

property could be re-inventoried and packed up pursuant to a transfer to SCI-Greene.3 After his

boxes were packed, Jones was told he was four boxes over the limit.4 Given the option of

destroying the extra boxes or shipping them at his own expense, he chose to sign a cash slip for

the shipment of the four boxes, with the understanding they would be transported by a

commercial carrier.5 On March 23 or 24, 2022, Jones was transferred from SCI-Phoenix to SCI-

Greene.6 Upon his arrival at SCI-Greene, Jones was placed in the Management Control Unit

(“MCU”) at the discretion of the Secretary of the DOC.7 Jones claims he was in a Restrictive

Housing Unit (“RHU”) when he was in the MCU under solitary confinement conditions.8 Jones

alleges that in the MCU he had restricted access to visitation with family, friends and the media;

and could not participate in educational programs outside the MCU or religious services or

congregated worship.9 He also alleges that he could not go to the main yard, meet with general

population inmates (including jailhouse lawyers), or go to the main library, and had restricted

access to exercise equipment, water, and bathroom facilities on the MCU yard.10

1 Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21-22 [Doc. No. 111].

2 Id. ¶ 23.

3 Id. ¶¶ 29-39.

4 Id. ¶ 33.

5 Id. ¶¶ 33-37.

6 Id. ¶ 39; Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. ¶¶ 67-68 [Doc. No. 144].

7 Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 39-40 [Doc. No. 111]; Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. ¶¶ 67-70 [Doc. No. 144].

8 Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 152-55 [Doc. No. 111].

9 Id. ¶ 152.

10 Id.

On April 3, 2022, Jones filed two administrative grievances.11 The first grievance related

to his placement in the MCU, which he characterized as retaliation for filing a complaint

regarding his placement on the RRL.12 The second grievance stated that the four boxes he

shipped still had not arrived at SCI-Greene.13 On April 8, 2022, a property officer brought Jones

only three of the four boxes that were shipped from SCI-Phoenix. Jones claims this fourth box

contained newly discovered evidence relevant to his criminal case, documents related to his civil

cases, and missing property including photographs, sneakers, a keyboard, and an amplifier.14

Later on April 10, 2022, Jones filed a third grievance describing the missing box and the

items it contained.15 Over the following week, Jones filed three more grievances. Two of the

grievances related to the missing boxincluding new arguments that the DOC’s use of FedEx

had cost Jones more than if it had used another carrierand the other grievances re-raised issues

concerning his MCU placement.16

Around that time, the DOC’s Program Committee Review (“PCR”) issued a “Progress

Report and Specific Rational for Continued Placement or for Transfer” concerning Jones’s

placement in the MCU.17 The PRC determined that Jones had been properly “placed in the MCU

11 Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 17 [Doc. No. 144-17] (Grievance # 975385); Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 18 at 1 [Doc.

No. 144-18] (Grievance History). The second grievance was provided to the Court with Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss. See Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss Ex. 2 [Doc. No. 26-2] (Grievance # 975387).

12 Grievance # 975385 [Doc. No. 144-17].

13 Grievance # 975387 [Doc. No. 26-2].

14 Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 58-63 [Doc. No. 111]; Pl.’s Opp. Defs.’ Mot. Sum. J. Attach. at 13 [Doc. No. 150-1]

(Grievance # 976398).

15 Grievance # 976398 [Doc. No. 150-1].

16 Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 19 [Doc. No. 144-19] (Grievance # 977466) (dated April 17, 2022); Defs.’ Mot.

Dismiss, Ex. 1 [Doc. No. 26-1] (Grievance # 976351) (dated April 10, 2022); Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss, Ex. 6 [Doc. No.

26-6] (Grievance # 976114) (dated April 13, 2022).

17 Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. ¶ 68. [Doc. No. 144]; Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 14 [Doc. No. 144-14] (PRC

Review, 2022); Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 16 [Doc. No. 144-16] (Appeal of MCU).

for IMU Phase 1 per the Secretary of the Pennsylvania [DOC],” he had “not received any

misconducts,” he would “hold a block worker position in the MCU,” and he would “continue his

General Population status (IMU Phase 1) on the [MCU].”18 Over the following weeks, DOC

Grievance Officers either denied the grievances on the merits or rejected them on procedural

grounds.19 Jones pursued first-level appeals to his Facility Manager and second-level requests to

the DOC Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (“SOIGA”).20 Jones

acknowledges that an appeal challenging the PCR report on his placement in the MCU did result

in a final merits review from Superintendent Michael J. Zaken.21

On August 8, 2022, Jones filed an Amended Complaint against three named Defendants:

(1) Kelly Long, identified as an “Inmate Mail Room Supervisor”; (2) FedEx Shipping & Mail

Carrier Handling Services (“FedEx”); and (3) George Little, who at that time was serving as the

Acting Secretary of the DOC.22 Although John Wetzel was not named in the initial Amended

Complaint, he and Little filed a joint Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim.23 Long filed a

separate motion to dismiss.24 The Court granted the motions to dismiss without prejudice.25

Jones then filed a second Amended Complaint, against Wetzel, Little, Long, and FedEx

Shipping & Ground Mail Services Carriers.26 Defendants did not file a Motion to Dismiss the

18 PRC Review, 2022 [Doc. No. 144-14].

19 Grievance # 975385 [Doc. No. 144-17]; Grievance History [Doc. No. 144-18]; Grievance # 977466 [Doc. No.

144-19].

20 Grievance History [Doc. No. 144-18].

21 Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 77-79 [Doc. No. 111].

22 Pl.’s Am. Compl. at 3 [Doc. No. 21].

23 Mem. Supp. Defs. Little & Wetzel’s Mot. Dismiss [Doc. No. 26].

24 Mem. Supp. Def. Long’s Mot. Dismiss [Doc. No. 63].

25 Order Mot. Dismiss at 1 [Doc. No. 63]; Order Mot. Dismiss at 1 [Doc. No. 26].

26 See Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 111]. FedEx has never been served, nor have they entered an appearance

in this litigation. Further, Jones accepted compensation from FedEx for the missing box. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex.

1, Pl.’s Dep. at 121 [Doc. No. 144-1].

second Amended Complaint. The parties proceeded to discovery and Wetzel, Little, and Long

now seek summary judgment on the merits and based on qualified immunity.27

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”28 A

fact is “material” if it could affect the outcome of the suit, given the applicable substantive law,

and a dispute is “genuine” if the evidence presented is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.29 In evaluating a summary judgment motion, a court “must

view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,” and make every reasonable

inference in that party’s favor.30

A court may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations at the summary

judgment stage.31 Nevertheless, the party opposing summary judgment must support each

essential element of the opposition with concrete evidence in the record.32 This requirement

upholds the “underlying purpose of summary judgment [which] is to avoid a pointless trial in

cases where it is unnecessary and would only cause delay and expense.”33 If the evidence is

merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.34

Therefore, if, after making all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, the court

27 Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. [Doc. No. 144].

28 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

29 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

30 Hugh v. Butler Cnty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005).

31 Boyle v. Cnty. of Allegheny Pa., 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998).

32 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).

33 Walden v. Saint Gobain Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 637, 641 (E.D. Pa. 2004).

34 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50.

determines there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, then summary judgment is

appropriate.35 Finally, although this Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s pro se filings, Plaintiff

must set forth facts, supported by affidavits or other evidence of record, sufficient to survive

summary judgment.36

III. DISCUSSION

Jones collectively alleges multiple violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. To state a claim under §1983, “a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by

the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law.”37 Section 1983 does not provide a cause

of action to challenge violations of DOC policy or state law that do not also include violation of

a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Defendants argue that Jones has not met his burden and summary judgment should be

granted on all Jones’s remaining claims: (1) Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference, cruel

and unusual punishment, and “poor prison conditions” claims; (2) Fourteenth Amendment due

process claims alleging he has been unable to challenge his placement on RRL and MCU, for

unconstitutionally harsh conditions in RRL and/or MCU, and for his lost property; (3) Equal

Protection Clause claims alleging he has been denied the same privileges as inmates in the

general population; and (4) First Amendment retaliation, access to courts, and supervisor liability

claims.38 Defendants also assert that Long was not properly named under § 1983 and that

35 Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1987).

36 Houseknecht v. Doe, 653 F. Supp. 2d 547, 555 (E.D. Pa. 2009).

37 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

38 See generally Mem. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. [Doc. No. 147].

Defendants are entitled to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.39 Because the Court

will grant summary judgment on the merits of the claims, the Court does not reach the issue of

qualified immunity or whether Long is an appropriate defendant.

A. Plaintiff Failed to Exhaust Claims of Retaliation.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) states that “[n]o action shall be brought with

respect to prison conditions under [§1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in

any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as available are

exhausted.”40 Therefore, exhaustion of administrative remedies is a threshold question.

Jones contends that the DOC intentionally withheld copies of its officers’ adjudications,

thereby violating his constitutional rights and frustrating his attempts to exhaust administrative

remedies for his access to courts and supervisory liability claims.41 Defendants argue that Jones

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding his complaints of retaliation, access to

courts, and supervisory liability.42 Defendants claim Jones failed to exhaust his access to the

courts claim, but the Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts described Jones properly appealing

the grievance to the highest level.43 Defendants do not point to evidence of a failure to exhaust

the supervisory liability claim.44 Defendants acknowledge that Jones did file a grievance for

being placed in the MCU, rather than general population, as retaliation for filing a civil lawsuit

about his placement on the RRL. However, Defendants argue that he did not appeal denial of his

39 Id. at 9, 35.

40 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

41 Pl.’s Opp. Defs.’ Sum. J. at 24 [Doc. No. 150].

42 Mem. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 26 [Doc. No. 147].

43 Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. ¶ 96 [Doc. No. 144].

44 Mem. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 26 [Doc. No. 147].

grievance to the highest level, and Jones has not produced evidence showing exhaustion.45

Defendants contend that Jones never filed a grievance for the mail room’s failure to mail his civil

complaint, and Jones has not provided evidence of such a grievance.46 Defendants claim Jones

never filed a grievance after Little purportedly told him to drop his complaint, and Jones has not

provided evidence of such a grievance.47

A grievance procedure may be rendered “unavailable” when a prison official thwarts an

inmate’s ability to utilize it.48 Intimidation, or “serious threats of retaliation and bodily harm,”

may render a remedy unavailable.49 Here, Jones has failed to establish that he was prevented

from filing such a grievance regarding retaliation against him; and he filed other grievances.

Because Jones failed to exhaust these claims, summary judgment will be granted on the

retaliation claims.50

Jones did file a grievance challenging the loss of his shipped property which he claims

contained evidence and documents relevant to his criminal case and other civil cases and fully

exhausted it through appeals.51

45 Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. ¶ 76 [Doc. No. 144]; Grievance # 975385 [Doc. No. 144-17]; Grievance History

[Doc. No. 144-18].

46 Jones Dep. at 95 [Doc. No. 144-1]; Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. ¶ 83-96 [Doc. No. 144]; Grievance History

[Doc. No. 144-18].

47 Jones Dep. at 111 [Doc. No. 144-1]; Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. ¶ 88 [Doc. No. 144]; Grievance History

[Doc. No. 144-18].

48 Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643 (2016); see also Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 266-67 (3d Cir. 2018).

49 See Rinaldi, 904 F.3d at 267.

50 See Simmons v. Szelewski, 642 Fed. Appx 95, 99 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding that the plaintiff failed to exhaust

administrative remedies regarding alleged retaliation and confirming grant of summary judgment).

51 Grievance 977466 [Doc. No 144-19]; Pl.’s Opp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Attach., Ex. E, at 24-36 [Doc. No. 150-1].

B. Plaintiff Failed to Adduce Sufficient Evidence for his Eighth Amendment

Claims.

Jones alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated because his placement in

the MCU “deprived [him] of the right to basic human needs, human contact, [e]xercise, [and]

[m]ental [s]timulation.”52

A claim that an inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights are violated requires the plaintiff to

establish that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to conditions of confinement that

constitute cruel and unusual punishment.53 There is a two-pronged test for determining whether a

prison official violated the Eighth Amendment. The first prong is an objective determination of

whether the deprivation is “sufficiently serious” such that the official’s act or omission resulted

“in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.”54 Life’s necessities include

“food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety.”55 “[E]xtreme deprivations” are

required to establish a claim for unconstitutional confinement conditions.56

The second prong is a subjective test as to whether the official had a “sufficiently

culpable state of mind,” i.e., one of “deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.”57 The

official must have actually known or been aware that the condition created an excessive risk to

the prisoner’s health or safety.58 To be liable, the prison official must “know[] of and disregard[]

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”59

52 Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. ¶ 143 [Doc. No. 111].

53 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1991).

54 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citations omitted).

55 Tillma v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 418 (3d Cir. 2000).

56 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).

57 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (internal quotation and citations omitted).

58 Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 138 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 133 (3d Cir.

2001)).

59 Id. at 142 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).

1. Substantial Deprivation

Jones alleges that Defendants kept him in solitary confinement conditions, regardless of

the official designation as RRL, IMU, or MCU.60 While the Court considers the duration and

severity of confinement regardless of official designation, Jones has failed to adduce sufficient

evidence to show he was kept in unconstitutionally restrictive conditions.61 Conclusory claims

that the MCU inflicted torturous and malicious acts of cruel and unusual punishment are

unsupported; the actual allegations do not approach this level.62

The claims that Jones is prohibited from contact visitation, from getting married, from

participating in non-MCU programming, from participating in religious services or congregated

worship, from obtaining meaningful exercise equipment, from attending services or interacting

with inmates outside the MCU, from going to the main yard, from bringing a drink of water to

the MCU yard, and from attending the main library or having access to jailhouse lawyers, are not

comparable to conditions of perpetual solitary confinement.63 As Jones admitted in his

deposition, in the MCU: he is able to hold a job as a block worker;64 he is permitted between

four and five “stream” or no contact visits per month;65 he gets four phone calls per day;66 he is

60 Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. ¶ 210(G)(4) [Doc. No. 111].

61 Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686 (1978) (“[T]he length of confinement cannot be ignored in deciding whether

the confinement meets constitutional standards.”).

62 Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 134-40 [Doc. No. 111].

63 Id. ¶¶ 154-60. See, e.g., Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2000) (describing solitary confinement

conditions including virtual isolation; confinement to a cell for twenty-three hours a day for five days a week and

twenty-four hours a day for two days a week; eating meals in isolation; sole contact being with DOC officials; no

contact with family; no educational, vocational, or organizational programs; and no access to the library).

64 Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 1, Pl.’s Dep. at 63–64 [Doc. No. 144-1].

65 Id. at 64.

66 Id. at 66.

permitted a tablet;67 he is permitted the same electronics as in the general population;68 he is

permitted to make vendor/commissary purchases;69 he gets unlimited showers;70 he gets three

hours of yard time per day;71 he is permitted to congregate with other MCU inmates every day;72

he has access to legal materials on a computer;73 there is some MCU programming;74 and he is

receiving regular psychological treatment.75

Jones does not allege nor provide supporting evidence for any claim he was denied any

basic human needs, such as food, clothing, or shelter. Courts must be cognizant of the

“fundamental difference” between deprivation of discretionary privileges that a prisoner in

general population may enjoy and deprivation “of the basic necessities of human existence.”76

Although Jones has been in the MCU for three years, he has not shown that some restriction on

general population privileges violate the Eighth Amendment.77

Limitations on contact visits are not sufficient to establish a claim for an Eighth

Amendment violation.78 Lack of sufficient exercise equipment, too, does not rise to the level of

an Eighth Amendment violation, especially as he is permitted daily outdoor exercise. Jones has

67 Id. at 66.

68 Id. at 67.

69 Id. at 67-68.

70 Id. at 68.

71 Id.

72 Id. at 70.

73 Id. at 72.

74 Id. at 73.

75 Id.

76 Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 364 (3d Cir. 1992).

77 Jones notes that prior to his placement in the MCU, he was on the RRL for four years. Pl.’s Opp. Defs.’ Mot.

Summ. J. at 8 [Doc. No. 150].

78 See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 136 (2003) (holding that a restriction to noncontact visitation does not

violate the Eighth Amendment); see also Naranjo v. Little, No. 22-1890, 2024 WL 5479147, at *11 (W.D. Pa. July

18, 2024) (MCU restriction to noncontact visitation did not violate Eighth Amendment).

not demonstrated that he suffers ill effects from the lack of exercise equipment or that he has

sought medical care related to his inability to exercise in the way he chooses.

Similarly, lack of access to the main yard or general population inmates and

programming does not establish an Eighth Amendment violation. These restrictions do not

deprive Jones of the basic necessities of life because he can congregate with other MCU inmates

daily. Although the MCU conditions may be more restrictive than in general population, Jones

has not shown that they approximate unconstitutional perpetual solitary confinement.

Jones has also not demonstrated a substantial deprivation based on lack of access to the

main law library or jailhouse lawyers. He has access to a law library computer station with legal

books, cases, and judicial decisions.79

The totality of circumstances of the conditions of Jones’s confinement in the MCU are

not “objectively, sufficiently serious” so as to “result in the denial of the minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities.”80 The motion for summary judgment will be granted as to the

Eighth Amendment claim.

C. Plaintiff Failed to Adduce Sufficient Evidence for his Fourteenth

Amendment Due Process Claims.

Jones claims that he has a protected liberty interest in placement in general population

housing, but that Defendants sent him to the MCU, which he describes as a Restrictive Housing

Unit, with no opportunity to appeal or be heard. He also asserts that Long and FedEx violated his

Fourteenth Amendment rights in connection with shipping the box that was lost.

79 Jones’s complaints about lack of access to religious services are better construed as First Amendment claims, not

Eighth Amendment claims, and are discussed below with his other First Amendment claim.

80 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted).

1. Procedural Due Process

To succeed on a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) he was

deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s

protection of ‘life, liberty, or property,’ and (2) the procedures available to him did not provide

‘due process of law.’”81 Plaintiffs “must, at a minimum, prove recklessness or gross negligence

and in some instance may be required to show a deliberate decision to deprive the plaintiff of due

process.”82

The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that “any change in conditions of confinement

having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner involved is sufficient to invoke the

protections of the Due Process Clause.”83 Here, neither state law nor the Constitution has

conferred a right on Jones to move to general population housing upon completion of the RRL

step down program.84 Only prison procedures and policy describe this process, and such policies

cannot create a liberty interest unless they impinge on a freedom from restraint which “imposes

atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life.”85 Here, the policies do not impose atypical and significant hardship.

Jones does not have a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to be

placed in general population housing or to a particular classification.86 “As long as the conditions

or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed on

81 Mulholland v. Gov’t Cnty. of Berks, 706 F.3d 227, 238 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1).

82 Id. (internal quotation omitted) (citation omitted).

83 Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976).

84 Id. at 226-28; Bracey v. Sec’y Pa. Dept. Corrs., 686 Fed. App’x 130, 135 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[T]here is no

constitutional right to remain in the general prison population.”).

85 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).

86 Reynolds v. Warden Schuylkill Fed. Corr. Inst., No. 24-1942, 2024 WL 4164271, at *5 n.4 (3d Cir. Sep. 12, 2024)

(citing Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976)).

him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself

subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.”87

2. Substantive Due Process

To the extent Jones intends his due process claim to allege a violation of substantive due

process, he also fails to provide sufficient evidence for such a claim. The evidence is the same as

that cited in support of his Eighth Amendment claim. Under the “more-specific-provision rule,”

“if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the . . . Eighth

Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific

provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.”88

Because Jones’s claims concern the conditions of his confinement in the MCU, access to

courts, and retaliation, which fit squarely within the Eighth and First Amendments, the more-

specific-provision rule forecloses any substantive due process claim.

3. Lost Property

Jones alleges negligent deprivation of property under the Fourteenth Amendment against

Long and FedEx, claiming that they both violated shipping policy.89 He claims Long failed to fill

out a shipping manifest and declare a value before shipping the property, which Jones blames for

the loss and lack of sufficient reimbursement of his property.90 Negligent deprivation of property

does not violate the Due Process Clause.91 No evidence is provided here as to any negligence

that resulted in a deprivation of his property. As Defendants present, even if Jones is alleging

87 Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976).

88 United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997); see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 844

(1998); Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 261 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying the more-specific-provision

rule).

89 Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 160-69 [Doc. No. 111].

90 Id. ¶ 170.

91 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986).

intentional deprivation of property, he still fails to produce any evidence to support a claim. A

plaintiff cannot assert a claim under §1983 for an intentional deprivation of property by a state

employee, “if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.”92 Jones accepted

compensation from FedEx, and he took advantage of the Pennsylvania DOC grievance procedure

and appealed to the highest level.93

D. Plaintiff Failed to Adduce Sufficient Evidence for his Fourteenth

Amendment Equal Protection Clause Claims.

Jones alleges his equal protection rights were violated based on the different treatment

between general population inmates and inmates in the MCU, including lack of or restricted

access to congregated worship services, contact visits with loved ones, and activities outside of a

restricted housing unit.94 Jones claims that the failure to treat MCU inmates the same as general

population inmates violates his rights to equal protection.

The Equal Protection clause provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”95 Jones does not allege an equal protection claim

based on race, religion, or national origin, and inmates are not a protected class.96 Nor does Jones

argue that MCU inmates should be a protected class. Thus, he proceeds on a “class of one”

theory. Under a class of one theory, “a plaintiff states a claim for violation of the Equal

Protection clause when he ‘alleges that he has been intentionally treated differently from others

92 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984).

93 Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 1, Pl.’s Dep. at 121 [Doc. No. 144-1]; Cruz v. SCI-SMR Dietary Servs., 566 Fed. App’x

158, 160 (3d Cir. 2014); Tillman, 221 F.3d at 422.

94 Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 101-14 [Doc. No. 111].

95 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

96 Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 317 (3d Cir. 2001). Jones notes, without providing supporting evidence,

that the MCU disproportionately includes more African American and Latino inmates than White inmates who have

committed similar crimes, Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. ¶ 197 [Doc. No. 111], but he does not make an equal protection

claim on the basis of race.

similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.’”97 Jones

acknowledges rational basis review applies to his claim.98

Jones alleges facts comparing his treatment to the treatment of general population

inmates. He does not allege facts comparing his treatment to other similarly situated MCU

inmates. If the MCU is viewed as a restrictive housing unit, then MCU inmates are not similarly

situated to general population inmates.99 Even if the Court accepts that Jones is similarly situated

to general population inmates, there is a rational connection between his disparate treatment: his

history of misconduct and previous placement on the RRL.100 The difference in treatment is

likely “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”101

Failure to apply policies applicable to general population inmates to MCU inmates does

not rise to the level of a constitutional equal protection violation, and § 1983 does not provide a

cognizable cause of action for violations of internal DOC policy. Because Jones has not alleged a

basis for the claim that he is treated differently from similarly situated inmates without rational

basis, he has not provided sufficient evidence for an equal protection claim.

97 Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S.

562 (2000)).

98 Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. ¶ 115 [Doc. No. 111].

99 Wilson v. Jin, 698 F.App’x 667, 672 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Fogel v. Pierson, 43 F.3d 1252, 1260-61 (10th Cir.

2006) (“RHU inmates are not similarly situated to general population inmates.”).

100 Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 6, Misconduct History [Doc. No. 144-6]; Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 1, Pl.’s Dep. at

34-35 [Doc. No. 144-1].

101 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).

E. Plaintiff Failed to Adduce Sufficient Evidence for his First Amendment

Claims.

1. Access to Religious Services

Jones’s claims about restricted access to religious services are better construed as First

Amendment claims, so the Court will evaluate them under the First Amendment framework.102

Because pro se complaints shall be construed liberally, Jones’s claims will also be construed as

claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), which

offers more protections than the First Amendment.103 Under RLUIPA, once a plaintiff shows a

substantial burden is placed on his religious exercise, the policy or practice is invalidated only if

it is not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. To survive summary judgment, a

plaintiff alleging First Amendment freedom of religion violations must “show that the activities

which he wishes to engage in are mandated by [his] religion.”104

Jones’s claims that he has been prohibited from accessing religious services are not

sufficiently detailed to allege violations of the First Amendment or RLUIPA. In his complaint,

Jones alleges in the MCU he is prohibited from “[p]articipating in any [r]eligious [s]ervices or

congregated worships, [or] [p]racticing [p]laintiff[’s] [r]eligion.”105 When asked about the claim

in his deposition, he said there were no religious services in the MCU, that inmates were

supposed to have religious congregation services every week but had none, and that he grieved

102 “Inmates clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, including its directive that no law shall

prohibit the free exercise of religion.” O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (internal citation

omitted). However, an inmate only “retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as

a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,

822 (1974).

103 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et. Seq; Nunez v. Wolf, 117 F.4th 137, 146 (3d. Cir. 2024).

104 Small v. Lehman, 98 F.3d 762, 767 (3d. Cir. 1996) (quoting Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995).

105 Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. ¶ 152 [Doc. No. 111].

and appealed the issue all the way up but was denied.106 Jones provided the court with his

grievance and appeals on the issue.107 He identified his religious preference as “Muslim-Other

Moorish Science Temple.”108 In response to Jones’s filed grievance regarding the lack of in-

person or televised Moorish Science congregations or ceremonies, Defendant’s facility admitted

that “SCI Greene does not have worship services of Moorish Science Temple.”109 The SCI-

Greene inmate handbook notes that the prison offers services for a more generalized “Nations of

Islam” faith, but does not specify whether these services are accessible from the MCU.110

Because Jones has not shown that participation in a religious congregation is mandated

by his religion, or that his religious exercise has been substantially burdened in another way, he

cannot establish violations of the First Amendment or RLUIPA. Summary judgment will be

granted on this claim.

2. Access to Courts

“[P]risoners retain a right of access to the courts.”111 In order to succeed on a claim that

the Defendants’ actions have inhibited Plaintiff’s opportunity to present a past legal claim, he

must show “(1) that [he] suffered an ‘actual injury’—that [he] lost a chance to pursue a

‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable’ underlying claim; and (2) that [he has] no other ‘remedy that may be

awarded as recompense’ for the lost claim other than in the present denial of access suit.”112

106 Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 1, Pl.’s Dep. at 143-45 [Doc. No. 144-1].

107 Pl.’s Opp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Attach. at 157-65 [Doc. No. 150-1].

108 Id. at 160.

109 Id.

110 Id. at 138, 153.

111 Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008).

112 Id. (quoting Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)).

Plaintiff therefore must describe the arguable claim well enough to show the claim is “more than

mere hope” and must describe the “lost remedy.”113

Jones has failed to establish that he suffered an actual injury. He has not explained the

nature of the legal documents lost or what claims they would have supported in any of his civil

cases or in a post-conviction challenge in his habeas case. Jones refers to evidence that would

establish his innocence of the crime of which he was convicted, but does not describe this

evidence beyond references to DNA evidence and affidavits.114 Jones asserts that the loss of his

items disrupted his ability to timely file a successive PCRA petition, but he does not identify

what claims such evidence would have enabled him to bring or how the claims were timely. The

motion for summary judgment will be granted on this claim.

F. Plaintiff Failed to Adduce Sufficient Evidence Showing Defendant Wetzel is

Liable Under §1983 on a Theory of Supervisory Liability.

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 if Plaintiff: (1) identifies a specific supervisory

practice or procedure that the supervisor failed to employ; (2) shows that the existing custom and

practice without the identified, absent custom or procedure created an unreasonable risk of the

ultimate injury; (3) shows that the supervisor was aware that this unreasonable risk existed; (4)

that the supervisor was indifferent to the risk; and (5) the underling’s violation resulted from the

supervisor’s failure to employ that supervisory practice or procedure.115 “[I]t is not enough for a

plaintiff to argue that the constitutionally cognizable injury would not have occurred if the

superior had done more than he or she did.”116

113 Id. (citing Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416-17).

114 Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. ¶¶ 98-101 [Doc. No. 144]; Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 1, Pl.’s Dep.

at 135–136, 132 [Doc. No. 144-1].

115 Brown v. Muhlenberg Township, 269 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2001).

116 Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989).

Because Jones has failed to provide sufficient evidence showing constitutional injury, he

likewise has failed to provide sufficient evidence to support a claim for supervisory liability. 117

Summary judgment will be granted.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be granted as to

all claims. An order will be entered.

117 See Turner v. Varner, 786 Fed. App’x 326, 329 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that claims of supervisory liability failed

because the record did not support an underlying constitutional violation); Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d

121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (reasoning that a supervisory liability claim “necessarily includes as an element an actual

violation at the hands of subordinates”).