Harlan v. Commissioner of Social Security

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SUSAN J. HARLAN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:24-CV-01725-DWD

)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL )

SECURITY, )

)

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the final agency

decision by the Defendant denying Plaintiff’s applications for Disability Insurance

Benefits (“DIBs”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). For the reasons explained

below, the Court AFFIRMS the final agency decision of Defendant. The Clerk is

DIRECTED to enter judgment for Defendant and against Plaintiff.

Procedural History

On October 20, 2021, Plaintiff filed her application for DIBs and SSI. (Doc. 10-2, pg.

18). Plaintiff alleged a disability onset date of March 22, 2020. (Doc. 10-2, pg. 18). Plaintiff’s

claim was initially denied on May 11, 2022, and then again upon reconsideration on

October 12, 2022. (Doc. 10-2, pg. 18). Following Plaintiff’s written request, her claims were

the subject of an evidentiary hearing held on July 25, 2023. (Doc. 10-2, pg. 18). In a decision

dated October 24, 2023, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that Plaintiff was

not disabled, resulting in a denial of her applications. (Doc. 10-2, pgs. 18-41). On June 7,

2024, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (Doc. 10-2, pgs. 2–6).

Therefore, the ALJ’s decision is final for purposes of the Court’s review. Plaintiff

exhausted her administrative remedies and timely filed a Complaint (Doc. 1).

Applicable Legal Standards

To qualify for DIBs or SSI, a claimant must be disabled. A disability is defined as

an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment that, inter alia, has lasted or can be expected

to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The

claimant bears the burden of producing medical evidence to support the claims of

disability. Eichstadt v. Astrue, 534 F.3d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 2008); see also 42 U.S.C.

§ 423(d)(5)(A) (“An individual shall not be considered to be under disability unless he

furnishes such medical and other evidence of the existence thereof.”). While a claimant’s

statements of pain or other symptoms are considered, those statements alone are not

conclusive evidence of a disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529.

To assess an alleged disability, the ALJ employs a “five-step sequential evaluation

process.” See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a)(1), (2), (4); 416.920(a)(1), (4). The ALJ asks the

following questions: (1) whether the claimant is doing substantial gainful activity;

(2) whether the claimant has a severe medically determinable physical or mental

impairment that meets certain duration requirements or a combination of impairments

that is severe and meets the duration requirements; (3) whether the claimant has an

impairment that meets or equals one of the impairments listed in the regulations and

satisfies the duration requirements; (4) whether, in view of the claimant’s residual

functional capacity (“RFC”) and past relevant work, he or she can perform past relevant

work; and (5) whether, in view of the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work

experience, he or she can adjust to other work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4);

416.920(a)(4); see also Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2004).

If the claimant is doing substantial gainful activity under step 1, does not have an

impairment or combination of impairments as described at step 2, can perform past

relevant work under step 4, or can adjust to other work under step 5, then the claimant is

not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i),(ii), (iv), (v); 416.920(a)(4)(i), (ii), (iv), (v). If

the claimant has an impairment that meets the requirements of step 3 or is incapable of

adjusting to other work under step 5, then he or she is disabled. See 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),(v); 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (v). The claimant has the burden of proof at

steps 1-4. Mandrell v. Kijakazi, 25 F.4th 514, 516 (7th Cir. 2022).

A severe impairment under step 2 is defined as “any impairment or combination

of impairments which significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do

basic work activities.” §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20,

124 S. Ct. 376, 157 L. Ed. 2d 333 (2003). Impairments which are expected to result in death,

or those which have lasted or are expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve

months, qualify as severe under the duration requirement. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii);

404.1509; 416.920(a)(4)(ii); 416.909. “[T]he step two determination of severity is ‘merely a

threshold requirement’” to “proceed to the remaining steps of the evaluation process.”

Castile v. Astrue, 617 F.3d 923, 926-27 (7th Cir. 2010). Once an ALJ makes a finding that

one or more of a claimant’s ailments are severe, he must “consider the aggregate effect of

the entire constellation of ailments—including those impairments that in isolation are not

severe.” Golembiewski v. Barnhart, 322 F.3d 912, 918 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing 20 C.F.R. §

404.1523; and then collecting cases).

Impairments and related symptoms may cause physical and mental limitations

that affect what may be done in a work setting. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1);

416.945(a)(1). The RFC at issue in step 4 assesses the most that a claimant can do in a work

setting, notwithstanding those limitations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1); 416.945(a)(1);

accord SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, *2; Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872-73 n.7 (7th Cir.

2000). In this way, an RFC is an assessment of the claimant’s ability to perform sustained

work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing

basis, i.e., for eight hours a day and five days a week or an equivalent work schedule. See

Tenhove v. Colvin, 97 F. Supp. 2d 557, 568 (E.D. Wisc. 2013); SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184,

*2; accord Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1121 (7th Cir. 2014). An RFC must be based on

all of the relevant medical and other evidence contained in the record. See 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1545(a)(3); 416.945(a)(3); SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, *2-3, 5.

When completing an RFC, the ALJ must identify the claimant’s functional

limitations and assess his or her work-related abilities on a function-by-function basis.

See Tenhove, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 569; SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, *1, 3; accord Lechner v.

Barnhart, 321 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1036 (E.D. Wisc. 2004). The ALJ considers all impairments,

including those that are not severe, and the claimant’s ability to meet physical, mental,

sensory, and other requirements of work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(2), (4); 416.945(a)(2),

(4); see also Alesia v. Astrue, 789 F. Supp. 2d 921, 933 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“[T]he ALJ must

consider the combined effect of all impairments, ‘even those that would not be considered

severe in isolation.’”). “An impairment or combination of impairments is not severe if it

does not significantly limit [the] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20

C.F.R. § 404.1522(a). And, importantly, while a claimant’s statements of pain or other

symptoms are considered, they alone are not conclusive evidence of a disability. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1529.

As to physical abilities, the ALJ assesses the nature and extent of any physical

limitations, then determines the RFC for work activity on a regular and continuing basis.

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(b); 416.945(b). A limited ability to perform physical demands of

work activity, such as sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling,

reaching, handling, stooping, or crouching may reduce the ability to do past work. See 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(b); 416.945(b); see also SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, *5-6. Other

impairments affecting work abilities include, among other things, impairments imposing

environmental restrictions. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(d); 416.945(d). If the symptoms,

signs, or laboratory findings for a severe impairment do not meet or equal those of a listed

impairment, the ALJ considers the total limiting effects of all impairments, including

medical and nonmedical evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(e); 416.945(e).

After the identification of the claimant’s functional limitations and the assessment

of his or her work abilities on a function-by-function basis, the RFC may be expressed by

exertional category, including “light.” See Tenhove, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 569; accord Lechner,

321 F. Supp. 2d at 1036; SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, *3. To do a full range of work in an

exertional category, such as “light,” the individual must be able to perform substantially

all of the functions required at that level. See SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, *5-6. Light work

involves “lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of

objects weighing up to 10 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b); 416.967(b). Even the weight

lifted in a job is very little, a job is considered light work if it requires a good deal of

walking or sitting, or sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or

leg controls. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b); 416.967(b). In the absence of additional limiting

factors like “loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time,” a person

considered capable of performing light work is also considered capable of performing

sedentary work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b); 416.967(b).

The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s alleged disability under the five-step sequential

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (a)(1), (2), (4). At step one, the ALJ found

Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged disability onset

date, March 22, 2020. (Doc. 10-2, pg. 21). Under step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff

suffered from the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease, stenosis,

radiculopathy, hand and wrist osteoarthritis, osteopenia, right wrist ganglion cyst,

adjustment disorder with anxious and depressed mood, generalized anxiety disorder,

attention deficit disorder, and fibromyalgia syndrome. (Doc. 10-2, pgs. 20-23). The ALJ

also provided that the medical evidence failed to demonstrate that the numerous other

diagnoses that Plaintiff alleged were “more than slight abnormalities, which would have

more than minimal effects on an individual’s ability to perform basic work activities.”

(Doc. 10-2, pg. 21). Still, in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ considered all of Plaintiff’s

medically determinable impairments, “including those that are not severe, when

assessing [Plaintiff’s] residual functional capacity.” (Doc. 10-2, pg. 22).

At step 3, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s impairments, even when considered in

combination, did not meet or medically equal the severity of the impairments listed in

the regulations. (Doc. 10-2, pg. 24). The ALJ’s decision provided that the evidentiary

record did not establish that Plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease, stenosis, radiculopathy,

hand and wrist osteoarthritis, osteopenia, or right wrist ganglion cyst met the severity

levels provided for such conditions in the regulations. (Doc. 10-2, pg. 24). In consideration

of Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia, an impairment that is not listed in the regulations, the ALJ

again considered the effects of that impairment on its own and in combination with

Plaintiff’s other impairments and found that “the evidence of record fails to show that

the [Plaintiff’s] fibromyalgia-related symptoms increase the severity of her other

medically determinable severe impairments to an extent that the combination of

impairments meets the requirements of a listing.” (Doc. 10-2, pg. 24). Regarding Plaintiff’s

mental impairments, the ALJ further determined that Plaintiff had mild limitations in

understanding, remembering or applying information, interacting with others, and

adapting or managing oneself. (Doc. 10-2, pgs. 25-26). Plaintiff was determined to have a

moderate limitation in concentrating, persisting or maintaining pace. (Doc. 10-2, pgs. 25-

26). As such, the “paragraph B” criteria for the listings were not satisfied because the

impairments did not “result in one extreme limitation or two marked limitations in a

broad area of functioning.” (Doc. 10-2, pgs. 25-26).

Before proceeding to step 4, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following RFC:

[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform

light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and

416.967(b) except she can lift and/or carry (including upward

pulling) 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently.

She can push and/or pull 20 pounds occasionally and 10

pounds frequently with the lower and upper extremities. She

can stand and/or walk (with normal breaks) for a total of six

hours in an eight-hour workday. She can sit (with normal

breaks) for a total of six hours in an eight-hour workday. She

can occasionally climb, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She

can frequently reach, handle, and perform fine manipulation

with the bilateral upper extremities. She can understand,

carry out, and remember simple and detailed but not complex

instructions. She can use judgment in making work-related

decisions about simple, detailed, but non-complex

instructions.

(Doc. 10-2, pg. 27).

The ALJ found Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably

have been expected to cause the alleged symptoms, but that Plaintiff’s statements on the

symptoms’ intensity, persistence and limiting effects were “so inconsistent with the

medical and other evidence in the record that they will not serve as the basis for the

residual functional capacity.” (Doc. 10-2, pg. 29). The ALJ detailed Plaintiff’s testimony

at the hearing regarding the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her symptoms

including, but not limited to, that her conditions affect her ability to sit, stand, walk, lift,

reach, squat, bend, kneel, and climb stairs, and that she has difficulty pinching or picking

up and holding onto objects, bending her neck, and writing and typing. (Doc. 10-2, pg.

28). Plaintiff also testified that she can only lift about half of a pound, that she can only

lift clothes hangers using her thumb and pinky fingers, and that she can only stand for

two minutes and walk about ten feet before needing to rest. (Doc. 10-2, pg. 28). She also

stated that her mental impairments affect her memory, her ability to understand

instructions, concentrate, and complete tasks, and that she struggles to go places on her

own due to her daily struggles with depression and anxiety. (Doc. 10-2, pg. 28). The ALJ

stated that Plaintiff’s testimony “bore very little resemblance to the record” before

conducting a detailed evaluation of Plaintiff’s testimony compared to her previous

statements and medical records. (Doc. 10-2, pgs. 29-35). The ALJ then considered the

medical opinions without deference to those opinions or giving them any specific

evidentiary weight. (Doc. 10-2, pgs. 35–38). Based on this evidence, the ALJ concluded

that Plaintiff could perform the above RFC. (Doc. 10-2, pg. 38).

At step 4, the ALJ found Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work.

(Doc. 10-2, pg. 39). The ALJ noted that the vocational expert testified Plaintiff had past

relevant work as a preschool teacher and quality control technician that was performed

up to the heavy level, and that such work would exceed Plaintiff’s RFC. (Doc. 10-2, pg.

39).

Finally, at step 5, the ALJ found that, in consideration of her age, education, work

experience, and RFC, Plaintiff could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in

the national economy. (Doc. 10-2, pgs. 39–40). In doing so, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff,

who was 43 years old on the alleged disability onset date, was considered a younger

individual and has at least a high school education. (Doc. 10-2, pg. 39). The ALJ’s finding

for this step was also based on testimony from the vocational expert stating that Plaintiff

could perform the requirements of occupations such as Laboratory Sample Carrier,

Router, and Collator Operator. (Doc. 10-2, pg. 40). As such, the ALJ determined that

Plaintiff was “not disabled” from March 22, 2020, through the date of the decision. (Doc.

10-2, pg. 40). As a result, Defendant denied Plaintiff’s application for DIBS and SSI.

Analysis1

The Court’s review of the ALJ’s decision is “extremely limited” and “very

deferential.” See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Jarnutowski v. Kijakazi, 48 F.4th 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2022)

(quoting Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008)). Findings of fact, supported by

substantial evidence, are conclusive. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); accord Clifford, 227 F.3d at 869.

The Court will reverse the ALJ’s decision only if the findings of fact were not supported

by substantial evidence or the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard. See Clifford, 227 F.3d

at 869; accord Martin v. Saul, 950 F.3d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 2020). In this context, “substantial

evidence means ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate

to support a conclusion.’” See Clifford, 227 F.3d at 869 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402

U.S. 389, 401 (1971)); accord Jarnutowski, 48 F.4th at 773. If reasonable minds could differ

about whether a claimant is disabled and the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial

evidence, then the Court will affirm the denial of claims. Jarnutowski, 48 F.4th at 773

(quoting Elder, 529 F.3d at 413). When assessing the evidence, the Court reviews the entire

record, but does not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts, decide credibility questions,

or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. See Clifford, 227 F.3d at 869; accord Lopez ex

rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003). The ALJ is not required to address

every piece of evidence or testimony presented, but he must build a ‘logical bridge’

1 The portions of the evidentiary record relevant to Plaintiff's arguments and the Court's resolution of the case are

incorporated into the analysis below.

between the evidence and his conclusions. Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 2009);

see also Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d 893, 901 (7th Cir. 2021) (“The ALJ’s summary does not

mention every detail. But it need not.”). An ALJ is not permitted to “cherry pick evidence

from the record” to support a conclusion without engaging with evidence weighing

against it. Plessinger v. Berryhill, 900 F.3d 909, 915 (7th Cir. 2018). The Court will not

decline to engage in a critical review to act as a rubber stamp. See Clifford, 227 F.3d at 869.

Plaintiff presents two arguments in her challenge to the ALJ’s decision denying

her application. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “played medical doctor” in

substituting his own judgment for Plaintiff’s treating provider when determining

Plaintiff’s RFC. (Doc. 16, pgs. 4, 6). Specifically, Plaintiff states that her RFC as determined

by the ALJ is unsupported by the record where it states that Plaintiff (1) is capable of light

work, and (2) “can use her hands more than one-third of the time, i.e. occasionally, but

‘probably not all the time,’ i.e. constantly.” (Doc. 16, pgs. 3, 5). Second, Plaintiff argues

that the ALJ failed in analyzing the limitations on Plaintiff’s “ability to manage or adapt”

caused by her mental impairments. (Doc. 16, pgs. 6-7).

To start, Plaintiff argues that the evidence in the record does not support a finding

that she is capable of light work; namely, that she can lift up to 20 pounds and 10 pounds

frequently, as required by 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). (Doc. 16, pg. 3).

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s decision failed to recognize that the disability

determinations performed at the initial and reconsideration levels of her application

“both failed to account for the full scope of issues.” In particular, Plaintiff contends that

the initial level disability determination performed by Renga Reddy, M.D., “failed to note

the reduced strength and range of motion in Plaintiff’s left shoulder, noted the use of a

brace on Plaintiff’s left wrist without further analysis and found tenderness in the left

hand.” Plaintiff further avers that, while the reconsideration level disability

determination performed by Kathleen Treanor, M.D., “noted the diminished strength

and range of motion in [Plaintiff’s] left shoulder,” Dr. Treanor “made no mention of any

real examination of Plaintiff’s hands.” Plaintiff then claims that the ALJ “cited but largely

dismissed” the evaluation of one of Plaintiff’s treating nurses, Noemi L. Shilts, APRN,

arguing that the decision offered no evidence in rebuttal of Ms. Shilts opinion that

recommended lifting of no more than 10-15 pounds, “other than to state that the earlier-

mentioned evaluations by [Dr.] Reddy and [Dr.] Treanor seemed more supported.” (Doc.

16, pgs. 3-4). Plaintiff’s position is not tenable. Her argument not only mischaracterizes

the ALJ’s treatment of these three medical opinions but also ignores all other evidence

considered and discussed in the decision.

The ALJ’s decision did not “largely dismiss” Ms. Shilts opinion. In fact, the

decision found that her opinion was “not entirely at odds” with those of Dr. Reddy and

Dr. Treanor and was partially persuasive. Also, the ALJ relied on more than just the state-

agency medical opinions in reaching its conclusions. The ALJ clearly stated that a lifting

limit of “20 pounds seems more supportable than 15 pounds” was supported by

Plaintiff’s “recovery after the hand surgeries and the generally full strength in her arms”

in addition to the opinions of Dr. Reddy and Dr. Treanor. (Doc. 10-2, pg. 38). That

recovery and strength assessment was discussed at length in the ALJ’s analysis of

Plaintiff’s medical records pertaining to her upper extremities. (Doc. 10-2, pgs. 29-31, 34).

That Plaintiff would have this Court grant greater weight to the “more thorough exam”

(Doc. 16, pg. 3) of her treating nurse is contrary to the standard of review that is to be

applied here. As provided above, the Court reviews the entire record, but does not

“reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts, decide credibility questions, or substitute its

judgment for that of the ALJ.” Morales v. O’Malley, 103 F.4th 469, 471 (7th Cir. 2024); see

also Clifford, 227 F.3d at 869. As such, the Court finds that the ALJ’s determination that

Plaintiff is capable of light work is supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision is affirmed on this point.

Plaintiff again challenges the ALJ’s determination of her RFC by claiming that the

manipulative limitations provided were not sufficient considering the evidentiary record.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to address conflicting evidence. Specifically, she

alleges that the ALJ did not “account for the combined limitations in the [P]laintiff’s

hands from her extensive issues with her right thumb, arthritis in the left hand and

complaints regarding cervical radiculopathy.” (Doc. 16, pgs. 5-6). That is simply not the

case.

The ALJ’s decision could not have made it clearer that Plaintiff’s hand-related

issues were considered in combination when it determined the appropriate manipulative

restriction in Plaintiff’s RFC. Shortly after detailing the relevant medical evidence

concerning Plaintiff’s thumb, hand and cervical spine issues, the ALJ’s decision provided

as follows:

[Plaintiff] reported pain that starts at the base of her head and

can travel down her left arm and into her wrist. On

examination, the claimant had abnormal medical signs

indicative of decreased sensation in both hands and all

fingers[.] […] Coupled with the abnormal medical imaging

and signs stemming from the thumb problem, this evidence

justified the need for some manipulative restrictions. She can

use her hands for gross movements like holding a steering

wheel and baking and given that she can use her hands for

fine manipulation when using electronic devices or smoking,

the evidence shows she can use her hands and fingers more

than alleged at the hearing. This is not an independent

medical judgment by a layperson, but rather applying the

regulations as written. There is objective medical evidence

showing she [has] problems with her hands. Thus, a need for

manipulative restriction is a matter of common sense that

does not require specialized medical knowledge. Her

statements to her medical sources about daily activities and

her response to treatment, both of which are discussed above,

suggest she can likely use her hands and fingers more than

one-third of the time (i.e. “occasionally”) but probably not all

the time (i.e. “constantly”), so this decision finds she can

frequently reach, handle, and perform fine manipulation.

(Doc. 10-2, pg. 31) (emphasis added). In addition to showing that Plaintiff’s impairments

were considered in combination, this excerpt shows how the ALJ’s decision to include

manipulative restrictions in Plaintiff’s RFC was “common sense,” and not a case of an

ALJ “playing medical doctor in assuming [P]laintiff could frequently use her hands,” as

Plaintiff erroneously concludes. (Doc. 16, p. 6). Later in the decision, the ALJ again

provides further evidentiary justification for the manipulative restrictions in Plaintiff’s

RFC when discussing the previous disability determinations. The decision provides that

“additional limitations on manipulation and reaching are necessary in light of her

functional difficulty with both hands, which is supported by medical imaging of her

spine,” and that Plaintiff “had some reduced sensation in her hands and a joint problem

in one hand, so additional manipulative restrictions were justified.” (Doc. 10-2, pg. 36).

This demonstrates that the ALJ adequately addressed the evidence of combined

limitations of Plaintiff’s hands due to her extensive issues with her right thumb, arthritis

in the left hand and complaints regarding cervical radiculopathy. Accordingly, the ALJ’s

decision was adequately supported on this issue as well.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s analysis of her mental disorders was

insufficient. (Doc. 16, pgs. 6-8). Plaintiff states that the ALJ failed “in the analysis of

Plaintiff’s ability to manage or adapt.” (Doc. 16, pgs. 6-7). She claims that the report of

her psychology consultant Marilyn Marks-Frey, Ph.D., provides the evidence of

Plaintiff’s “extreme limitation” in her ability to adapt or manage herself. (Doc. 16, pg. 7).

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s decision ignores her inability to control her emotions and

the uncontrolled and random emotional outbursts demonstrated and detailed in Dr.

Marks-Frey’s report, and that no evidence is presented to refute her lack of emotional

control. But this argument is insufficient for this Court to justify remand.

As explained supra, the ALJ’s analysis of Plaintiff’s mental impairments

determined that her impairments cause her no more than a moderate limitation, and

therefore the “paragraph B” criteria are not satisfied. (Doc. 10-2, pgs. 25-26). Regarding

her ability to adapt and manage herself, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff experiences a

mild limitation. (Doc. 10-2, pg. 26). In support of this finding, the ALJ considered

Plaintiff’s statements that she finds it challenging to handle stress and changes in routine

and that she sometimes bites her fingernails and has unusual fears about her inabilities

as a result. The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff stated her attention deficit disorder

contributes to her difficulty, but that she finds her medication very helpful. Plaintiff also

stated in her consultative psychological evaluation with Dr. Marks-Frey that she is not

seeing a psychiatrist or therapist and has never undergone a psychiatric evaluation. This

evidence from Plaintiff’s consultative psychological evaluation and records from her

treating physicians, along with her demonstrated management of her day-to-day

activities, led the ALJ to conclude that Plaintiff only had a mild limitation in her ability

to adapt or manage herself. (Doc. 10-2, pg. 26).2

Further, while Plaintiff states that Dr. Marks-Frey’s evaluation and resulting

opinion provides the evidentiary support for her alleged “extreme limitation,” the ALJ’s

decision takes care to explain the reasons why it considered that opinion unpersuasive.

First, Dr. Marks-Frey report included many abnormal psychiatric signs, which stood in

“sharp contrast” to the remainder of the record. (Doc. 10-2, pg. 37). Second, despite the

report’s opinion that Plaintiff’s “adaptive functioning was somewhat limited” and she

had “severe anxiety and depressed mood that may impact her ability to work,” the ALJ

found that there was virtually no evidence of Plaintiff’s reduced adaptive abilities or

“severe anxiety or a depressed mood, at least not chronically.” (Doc. 10-2, pg. 38).

Plaintiff also makes a cursory argument that the ALJ failed to address the evidence

showing that she meets or at least equals 12.04, 12.06, 12.11 and 12.08, and that the ALJ

“did not evaluate all the paragraph B criteria shared across” those listings. (Doc. 16, pg.

8; Doc. 23, pg. 7). While Plaintiff’s argument is underdeveloped, it does not take much to

find its fatal flaws. To start, Plaintiff seemingly argues that Dr. Marks-Frey’s evaluation

2 While Plaintiff’s challenge of the ALJ’s decision focuses on whether she met or equals the listings for mental

impairments at step 3 of the analysis, the ALJ also analyzed the evidence of Plaintiff’s mental impairments in

determining her RFC as well, concluding that they “cause no greater than moderate functional limitation, and supports

work that involves simple and detailed but not complex instructions.” (Doc. 10-2, pgs. 34-35).

serves as the entirety of the evidence supporting her contention that she met or equals

each listing. However, the ALJ, as just detailed, found that opinion unpersuasive. Further,

not only did Plaintiff fail to specify the evidence demonstrating that such listings were

met, she also fails to state which paragraph A criteria is applicable to her for each listing.

And Plaintiff’s complaint that the ALJ failed to evaluate all the paragraph B criteria

shared across the listings rings hollow because she refuses to inform the Court of which

area of her mental functioning is limited such that she believes she meets the paragraph

B criteria. The only area of mental functioning Plaintiff mentions is her ability to adapt

and manage herself, but as the Court just explained, the ALJ’s determination that

Plaintiff’s limitation in that area is mild was reasonable. Even if Plaintiff had identified

and claimed that another area of mental functioning listed in paragraph B criteria applied

to her, her argument would still fall well short of success. As the Court summarized in

the preceding section of this order, the ALJ provided a detailed and reasonable

determination for each of the other areas of mental functioning included in paragraph B

of listings 12.04, 12.06 and 12.11, finding that Plaintiff’s limitations in any such area did

not exceed a moderate level.

Plaintiff also takes specific issue with the ALJ’s failure to evaluate her mental

impairments under Listing 12.08. She argues that Dr. Marks-Frey’s consultative

psychological evaluation demonstrated that she suffered from excessive emotionality

and attention seeking, and feelings of inadequacy, which would satisfy subparts 5 and 6

of paragraph A of the listing. But even assuming, arguendo, that the ALJ found such

evidence persuasive and those subparts were met, Plaintiff cannot meet the other

requisites of Listing 12.08 under paragraph B. As just detailed above, Plaintiff cannot

demonstrate that she would meet the criteria under paragraph B because the ALJ

reasonably concluded that Plaintiff’s mental impairments do not cause at least two

marked limitations or one extreme limitation. Plaintiff’s limitations were deemed no

worse than moderate. As such, analysis by the ALJ under this listing would have been

superfluous.

As shown, the ALJ completed a satisfactory analysis of Plaintiff’s mental

impairments that provided the necessary “logical bridge” between the evidence and the

conclusions. While Plaintiff wishes that the ALJ’s decision would have given Plaintiff’s

consultative psychiatric evaluation more weight than it did, that is not a determination

within this Court’s purview. Accordingly, the Court cannot say that the ALJ erred in its

analysis of listings for Plaintiff’s mental impairments.

Conclusion

For these reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the final agency decision of Defendant. The Clerk

is DIRECTED to enter judgment for Defendant and against Plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 30, 2025 /s David W. Dugan

______________________________

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge