Borchgrevink v. Harris County, Texas

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT September 30, 2025

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

HOUSTON DIVISION

SARAH BORCHGREVINK, et al., §

Plaintiffs, §

§

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:23-CV-03198

§

HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS, et al., §

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This civil rights action arises out of Matthew Shelton’s death in Harris County Jail.

Pending before the Court is Defendant Ed Gonzalez’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 137).1 After

careful consideration of the briefing and the applicable law, the Court DENIES the motion

(Dkt. 137).

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The background facts of Matthew Shelton’s death are recited as alleged in the

Memorandum Opinion and Order issued by the Court on March 6, 2025. (Dkt. 174). Here,

Plaintiffs bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Sheriff Ed Gonzalez

(“Gonzalez”) in his individual capacity2 for alleged violations of Shelton’s constitutional

1 The Court acknowledges that the motion was filed after the applicable deadline. However,

because Plaintiffs had adequate time to respond and have not demonstrated any resulting prejudice,

the Court will consider the motion on the merits. See FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b).

2 “Plaintiffs did not bring claims against [Sheriff Gonzalez] in his official capacity, as these would

have been duplicative of their claims against the County.” (Dkt. 166 at p. 10).

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rights.3 (Dkt. 72 at p. 119). Gonzalez asserts that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim and

that any stated claim is barred by qualified immunity. (Dkt. 137). Plaintiffs argue they have

sufficiently alleged both a conditions-of-confinement case and an episodic-acts-and-

omissions case against Gonzalez. (Dkt. 166).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND APPLICABLE LAW

A. Rule 12(b)(6)

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a pleading to contain “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.

R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). A motion filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests a

pleading’s compliance with this requirement and is “appropriate when a defendant attacks

the complaint because it fails to state a legally cognizable claim.” Ramming v. United

States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). A complaint can be dismissed under Rule

12(b)(6) if its well-pleaded factual allegations—when taken as true and viewed in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff—do not state a claim that is plausible on its face. Amacker

v. Renaissance Asset Mgmt., LLC, 657 F.3d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 2011); Lone Star Fund V

(U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010).

3 Plaintiffs also bring a claim for denial of access to courts under section 1983. (Dkt. 72 at p. 125).

The Court has previously held that Plaintiffs’ identical claim against Defendant Harris County is

insufficient. (Dkt. 167 at pp. 2 – 3). For the same reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not

successfully pled a claim against Gonzalez. However, the Court’s ruling on this claim does not

preclude any motions for sanctions based upon spoliation of evidence or other sanctions regarding

discovery available in civil suits. The Court only holds that Plaintiffs cannot bring a separate claim

for the denial of access to courts at this time.

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When considering a motion to dismiss, a district court generally may not go outside

the pleadings. Sullivan v. Leor Energy, LLC, 600 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2010). The

Court’s review is limited to the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, any

documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced

by the complaint, and matters subject to judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence

201. Allen v. Vertafore, Inc., 28 F.4th 613, 616 (5th Cir. 2022); George v. SI Group, Inc.,

36 F.4th 611, 619 (5th Cir. 2022).

B. Qualified Immunity

The motion to dismiss filed by Gonzalez invokes qualified immunity. The doctrine

of qualified immunity protects government officers from civil liability in their individual

capacities if their conduct does not violate clearly established federal statutory or

constitutional law. Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018). This inquiry requires

a two-prong analysis, in which the court determines (1) whether the official violated a

statutory or constitutional right, and (2) whether the unlawfulness of the official’s conduct

was “clearly established” at that time. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589

(2018); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011).

Once raised as a defense, plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate that qualified

immunity should be pierced. Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010). At

the motion-to-dismiss stage, “a plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified immunity must

plead specific facts that both allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the harm he has alleged and that defeat a qualified immunity

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defense with equal specificity.” Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 2012). If

“the pleadings are insufficient to overcome [qualified immunity], the district court must

grant the motion to dismiss without the benefit of pre-dismissal discovery.” Carswell v.

Camp, 54 F.4th 307, 312 (5th Cir. 2022). Similarly, “where the pleadings are sufficient to

overcome [qualified immunity], the district court must deny the motion to dismiss without

the benefit of pre-dismissal discovery.” Id.

III. ANALYSIS

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have successfully pled their claims against Gonzalez

for the alleged violation of Shelton’s constitutional rights. “The constitutional rights of a

pretrial detainee are found in the procedural and substantive due process guarantees of the

Fourteenth Amendment.” Reed v. Wichita Cty. (Estate of Henson), 795 F.3d 456, 462 (5th

Cir. 2015) (citing Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1996)).

“Though the state has a recognized interest in detaining defendants for trial, the substantive

limits on state action set by the Due Process Clause provide that the state cannot punish a

pretrial detainee.” Id. (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)). In the Fifth Circuit,

“the legal standard used to measure the due process rights of pretrial detainees depends on

whether the detainee challenges the constitutionality of a condition of his confinement or

whether he challenges an episodic act or omission of an individual state official.” Id. The

Court finds that Plaintiffs have successfully pled challenges to both.

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A. Conditions of Confinement

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have successfully alleged a conditions-of-

confinement claim against Gonzalez.4 “[T]he Constitution does not mandate comfortable

prisons, but neither does it permit inhumane ones.” Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d 584, 592 (5th

Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832). Still, it is

clear that “the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of conditions of

confinement on pretrial detainees that constitute punishment.” Collins v. Ainsworth, 382

F.3d 529, 540 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“A challenge to a condition of confinement is a challenge to ‘general conditions,

practices, rules, or restrictions of pretrial confinement.’” Reed, 795 F.3d at 463 (quoting

Hare, 74 F.3d at 644). “A condition is usually the manifestation of an explicit policy or

restriction: the number of bunks per cell, mail privileges, disciplinary segregation, etc.”

Shepherd v. Dall. Cty., 591 F.3d 445, 452 (5th Cir. 2009). When the plaintiff is challenging

a condition of confinement, the Court asks whether the condition is “reasonably related to

4 The Court notes that the Fifth Circuit has at least suggested that conditions-of-confinement claims

are cognizable against individual actors only in their official capacities. See Estate of Allison v.

Wansley, 524 F. App’x 963, 970 n.4 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Appellees’ claim against the individual

defendants is properly analyzed as an ‘episodic act or omission case,’ rather than ‘condition of

confinement’ case.”). However, the Fifth Circuit has also suggested that conditions-of-

confinement claims may proceed against defendants in their individual capacity where the

defendant is personally involved in the challenged conditions. See Brown v. McLane, 807 F. App’x

410, 411 (5th Cir. 2020) (“[Plaintiff] has never alleged facts establishing [Defendant’s] personal

involvement in his conditions of confinement. Thus, we affirm the dismissal of [Plaintiff’s]

individual-capacity claims against [Defendant]…”). As the Court finds that Plaintiffs alleged facts

establishing Gonzalez’s personal involvement in Shelton’s conditions of confinement, the Court

proceeds with its analysis of Plaintiffs’ conditions-of-confinement claim against Gonzalez in his

individual capacity.

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a legitimate governmental objective.” Reed, 795 F.3d at 463. “[I]f a restriction or condition

is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or purposeless—a court

permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may

not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.

520, 539 (1979).

To state a claim, Plaintiffs must allege (1) “‘a rule or restriction or ... the existence

of an identifiable condition or practice ... [or] that [Gonzalez’s] acts or omissions were

sufficiently extended or pervasive’; (2) which was not reasonably related to a legitimate

governmental objective; and (3) which caused the violation of [Shelton’s] constitutional

rights.” Duvall v. Dallas County, Tex., 631 F.3d 203, 207 (5th Cir. 2011) (citations

omitted). The “reasonable relationship test in conditions cases is functionally equivalent to

the deliberate indifference standard employed in episodic cases.” Id.

Plaintiffs are challenging three conditions of Shelton’s confinement:

“1) the Sheriff’s longstanding policy of understaffing his jail, 2) his officers’

pervasive custom of non-monitoring of detainees, and 3) the practices that

denied insulin and blood glucose monitoring to diabetics.”

(Dkt. 166 at p. 13). Plaintiffs specifically allege, among other things, that:

 “Sheriff Gonzalez knew he was understaffing his Jail and detainees were not being

observed, as evidenced by the numerous deaths, documented instances of fabricated

detainee monitoring, repeated citations by the Commission in the five years before

Mr. Shelton died, [] detention officer admissions, and his own December 8, 2021[,]

press conference addressing staffing following a brutal sexual assault in the Jail.”

(Dkt. 72 at p. 98).

 “Sheriff Gonzalez … [was] aware that it was the policy or practice of providers to

write single-dose orders of insulin for as long as a detainee remained in the JPC, []

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though Type 1 diabetics need insulin on a repeating, multiple-times-a-day basis to

survive.” (Id. at p. 82).

 “Sheriff Gonzalez … [was] aware that it was the policy or practice of providers to

order single-instance or short term, e.g., not more than three days, orders for blood

glucose monitoring for as long as a detainee remained in the JPC, despite Type 1

diabetics needing ongoing, regular monitoring to live.” (Id. at p. 83)

Plaintiffs support these allegations with lengthy specifics of past deaths and medical

emergencies related to the three alleged conditions. See (id. at pp. 7 – 103). Plaintiffs allege

as to each condition that Gonzalez knew of the deficiencies, knew of their fatal or serious

consequences, and did not remedy the situation. Id.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled a conditions-of-confinement

claim against Gonzalez. Gonzalez’s failure to remedy the understaffing of his jail, the non-

monitoring of detainees, and the deficient medical practices, as alleged, are sufficiently

pervasive to amount to an identifiable condition or practice of the jail. As pled, these

conditions were not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective. Without a

legitimate governmental objective, these conditions violated Shelton’s right under the

Fourteenth Amendment not to be punished as a pretrial detainee. Accordingly, the Court

holds that Plaintiffs have successfully pled a conditions-of-confinement claim against

Gonzalez in his individual capacity.

Qualified Immunity

The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ conditions-of-confinement claim against Gonzalez

is not barred by qualified immunity. The Court evaluates “claims of qualified immunity

using a two-part test: (1) whether the facts that a plaintiff has shown establish a violation

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of a constitutional right; and (2) whether the right was clearly established at the time of the

defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Wilkerson v. Goodwin, 774 F.3d 845, 851 (5th Cir.

2014). The Court “may examine these two factors in any order.” Id. As described above,

the Court finds that Plaintiffs have successfully alleged that the conditions of Shelton’s

confinement constituted punishment and therefore violated his constitutional rights. As

such, the Court need only assess whether Shelton’s right was clearly established at the time

of Gonzalez’s alleged misconduct.

To be “clearly established” for purposes of qualified immunity, “[t]he contours of

the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he

is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S. Ct. 3034,

97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987). This inquiry “requires an assessment of whether the official’s

conduct would have been objectively reasonable at the time of the incident.” Kinney v.

Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 350 (5th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). When attempting to show

that a right was clearly established at the time of the violation, “[i]t is the plaintiff’s burden

to find a case in his favor that does not define the law at a high level of generality.” Vann

v. City of Southaven, Mississippi, 884 F.3d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks

omitted). The inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the particular

case, not as a broad general proposition.” Baldwin v. Dorsey, 964 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir.

2020) (brackets and ellipsis omitted). “Although qualified immunity does not require a case

in point, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question

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beyond debate[,]” such that “every reasonable official would understand that what she is

doing violates that right.” Id. (brackets and quotation marks omitted).

The Court finds that Plaintiffs satisfy their burden to produce a relevant pre-existing

case. Specifically, Plaintiffs look to Shepherd, Sanchez, and Montano, arguing that these

three cases work together to demonstrate that Shelton’s right was clearly established at the

time of his violation. (Dkt. 166 at p. 30); see Shepherd, 591 F.3d at 450; Sanchez v. Young

Cty., 956 F.3d 785, 793-96 (5th Cir. 2020); Montano, 842 F.3d at 878-79. The Court is

persuaded by this argument.

Shepherd, decided by the Fifth Circuit in 2009, found that a jail’s evaluation,

monitoring, and treatment of inmates with chronic illness was so “grossly inadequate” as

to constitute a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Shepherd, 591 F.3d at 454.

Specifically, the jail in Shepherd’s “medical program was understaffed to the point that

routine treatment could not be provided,” “fifty percent or more of prescriptions regularly

went undelivered to inmates,” and “records concerning medication administration were

regularly falsified.” Id. at p. 450. Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit upheld a jury verdict against

the county in Shepherd—finding liability for dangerous conditions of confinement. Id. at

p .458.

Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Sanchez reversed a grant of summary judgment where

plaintiffs showed evidence of a pervasive practice of detention officers not monitoring

detainees with serious medical needs. Sanchez, 956 F.3d at p. 796. In Sanchez, the plaintiffs

argued that the County has “numerous de facto policies that systematically deny medical

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care to [] detainees,” including “failing to train jailers to evaluate detainees’ … medical

needs.” Id. at 792. The Fifth Circuit found that a “jury could reasonably conclude that

policies where jailers were not required to review [medical] results … coupled with a

policy of ignoring outside information when assessing medical needs—were a substantial

factor in causing [the pretrial detainee] to be denied medical care.” Id. at 795. Under these

facts, the Sanchez court reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to the

county in 2020.

Finally, in Montano, the Fifth Circuit found that “a reasonable juror could find that

a de facto policy existed to isolate seemingly-intoxicated pretrial detainees in the bubble,

and to leave them there until either they became coherent or a contract physician visited,

and that the policy served no legitimate government interest.” Montano, 842 F.3d at 878.

In the Montano court’s words: “There can be no denying [the pretrial detainee] was

punished” by these conditions. Id. at 879. This 2016 holding reflects that leaving pretrial

detainees without observation or medical care in jail qualifies as unconstitutional

conditions amounting to punishment. Id. at 876.

Here, Plaintiffs argue that Gonzalez was on notice in 2022 that “operating a jail that

was understaffed, where detention officers had a custom of not monitoring detainees, and

where detainees were regularly denied medical care” amounted to unconstitutional

conditions of confinement. (Dkt. 166 at p. 31). The Court agrees. Gonzalez’s alleged

conduct was such that all reasonable officers in his circumstances would have then known

that his conduct violated Shelton’s rights. Accordingly, the Court holds that Shelton’s

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rights were clearly established at the time of Gonzalez’s alleged violation. Gonzalez’s

motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ conditions-of-confinement claim must be dismissed.

B. Episodic Acts and Omissions

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have successfully pled an episodic-acts-or-omissions

claim against Gonzalez. An episodic-acts-or-omissions claim “faults specific jail officials

for their acts or omissions.” Shepherd, 591 F.3d at 452; see also Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d

51, 53 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (“[W]here the complained-of harm is a particular act or

omission of one or more officials, the action is characterized properly as an ‘episodic act

or omission’ case.”). In such a case, an actor is “interposed between the detainee and the

municipality, such that the detainee complains first of a particular act of, or omission by,

the actor and then points derivatively to a policy, custom, or rule (or lack thereof) of the

municipality that permitted or caused the act or omission.” Scott, 114 F.3d at 53.

Plaintiffs attempt to bring an episodic acts and omissions claim against Gonzalez,

the Sheriff, in his individual capacity. “Liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior

is not cognizable in actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Ford v. Anderson Cty.,

102 F.4th 292, 321 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Par. Council-President

Gov’t, 279 F.3d 273, 286 (5th Cir. 2002)). “Rather, a plaintiff must show either [that] the

supervisor personally was involved in the constitutional violation or that there is a

‘sufficient causal connection’ between the supervisor’s conduct and the constitutional

violation.” Brown v. Taylor, 911 F.3d 235, 245 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Evett v.

DETNTFF, 330 F.3d 681, 689 (5th Cir. 2003)). Liability may be found where “supervisory

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officials implement a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of

constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Thompkins

v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d

161, 169 (5th Cir. 1985)). Furthermore, “[i]n order to establish supervisor liability for

constitutional violations committed by subordinate employees, plaintiffs must show that

the supervisor act[ed], or fail[ed] to act, with deliberate indifference to violations of others’

constitutional rights committed by their subordinates.” Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 446

(5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Gates v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 537 F.3d 404,

435 (5th Cir. 2008)).

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled both that Gonzalez

implemented a deficient policy and that Gonzalez failed to train or supervise his

subordinates.

i. Deficient Policy

For similar reasons as espoused above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have

sufficiently alleged supervisory liability for Gonzalez. “Supervisory liability exists even

without overt personal participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials implement

a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the

moving force of the constitutional violation.” Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th

Cir. 1987) (cleaned up). To successfully allege this claim, Plaintiffs must plead that (1)

Gonzalez knew the jail’s system was “so deficient as to expose prisoners to substantial risk

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of significantly unmet serious medical needs,” (2) Gonzalez “failed to properly attempt to

correct it,” and (3) Gonzalez’s action or inaction caused Shelton’s injuries. Id.

Plaintiffs argue that Gonzalez “was subjectively aware of the 41 dangerous practices

that denied insulin and blood glucose monitoring to diabetic detainees and the ongoing

danger they posed to similar detainees in his jail.” (Dkt. 166 at p. 32). The Court agrees

that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Gonzalez was deliberately indifferent to

Shelton’s medical needs by adopting dangerous practices that denied Shelton insulin and

blood glucose monitoring. As explained above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged

that Gonzalez not only had knowledge of the system’s deficiencies, but also that Gonzalez

failed to correct those deficiencies. See (Dkt. 72 at pp. 7 – 103). Further, the Court finds

that these deficiencies were sufficiently alleged to be the moving force behind Shelton’s

death of diabetic ketoacidosis. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have successfully pled that Gonzalez

is subject to supervisory liability for the jail’s deficient policies.

Qualified Immunity

The Court finds that Gonzalez is not entitled to qualified immunity for this claim.

Again, as described above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have successfully alleged a

violation of Shelton’s constitutional rights. See Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 380 (5th

Cir. 2020) (“The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees pretrial detainees a right ‘not to have

their serious medical needs met with deliberate indifference on the part of the confining

officials.’”); see also Austin v. Johnson, 328 F.3d 204, 210 n.10 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Although

both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments protect the safety and bodily integrity of

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prisoners, the legal standards are virtually identical.”). As such, the Court need only assess

whether Shelton’s right was clearly established at the time of Gonzalez’s alleged

misconduct. See Wilkerson, 774 F.3d at 851.

Again, the Court must determine whether Gonzalez’s “conduct was objectively

reasonable in light of clearly established law at the time the challenged conduct occurred.”

Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 750 (5th Cir. 2005). Plaintiffs look to a handful of

cases to establish that Gonzalez was on notice that “he could not implement practices that

impeded diabetics like Mr. Shelton from receiving insulin and that his practices that denied

insulin and blood glucose monitoring to diabetic detainees constituted wanton disregard

for their constitutional rights.” (Dkt. 166 at pp. 35 – 36). The Court need only look to one

case to determine that it agrees with Plaintiffs. See Colle v. Brazos Cnty., Tex., 981 F.2d

237 (5th Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds by Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narc.

Intel. & Coord. Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993).

In Colle, the Fifth Circuit in 1993 denied a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity

by a sheriff. Id. at p. 246. The Fifth Circuit found that the sheriff “knew of or should have

known that if he staffed the jail with persons having no authority to transfer a seriously ill

detainee to a hospital, and if he pursued a policy of failing to monitor the critical medical

condition of a detainee, these actions would be constitutionally impermissible.” Id. The

Court agrees with Plaintiffs that Colle clearly established that implementing jail policies

that denied seriously ill detainees access to medical care and necessary monitoring would

unconstitutionally deprive detainees of reasonable medical care. Accordingly, the Court

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finds that Gonzalez’s alleged conduct in implementing these policies was objectively

unreasonable and any claims against him for such are not barred by qualified immunity.

ii. Failure to Train or Supervise

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have successfully pled a failure-to-train-or-supervise

claim against Gonzalez. “When, as here, a plaintiff alleges a failure to train or supervise,

‘the plaintiff must show that: (1) the supervisor either failed to supervise or train the

subordinate official; (2) a causal link exists between the failure to train or supervise and

the violation of the plaintiff’s rights; and (3) the failure to train or supervise amounts to

deliberate indifference.’” Estate of Davis v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 381

(5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Smith v. Brenoettsy, 158 F.3d 908, 911-12 (5th Cir. 1998)). “To

show deliberate indifference, a plaintiff normally must allege a pattern of similar

constitutional violations by untrained employees.” Hutcheson v. Dall. Cty., 994 F.3d 477,

482 (5th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).

Plaintiffs argue that Gonzalez “is liable for his failure to train his detention officers

about Type 1 diabetes and to monitor detainees face-to-face at least every sixty minutes as

this was objectively unreasonable under clearly established law” because Gonzalez had a

clearly established duty to provide his officers with minimal training to detect obvious

medical needs. (Dkt. 166 at p. 40). Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that Gonzalez’s failure to

provide “training to his detention officers to recognize the signs or symptoms of high blood

glucose, low blood glucose, or diabetic ketoacidosis … placed detainees with diabetes at

substantial risk of injury.” (Dkt. 166 at p. 36). Further, Plaintiffs argue that Gonzalez failed

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to train his detention officers to appropriately monitor detainees for signs of medical

distress—“despite knowing that this flaw in his training program continued to place

detainees at substantial risk of serious injuries.” (Id. at p. 37). The Court finds that Plaintiffs

have successfully pled such.

By alleging the jail’s history of death, injury, and citation as detailed above,

Plaintiffs establish that Gonzalez knew with substantial certainty that failing to train his

detention officers to appropriately supervise detainees would result in serious injury or

death for those detainees with diabetes. See (Dkt. 72 at pp. 77 – 121). Plaintiffs allege that

Gonzalez still did not correct these training deficiencies. See (Dkt. 166 at p. 38).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have successfully pled that Gonzalez was

deliberately indifferent in his failure to train.

Finally, the Plaintiffs argue that “[h]ad even one detention officer reported when

Mr. Shelton told them he had Type 1 diabetes or requested insulin to a medical provider or

reported the obvious signs of ketoacidosis that Mr. Shelton was exhibiting (if they had been

trained to look for them) to medical personnel, Mr. Shelton would not have died.” (Dkt.

166 at p. 39). Under the facts as alleged, the Court agrees. Gonzalez’s failure to train his

detention officers on monitoring generally, and diabetes more specifically, is appropriately

alleged to have caused Shelton’s death. As such, this failure to train is alleged to have

violated Shelton’s constitutional rights as a pretrial detainee.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Gonzalez failed to train

the detention officers involved in Shelton’s death, this failure to train violated Shelton’s

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constitutional rights, and this failure amounts to deliberate indifference. Accordingly,

Plaintiffs have successfully pled a failure-to-train claim against Gonzalez.

Qualified Immunity

The Court finds that qualified immunity does not bar Plaintiffs’ claim against

Gonzalez for the failure to train or supervise. Again, as described above, the Court finds

that Plaintiffs have successfully alleged a violation of Shelton’s constitutional rights. As

such, the Court need only assess whether Shelton’s right was clearly established at the time

of Gonzalez’s alleged misconduct. See Wilkerson, 774 F.3d at 851. The Court finds that

Plaintiffs have demonstrated such.

Plaintiffs argue that Gonzalez had a clearly established duty to provide his officers

with minimal training to detect obvious medical needs. (Dkt. 166 at p. 40). Plaintiffs point

to Fifth Circuit precedent which they argue establishes a duty to provide officers with

minimal training to detect obvious medical needs. (Dkt. 166 at p. 40); see Burns v. City of

Galveston, Tex., 905 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1990). Specifically, the Burns court

determined that a municipality was required to train police “to recognize and not ignore

obvious medical needs of detainees with known, demonstrable, and serious mental

disorders.” Burns, 905 F.2d at 104. While the Burns court was specifically addressing

mental disorders, the Court finds that such duty reasonably encompasses physical, medical

disorders such as Type 1 diabetes.

The Court finds that it was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation

that detention officers must be trained to recognize and not ignore obvious medical needs

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of detainees with known, demonstrable, and serious disorders. As such, any reasonable

officer in Gonzalez’s position would know that “not training officers on Type 1 Diabetes

and to monitor detainees individually face-to-face” would result in a violation of the rights

of a detainee with a serious medical disorder. Accordingly, the Court finds that qualified

immunity does not protect Gonzalez from a failure-to-train claim at this time.

iii. Punitive Damages

Plaintiffs seek punitive damages pursuant to section 1983, arguing that they have

alleged Gonzalez’s deliberate indifference and therefore “sufficiently state his reckless and

callous indifference to Mr. Shelton’s rights.” (Dkt. 166 at p. 45). The Supreme Court has

found punitive damages can be awarded “in an action under § 1983 when the defendant’s

conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or

callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S.

30, 56 (1983).

Here, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a section 1983 claim against Gonzalez. The

Court finds that, based on the facts alleged, Plaintiffs could plausibly make out a claim for

punitive damages under the Smith standard. Accordingly, the Court must deny Gonzalez’s

motion to dismiss as to Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have successfully pled claims against Gonzalez for

the alleged violation of Shelton’s constitutional rights. The Court also finds that Gonzalez

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should not be afforded qualified immunity for any claim under the facts as alleged.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Gonzalez’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 137).

SIGNED at Houston, Texas on September 30, 2025.

GEORGE C. HANKS,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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