Reeves v. The City of Springfield

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

ANNE MARIE REEVES, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 23-3168

)

CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, et. al, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

(d/e 18). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part.

I. INTRODUCTION

On May 9, 2023, Plaintiff, Anne Marie E. Reeves, filed the

instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging various

violations of her rights. See d/e 1. In Count I, Plaintiff alleges

Defendants, Officer Gray and Officer Fairlee, violated Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment rights for false arrest and wrongful detention. Id

at pp. 3-4. In Counts II and III, Plaintiff brings a state law claim for

malicious prosecution against the Defendant Officers, as well as the

City of Springfield. Id. at pp. 4-5.

On April 10, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment (d/e 10). Plaintiff filed her response on May 16, 2025 (d/e

20), and Defendants filed their Reply on May 22, 2025 (d/e 21).

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to their initial

conversation with and arrest of Plaintiff. However, summary

judgment is denied as to Plaintiff’s wrongful detention and malicious

prosecution claims.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Section

1983 claim because it arises under the United States Constitution

and is brought pursuant to a federal statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331

("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions

arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States."). Because Plaintiff’s state law claims against Officer Gray,

Officer Fairlee, and the City of Springfield are related to Plaintiff’s

Section 1983 claim, such that the claims form part of the same case

or controversy, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

the state law claims. See 28 U.S.C § 1367(a).

The events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred in Sangamon

County, Illinois, which is located within the boundaries of the Central

District of Illinois. Venue is, therefore, proper in this District. See 28

U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) (stating that a civil action may be brought in "a

judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions

giving rise to the claim occurred").

III. FACTS

The Court draws the following facts from the parties’ statements

of material facts in the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

(d/e 18), Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition (d/e 20), and Defendants

Reply (d/e 21). Any fact submitted by any party that was not

supported by a citation to evidence will not be considered by the

Court. See Civ. LR 7.1(D)(2)(b)(2). Any response to an allegedly

disputed fact unsupported by evidentiary documentation is deemed

admitted. Id.

At all relevant times, Officers Gray and Fairlee were employed

by the City of Springfield. (d/e 18, ¶ 1). On October 21, 2022, Laura

Newquist (“Newquist”) called the police, alleging she was robbed and

battered. (d/e 20, p. 4, ¶ 1). Officer Gray responded to this call and

interviewed Newquist. Id. During this interview, Newquist admitted

that she smoked crack that day. (d/e 20, p. 4, ¶ 2). Newquist

informed Officer Gray that Plaintiff picked Newquist up with two

other people in Plaintiff’s car. Id. at ¶ 4. Newquist also told Officer

Gray that the two other people in Plaintiff’s car cut Newquist’s face

with a sharp object, sprayed her with pepper spray, and stole her

money. Id. Thereafter, Newquist was left at a church parking lot. Id.

No evidence was found in the church parking lot substantiating

Newquist’s story. Id. at p. 5, ¶ 6.

After obtaining this information, Officers Gray and Fairlee went

to Plaintiff’s residence. (d/e 18, ¶ 2; d/e 20, p. 3 ¶ 2). Before their

arrival, the officers did not obtain an arrest warrant for the Plaintiff.

While on foot and trying to locate Plaintiff’s residence within an

apartment complex, Officers Gray and Fairlee had a conversation

with each other about Ms. Newquist. Specifically, Officer Gray told

Officer Fairlee that Newquist’s judgment was not the best because

she is a drug user. (d/e 20, p. 5 ¶ 9). After asking other residents for

directions to the correct building, Officers Gray and Fairlee went to

Plaintiff’s building and walked onto her front porch, where Officer

Gray attempted, unsuccessfully, to open the locked screen door

before knocking. (d/e 20, p. 5 ¶ 12).

The Officers agreed that Officer Gray should “check the back”

while Officer Fairlee remained by the front door of Plaintiff’s

residence. Officer Gray then walked around the side of Plaintiff’s

building, where his body camera shows a door leading from Plaintiff’s

unit into a fenced-in backyard with a gate.

As Officer Gray returned to the front of the residence, Plaintiff

opened the front door and stood in the doorway, briefly holding the

screen door open. (d/e 20, p. 6 ¶ 13). When Officer Gray asked for

Plaintiff’s name, she closed and locked the screen door before

responding that her name was Anne. Officer Gray told Plaintiff he

needed to speak with her. Plaintiff responded that any conversation

could be done through the screen door. (d/e 20, p. 6 ¶ 16). Officer

Gray told Plaintiff that she would be read Miranda rights, and Plaintiff

inquired whether she was under arrest, to which Officer Gray said,

“No”. (d/e 20, p. 6 ¶ 17-18). Plaintiff then attempted to close the front

door to which Officer Fairlee said “No,” and Officer Gray told Plaintiff

they only wanted to talk. (d/e 20, p. 6 ¶ 19-20). Officer Gray

remarked: “We might’ve gotten off on the wrong foot here. It looked

like you were gonna, like, run.” Officer Fairlee agreed.

Plaintiff informed the officers she had children inside of the

home and asked whether she could come on the porch and whether

she was being arrested. (d/e 20, p. 7 ¶ 21-22). Officer Gray stated

again they just wanted to talk. Id. After the Officers allowed Plaintiff

to ask her husband to stay inside with the children, Plaintiff stepped

onto the porch and was read her Miranda rights. (d/e 20, p. 7, ¶ 23-

24). After Plaintiff was on the porch, Officer Gray asked Plaintiff

questions about the alleged robbery earlier that day. (d/e 20, p. 7, ¶

26). Plaintiff admitted to offering and providing Ms. Newquist with a

ride in Plaintiff’s vehicle. (d/e 18, ¶ 9). Plaintiff further admitted that

she picked up Ms. Newquist with two other women in the car, that a

physical altercation occurred inside the vehicle, and that Ms.

Newquist left the vehicle near a church parking lot. (d/e 20, ¶ 10).

Plaintiff informed the officers that Newquist appeared to be under the

influence during the interaction the women had earlier in the day.

(d/e 20, p. 7 ¶ 27).

Thereafter, Officer Gray asked for permission to search

Plaintiff’s vehicle for blood and evidence of pepper spray being

deployed. Plaintiff responded that the officers would have to ask

Plaintiff’s husband since it was his vehicle. (d/e 20, p. 7 ¶ 28). After

answering the officers’ questions, Plaintiff attempted to re-enter her

home but Officer Gray was standing in her path. When Plaintiff asked

Officer Gray to move, she was informed that Officer Gray was going

to detain her in handcuffs. Plaintiff locked her wrists and did not

initially comply with the officers’ instructions to place her hands

behind her back. After a very brief period, Officers Gray and Fairlee

were able to place Plaintiff in handcuffs and put her in the back of a

police vehicle. (d/e 20, pp. 7-8 ¶¶ 29, 30, 31).

After Plaintiff was placed in the vehicle, Officer Gray asked

Plaintiff’s husband for consent to search his vehicle. Plaintiff’s

husband initially declined, but he relented after Officer Gray

informed Plaintiff’s husband the vehicle would be impounded if he

did not consent to the search at that time. (d/e 20, pp. 8 ¶ 33). A

search of the vehicle did not find any blood or evidence that pepper

spray had recently been deployed.

Once the search of the vehicle was conducted, Officer Fairlee

transported Plaintiff to the Sangamon County Jail. On October 23,

2024, Plaintiff appeared in court for a bond/probable cause hearing.

(d/e 20, pp. 8-9 ¶¶ 35, 36). Plaintiff was charged with armed robbery,

aggravated battery/use of a deadly weapon, and resisting or

obstructing a police officer. On October 24, 2024, the State’s Attorney

dismissed all charges against Plaintiff, and she was released from jail

later that same day.

IV. LEGAL STANDARD

When moving for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the moving party bears the burden

of showing, based on the materials in the record, “that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) & (c); Hummel v.

St. Joseph Cty Bd. of Comm’rs, 817 F.3d 1010, 1015–16 (7th Cir.

2016).

“The moving party has the burden of either: (1) showing that

there is an absence of evidence supporting an essential element of

the non-moving party's claim; or (2) presenting affirmative evidence

that negates an essential element of the non-moving party's claim.”

Id. But even where there is no dispute as to the basic facts of a case,

summary judgment will not be appropriate “if the parties disagree on

the inferences which may reasonably be drawn from those

undisputed facts.” Cent. Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of

Md., 626 F.2d 537, 539–40 (7th Cir. 1980). The facts and all

reasonable inferences derived therefrom are viewed in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545,

550 (7th Cir. 2008).

V. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff Anne Marie Reeves alleges Officers Gray and Fairlee

violated her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to be free

from false arrest, wrongful detention, and malicious prosecution.

(d/e 1). Defendants move for summary judgment as to each count,

so the Court will take each argument in turn.

A. Defendants’ Conversation with Plaintiff was not an

impermissible seizure.

The Fourth Amendment provides equal protection to a home’s

curtilage, the areas immediately surrounding the home itself. See

Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984). Specifically, the

Supreme Court has found that the curtilage is “part of [the] home

itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.” Id. Given these guaranteed

protections law enforcement officers must have a warrant to enter

either the curtilage or the home unless an exception applies. See

Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295, 301 (2021). These exceptions allow

for a warrantless entry when: exigent circumstances exist, the

resident consents to entry, or the officers conduct a knock-and-talk.

Id.; see Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013).

Here, Plaintiff argues the Defendants’ questioning of Plaintiff on

her porch was a warrantless seizure and a Fourth Amendment

violation as there were no exigent circumstances. (d/e 20, pp. 14-17).

Plaintiff further argues she was seized by Defendants throughout the

entirety of the parties’ conversation.

Defendants argue exigent circumstances justified Plaintiff’s

seizure. Specifically, Defendants argue that they reasonably believed

that Plaintiff might flee, which justified Plaintiff’s seizure under the

exigent circumstance exception to a warrantless search or seizure.

(d/e 21). In support, Defendants point this Court to Defendant Gray’s

statement that he thought Plaintiff might flee, coupled with Plaintiff’s

departure from the alleged crime scene earlier in the day.

Exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search or

seizure include destruction of evidence, emergency aid, and hot

pursuit. See Lange at 2017. Defendants have not provided any

evidence they observed Plaintiff destroying any evidence, nor were the

Defendants rendering emergency aid. However, Defendants were

concerned Plaintiff would flee especially after they knocked on

Plaintiff’s locked screen door. Defendant Gray’s body camera showed

a fenced in yard behind the address. This yard had access to the back

of Plaintiff’s house through a door connected to the home, as well as

a gate in the fence which allowed someone in the yard to leave

without being seen from the front door.

Defendant Gray was worried Plaintiff might flee through the

back of her home while Defendants were unable to see her. This

concern is supported by Plaintiff’s departure from the scene earlier

in the day and her demeanor when speaking to the Defendants.

Therefore, the Court is persuaded exigent circumstances existed to

bypass a warrantless seizure. See Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952, 957-

58 (7th Cir. 1992) (fleeing raises reasonable suspicion of criminal

activity such that police may even reasonably use handcuffs when

executing an investigative stop without converting stop into an

arrest).

Even if the exigent circumstances exception did not apply, the

Court finds that the “knock-and-talk” exception does apply to the

conversation Defendants had with Plaintiff. A police officer not armed

with a warrant may approach a home and knock, precisely because

that is “no more than any private citizen might do.” Kentucky v. King,

563 U.S. 452, 469 (2011).

Here, the Defendants approached Plaintiff’s residence and

knocked on her locked screen door. Plaintiff answered the door,

identified herself, and Defendant Gray told Plaintiff they needed to

talk. Defendant Gray proceeded to read Plaintiff her Miranda rights,

after which Plaintiff inquired whether she was under arrest.

Defendant Gray confirmed Plaintiff was not under arrest, and

Plaintiff began to close her door. Defendant Fairlee who was farther

away from Plaintiff near the front of the porch, told Plaintiff “No,” and

the Defendants reiterated they just wanted to speak with Plaintiff.

Plaintiff proceeded to explain to Defendants there were kids inside

and asked whether she could step onto the porch without being

handcuffed. Once Defendants confirmed Plaintiff could step onto the

porch without being handcuffed, Plaintiff exited her home and closed

the front and screen doors behind her. Defendant Gray read Plaintiff

her rights, and for the next ten minutes, the parties had a

conversation about Plaintiff’s interaction with Ms. Newquist earlier in

the day. Defendants questioned where Plaintiff had been, whom she

had transported in her car, and what had occurred. At the conclusion

of this ten-minute conversation, Plaintiff was placed in handcuffs by

the Defendants.

Plaintiff argues that, from the inception of this conversation

with Defendants, Plaintiff was seized without a warrant, in violation

of the Fourth Amendment. Defendants argue that, after the

Defendants knocked on Plaintiff’s door, Plaintiff came onto the porch

to speak with them and did so voluntarily. Defendants argue that the

voluntariness of Plaintiff’s participation in the conversation negates

any claim of unlawful coercion or seizure. Additionally, Defendants

argue that any seizure would have been justified because the officers

had a reasonable suspicion supported by facts that Plaintiff

previously had engaged in criminal activity.

In United States v. Jerez, the Seventh Circuit provided guidance

regarding a “knock-and-talk” and how to assess when this

interaction turns into a seizure. United States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d, 684.

Jerez involved a nighttime encounter at a motel. Police knocked on

the door of the motel room for three minutes. They knocked on the

window for an additional one and one-half minutes, all without

producing an answer from the occupants. The police then shone a

flashlight through a small opening in window drapes onto one of the

occupants as he lay on a bed and commanded, “Police, Open the

door.”

The Seventh Circuit concluded that, based on the totality of

circumstances surrounding the encounter, the motel occupants were

seized. The Court distinguished cases in which occupants voluntarily

opened the door after a daytime knock and engaged in a consensual

encounter.

Once the officers had been refused admittance, their continued

efforts to rouse the occupants out of bed certainly prevented

them from ignoring the continued requests and from

maintaining the privacy and solitude of their dwelling. The

deputies’ persistence, in the face of the refusal to admit,

transformed what began as an attempt to engage in a

consensual encounter into an investigatory stop.

Jerez, 108 F.3d at 691-92. The law enforcement officers refused to

take “no” for an answer and a “reasonable person in [the plaintiffs']

situation could conclude only that the deputies would not leave

unless the door was opened.” Id. at 692-93. The court further found

that when the occupant opened the door, he submitted to the officers’

show of authority. Id. at 692.

Here, Plaintiff almost immediately responded to police knocking

on her locked screen door. Plaintiff opened her front door and stood

in the doorway speaking to the officers through the screen door.

Under this circumstance, the Plaintiff cannot claim that she was

seized when she voluntarily opened the door to speak to the officers.

Plaintiff voluntarily identified herself to the officers and asked

whether she was under arrest. The officers informed Plaintiff she was

not under arrest, and she began to shut the door. The officers

reiterated they just wanted to talk. Plaintiff asked whether she could

come onto the porch without being arrested. Plaintiff walked out on

the porch, was read her Miranda rights, sat in a camping chair, and

told the Defendants about her interaction with Ms. Newquist earlier

in the day. All of these factors are relevant to whether a reasonable

person would believe it was within their power to terminate the

encounter. At the end of the approximately 10-minute conversation,

Plaintiff stood up from her chair and attempted to walk back inside

her home. Defendant Gray blocked her entry and told Plaintiff that

she was being detained in handcuffs. Plaintiff was then placed in

handcuffs by the Defendant officers who walked Plaintiff to a police

car and secured her inside.

A review of the totality of the circumstances does not indicate

that Plaintiff was seized, but rather was voluntarily answering

officers’ questions, and when through answering questions, she

attempted to go back inside her home. Specifically, Plaintiff moved

towards her front door and Defendant Gray stood in her path.

Plaintiff asked Defendant Gray to move, and Plaintiff was informed

she was being detained. Defendant Gray detained Plaintiff in

handcuffs based on her answers to the questions posed and how

Plaintiff’s story lined up with that of the victim, Ms. Newquist.

Defendants reasonably believed Plaintiff was likely to flee during

their interaction with the Plaintiff given her ability to escape without

immediate detection. Additionally, Defendants permissibly executed

a “knock-and-talk” with Plaintiff on her front porch which she

voluntarily participated in. Therefore, under either exception the

Defendants did not impermissibly seize the Plaintiff.

B. Defendants Gray and Fairlee Had Probable Cause to Arrest

the Plaintiff.

To state a claim for false arrest under § 1983, a plaintiff must

allege that there was no probable cause for his arrest. Gardunio v.

Town of Cicero, 674 F. Supp. 2d 976, 984 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (citing

Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 537 (7th Cir. 2009)). The

existence of probable cause is an “an absolute defense to any § 1983

claim for false arrest.” Abbott v. Sangamon County, 705 F.3d 706,

713-14 (7th Cir. 2013).

A police officer has probable cause to make an arrest if a

reasonable person, knowing all of the facts and circumstances known

to this officer, would believe that the individual in question has

committed or is committing a crime. Seiser v. City of Chicago, 762

F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2014). Whether an arrest is supported by

probable cause is usually a question of fact decided by the jury.

Abbott, 705 F.3d at 714. However, if the underlying facts are

undisputed, the court can make that decision on summary

judgment. Id.

Defendants argue that they had probable cause to believe Ms.

Reeves was involved as a participant in a robbery and assault, and,

therefore, the arrest of Plaintiff was reasonable based on a totality of

the circumstances known to the officers at the time. Defendants

argue that the alleged victim of the robbery identified the Plaintiff by

name when officers responded to an emergency call. (d/e 18, p. 6).

The victim had injuries consistent with the story told to responding

officers, consisting of a laceration to her face and symptoms of pepper

spray exposure. Id. After this interaction with the victim, the officers

did a vehicle registration check, which confirmed a teal Honda was

registered to Plaintiff’s husband.

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff admitted to offering and

providing a ride to Ms. Newquist and two other women, that a

physical altercation occurred, and that Plaintiff saw the victim leave

the vehicle at a church. Id at p. 7. These facts, which were the

circumstances surrounding the visit to Plaintiff’s residence,

Defendants argue, support the core facts of the offense for which

Plaintiff was arrested. Further, Defendants argue this information

provided probable cause to the officers to arrest the Plaintiff and

defeats the wrongful arrest claim.

Plaintiff, in opposition, notes that the alleged victim in this

matter, Ms. Newquist, has a history of drug use, which the officers

knew about at the time of the emergency response to Ms. Newquist’s

call to the police and during their interactions with Plaintiff

thereafter. This fact alone, Plaintiff argues, proves that Ms. Newquist

was not a reasonably credible victim. In support, Plaintiff points to

the officers’ knowledge of Ms. Newquist’s use of crack cocaine, an

admission by Officer Gray that the victim’s story did not make sense,

no evidence of a crime scene at the church parking lot, and the

officers’ belief that Ms. Newquist did not always utilize good

judgment. Further, the Plaintiff cites the Hebron case in support.

Whether officers had probable cause is an objective inquiry;

their subjective beliefs are irrelevant whatever those beliefs may be.

See Abbott, 705 F.3d at 714. As a result, even if an officer believed

that probable cause was lacking, the Court still has the duty to

objectively determine if probable cause was present.

Here, the officers responded to an emergency call and met with

a victim, who had a laceration to her face which required medical

attention. During their conversations with the alleged victim, the

victim gave Plaintiff’s name specifically as an individual involved in

the robbery of her personal items. Plaintiff was identified as the driver

of the vehicle Ms. Newquist was in while she was robbed by two other

women also being transported by the Plaintiff.

Probable cause can be based on a single identification from a

credible eyewitness. Hart v. Mannina, 798 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 2015);

See also Phillips v. Allen, 668 F.3d 912, 915 (7th Cir. 2012)

(“Identification by a single eyewitness who lacks an apparent grudge

against the accused person supplies probable cause for arrest.”).

While Plaintiff concedes that a credible eyewitness can form the

requisite probable cause by identifying a possible perpetrator,

Plaintiff argues Ms. Newquist is not a reliable witness. Plaintiff bases

this argument on Ms. Newquist’s drug use, which was known by the

officers, and the confusing nature of her story. Further, Plaintiff

argues the lack of pepper spray and blood in the Plaintiff’s vehicle is

evidence the arrest was improper.

As an initial matter, the lack of pepper spray or blood in

Plaintiff’s husband’s vehicle was not discovered until after Plaintiff

was already under arrest, handcuffed, and in the back of a police

vehicle. Therefore, such information is irrelevant to the question the

Court is currently determining: that is whether probable cause

existed to arrest the Defendant. Turning to Ms. Newquist’s credibility

and reliability as a witness, the Court finds Ms. Newquist reasonably

credible.

Plaintiff cites Hebron v. Touhy in support of her contention that

this Court should find Ms. Newquist is not a credible victim as she is

a drug user and likely held a grudge against the Plaintiff for leaving

her in a church parking lot. Plaintiff argues that like in Hebron, given

the likelihood of a grudge, further investigation was necessary before

an arrest, given the negative relationship between the accuser and

accused. Hebron v. Touhy, 18 F.3d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 1994). In

Hebron, a landlord brought suit for false arrest regarding a landlord-

tenant dispute. The district court granted summary judgment for the

defendant officers on the Plaintiff’s false arrest claim, concluding the

tenants’ complaint plus the officers’ investigation into a lack of hot

water in their apartment and the landlord’s admitted denial of access

to a washer and dryer supplied the necessary probable cause for

arrest. Id.

Here, Ms. Newquist told the officers that Plaintiff came to pick

her up from a friend’s house. Thereafter, Ms. Newquist was picked

up by the Plaintiff along with two other women, one of whom she

owed money to. (d/e 18, Exhibit 2). Ms. Newquist reported an

altercation while in Plaintiff’s vehicle with the two women, who

sprayed her in the eyes with pepper spray and cut the right side of

her face. Id. During this altercation, Ms. Newquist’s wallet was taken

from her, she was able to exit the car, and found herself in a church

parking lot.

Although Plaintiff argues that Ms. Newquist’s use of an illicit

substance and the fact her story was somewhat confusing make her

a noncredible witness, at least to the officer’s knowledge at the time

of the arrest, this Court disagrees. The physical injuries to Ms.

Newquist that were clearly visible and the calm and straightforward

manner in which she recounted the events would support a finding

that she was at least facially credible. In addition, once the officers

started to investigate what she told them, namely looking for the

individual she identified, they began to corroborate her story.

Those investigatory steps taken here, like the officers in Hebron,

included questioning the alleged perpetrator, trying to verify the

victim’s story, and looking for evidence. After determining that

Plaintiff had a vehicle tied to Plaintiff’s personal phone number,

which matched the vehicle described by Ms. Newquist, the officers

went to Plaintiff’s residence and began to question her.

Plaintiff’s answers to the officers’ questions supported the basic

story Ms. Newquist recited. These answers confirmed who was in the

vehicle, that a physical altercation occurred, and that Ms. Newquist

was dropped off at the church parking lot. Although Plaintiff denied

that she was involved in any robbery or scheme, that pepper spray

was ever used, or that Ms. Newquist was injured, the police were not

required to believe Plaintiff’s version of events.

Plaintiff further argues that there was no evidence of a crime

scene in the church parking lot where Ms. Newquist was dropped off

or in Plaintiff’s husband’s vehicle. Although Plaintiff refers to the

church parking lot as the crime scene, the Plaintiff’s husband’s

vehicle was more akin to the scene of the alleged crime. Plaintiff’s

husband’s vehicle, which the police officers were unable to search

until after Plaintiff was placed under arrest, did not have any

evidence of pepper spray or blood. This information, however, was

not discovered until after Plaintiff was already arrested.

Probable cause “is not a high bar.” District of Columbia v.

Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018). Probable cause is established where

a probability or a substantial chance of criminal activity exists and

does not require a certainty that a crime was committed. Garcia v.

Posewitz, 79 F.4th 874, 879-80 (7th Cir. 2023). The Court finds

Officers Gray and Fairlee had probable cause to arrest the Plaintiff

based on the totality of the circumstances known to them at the time.

Plaintiff confirmed basic details of Ms. Newquist’s story, there were

physical injuries observed by the officers that supported Ms.

Newquist’s chronology of events, and Plaintiff was identified by name

and vehicle. This is enough to support an arrest as there was a

probability of criminal activity, especially given Plaintiff’s alleged role

as the driver of the vehicle in which the alleged victim was robbed.

Officers Gray and Fairlee are entitled to summary judgment as

to Plaintiff’s false arrest claim as to her initial arrest, so Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Count I.

C. Defendants are not Entitled to Summary Judgment as to

Plaintiff’s Wrongful Detention Claim.

Along with false arrest, Plaintiff alleges a wrongful detention

claim in Count I. (d/e 1, 20). This wrongful detention stems from the

period of time after Plaintiff was arrested, placed in a police car, and

the Defendant officers completed a search of Plaintiff’s husband’s

vehicle. For the following reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment is DENIED on Plaintiff’s wrongful detention claim.

The Court has, in this order, provided analysis as to why

Defendants had probable cause to arrest the Plaintiff for armed

robbery and aggravated battery based on the totality of

circumstances known to them at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest.

However, the Defendants’ investigation of the robbery earlier in the

day did not end with Plaintiff’s arrest. Defendants continued their

investigation after receiving consent from Plaintiff’s husband to

search his vehicle, which Defendants identified as the crime scene.

During Defendant Gray’s search of the vehicle, he did not locate

a weapon, blood, or any evidence of pepper spray. However, this

absence of evidence, Plaintiff argues, forecloses a summary judgment

finding for Defendants as to Plaintiff’s continued detention, as there

is an issue of material fact whether probable cause still existed. This

Court agrees.

Defendants, in moving for summary judgment and in their

reply, argue that probable cause was present throughout Plaintiff’s

initial arrest, continued detention, and still existed to support

charging her with multiple crimes. However, because the search of

Plaintiff’s husband’s vehicle did not uncover any evidence of the

alleged robbery, this Court finds there is a genuine issue of material

fact as to whether probable cause existed after the search of the

vehicle to justify Plaintiff’s continued detention. Therefore,

Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED as Plaintiff’s

wrongful detention claim.

D. Defendants Are Not Entitled to Summary Judgment on

Plaintiff’s Malicious Prosecution Claim.

Under Illinois law, in order to prevail on a claim of malicious

prosecution, the plaintiff must demonstrate five elements: 1. the

commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil judicial

proceeding by the defendant; 2. termination of the proceeding in favor

of the plaintiff; 3. the absence of probable cause; 4. malice; and 5.

damages. See Swick v. Liautaud, 169 Ill.2d 504, 512, 662 N.E.2d

1238, 215 Ill. Dec. 98 (1996).

The Defendants argue Plaintiff cannot show there was no

probable cause. Defendants point to the Plaintiff’s statements

confirming her involvement in picking up Ms. Newquist, a physical

altercation between Ms. Newquist and the two other passengers in

Plaintiff’s car, and the removal of Ms. Newquist from the car. (d/e 18,

p. 8). Defendants argue Ms. Newquist identified Plaintiff as the driver

of the vehicle during the robbery and provided corroborating

information regarding Plaintiff’s vehicle and personal information. Id.

This corroborating information included Plaintiff’s cell phone number

and description the vehicle eventually located by the Defendants.

This information, Defendants argue, along with Ms. Newquist’s

injuries, support a finding of probable cause sufficient to initiate

charges and prosecution.

Plaintiff contends there was no probable cause for her arrest, or

for charging her with various crimes. (d/e 20, pp. 10-14). The Court

has already determined that probable cause existed for Plaintiff’s

initial arrest, but in a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must

prove there was no probable cause to charge her with a crime.

Plaintiff argues, however, that, even if the Court finds there were

probable cause to make an arrest, that a probable cause

determination is fluid and, as evidence develops, probable cause may

wane. (d/e 20). Plaintiff specifically notes that even if there were

probable cause to believe Plaintiff committed a crime before she was

arrested, that probable cause dissipated after officers failed to find

any evidence of the alleged crimes in the vehicle allegedly utilized in

the crime. (d/e 20, p. 14).

Plaintiff specifically points to the lack of blood, sharp object, or

odor of pepper spray in her husband’s vehicle. This vehicle was the

“scene of the crime” based on Ms. Newquist’s account. Plaintiff

argues that, after the Defendants failed to find evidence of a crime in

the vehicle driven by the Plaintiff during the crime on the date in

question, there was less of a likelihood Plaintiff committed the alleged

crime.

Defendants argue that probable cause existed for Plaintiff’s

arrest, detention, and prosecution during the entirety of their

interaction on October 21, 2022. Defendants do not believe that

probable cause ever waned, even after a search of Plaintiff’s

husband’s vehicle did not uncover additional evidence supporting

Ms. Newquist’s allegations.

The lack of physical evidence in Plaintiff’s husband’s vehicle

does not negate the probable cause that existed at the time of

Plaintiff’s arrest. However, the lack of evidence after the search of the

vehicle does challenge whether a reasonable officer would believe

probable cause existed to charge Plaintiff with a crime. Given the

ongoing investigation and search did result in evidence to further

support Ms. Newquist’s allegations, the Court finds a genuine issue

of material fact exists regarding whether probable cause remained to

charge Plaintiff with a crime. Therefore, Defendants Motion for

Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim is

DENIED.

E. Defendants are not Entitled to Qualified Immunity.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity in the Fourth

Amendment context if a reasonable officer could have believed that

“arguable” reasonable suspicion (for a traffic stop) or “arguable”

probable cause (for an arrest) existed to detain the plaintiff. See Huff

v. Reichert, 744 F.3d 999, 1007 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Humphrey v.

Staszak, 148 F.3d 719, 725 (7th Cir. 1998) (arguable reasonable

suspicion and probable cause are established “when a reasonable

officer ‘in the same circumstances and . . . possessing the same

knowledge as the officer in question could have reasonably believed

that [reasonable suspicion or] probable cause existed in light of well-

established law.’”).

A government actor is entitled to qualified immunity unless the

plaintiff shows that: (1) the facts, read in favor of the non-moving

party, amount to a constitutional violation; and (2) the constitutional

right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. See

Rainsberger v. Benner, 913 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2019); Leiser v.

Kloth, 933 F.3d 696, 701 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct.

2722, 206 L. Ed. 2d 856 (2020) (qualified immunity is an affirmative

defense, but once a defendant properly raises the defense, the burden

shifts to the plaintiff to defeat it). A Court need not always address

both questions in the qualified immunity analysis. Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236-42, 129 S. Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565

(2009). “[I]f the law was not clearly established, there is no need to

tackle the (often harder) question whether the challenged conduct

violated the Constitution.” Rainsberger, 913 F.3d at 647. But where

the law was clearly established, both qualified immunity questions

must be addressed. Id.

Defendants argue that qualified immunity is appropriate here

because it shields from liability police officers “who act in ways they

reasonably believed to be lawful.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.

635, 638 (1987). Defendants further argue that qualified immunity

provides “ample room for mistaken judgment” and protects all but

the plainly incompetent and those who knowingly violate the law.”

(d/e 18, p. 10). The Court has previously found that a genuine issue

of material fact remains that allows for a reasonable jury to make two

differing conclusions regarding whether the Defendants had probable

cause to detain Plaintiff after the search of her husband’s vehicle and

whether probable cause existed to substantiate charging Plaintiff

with a crime.

If probable cause did not exist after the vehicle search, the

Defendants could have violated Plaintiff’s clearly established right to

be free from an unreasonable seizure and improper detention. As a

result, the Court cannot find that Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity. See Nettles-Bey v. Williams, 819 F.3d 959, 961 (7th Cir.

2016) (holding that where the admissible evidence would permit two

inferences, one of which would implicate violations of a plaintiff's

clearly established constitutional rights, the case must proceed to

trial, and the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity).

Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgement based on

qualified immunity is DENIED.

VI. CONCLUSION

Defendants have failed to carry their burden of showing an

absence of issue of material fact relating to Plaintiff’s wrongful

detention and malicious prosecution claims. However, Defendants

are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s false arrest claim.

Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 18) is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff may proceed to trial

on her wrongful detention claim and malicious prosecution claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: October 1st, 2025.

FOR THE COURT

/s/ Sue E. Myerscough____________

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE