The opinion
[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 74 Ohio St.3d 513.]
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, APPELLANT, v. CUYAHOGA COUNTY BOARD
OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES.
[Cite as Gen. Motors Corp. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 1996-Ohio-287.]
Taxation—Real property valuation—Board of Tax Appeals’ decision affirmed by
Supreme Court when decision is reasonable and lawful—Board of Tax
Appeals’ decision remanded by Supreme Court when Supreme Court
unable to find any evidence to support board’s finding.
(No. 95-441—Submitted November 9, 1995—Decided February 14, 1996.)
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, Nos. 85-G-440, 85-A-441, 85-B-442 and
85-C-443.
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{¶ 1} This case is once again before us after our remand in Gen. Motors
Corp. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 233, 559 N.E.2d
1328, and in Gen. Motors Corp. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1993), 67 Ohio
St.3d 310, 617 N.E.2d 1102. We were unable to ascertain how the Board of Tax
Appeals (“BTA”) reached its decisions, and, in those cases, we directed the BTA
to set forth its findings and the basis therefor.
{¶ 2} On this remand, the BTA, on January 27, 1995, issued a more detailed
decision, finding that the true value of the subject property was $41,500,000 for tax
year 1982, $43,800,000 for tax year 1983, and $45,200,000 for tax year 1984. We
described the facility in our first opinion.
{¶ 3} This cause is before this court upon General Motors Corporation’s
(“GM’s”) appeal as of right.
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Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Roger F. Day and John C. Duffy, Jr., for
appellant.
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and
William J. Day, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees Cuyahoga County
Auditor and Cuyahoga County Board of Revision.
Armstrong, Mitchell & Damiani, Timothy J. Armstrong, Deborah J.
Papushak and William Mitchell, for appellee Parma Board of Education.
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Per Curiam.
{¶ 4} In R.R.Z. Assoc. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1988), 38 Ohio
St.3d 198, 201, 527 N.E.2d 874, 877, we stated:
“The BTA need not adopt any expert’s valuation. It has wide discretion to
determine the weight given to evidence and the credibility of witnesses before it.
Its true value decision is a question of fact which will be disturbed by this court
only when it affirmatively appears from the record that such decision is
unreasonable or unlawful. Cardinal Federal S. & L. Assn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of
Revision (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 13, 73 O.O.2d 83, 336 N.E.2d 433, paragraphs two,
three, and four of the syllabus. This court is not a ‘“super” Board of Tax Appeals.’
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Revision (1981), 66 Ohio
St.2d 398, 400, 20 O.O.3d 349, 351, 422 N.E.2d 846, 848. We will not overrule
BTA findings of fact that are based upon sufficient probative evidence. Hawthorn
Mellody, Inc. v. Lindley (1981), 65 Ohio St.2d 47, 19 O.O.3d 234, 417 N.E.2d 1257,
syllabus.”
{¶ 5} GM, appellant, contests several specific BTA findings. Now that the
BTA has set forth its reasons for its findings, we may cogently address GM’s
contentions. At the outset, we observe that GM claims that the testimony of its
appraisal expert, Bruce Pickering, should prevail over the testimony of the
competing appraisal expert, Robert J. Kocinski, presented by the Parma Board of
Education (“Parma”), appellee. “However, such a determination is precisely the
kind of factual matter to be decided by the BTA. It is clear from the record that the
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BTA’s final determination represented a compromise between the conflicting
positions of the two experts.” Wolf v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1984), 11
Ohio St.3d 205, 207, 11 OBR 523, 524, 465 N.E.2d 50, 52. In any event, we will
review each major contention and measure the BTA findings in light of the BTA’s
duty and our appellate role in these matters.
{¶ 6} First, GM claims that the BTA erred in rejecting GM’s “greenfield
model” to replace the facility under its cost approach. Pickering employed an
engineering firm to design and price an ideal manufacturing complex to replace the
plant. However, the BTA found that GM had “failed to demonstrate that its
theoretical greenfield model is, in fact, an ‘equal’ substitute for this facility. Its
characteristics vary substantially. It is much smaller. This, in our view, limits its
flexibility for adaptation to other uses. It is less likely to be adaptable to shifts in
future production requirements because of this limited size. Less space is available
for storage or other ancillary needs. Its utility is not ‘equivalent.’ Further, the
greenfield model is predicated upon a special hypothetical facility. It is far from
evident this hypothetical structure would ever actually be constructed. Thus,
appellant’s greenfield model is predicated upon speculation. It may never become
reality.”
{¶ 7} The BTA, instead, adopted Kocinski’s cost approach. Kocinski
selected amounts from the Marshall-Swift valuation manual, a “tried and true
generally accepted technique often employed in the appraisal field.” The BTA may
weigh evidence and grant credibility to some witnesses and none to others. We
find no abuse of discretion in how the BTA weighed this evidence and credited the
testimony. Webb Corp. v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Revision (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 36, 647
N.E.2d 162.
{¶ 8} Second, GM claims that under the cost approach the BTA should have
deducted from total replacement cost more than the one million dollars depreciation
that it did for additional deterioration for the roof of the facility. GM claims that
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the BTA should have deducted Pickering’s amount ($9,382,215) to repair the roof.
However, the BTA found that GM had not demonstrated that an entire roof
replacement was necessary as Pickering had proposed.
{¶ 9} Kocinski did not testify about any additional deduction for roof repair.
Thus, the BTA could have selected no additional deduction or a deduction up to the
nine million dollar figure that Pickering proposed. The BTA was well within its
authority to select an amount in the range supported by the testimony. Accordingly,
the evidence supports the BTA’s finding of one million dollars as additional roof
depreciation. See W. Bay Manor Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1995), 73
Ohio St.3d 568, 570, 653 N.E.2d 379, 380.
{¶ 10} Third, GM claims that the BTA should have deducted from
replacement cost an amount for a stamping plant upgrade to accommodate larger
and more efficient transfer presses. Kocinski, to the contrary, considered the
stamping plant suitable for general industrial manufacturing and did not allow any
additional depreciation for upgrade. The BTA did not grant a further deduction for
this item.
{¶ 11} The BTA was warranted in accepting Kocinski’s testimony that the
stamping plant was satisfactory for general use for industrial manufacturing. GM’s
argument borders on pursuing a current use valuation to transform this plant into a
special automotive stamping plant. Of course, we have previously disapproved the
current use method of valuation. State ex rel. Park Invest. Co. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals
(1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 28, 33, 61 O.O.2d 238, 241, 289 N.E.2d 579, 582.
{¶ 12} Also, GM argues for an additional deduction for asbestos removal.
The BTA ruled that GM had not adequately established a diminution in value due
to the environmental contamination and asbestos. The BTA could not find any
evidence that these defects must be corrected at any given time or that the cost here
must be deducted on a dollar-for-dollar basis without any supporting evidence on
its effect on market value. Moreover, Kocinski allowed no additional deduction for
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asbestos removal. Accordingly, the record supports the BTA’s finding. Hawthorn
Mellody, Inc. v. Lindley, supra.
{¶ 13} Next, the BTA allowed extra physical deterioration for the heating,
ventilating, roof and miscellaneous repairs only for the 1982 valuation. It did not
deduct these amounts as additional depreciation from the 1983 or 1984 valuations
because it “deemed [them] repaired or replaced by that expenditure in 1982.” It
concluded that deducting these amounts again would be an improper double credit.
{¶ 14} We are unable to find any evidence to support this finding. Neither
appraiser testified to the finding that the BTA made; both appraisers carried these
depreciation deductions through all three tax years. Since we do not find any record
support for this finding, we remand this case to the BTA to deduct amounts for
these defects, adjusting these deductions for the passage of time if necessary, for
1983 and 1984.
{¶ 15} When the BTA clarified its earlier decisions in its third decision, it
reached different amounts as the final value for each year. The BTA states that it
erred in its calculations in the earlier decisions. Since the BTA explained its earlier
decisions in its third decision, we accept its explanation as to these different
amounts. The BTA’s final opinion satisfies our directive.
{¶ 16} Finally, GM claims that the BTA should not have placed so little
weight on the market data approach. The BTA thoroughly discussed the
comparable sales presented by both appraisers but did not give great weight to this
approach. This it may do, and, since we do not find that it abused its discretion in
so weighting this evidence, we affirm its decision.
{¶ 17} Accordingly, we reverse only that portion of the BTA’s decision in
which it did not deduct additional depreciation for heating, ventilating, roof and
miscellaneous repairs from the 1983 and 1984 valuations. We remand this matter
to the BTA to correct this failure and, if necessary, adjust these repair amounts for
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such years. We affirm the remainder of the decision because it is reasonable and
lawful.
Decision affirmed in
part, reversed in part
and cause remanded.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, RESNICK, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur.
F.E. SWEENEY, J., dissents.
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