The opinion
[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 86 Ohio St.3d 181.]
VICTORIA PLAZA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ET AL., APPELLEES, v.
CUYAHOGA COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION; NORTH OLMSTED BOARD OF
EDUCATION, APPELLANT.
[Cite as Victoria Plaza Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision,
1999-Ohio-148.]
Taxation—Real property valuation—Holder of an equitable interest in real
property does not have standing to file a valuation complaint—R.C.
5715.19, construed and applied.
(No. 98-1446—Submitted March 17, 1999—Decided July 28, 1999.)
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 96-B-641.
__________________
{¶ 1} On November 30, 1994, Victoria Plaza Limited Partnership
(“Partnership”) and Victoria Plaza Limited Liability Company, the successor to
G.M.S. Realty Company (“ Company”), appellee, signed an agreement for
Partnership to sell the Victoria Plaza Apartments to Company for $7,275,000.
Company deposited $100,000 with Partnership as earnest money to credit toward
the purchase price. The parties agreed to prorate real property taxes “as of midnight
of the day immediately prior to the Closing Date[.]”
{¶ 2} On March 27, 1995, Daniel S. Siegel, Attorney at Law, filed a
complaint with the Cuyahoga County Board of Revision (“BOR”), appellee,
seeking to establish the purchase price as the true value of the property for the tax
year 1994; the deadline to file such a complaint was March 31, 1995. In the
complaint, Siegel named Company and Partnership as “Owner of property.”
{¶ 3} On March 28, 1995, Partnership signed a limited warranty deed
granting the property to Company. The record does not establish when Partnership
delivered the deed to Company.
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
{¶ 4} On March 30, 1995, Raymond Slepski, apparently an employee of
AvTax, Inc., filed a valuation complaint with the BOR, naming Partnership as
owner of the property. The cover letter accompanying this complaint does not
indicate what authority Slepski had regarding the complaint. The complaint, which
sought to reduce the value of the property, listed Slepski as “Agent.”
{¶ 5} On March 31, 1995, the deed was filed with the Cuyahoga County
Auditor and with the Cuyahoga County Recorder.
{¶ 6} The North Olmsted Board of Education (“BOE”), appellant, filed
complaints countering the earlier complaints.
{¶ 7} The BOR dismissed the complaint filed by Siegel because, incorrectly
as it turns out, the complainant had filed a complaint for the tax year 1994, being,
so the BOR concluded, a second filing in the same interim period. Nevertheless,
the BOR reduced the value of property under the complaint filed by AvTax to
$6,977,000. Company, Partnership, and the BOE filed notices of appeal with the
Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”).
{¶ 8} The BTA dismissed the appeal of Partnership’s complaint originally
filed by AvTax for lack of jurisdiction under Sharon Village Ltd. v. Licking Cty.
Bd. of Revision (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 479, 678 N.E.2d 932, and ordered the BOR
to dismiss the AvTax complaint.
{¶ 9} As to the Company/Partnership complaint filed by Siegel, the BTA
reversed the BOR’s decision that the BOR lacked jurisdiction and remanded the
case to the BOR to determine the true value of the property. The BTA found that
Company, by agreeing to purchase the property on November 30, 1994, obtained
an equitable interest in the property sufficient to pursue a complaint seeking to
reduce the property’s value. The BOE appeals the latter decision.
{¶ 10} This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right.
__________________
Fred Siegel Co., L.P.A., and Annrita S. Johnson, for appellees.
2
January Term, 1999
Kolick & Kondzer, Thomas A. Kondzer and Kimberly A. Aldrich, for
appellant.
__________________
Per Curiam.
{¶ 11} The BOE primarily argues that Company, despite having an
equitable interest in the property, does not have standing to file a valuation
complaint as an owner, contending that the owner must hold legal title to the
property. Company responds that, first, it had sufficient ownership interest, an
equitable interest, to have standing to file the complaint. Second, it maintains that
the complaint satisfies the standing requirement because the complaint listed
Company and Partnership as the owner of the property, each of which, at some
point, owned the property.
{¶ 12} We conclude that the holder of an equitable interest in real property
does not have standing to file a valuation complaint. We further conclude that
Partnership held legal title to the property when Company and Partnership filed
their joint complaint and that Partnership had standing to proceed on the joint
complaint.
{¶ 13} R.C. 5715.19(A)(1) provides for the filing of valuation complaints:
“Any person owning taxable real property in the county * * * may file [a
valuation] complaint regarding any such determination affecting any real property
in the county * * * .”
{¶ 14} In Soc. Natl. Bank v. Wood Cty. Bd. of Revision (1998), 81 Ohio
St.3d 401, 403, 692 N.E.2d 148, 150, we held that a complainant under the statute
“must own taxable real property in the county at the time the complaint is filed.”
In Buckeye Foods v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 459, 461,
678 N.E.2d 917, 919, we ruled that standing to file valuation complaints is
jurisdictional. Standing is jurisdictional in administrative appeals “where parties
must meet strict standing requirements in order to satisfy the threshold requirement
3
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
for the administrative tribunal to obtain jurisdiction.” State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v.
Suster (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 77, 701 N.E.2d 1002, 1008, fn. 4. Thus, to have
standing, one filing a valuation complaint as the owner of real property must own
real property in the county when such person files the complaint to invoke the
jurisdiction of the board of revision.
{¶ 15} To satisfy this standing requirement, Company maintains that it
owned an equitable interest in the property. However, in Bloom v. Wides (1955),
164 Ohio St. 138, 141, 57 O.O. 132, 134, 128 N.E.2d 31, 33, the court stated,
“[w]here the term ‘owner’ is employed with reference to land or buildings, it is
commonly understood to mean the person who holds the legal title.” Moreover, in
State ex rel. Multiplex, Inc. v. S. Euclid (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 167, 169-170, 65
O.O.2d 383, 384-385, 304 N.E.2d 906, 907-908, the court, citing Bloom, ruled that
a purchaser that had not yet taken title to real property was not the owner of the
property. Consequently, to be the owner of real property, the person must hold
legal title to the property, not simply an equitable interest in the property.
{¶ 16} Company also argues that Bloom and Multiplex interpreted the term
“owner” and that R.C. 5715.19 employs the phrase “person owning taxable real
property.” Nevertheless, in Refreshment Serv. Co. v. Lindley (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d
400, 403, 21 O.O.3d 251, 253, 423 N.E.2d 1119, 1122, we construed the phrase
“person * * * owning or having a beneficial interest in taxable personal property *
* *,” found in R.C. 5711.01(B). We contrasted “owning” with “having a beneficial
interest”:
“[W]e construe the term ‘beneficial interest’ to include the interest of one
who is in possession of all characteristics of ownership other than legal title of the
taxable property.”
{¶ 17} Thus, a person owning property has legal title to it; a person having
the beneficial interest in property has possession of all characteristics of ownership
other than legal title. Since R.C. 5715.19 does not contain language allowing
4
January Term, 1999
someone other than the person holding legal title to file a complaint, we conclude
that the owner of an equitable interest in real property does not have standing to file
a complaint.
{¶ 18} Partnership, however, did hold legal title to the property and was the
owner of it when Siegel filed the complaint, which named Company and
Partnership as owner. Thus, this complaint identified an owner of the property,
rendering it a valid complaint.
{¶ 19} Accordingly, we affirm, for different reasons, the decision of the
BTA, and remand the cause to the BTA for a decision consistent with this opinion.
Judgment accordingly.
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
DOUGLAS and RESNICK, JJ., dissent.
PFEIFER, J., dissents.
__________________
PFEIFER, J., dissenting.
{¶ 20} In my opinion, a holder of an equitable interest in real property does
have standing to file a valuation complaint.
__________________
5