discussing mutual mistake and noting that school board acted in good faith
How later courts described this case
- discussing mutual mistake and noting that school board acted in good faith
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 79 Ohio St.3d 216.]
THE STATE EX REL. WALKER, APPELLEE, v. LANCASTER CITY SCHOOL
DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL., APPELLANTS.
[Cite as State ex rel. Walker v. Lancaster City School Dist. Bd. of Edn.,
1997-Ohio-396.]
Schools—Teacher salaries—Contracts—Mutual mistake—Years of service credit
requirements—Board of education that erroneously awarded a year of
service credit has authority to correct that error.
(No. 96-1645—Submitted March 31, 1997—Decided July 16, 1997.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Fairfield County, No. 95-CA-0024.
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{¶ 1} During the 1991-1992 school year, appellant, Lancaster City School
District Board of Education (“Board”), employed appellee, Sandra Walker, as a
substitute teacher. Excluding half days, Walker worked 106 days for the Board that
year. Including half days, she worked 113.5 days for the Board. Walker also
worked nine days that year as a substitute teacher for the Fairfield Union Local
School District.
{¶ 2} The Board hired Walker as a full-time teacher beginning with the
1992-1993 school year and placed her at Step 0 on its salary schedule. Pursuant to
R.C. 3317.14, the Board adopted annual teachers’ salary schedules with increments
based on academic training and years of service. By placing Walker at Step 0, the
Board did not credit her service as a substitute teacher in the 1991-1992 school
year. The Board placed Walker at Step 1 on its salary schedule for the 1993-1994
school year and at Step 2 on its 1994-1995 salary schedule.
{¶ 3} In August 1994, Walker contacted the school district’s human
resources department, and requested that the Board grant her an additional year of
service because of her substitute teaching experience during the 1991-1992 school
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year. At that time, Dr. Jacalyn R. Osborne had just been assigned as director of
the department. Osborne received information concerning Walker’s 1991-1992
experience from the Lancaster City School District payroll clerk and the Fairfield
Union Local School District. Osborne also received a newsletter by the Lancaster
Education Association (“LEA”), the exclusive representative of teachers employed
by the Board, which indicated that teachers could get credit for one year on the
salary schedule if they had substitute teaching experience in any school year of 120
days aggregated for time spent in one or more districts.
{¶ 4} Osborne added the figure provided by the district payroll clerk, which
included half days, to the nine days Walker had worked for the Fairfield Union
Local School District and recommended that the Board grant Walker an additional
year of service credit for her 1991-1992 substitute teaching experience. Osborne
based her recommendation on a mistaken interpretation of the “years of service”
definition in R.C. 3317.13(A) and the information contained in the LEA newsletter.
On August 25, 1994, the Board, without discussion, adopted the recommendation
and increased Walker to Step 3 on the salary schedule.
{¶ 5} In September 1994, Dianne L. Combs, LEA President, advised
Osborne that she had received inquiries from other teachers with substitute teaching
experience concerning their possible entitlement to additional service credit.
Combs requested that Osborne state whether under the Board’s policy time could
be combined from more than one school district to satisfy the 120-day service-year
requirement. Osborne then recalculated Walker’s substitute teaching service but
did not include half days and did not aggregate the nine days in which Walker
taught at the other school district. By memorandum dated October 18, 1994,
Osborne informed Combs that the Board had erroneously granted Walker the
service credit for her 1991-1992 substitute teaching experience:
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January Term, 1997
“Sandy Walker had only 106 days in 1991-92 in Lancaster City Schools.
Earlier she was erroneously awarded a one-year experience increment increase by
including hours of work as a [substitute teacher] in another district.
“In that our research indicates that by definition (ORC 3317.13A) a year of
substitute teaching service credit for salary step increase purposes is 120 full days
of substitute teaching in one school year in our school district, it is our belief that
we have erred in giving Ms. Walker a step increase for the 1991-92 school year. *
* *” (Emphasis sic.)
{¶ 6} Osborne then recommended that Walker’s previous step increase be
withdrawn, and on October 27, 1994, the Board adopted the recommendation.
Osborne’s recommendation and the Board’s action comported with the Board’s
practice of never aggregating teaching experience from different school districts to
meet the 120-day requirement in R.C. 3317.13(A) for an additional year of service
credit.
{¶ 7} Instead of filing a grievance under Article VI of the collective
bargaining agreement between the Board and the LEA, Walker filed a complaint in
the Court of Appeals for Fairfield County. Walker requested a writ of mandamus
to compel appellants, the Board and its treasurer, to restore her service year credit
and award her back pay in the amount she would have received if the credit had not
been revoked, together with appropriate contributions to the State Teachers
Retirement Fund. The case was submitted to the court of appeals on the parties’
evidence and briefs. The court of appeals granted the writ.
{¶ 8} The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.
____________________
Cloppert, Portman, Sauter, Latanick & Foley and David G. Latanick, for
appellee.
Bricker & Eckler and Sue Wyskiver Yount, for appellants.
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COOK, J.
{¶ 9} Before we can reach the question of the revocability of service credit,
we must address the Board’s assertion that the grievance and arbitration procedure
of a collective bargaining agreement constitutes an adequate remedy at law when
pursuing a claim for wages, including placement on a teachers’ salary schedule,
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between a public employer and an
exclusive bargaining representative.
{¶ 10} A writ of mandamus will not issue where there is an adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of the law. R.C. 2731.05. A remedy is adequate if
it is complete, beneficial, and speedy. State ex rel. Horwitz v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court
of Common Pleas, Probate Div. (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 323, 328, 603 N.E.2d 1005,
1009. A grievance and arbitration procedure in a collective bargaining agreement
generally provides an adequate legal remedy, which precludes extraordinary relief
in mandamus, when violations of the agreement are alleged by a person who is a
member of the bargaining unit covered by the agreement. State ex rel. Zimmerman
v. Tompkins (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 447, 449, 663 N.E.2d 639, 641.
{¶ 11} Contrary to the Board’s assertion, however, State ex rel. Johnson v.
Cleveland Hts./Univ. Hts. School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 189, 652
N.E.2d 750, does not always mandate that a grievance and arbitration procedure in
a collective bargaining agreement constitutes an adequate remedy for a teacher’s
claim that she is entitled to increased salary based on an increment in years of
training. The Johnson claimant conceded that her claim was based on the collective
bargaining agreement. Id. at 192, 652 N.E.2d at 752. Conversely, Walker denies
that her claim is based on the collective bargaining agreement.
{¶ 12} Article VI(A)(2) of the collective bargaining agreement between the
Board and the LEA defines a “grievance” as a “complaint involving the alleged
violation, misinterpretation, or misapplication of this contract.” The agreement
does not address calculation of days of substitute teaching experience for service
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January Term, 1997
credit purposes. Nor does it contain provisions concerning the Board’s authority to
revoke previously granted service credit. In the absence of a grievable issue, the
grievance and arbitration procedure does not constitute an adequate legal remedy
in the ordinary course of law. See, also, Tapo v. Columbus Bd. of Edn. (1987), 31
Ohio St.3d 105, 31 OBR 268, 509 N.E.2d 419, syllabus. Accordingly, we reject
the Board’s first proposition of law.
{¶ 13} Appellants assert, in their second proposition of law, that a board of
education that has erroneously awarded a year of service credit must have the
authority to correct that error.
{¶ 14} R.C. 3317.13(A)(1) defines “years of service” to include “[a]ll years
of teaching service in the same school district * * *, regardless of training level,
with each year consisting of at least one hundred twenty days under a teacher’s
contract[.]” Pursuant to R.C. 3317.13(A)(1), the school board is not required to
aggregate either teaching experience from different school districts or half days
from the same school district. See, generally, State ex rel. Filipiak v. Midview Local
School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1993), 95 Ohio App.3d 139, 641 N.E.2d 1380; Oney v.
Westerville City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (Sept. 29, 1981), Franklin App. No. 81AP-
171, unreported, 1981 WL 3488. Nonetheless, despite the statutory definition of
“years of service,” a board of education is free to establish its own service credit
requirements. See, e.g., Maple Hts. Teachers Assn. v. Maple Hts. Bd. of Edn.
(1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 314, 6 OBR 374, 453 N.E.2d 619, syllabus (“Notwithstanding
the definition of ‘years of service’ in R.C. 3317.13, a board of education is
authorized by R.C. 3317.14 to establish its own service requirements as long as
each teacher is given full credit for a minimum of five years’ prior actual teaching
experience.”).
{¶ 15} The court of appeals, relying on State ex rel. Madden v. Windham
Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 86, 537 N.E.2d
646, held that once the Board granted the one-year service credit to Walker, it could
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not revoke that credit. In Madden, a school board granted a one-year service credit
to a teacher even though she had not taught a sufficient number of days during that
year to be eligible for the credit. This court held that the school board was not
entitled to withdraw the credit when the teacher resigned and returned to her
position eight years later, because “although [the school board] had discretion in
1968 whether to credit [the teacher] with one year of teaching, it did not have
continuing discretion to withdraw it at a later date.” Id. at 89-90, 537 N.E.2d at
649.
{¶ 16} In the present case, the court of appeals determined that under
Madden, “[o]nly if the record demonstrates some action by the teacher indicating
she voluntarily and knowingly relinquished her right to the additional year of
service is the Board entitled to reduce it.” The Board claims, however, that the
award of additional service credit to Walker resulted from mistake, not a
discretionary decision to vary from the statute. Therefore, the Board continues,
the court of appeals’ reliance on Madden is misplaced. The Madden court
suggested its decision may have been different had the service credit been the result
of mistake or fraud. Id. at 89, 537 N.E.2d at 648 (“In the case before us, it is
undisputed that when respondent credited relator with one year of teaching
experience, it was under no obligation to do so since she only had one hundred five
days of teaching in the prior year. Clearly such an act was discretionary and was
not the product of any mistake or fraud.” [Emphasis added.]). If the additional
service credit to Walker resulted from mistake, then Madden is not controlling.
{¶ 17} The court of appeals made no express finding as to whether the
Board committed a mistake. Our plenary authority in extraordinary actions permits
us to consider the instant appeal as if it had been filed in this court originally. State
ex rel. Minor v. Eschen (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 134, 138, 656 N.E.2d 940, 943, citing
State ex rel. Natalina Food Co. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. (1990), 55 Ohio St.3d
98, 99, 562 N.E.2d 1383, 1384; State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm. (1967), 11
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January Term, 1997
Ohio St.2d 141, 40 O.O.2d 141, 228 N.E.2d 631, paragraph ten of the syllabus.
Accordingly, we determine the factual issue of mistake de novo.
{¶ 18} A finding of mistake is supported by the weight of the evidence,
particularly the deposition testimony of Osborne. Osborne testified that her
decision to recommend that Walker receive the credit was based on her mistaken
interpretation of “years of service” as defined in R.C. 3317.13(A) — she was not
aware of the Board’s authority to refuse to aggregate teaching experience from
different districts or half days from the same district. The mistake also resulted
from her reliance on the information in the LEA Newsletter, her inexperience in
calculating service credit, and her belief that she had to act quickly because salary
corrections could not be made midyear.
{¶ 19} Walker relies solely on the LEA President’s statement that the
assistant superintendent for the Board told her (LEA President) at an August 1994
meeting that the Board accepted service credit for 120 days of substitute teaching
experience from one or more school districts. This purported statement of policy,
however, is rebutted by appellants’ evidence as well as the LEA President’s
September 1994 letter asking Osborne whether time could be combined from more
than one district to meet the service credit requirement. As the Board notes, if the
LEA President had been advised of this Board policy in August 1994, she would
not have inquired about the same issue less than a month later.
{¶ 20} Thus, we conclude that the credit resulted from a mutual mistake,
and not from the application of an existing policy or a discretionary decision by the
Board. In the absence of a discretionary choice by the Board to give credit more
generous than statutorily mandated, Walker had no legal right to the service credit.
{¶ 21} The mistake here is a mutual mistake of fact and law permitting
rescission. See 1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Contracts (1981) 385, Mistake,
Section 152(1); Reilley v. Richards (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 352, 353, 632 N.E.2d
507, 509. Walker requested the service credit under the mistaken belief that she
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was entitled to it under the applicable law and the facts of her employment history.
Likewise, Osborne labored under the same mistaken belief when recommending to
the Board that Walker be credited with the requested year of service. When the
mistake was discovered due to demands by other teachers for similar treatment, it
was promptly corrected by the Board. Osborne and the Board acted in good faith.
See Restatement of Contracts 2d 416, Mistake, Section 157. Walker suffered no
loss; she was paid in accordance with the mistake for two months and then returned
to the correct step on the pay scale. Considerations regarding recovery of funds
paid by mistake, as analyzed in the authority cited by Walker, Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Cent. Natl. Bank of Cleveland (1953), 159 Ohio St. 423, 50 O.O.
364, 112 N.E.2d 636; State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher (1949), 151 Ohio St.
391, 39 O.O. 221, 86 N.E.2d 5; Cincinnati v. Gas Light & Coke Co. (1895), 53
Ohio St. 278, 41 N.E. 239, are not implicated here because the Board is not seeking
repayment from Walker.
{¶ 22} Based on the foregoing, we sustain appellants’ second proposition
of law and reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
Judgment reversed.
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., dissent.
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ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., dissenting.
{¶ 23} I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
DOUGLAS and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting
opinion.
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