State ex rel. Boggs v. Springfield Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn.

[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 72 Ohio St.3d 94.]

THE STATE EX REL. BOGGS ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. SPRINGFIELD LOCAL

SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, APPELLEE.

[Cite as State ex rel. Boggs v. Springfield Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn.,

1995-Ohio-202.]

Mandamus—Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss improperly used by court, when.

(No. 94-436—Submitted March 7, 1995—Decided April 26, 1995.)

Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. 16451.

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{¶ 1} According to the amended complaint, appellants/relators were

employed as bus drivers under a collective bargaining agreement with the

Springfield Local School District Board of Education. On August 31, 1993, the

agreement expired by its own terms. The agreement was not extended by the union.

{¶ 2} On September 13, 1993, the board authorized its superintendent to

enter into a pupil transportation contract with an outside third party. In the same

resolution, the board stated that the bus driver positions would be abolished once

the third-party contract was effective.

{¶ 3} Relators allege that their group comprises continuing contract

employees and limited contract employees pursuant to R.C. 3319.081. Following

the board's September 13, 1993 authorization to enter into the transportation

agreement, relators demanded that the board honor their statutory contracts.

{¶ 4} On or about September 23, 1993, the superintendent sent notice to the

relators that all bus drivers could be laid off effective October 8, 1993. On or about

October 1, 1993, the board tendered its final offer to the relators, stating that the

parties were at an ultimate impasse and that the terms of the final offer would be

implemented at the close of business on October 8, 1993. Relators rejected the final

offer and again demanded that the board honor their statutory contracts.

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{¶ 5} On Saturday October 9, 1993, the board executed a pupil

transportation contract with a third party. Two days later, on Monday, October 11,

1993, relators' jobs were abolished.

{¶ 6} This action in mandamus was initiated on September 17, 1993, after

the board authorized its superintendent to enter into the pupil transportation

contract, but before relators' jobs were abolished on October 11, 1993. Relators

allege that the board terminated their statutory contracts in violation of their

statutory contracts. Relators seek to compel the board to reinstate the relators to

their positions as bus drivers, to award back pay and all benefits from October 11,

1993, and to recognize the relators' continuing and limited contracts under R.C.

3119.081 et. seq.

{¶ 7} The board filed no answer, but on September 30, 1993, filed a motion

to dismiss the complaint because (1) it had not been brought in the name of the state

of Ohio, and (2) it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The

board's motion included several attachments. Relators filed a supplemental

complaint on October 18, 1993, bringing the action in the name of the state of Ohio

and restating many of the facts from the original complaint.

{¶ 8} On December 23, 1993, the parties argued the case before the court

of appeals. On January 19, 1994, the court of appeals denied relators' petition for

a writ of mandamus and dismissed the case. The cause is now before us upon an

appeal as of right.

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Lucas, Prendergast, Albright, Gibson & Newman and James E. Melle, for

appellants.

Johnson, Balazs & Angelo and Michael J. Angelo, for appellee.

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Per Curiam.

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January Term, 1995

{¶ 9} A Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a

complaint. State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1992), 65 Ohio

St.3d 545, 548, 605 N.E.2d 378, 381. In reviewing the complaint, the court must

take all of the material allegations as admitted and construe all reasonable

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Id.

{¶ 10} "'A complaint in mandamus states a claim if it alleges the existence

of the legal duty and the want of an adequate remedy at law with sufficient

particularity so that the respondent is given reasonable notice of the claim

asserted.'" Id., quoting State ex rel. Alford v. Willoughby (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d

221, 224, 12 O.O.3d 229, 230, 390 N.E.2d 782, 785. "In order for a court to dismiss

a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted * * *, it

must appear beyond doubt from the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of

facts entitling him to recovery." O'Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc.

(1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 71 O.O.2d 223, 327 N.E.2d 753, syllabus.

{¶ 11} Thus, a complaint for a writ of mandamus is not subject to dismissal

under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) if the complaint alleges the existence of a legal duty by the

respondent and the lack of an adequate remedy at law for the relator with sufficient

particularity to put the respondent on notice of the substance of the claim(s) being

asserted against it, and it appears that the plaintiff might prove some set of facts

entitling him to relief.

{¶ 12} The relators' complaint below complies with this standard.1 The

complaint alleges the existence of a clear legal duty by the board and the lack of an

1. The amended verified complaint provides in part:

"1. * * * [Certain named relators] are employees of [the board], each of whom hold[s]

continuing contracts of employment pursuant to R.C. 3319.081.

"2. * * * [Other named relators] are not yet continuing contract employees pursuant to

R.C. 3319.081, but, have limited contracts of employment for the school year 1993-1994 with

Respondent.

"* * *

"6. All Relators demanded that Respondent honor their contracts and their tenure.

"* * *

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adequate remedy by the relators with sufficient particularity to put the respondent

on notice of the relators' claims against it. State ex rel. Hanson, supra, 65 Ohio

St.3d at 548-549, 605 N.E.2d at 381-382. Further, the complaint alleges facts

which, if proven, might entitle the relators to relief. O'Brien, supra, 42 Ohio St.2d

242, 71 O.O.2d 223, 327 N.E.2d 753, syllabus. Thus, the complaint states a claim

against the board.

{¶ 13} Further, under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), respondent was not permitted to

support its motion to dismiss by relying on anything outside of the complaint:

"[T]he movant may not rely on allegations or evidence outside the

complaint; otherwise, the [Civ.R. 12(B)(6)] motion must be treated, with

reasonable notice, as a Civ.R. 56 motion for summary judgment. * * * Even then,

only certain forms of evidence may be submitted to support the motion." (Citations

omitted.) State ex rel. Hanson, supra, 65 Ohio St.3d at 548, 605 N.E.2d at 381.

{¶ 14} Thus, if the court of appeals below relied upon the documents

attached to the board's motion in rendering its decision, the court was required to

convert the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Id. Failure to notify

the parties that the court is converting a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss into one

for summary judgment is, itself, reversible error. State ex rel. Baran v. Fuerst

(1990), 55 Ohio St.3d 94, 97, 563 N.E.2d 713, 716. The court of appeals below

gave no notice that it was converting respondent's motion to dismiss into one for

summary judgment.

"10. On or about Saturday October 9, 1993 Respondent executed a pupil transportation

contract with Seattle (Ex. 10) and effective Monday October 11, 1993 Relators jobs were

purportedly abolished.

"11. Because Respondent has not complied with Relators' rights under R.C. 3319.081 et.

seq., the contract entered into with Seattle is neither valid nor effective.

"* * *

"13. Relators have a clear legal right to be reinstated to their positions pursuant to their

continuing and limited contracts with Respondent and to receive all back pay and benefits from

September 13, 1993. Respondent has a clear legal duty to honor the continuing and written contracts

of Relators and pay them back pay for the period of time that they have been wrongfully excluded

from employment. Relators have no adequate remedy at law."

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January Term, 1995

{¶ 15} Instead, the court of appeals stated:

"[T]he relators in this case have not shown a clear legal right to be

reinstated, nor have they demonstrated that no other plain and adequate remedy

exists in the ordinary course of the law to vindicate whatever contractual rights they

may have with respect to their continuing contracts of employment. Moreover, the

relators' contention that their positions were not, in fact, abolished is a factual

determination to be made in an appropriate civil action and not the subject for an

action in mandamus. Accordingly, because the relators have not established a clear

legal right to the relief sought, we deny a writ of mandamus."

{¶ 16} Under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), the court was required to take all of the

factual allegations in the relators' complaint as true, including those regarding the

abolition of relators' positions. State ex rel. Hanson, supra, 65 Ohio St.3d at 548,

605 N.E.2d at 381. The court did not do so. Therefore, the court did not properly

use Civ.R. 12(B)(6) as the basis of its decision.

{¶ 17} Further, the court did not base its decision on Civ.R. 56. Under

Civ.R. 56(C), a court may only grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Civ.R. 56(C). The factual question noted by the court of appeals regarding

the abolition of relators' positions appears to involve a genuine issue of material

fact and, therefore, should have prevented the granting of summary judgment on

the board's behalf. State ex rel. Baran, supra, 55 Ohio St.3d at 97, 563 N.E.2d at

716. Moreover, this issue need not be resolved only in a contract action. We have

held that a contract action is not an adequate legal remedy for enforcing a right to

continued public employment. State ex rel. Donaldson v. Athens City School Dist.

Bd. of Edn. (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 145, 149, 624 N.E.2d 709, 713.

{¶ 18} Additionally, the evidence attached to the board's motion was not of

the form that may be used to support a motion for summary judgment. Under

Civ.R. 56(C), only "depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions,

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affidavits, transcripts of evidence in the pending case, and written stipulations of

fact" are permitted to support a motion for summary judgment. Civ.R. 56(C). The

letters, contract proposals, and board minutes attached to the board's motion do not

fit any of the categories listed in Civ.R. 56. No affidavits or authenticating

testimony for these documents was attached to respondent's motion. Thus, none of

the board's evidence properly supports a motion for summary judgment. State ex

rel. Freeman v. Morris (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 107, 109, 579 N.E.2d 702, 703.

Therefore, the court could not have properly rendered its decision based on Civ.R.

56.

{¶ 19} This was error. State ex rel. Hanson, supra, 65 Ohio St.3d 545, 605

N.E.2d 378. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and

remand the cause for further proceedings on the relators' complaint.

Judgment reversed

and cause remanded.

MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur.

WRIGHT and COOK, JJ., not participating.

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