Kerley v. Servies

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

RICHARD KERLEY,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 4:23-CV-22-GSL

BRADLEY ROBERT SERVIES, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, [DE 46],

filed on January 7, 2025. The motion has been fully briefed and is now ripe for ruling. The

Court, having reviewed both the motion and all supporting documentation, now finds that entry

of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants is proper. For the reasons below, the Court

GRANTS Defendants’ motion in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

As a preliminary note, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires that a party support

the facts upon which it relies at summary judgment by “citing to particular parts of materials in

the record” which establishes those facts, or by showing that the materials cited do not establish

the absence of a genuine dispute. See Carroll v. Horizon Bank, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30552, at

*2 (N.D. Ind. 2022) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)); Sommerfield v. City of Chi., 863 F.3d 645,

650 (7th Cir. 2017). This means that for each factual assertion in the statement of facts and

argument sections, the brief should cite to a page in a specific exhibit that supports that assertion.

See Carroll, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30552, at *2. Particularly relevant to the case at bar, even

pro se litigants must follow these procedural rules. Collins v. Illinois, 554 F.3d 693, 697; see

Pearle Vision, Inc. v. Romm, 541 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2008).

The Court notes that while Defendants’ statement of facts properly adheres to the citation

requirements, Plaintiff’s recitation of facts, in contrast, falls short. In “Plaintiff’s Memorandum

in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment,” [DE 61], he argues that

Defendants’ motion “mischaracterizes key facts, ignores relevant legal precedent, and selectively

presents evidence.” [Id. at 1]. Plaintiff goes on to say that the case is “replete with genuine

disputes of material fact, including whether Plaintiff’s traffic stop was a pretext for retaliation,

whether officers used excessive force, whether Plaintiff’s recording devices were unlawfully

seized, and whether officers engaged in a conspiracy to fabricate evidence.” [Id.]. But, while

Plaintiff does raise some legal citations in his brief, there are no supporting evidentiary citations

offered outside of occasional references to the Lafayette Police Department’s policies. [See, e.g.,

id. at 4–5]. Similarly, in Plaintiff’s “Response to Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts and

Genuine Issues in Dispute,” [DE 62], Plaintiff either admits to Defendants’ proffered statement

of material facts (which are supported by citations to the evidence) without issue, or, where he

contests Defendants’ factual statements, asserts facts often lacking in any citation to the record.

The sole exception to this again appears to be sporadic citations to the police department’s

policies, as well as occasional citations to the Defendants’ body cam footage. [See id.]. As such,

the Court will accept as uncontested all factual assertions beyond those to which Plaintiff has

explicitly provided support from the record. See Carroll, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30552, at *2–3.

Having addressed this, the Court now turns to the factual background of the case.

Plaintiff Richard Kerley is a resident of St. John, Indiana and a self-proclaimed “cop-

watcher” or “First Amendment auditor,” who records and publishes videos of police activity on

video streaming and social media services like Youtube and Facebook. [DE 1, ⁋ 14, n.1; DE 59-4

at 12:25–13:17]. According to Plaintiff, the primary goal of a “cop-watcher” is to ensure police

accountability by “mak[ing] sure that the police . . . do what they’re supposed to do and don’t do

what they shouldn’t be doing.” [DE 59-4 at 13:23–14:2]. To educate themselves on what police

conduct is considered “proper,” cop-watchers like Plaintiff watch online content from other cop-

watchers within the same community who “offer continuous information to help [one] learn

about the protections from the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, [and] Fifth Amendment.”

[Id. at 14:3–10]. While some of the cop-watchers Plaintiff follows are former police officers,

neither Plaintiff nor any of the channels Plaintiff familiarizes himself with have attended the

Indiana Law Enforcement Academy. [Id. at 14:11–13]. Prior to the date of this incident, Plaintiff

did not know either of the Defendant officers or any other member of the Lafayette Police

Department. [Id. at 11:2–7].

On March 4, 2021, Plaintiff traveled approximately an hour and a half to Lafayette,

Indiana to attend his first “cop-watching” session with fellow cop-watcher Bryan Wilkins, whose

Youtube channel Plaintiff follows.1 [Id. at 15:1–16:15]. Plaintiff met Wilkins at a gas station in

Lafayette and decided to use Plaintiff’s car that evening for “cop-watching,” whereby Plaintiff

and Wilkins would follow police activity by monitoring a police scanner app on Wilkins’ phone.

[Id. at 20:20–21:12, 22:7–18]. While Plaintiff’s goal was to observe police activity, Plaintiff did

not intend to interact with police or to be pulled over. [Id. at 28:20–22, 33:18–34:2].

Because Plaintiff was unfamiliar with Lafayette, he followed Wilkins’ directions on

where to go. [Id. at 25:20–25]. After leaving the gas station, Plaintiff and Wilkins pulled into the

parking lot of a Motel 6 and remained there for approximately one to two minutes before slowly

turning around. [Id. at 26:1–11, 28:1–11; DE 59-1 at 3]. However, despite monitoring police

activity on Wilkins’ scanner, Plaintiff was apparently unaware that this Motel 6 was designated

1 Wilkins is also known by his Youtube channel name, “Chuck Bronson.” [DE 59-4 at 16:18–20].

as a high crime area for various criminal activities, including prostitution, robbery, theft, and in

particular, drug trafficking.2 [DE 59-4 at 27:4–16; DE 59-1 at 3]. As part of a multi-day directed

patrol operation conducted by the Lafayette Police Department, Officer Shana Wainscott served

as an unmarked spotter calling out vehicles which made suspicious visits to the area, including

vehicles which either arrived and remained at the hotel for fifteen or less minutes, lurked around

the hotel, or had someone exit a hotel room to meet with the vehicle’s occupants for a brief time.

[DE 59-1 at 3–4]. Once Officer Wainscott spotted the vehicle, other officers in the area would

then attempt to stop it. [Id. at 4].

Upon exiting the parking lot, Plaintiff noticed multiple police officers began following

him and Wilkins. [DE 59-4 at 34:14–35:3]. Police cars followed Plaintiff and Wilkins for around

thirty-four minutes, during which time Plaintiff attempted to avoid police interaction by pulling

off and reentering the road, obeying all traffic laws, traveling right at or just below the speed

limit, and engaging his turn signal at least 200 feet before making a turn. [Id. at 32:4–9, 32:24–

33:14, 35:7–16]. To determine the requisite two-hundred-foot distance, Plaintiff relied upon

“visual estimates.” [Id. at 35:17–19]. Plaintiff, however, admitted that at some point it was

possible he could have engaged his turn signal less than the requisite two-hundred-foot distance.

[Id. at 35:20–23].

Eventually, Officer Israel Salazar, having developed a good faith belief that Plaintiff

failed to signal a turn with at least 200 feet of notice, activated his lights and pulled Plaintiff

over. [Id. at 36:14–16; DE 59-1 at 1]. Once pulled over, Officer Salazar approached the driver’s

side of the vehicle while Officer Bradley Servies approached the passenger side. [DE 59-4 at

2 While Plaintiff highlighted that he was unaware of the directed patrol being conducted at the Motel 6, it appears

Wilkins was aware of the police presence there. Specifically, Officer Steven Prothero noted that Wilkins had likely

been monitoring police activity in the area as he arrived one night prior to Plaintiff being pulled over to film another

stop being conducted as part of the operation. [DE 59-1 at 5].

38:6–11]. Neither officer addressed Plaintiff or Wilkins by name and there was no indication that

either officer recognized Plaintiff or Wilkins. [Id. at 38:2–11, 39:6–16]. Plaintiff, however, was

aware from conversations with Wilkins that Officer Salazar had a protective order against

Wilkins. [Id. at 18:19–19:15]. Wilkins had the hood of his sweatshirt pulled up and his head

covered as the officers approached the vehicle. [Id. at 38:23–39:5].

Once the officers approached the vehicle’s rear windows, however, both became

concerned when they noticed Wilkins begin to reach for an unknown object on the floorboard

and not follow orders to show his hands. [Id. at 40:21–41:4; Body-worn Camera Footage of

Officer Servies, 2021002587-8 at 3:23:23; Body-worn Camera Footage of Officer Salazar,

2021002587-10 at 22:14:40–22:13:07]. Believing that Wilkins was reaching for a handgun, both

officers instructed the passengers to raise their hands multiple times before drawing their service

weapons, backing away, and instructing the passengers to exit the vehicle.3 [DE 59-4 at 42:21–

43:13, 44:23–45:2].

Upon exiting the vehicle, Plaintiff was specifically instructed to put his phone down—

which he was using to record the altercation—and face away from the officers. [Id. at 44:3–9].

Plaintiff did not comply with the order to put his phone down. [Id. at 44:3–13, 44:23–45:9]. The

officers provided further instructions to execute the traffic stop and handcuff Plaintiff, who still

had not relinquished his phone. [Id. 45:19–24]. The officers then proceeded to pat Plaintiff down

to check for weapons and, once finished, confiscated the phone and placed him into Officer

Servies’ squad car for approximately fifteen minutes. [Id. at 46:17–24, 48:8–11]. The same was

3 Officers Servies and Prothero acknowledged that they did not recognize Wilkins as the passenger until after he was

removed from the vehicle due to Wilkins’ concealment of his face. [DE 59-1 at 1, 3]. Both officers stated that they

know Wilkins through “reputation and experience” as a “city resident who attempts to get in confrontations with

officers with the intent to film the encounter.” [Id.]. In addition, Officer Prothero highlighted a then-recent directive

to minimize encounters and conversations with Wilkins. [Id. at 3].

done to Wilkins, who was placed in a separate squad car. [Id. at 46:16–18]. At all times during

the officers’ interactions with Plaintiff and Wilkins their body-worn cameras were unmuted. [See

generally Body-worn Camera Footage of Officer Servies, 2021002587-8 at 0:29–16:43; Body-

worn Camera Footage of Officer Salazar, 2021002587-10 at 0:35–9:44].

Sometime after Plaintiff and Wilkins were placed into the squad cars, Officer Servies

explained to Plaintiff why the high-risk stop was conducted. [DE 59-1 at 1]. After receiving

Plaintiff’s information and ensuring that there were no active warrants in place for his arrest,

Plaintiff and Wilkins were released from their handcuffs, Plaintiff’s phone was returned to him,

and Plaintiff was given a verbal warning for failing to properly signal his turn. [Id.]. At no point

after Plaintiff was released from the squad car did Plaintiff interact with Officer Salazar, nor was

he aware of Officer Salazar’s identity. [DE 59-4 at 47:2–7]. Following the incident, Plaintiff

never indicated to any of the officers that the handcuffs were too tight, and moreover, never

reported a medical or psychological diagnosis related to the detainment. [Id. at 52:17–20, 53:23–

54:7, 57:2–5; DE 59-3 at 1].

On July 7, 2021, Plaintiff sought to review the body-worn camera footage from the

incident and made a public records request to the Lafayette Police Department under Indiana’s

“Access to Public Records Act” (APRA). [DE 50-2 at 6]. Plaintiff received several paper records

and sixteen recordings at a rate of $150 per recording, for a total of $2,440. [Id.; DE 59-4 at

58:7–13].

In March 2023, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, sued Officers Servies and Salazar—both in

their individual and official capacities—under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his First,

Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. [DE 1].4 Plaintiff further alleged a Monell claim

4 Following Defendants’ Answer to the Complaint, [DE 11], Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint naming Wilkins

as an additional plaintiff, as well as Officers Mason Jones, Steven Prothero, Samuel Gawaluck, Cody Fultz, and

under § 1983 against the City of Lafayette for the failure to properly train and supervise its

officers. [Id.]. Following the close of discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment. [DE

46]. The motion has been fully briefed, [see DE 47, 50, 59, 61–63, 67, 68], and is ripe for ruling.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a); Osborn v. JAB Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 126 F.4th 1250, 1258 (7th Cir. 2025). Facts are deemed

“material” when they “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and a

dispute is considered “genuine” when the evidence “is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Osborn, 126 F.4th at 1258 (quoting Ricci v.

DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009)).

The movant “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for

its motion and identifying those portions of” the evidence “which it believes demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

To survive a properly supported motion for summary judgment, “the nonmoving party must

present evidence sufficient to establish a triable issue of fact on all elements of its case.”

McAllister v. Innovation Ventures, LLC, 983 F.3d 963, 969 (7th Cir. 2020). While the facts are

construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party must

Shana Wainscott—each in their individual and official capacities—as additional defendants. [DE 15]. Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint, however, was stricken from the record for failure to abide by the requirements set forth under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). [DE 16]. Specifically, Plaintiff’s amendment fell outside of the twenty-one-

day period to amend as a matter of course under Subsection (a)(1)(B), and thus Plaintiff was required to seek either

Defendants’ consent or leave from this Court under Subsection (a)(2)—neither of which was obtained. [Id.].

Therefore, because no further amendments were sought by Plaintiff, only the defendants named in Plaintiff’s initial

Complaint remain relevant for the matter currently before the Court.

nonetheless present sufficient evidence to place his “‘version of events’ beyond the level of mere

‘speculation or conjecture.’” Osborn, 126 F.4th at 1258 (quoting Est. of Biegert ex rel. Biegert v.

Molitor, 968 F.3d 693, 701 (7th Cir. 2020)).

When analyzing a motion for summary judgment, the Court need only consider the cited

materials and need not search the record for other evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). The

Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly assured the district courts that they are not

required to “scour every inch of the record” for evidence that is potentially relevant to the

summary judgment motion before them. Davis v. United States, 400 F. Supp. 3d 745, 747 (S.D.

Ind. 2019) (citing Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573 (7th Cir. 2017)). See DeSilva v.

DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 867 (7th Cir. 1999) (“A brief must make all arguments accessible to

the judges, rather than ask them to play archaeologist with the record.”). With these principles in

mind, the Court will now turn to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

DISCUSSION

Defendants’ motion essentially raises the following arguments: (1) Plaintiff fails to state a

claim against Officers Servies and Salazar under (a) the First Amendment, (b) the Fourteenth

Amendment, and (c) the Fourth Amendment; (2) even if Defendants’ were liable, Officers

Servies and Salazar are entitled to qualified immunity; and (3) Plaintiff fails to establish an

unconstitutional municipal policy or custom against the City of Lafayette. The Court will address

these arguments in tow.

I. Liability Against Officers Servies and Salazar

Looking first to Plaintiff’s claims against the individual Defendants, Plaintiff alleges

violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983,

Plaintiff must show that he was “deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law,

by a person acting under color of law.” Thurman v. Vill. of Homewood, 446 F.3d 682, 687 (7th

Cir. 2006). To act “under color of state law,” the defendant must “misuse [] power, possessed by

virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of

state law.” Id. (quoting Burrell v. City of Mattoon, 378 F.3d 642, 649 (7th Cir. 2004)). In other

words, the allegedly unconstitutional conduct must be related to the performance of the

defendant’s official duties. Thurman, 446 F.3d at 687. Because the parties do not dispute that

Officers Salazar and Servies were acting under color of state law, the Court’s focus will be on

whether any constitutional deprivations occurred.

A. First Amendment

Plaintiff asserted in the Complaint that Officers Salazar and Servies “knew or should

have known that filming the police and other public servants in performance of their duties,

especially when in public is constitutionally protected.” [DE 1, ⁋ 36]. As such, Plaintiff alleges

that Officers Servies and Salazar initiated an unlawful and pretextual traffic stop in retaliation

against him for videorecording the events which took place on March 4, 2021. [Id.; DE 62 at 5].

Plaintiff further asserts that Officers Salazar and Servies seized his phone and interfered with his

recording, acts which he claims violated the Seventh Circuit’s holding in American Civil

Liberties Union of Illinois v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012). [DE 61 at 2]. Defendants

contend that Plaintiff’s phone was not seized, neither Officer Servies nor Officer Salazar

interfered with Plaintiff’s ability to record, and that Plaintiff has failed to establish any retaliatory

intent. [DE 47 at 7–8].

Beginning with Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim, Plaintiff must show that

“(1) [he] engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment, (2) [he] suffered a deprivation

that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future, and (3) the First Amendment

activity was . . . at least a motivating factor in the Defendant[s’] decision to take the retaliatory

action.” 145 Fisk, LLC v. Nicklas, 986 F.3d 759, 766 (7th Cir. 2021). As to the first element, the

Seventh Circuit has explained that “[a]udio and audiovisual recording are media of expression

commonly used for the preservation and dissemination of information and ideas and thus are

‘included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth

Amendments.’” Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 595 (quoting Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).

See also Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 595 (“The act of making an audio or audiovisual recording is

necessarily included within the First Amendment’s guarantee of speech and press rights as a

corollary of the right to disseminate the resulting recording. The right to publish or broadcast an

audio or audiovisual recording would be insecure, or largely ineffective, if the antecedent act of

making the recording is wholly unprotected…”) (emphasis in original). As such, “[a]udio

recording is entitled to First Amendment protection.” Id. at 597. Defendants do not challenge this

notion, and in fact appear to concede that Plaintiff’s efforts to record the activities of Officers

Salazar and Servies satisfies the first element of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. [DE 47 at 8 (“It is

well established in this Circuit that videotaping police officers in the performance of their duties

is protected conduct under the First Amendment.”)].

Defendants, however, specifically focus their efforts on arguing that Plaintiff has failed to

satisfy the third element, which requires a showing of retaliatory intent. To successfully prove

this element, Plaintiff must show “a causal link between the protected act and the alleged

retaliation.” Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Roger Whitmore

Auto. Servs., Inc. v. Lake Cnty., Ill., 424 F.3d 659, 669 (7th Cir. 2005)). Here, Defendants offer

facts showing that Plaintiff never knew of or previously engaged with Defendants prior to the

underlying incident on March 1, 2021, nor was there reason to believe that Officer Servies knew

who Plaintiff was when speaking to him and running his information. [DE 59-4 at 11:2–7,

24:22–25:3]. Moreover, there was no evidence to conclude that either officer recognized Plaintiff

or Wilkins when initially approaching the vehicle, and that the officers only recognized

Wilkins—whose face was previously covered up by his sweatshirt—after he was removed from

the vehicle. [Id. at 38:23–39:16]. Finally, Plaintiff’s own deposition testimony reveals that he

could not verify that the traffic stop was “motivated” by Plaintiff’s or Wilkins’ filming of the

officers’ activities. [Id. at 64:9–65:16].

In response, Plaintiff does not offer any facts to rebut those provided by Defendants. [See

DE 61 at 2; DE 62 at 5]. Instead, Plaintiff simply reiterates the Seventh Circuit’s holding in

Alvarez that recordings of public officials are protected under the First Amendment, and further,

that retaliatory stops are a violation of the First Amendment. See Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S.

391, 398 (2019) (alteration in original, internal quotation marks omitted) (“[A]s a general matter

the First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory

actions for engaging in protected speech.”). While Plaintiff’s legal citations may be generally

correct, the first citation is not disputed while the second citation lacks any sort of factual

support. As such, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the third element of his retaliation claim, and thus

this claim must fail.

As to Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants seized his phone and interfered with his

recording, Plaintiff’s only source of support is a reference to Lafayette Police Department Policy

219.3, which prohibits “threatening, intimidating, or discouraging individuals from recording

police activities.” [DE 61 at 2; DE 62 at 9]. Plaintiff, however, again fails to offer any factual

support showing that Officers Salazar and Servies intimidated him, threatened him, or

discouraged him from recording. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not offered any factual support to

show that Defendants seized his phone or interfered with his recording.

Therefore, because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the presence of any genuine

disputes of material fact as they pertain to his First Amendment claims, Defendants are entitled

to summary judgment on this issue.

B. Fourteenth Amendment

1. Excessive Force and Miscellaneous Claims

Looking next to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim, Plaintiff raised one issue in the

Complaint concerning an alleged due process violation for excessive fees pertaining to Plaintiff’s

public records requests. [DE 1, ⁋⁋ 39–41]. Defendants, however, appear to have construed

Plaintiff’s claim as not one involving excessive fees, but rather one involving excessive force

and an unconstitutional seizure. [DE 47 at 9]. Specifically, Defendants argue that because the

designated evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff’s alleged injuries occurred before any probable

cause determination was made, Plaintiff’s perceived excessive force claim is more appropriately

addressed under the Fourth Amendment rather than the Fourteenth Amendment. [Id.] See Collins

v. Al-Shami, 851 F.3d 727, 731 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal citations omitted) (“The Fourth

Amendment applies to the period of confinement between a warrantless arrest and the probable-

cause determination; the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs after the

probable-cause determination has been made; and the Eighth Amendment applies after a

conviction.”). Accordingly, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim.

[DE 47 at 9].

In response, Plaintiff appears to raise additional claims not previously stated in the

Complaint. [DE 61 at 2–3; DE 62 at 6]. First, Plaintiff claims that Officers Salazar and Servies

violated due process protections and shocked the conscience by selectively muting their body-

worn cameras and conspiring to fabricate evidence. [DE 62 at 6]. To this end, Plaintiff recites

Lafayette Police Department Policy 602.3.1, which provides that officers are required to activate

body-worn cameras during “all law enforcement-related contacts with citizens,” and points to

Officer Servies’ body-worn camera footage during the time span of 22:21:18 to 22:23:14, and

again from 22:24:36 to 22:28:08. [DE 61 at 2–3; DE 62 at 9]. Plaintiff further claims that

Officers Salazar and Servies “colluded to justify an unlawful stop” by muting their body-worn

camera footage, creating conflicting reports, and making false statements. [DE 61 at 3]. Finally,

Plaintiff raises an equal protection claim by arguing that he was selectively targeted. [DE 62 at

6].

The Court first notes that Defendants appear to have misinterpreted Plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment claim, as Plaintiff indeed raises his unconstitutional seizure claim under the Fourth

Amendment. [See DE 1, ⁋⁋ 33–34]. The Court, however, agrees with Defendants’ analysis that

the timeframe in which Plaintiff’s injuries arose would have placed his claim within the purview

of the Fourth Amendment regardless of whether he properly raised it as such. Therefore, the

Court will analyze that claim under the appropriate standard below. See infra, Section I.C.

As to Plaintiff’s arguments, the Court also notes that none of the claims raised by

Plaintiff in his response brief were initially raised in the Complaint, nor is it apparent that they

are responsive to Defendants’ arguments. Rather, it appears Plaintiff is attempting to sneak

additional claims in through the back door. Moreover, Plaintiff’s claims either lack citations to

factual support or, where factual citations are included, the cited evidence has not been provided

to the Court. [See DE 61 at 3; DE 62 at 6 (citing to body-worn camera footage not tendered to

the Court)]. In other contexts, the Seventh Circuit has analogized non-responsive arguments as a

form of waiver. See Alioto v. Town of Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Kirksey

v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1999) (analogizing a dismissal of a

“nonresponsive response brief” to default judgment); Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461,

466 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming district court’s dismissal of complaint where plaintiff failed to

respond to movant’s specific arguments and finding that the “[f]ailure to respond to an argument

. . . results in waiver”). Other courts within the circuit have reached a similar consensus for

nonresponsive and underdeveloped arguments raised during the summary judgment phase. See,

e.g., McCormick v. Goebel, 655 F. Supp. 3d 748, 760 (N.D. Ind. 2023) (emphasis in original)

(citing Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2012) (“To be explicit, Mr.

McCormick’s briefing is so inadequate that it would reasonably constitute a waiver of any

argument made in this manner.”); De v. City of Chi., 912 F. Supp. 2d 709, 733–34 (N.D. Ill.

2012) (“A party will be deemed to have waived a claim for failing to cite both legal authority and

supporting factual evidence.”).

Given this, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s additional arguments, lacking any form of

factual support or responsiveness, fail to establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to the

Fourteenth Amendment claim.

2. APRA Request

Having addressed the above point, the Court now turns to assess the merits of the only

Fourteenth Amendment claim Plaintiff raised in the Complaint, which concerned an alleged due

process violation for excessive fees pertaining to his public records request. At [DE 66], the

Court noted that neither party addressed the Fourteenth Amendment excessive fee claim in their

summary judgment briefing. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f)(2), the Court sua

sponte invited briefing to address the merits of that claim, with Defendants filing their brief at

[DE 67], and Plaintiff doing so at [DE 68]. The Court reviewed both.

Beginning with Plaintiff’s Complaint, Plaintiff argues that public records requests are

capped at a fee of $150, and thus he was harmed financially by having to pay more than this

amount for the requested public records. [DE 1, ⁋⁋ 39–41]. Although Plaintiff does not identify

the specific statute he is relying upon, that statute is Indiana Code Section 5-14-3-8(g)(1), which

states:

[F]or providing a duplicate of a . . . law enforcement recording, . . . a public agency

may charge a fee, uniform to all purchasers, that does not exceed the sum of the

following: (1) The agency’s direct cost of supplying the information in that form.

However, the fee for a copy of a law enforcement recording may not exceed one

hundred fifty dollars ($150).

(emphasis added).

Plaintiff’s claim fails on two grounds. First, a plain reading of Section 5-14-3-8 indicates

that a fee cap of $150 is applied to each individual law enforcement recording and is not, as

Plaintiff argues, an overall fee ceiling. Here, Plaintiff testified that he requested and received

several paper records, as well as sixteen video recordings, for a total of $2,440.00. [DE 59-4 at

58:7–13; DE 59-2 at 6]. Furthermore, Plaintiff stated that “APRA counselors concluded that

[Lafayette Police Department] charged $150 for each of 16 CDs[.]” [DE 59-2 at 6 (emphasis

added)]. Thus, as Plaintiff’s own testimony indicates, he was charged no more than the statutory

cap for each individual video recording he requested. Because the Court must consider what the

statute’s plain language says, and because it does not appear that Plaintiff was charged more than

the statutory cap for each recording sought, there is no indication that any statutory violation

occurred. See Fam. & Soc. Servs. Admin. v. Saint, 258 N.E.3d 972, 980 (Ind. 2025) (quoting

WTHR-TV v. Hamilton Se. Schs., 178 N.E.3d 1187, 1191 (Ind. 2022) (holding that courts must

consider “both what the statute does—and does not—say, because [courts] cannot ‘add words or

restrictions.’”).

Second, even if a statutory violation had taken place, Plaintiff’s claim does not meet the

threshold required to succeed on a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. The Fourteenth

Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without

due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Due Process Clause has two

components: substantive and procedural. Lukaszczyk v. Cook Cnty., 47 F.4th 587, 599 (7th Cir.

2022). “In a procedural due process claim, this must be an interest in life, liberty, or property[.]”

Snyder v. Smith, 7 F. Supp. 3d 842, 858 (Ind. S.D. 2014) (quoting Ky. Dept. of Corr. v.

Thomspon, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). “[I]n a substantive due process claim, it must be one of

the ‘fundamental rights’—a category of which has been strictly limited by the Supreme Court in

recent years, but which has been held to include interests in ‘marriage, family, procreation, and

the right to bodily integrity.’” Snyder, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 858. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,

272 (1994). While Plaintiff does not specify the type of claim he seeks to bring, his claim does

not appear to succeed under either component.

For procedural due process claims concerning a constitutionally protected property

interest, Plaintiff would need to establish the deprivation occurred without a pre- or post-

deprivation hearing or remedy. See Veterans Legal Def. Fund v. Schwartz, 330 F.3d 937, 939–40

(7th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff has not shown that he was denied an opportunity to challenge the

amount of fees paid, nor has Plaintiff demonstrated a lack of alternative state law remedies

available to redress his claim.

Moreover, “[s]ubstantive due process protects against only the most egregious and

outrageous government action,” Pangman v. Sellen, 839 Fed. Appx. 1, 6 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting

Campos, 932 F.3d at 975), thereby requiring Plaintiff to “allege that the government violated a

fundamental right or liberty,” Lukaszczyk, 47 F.4th at 599 (emphasis added) (citing Washington

v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)). However, such violations must be arbitrary or

irrational. Lukaszczyk, 47 F.4th at 599. Further, the Supreme Court has reiterated that courts

should be “reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for

responsible [decision-making] in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.” Collins v.

City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992). As the Seventh Circuit has explained, “[w]hen

a plaintiff brings a substantive due process claim predicated on the deprivation of a state-created

property interest, [he] must show that the state violated some other substantive constitutional

right or that state law remedies are inadequate. Schwartz, 330 F.3d at 941. As with the procedural

due process analysis, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the presence of a fundamental right, the

violation of some other substantive constitutional right, or the inadequacy of state law remedies.

For these reasons, summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment claims is appropriate.

C. Fourth Amendment

Turning next to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim, Plaintiff stated in the Complaint

that “[Officers Servies and Salazar] knew that making a pretextual stop just to make a seizure

and search of a person and/or his property absent probable cause and doing so by use of force

when no threat is present is a violation of the [Fourth] Amendment.” [DE 1, ⁋ 33]. “The Fourth

Amendment guarantees ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,

and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Defendants

concede that temporarily detaining Plaintiff during the traffic stop constituted a “seizure” of

“persons” as explained by the Supreme Court in Whren v. United States. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).

[DE 47 at 10]. Defendants focus on arguing that the detention was not “unreasonable” under the

circumstances, particularly where Defendants had probable cause to believe a traffic violation

occurred. [Id. at 11-12]. See United States v. Williams, 106 F.3d 1362, 1365 (7th Cir. 1997)

(citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 810) (“In the context of a stop in response to the commission of a

traffic offense, . . . the police need only have probable cause, in other words, circumstances

sufficient to warrant a man or woman of prudence to believe, that a moving violation has

occurred.”).

Defendants split their focus into two parts. First, Defendants assert that the initial traffic

stop was supported by probable cause when Plaintiff failed to properly signal a turn with at least

200 feet of notice. [DE 47 at 11]. In support, Defendants rely on several Seventh Circuit

decisions finding valid stops for various traffic infractions. [Id. at 10]. See United States v. Smith,

80 F.3d 215, 219 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding officer had probable cause to stop a vehicle where the

vehicle had been straddling lanes and the driver failed to signal before turning); Valance v.

Wisel, 110 F.3d 1269, 1275 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding a valid stop where officer suspected driver

of being under the influence of alcohol when driver crossed the centerline twice while navigating

a curve); United States v. Quinones-Sandoval, 943 F.2d 771, 774 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding an

officer was authorized to pull a driver over for improper lane usage when driver was observed

driving erratically); United States v. Fiala, 929 F.2d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 1991) (same). In addition,

Defendants point to testimony from Plaintiff acknowledging that he based his determination of

the 200-foot requirement on “visual estimates,” that it was possible he failed to signal the turn

with at least 200 feet of notice, and that Officer Salazar developed a good faith belief that

Plaintiff failed to provide the requisite notice before signaling his turn. [DE 47 at 11; see DE 59-

4 at 35:17–23; DE 59-1 at 1].

Second, Defendants contend that the detainment of Plaintiff was “reasonably related in

scope to the circumstances which justif[ied] the interference in the first place, [DE 47 at 11], and

that the detention lasted no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, [id.].

Here, Defendants offer facts showing that the traffic stop was elevated into a high risk stop

because of Wilkins’ and Plaintiff’s actions, specifically, Wilkins reaching toward the floorboard

and both Wilkins and Plaintiff failing to comply with orders. [DE 59-4 at 40:21–41:4, 44:3–9,

44:23–45:9; Body-worn Camera Footage of Officer Servies, 2021002587-8 at 3:23:23; Body-

worn Camera Footage of Officer Salazar, 2021002587-10 at 22:14:40–22:13:07; DE 59-3 at 1].

Because it was believed that Plaintiff or Wilkins may have possessed a handgun—particularly

given that Plaintiff and Wilkins were being tailed as part of a directed patrol operation involving

drug trafficking—Defendants drew their service weapons, ordered Plaintiff and Wilkins out of

their vehicle, searched them, and detained them while a drug K-9 inspected the vehicle. [DE 59-4

at 42:21–43:13, 44:23–45:2]. Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff and Wilkins were only

detained for a period of fifteen minutes, just long enough to run their background information

and ensure that no drugs or weapons were present in their vehicle. [Id. at 46:17–14, 48:8–12].

In response, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants admitted that Plaintiff was “driving like

angels” [sic] and that Defendants “manufactured a pretextual traffic stop.” [DE 62 at 6 (citing

2021-2587 radio traffic, 02:10)]. As to the former point, Defendant has not submitted this

evidence to the Court for consideration. Regardless, this citation does not appear to contest

Defendants’ showing that Plaintiff himself admitted he possibly failed to signal a turn with the

requisite statutory notice. And as to the latter point, Plaintiff offers no factual citations, period.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the “prolonged detention, which began thirty-four minutes prior to

the traffic stop, use of force, and seizure of Plaintiff’s phone violated his Fourth Amendment

rights.” [Id.]. Here again Plaintiff does not offer any factual citations in support.

Notwithstanding, Plaintiff’s argument misses the mark regardless because Plaintiff was not

detained during the thirty-four-minute interval in which Defendants followed him. Nor does

Plaintiff present a factual dispute regarding the reasonableness of Defendants’ conduct.

For these reasons, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact as to

the reasonableness of the seizure regarding either the initial stop or the detainment. Therefore,

summary judgment in favor of Defendants on this issue is appropriate.

D. Qualified Immunity

Arguing in the alternative, Defendants assert that even if a constitutional deprivation had

occurred, they would nonetheless still be entitled to qualified immunity. [DE 47 at 13]. Qualified

immunity is a legal issue to be decided by the court, not the jury, and thus is appropriately

handled on summary judgment. Simkunas v. Tardi, 930 F.2d 1287, 1291 (7th Cir. 1991).

“Qualified immunity shields a government official from suit for damages under § 1983

‘when [he] makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends

the law governing the circumstances [he] confronted.” Sabo v. Erickson, 128 F.4th 836, 843 (7th

Cir. 2025); see also Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 151 (2017) (“Whether qualified immunity

can be invoked turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the official’s acts.”) (internal

quotation omitted). To overcome a qualified immunity defense, Plaintiff bears the burden of

showing “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was

‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Sabo, 128 F.4th at 843 (quoting

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). To be “clearly established,” the right at issue

must be so “beyond debate” that any reasonable official in the defendant’s position would know

that his actions would violate it. Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018). Furthermore, “the

undebatable right must be defined with particularity.” Garcia v. Posewitz, 79 F.4th 874, 880 (7th

Cir. 2023).

Defendants argue that the focus is on whether a reasonable police officer in the same

position as Officers Salazar and Servies would have believed that Plaintiff’s detention was

constitutional under these facts.5 [DE 47 at 13–14]. Specifically, Defendants reiterate that the

cuffing, pat down, and brief detention of Plaintiff and Wilkins was reasonable given the fact that

they were seen leaving a suspicious area subject to a police operation, refused to comply with

orders, and potentially possessed weapons in the vehicle. [Id. at 14]. In response, Plaintiff

reasserts the same constitutional arguments he previously made as to his claims, and further, fails

to elaborate or offer support from the record as to why Defendants’ actions were unreasonable.

[DE 61 at 5; DE 62 at 7].

Here, Defendants’ arguments surrounding the circumstances of this incident appear to

align with prior decisions finding either the officers’ conduct did not lead to a constitutional

deprivation or that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. See Rabin v. Flynn, 725 F.3d

628, 634–36 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding defendant officers were entitled to qualified immunity on

excessive force and wrongful arrest claims where they arrested a private investigator for carrying

a concealed weapon, feared for the safety of the public and themselves when unable to verify the

carrying license’s legitimacy, and detained investigator in handcuffs until able to verify the

license); Matz v. Klotka, 769 F.3d 517, 525–56 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding it was reasonable for

defendant officers to draw weapons and detain suspect in handcuffs given the nature of suspect’s

5 Defendants argue that the traffic stop is not in dispute because Plaintiff cannot deny with certainty that he failed to

signal his turn with the requisite statutory notice. [DE 47 at 14]. In Plaintiff’s response brief, Plaintiff continues to

assert that the traffic stop was pretextual. However, Plaintiff does not present any cogent arguments as to how or why

the stop was pretextual, nor does Plaintiff elaborate on his belief that Officers Servies and Salazar fabricated

probable cause to justify the stop. [DE 62 at 7].

criminal history, the uncertainty of being outnumbered, the possibility of weapons being present,

and the need to prevent an escalation of violence); Mearday v. City of Chi., 196 F. Supp. 2d 700,

711–12 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (finding defendant officers were entitled to qualified immunity and that

it was reasonable to draw service weapons on suspect when it was believed suspect was reaching

under his coat for a gun). Therefore, it seems that an objectively reasonable officer in

Defendants’ position would have found their actions justified under the circumstances. And

because Plaintiff has not demonstrated that a clearly established right was violated, nor does he

point to case law indicating that Defendants’ actions were unjustified, Officers Salazar and

Servies are thus entitled to qualified immunity. Summary judgment in their favor is therefore

appropriate.

II. Municipal Liability Against the City of Lafayette

Finally, the Court turns to assess Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff failed to establish a

municipal liability claim. Plaintiff brought a § 1983 Monell claim against the City of Lafayette

alleging that the City has “demonstrated that they have a practice of detaining people, searching

and seizing persons and their property absent probable cause or warrant for improper reasons.”

[DE 1, ⁋ 43]. Moreover, Plaintiff also raised allegations that the City of Lafayette failed to

properly supervise or train its officers to avoid unconstitutional conduct. [Id., ⁋ 44]. In

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not identified an

unconstitutional policy or custom, nor have they proven the requisite causation element needed

to sustain a Monell claim. [DE 47 at 15].

Like with the individual Defendants in this matter, “[a] municipality is a ‘person’ under §

1983 and may be held liable for its own violations of the federal Constitution and laws.” First

Midwest Bank Guardian of Est. of LaPorta v. City of Chi., 988 F.3d 978, 986 (7th Cir. 2021)

(citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978). However, to succeed on a §

1983 Monell claim against a municipality, “a plaintiff must challenge conduct that is properly

attributable to the municipality itself.” City of Chi., 988 F.3d at 986 (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs

of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–04 (1997). In other words, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that a constitutional violation was caused by a governmental “policy or custom,

whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent

official policy.” City of Chi., 988 F.3d at 986 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). This “policy or

custom” language has been interpreted to include the following: “(1) an express policy that

causes a constitutional deprivation when enforced; (2) a widespread practice that is so permanent

and well-settled that it constitutes a custom or practice; or (3) an allegation that the constitutional

injury was caused by a person with final policymaking authority.” City of Chi., 988 F.3d at 986

(quoting Spiegel v. McClintic, 916 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2019)). Moreover, a plaintiff must

also “demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’

behind the injury alleged,” and thus “must show that the municipal action was taken with the

requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal

action and the deprivation of federal rights.” J.K.J. v. Polk Cnty., 960 F.3d 367, 377 (7th Cir.

2020) (emphasis in original) (quoting Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 404).

Defendants first argue that because no constitutional deprivation occurred, the analysis

ends there. [DE 47 at 15]. However, Defendants continue by asserting that even if a

constitutional deprivation had occurred, Plaintiff has nonetheless failed to satisfy the Monell

standard by failing to establish the presence or implementation of an unconstitutional policy or

custom. [DE 47 at 15–16]. In response, Plaintiff identifies various policies which he claims were

violated. [DE 62 at 7–9]. He further argues that the violation of these policies indicates a pattern

of unconstitutional practices supporting Monell liability. [Id. at 7].

To begin, the Court agrees with Defendants’ assertion that the failure to identify a

constitutional deprivation ends the Monell analysis. As was explained above, Plaintiff has

offered little to no factual support for his underlying constitutional claims, and thus has not

demonstrated the presence of a constitutional deprivation. Nonetheless, Plaintiff’s Monell claim

appears to fail on at least three other bases.

First, Plaintiff bears the burden of “set[ting] out some fact or facts to suggest that the

claimed policy or custom actually exists, and that the alleged deprivation resulted from

enforcement or pursuit of that policy—i.e., that the deprivation was not an ‘isolated’ incident.”

Blanton v. City of Indianapolis, Ind., 830 F. Supp. 1198, 1202 (citing Strauss v. City of Chi., 760

F.2d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 1985)). Here, Plaintiff has done no more than list out various Lafayette

Police Department policies which he claimed were violated. [DE 62 at 7–9]. However, no other

facts are offered to indicate that the alleged deprivation resulted from the policy, nor is it shown

that the alleged deprivation was not an isolated occurrence. In addition, Defendants provide

factual support indicating that Plaintiff not only lacked an understanding or awareness as to the

officers’ training in the Indiana Law Enforcement Academy, but that Plaintiff could not conjure

any court cases demonstrating prior unconstitutional conduct on behalf of the Lafayette Police

Department or its officers. [DE 59-4 at 14:11–13, 75:10–20].

Second, Plaintiff has not offered any proof to indicate municipal fault or causation

because of the City of Lafayette’s own deliberate conduct, a requisite element under the Monell

standard. See J.K.J, 960 F.3d at 377. Finally, while Plaintiff argues that the violation of the

policies themselves supports Monell liability, Plaintiff appears to be misdirecting the analysis

away from the municipality and to the officers. In this sense, although Plaintiff does not

explicitly state as much, it appears Plaintiff is arguing that the City of Lafayette should be held

liable for the actions of its officers and thus liability is supported under the doctrine of

respondeat superior. This, however, is expressly barred as § 1983 “does not incorporate the

common-law doctrine of respondeat superior, so a municipality cannot be held liable for the

constitutional torts of its employees and agents.” First Midwest Bank, 988 F.3d at 986 (citing

Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91).

Therefore, summary judgment in favor of Defendant City of Lafayette is appropriate.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [DE

46] in its entirety and DIRECTS entry of final judgment in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff takes

nothing by his Complaint.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: September 29, 2025

/s/ GRETCHEN S. LUND

Judge

United States District Court