quot- ing Henson, 29 F.3d at 286–87
How later courts described this case
- quot- ing Henson, 29 F.3d at 286–87
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
SETH CAMERON VIRGIL, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 1:23-cv-01488-SEB-MJD
)
EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, )
LLC, )
)
Defendant. )
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Seth Cameron Virgil ("Mr. Virgil") brought this action against Defendant
Equifax Information Services, LLC ("Equifax") alleging violations of the Fair Credit Re-
porting Act (the "FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. Now before the Court is Equifax's
Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. 45. For the reasons discussed below, that motion is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dis-
pute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those that "might affect the outcome of the suit,"
and a dispute of material fact is genuine when "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). As the
"put up or shut up" moment in a litigation, summary judgment requires parties to "show
what evidence [they] ha[ve] that would convince the trier of fact to accept [their] version
of events" and to find in their favor on any disputed elements. Steen v. Meyers, 486 F.3d
1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2007). "The court has one task and one task only: to decide, based on
the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial."
Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Anderson, 477
U.S. at 249–50). When deciding whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the court
construes all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all rea-
sonable inferences in that party's favor. Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d
565, 572 (7th Cir. 2021).
BACKGROUND
The underlying facts relate to the reported theft and subsequent use of Mr. Virgil's
personal identifying information ("PII"). Before turning to our recitation of the undisputed
material facts, we first address Mr. Virgil's statement of disputed material facts, which con-
sists almost entirely of factual assertions that are not supported by record citations, dkt. 48
¶¶ 8, 13, 39–40; or are accompanied by citations to materials that we have been unable to
locate in the record before us, id. ¶¶ 9–12, 14–38, 41–57. Compare id. ¶¶ 9, 15, 17, 20–21,
23–24 (citing to Exhibits 2–8), with dkt. 48-1 (sole exhibit appended to Mr. Virgil's sum-
mary judgment response brief). Insofar as Mr. Virgil's factual assertions lack citations "to
particular parts of materials in the record," as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires,
we have omitted them from our summary below. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
In its opening summary judgment brief, Equifax requests that we exclude from the
record certain documents that "were produced after the close of discovery." Dkt. 46 at 17
n.5. The discovery deadline in this action was August 2, 2024. Dkt. 18 at 5. Mr. Virgil's
counsel, however, delivered supplementary documents to opposing counsel on August 3,
2024, at 12:02 a.m. Dkt. 47-14. Because it is unclear whether Mr. Virgil's untimely docu-
ments were included in the record and/or relied upon by Mr. Virgil, we do not resolve
Equifax's objection at this time.
I. Equifax's Policies & Procedures
Equifax, a credit reporting agency, collects and assembles consumer information
into credit files on behalf of more than 200 million consumers in the United States. Munson
Decl. ¶¶ 4–5, dkt. 47-1 (Declaration of Equifax's Legal Support Lead Latonya Munson).
We outline below Equifax's policies and procedures that are relevant to the case at bar.
A. Furnishing Consumer Reports to Third Parties
Upon request from its customers, also referred to as "subscribers," Equifax prepares
and furnishes consumer reports, which Equifax's subscribers generally utilize to assess
consumers' "potential credit risk." Id. ¶ 6. Before Equifax furnishes consumer data, new
subscribers must undergo a certification process, whereby they certify the purpose(s) for
which the consumer information is sought and verify that the information will be used for
no other purpose(s). Id. ¶ 38. According to Equifax, it also follows "a verification process
through which it makes a reasonable effort to verify" the prospective user's identity as well
as the claimed purposes for which consumer data is requested, though Equifax does not
detail these procedures further. Id.
B. Data Collection Policies
Equifax gathers consumer information from so-called "data furnishers"—such as
banks, collection agencies, and court records—that are deemed "reliable" based on
Equifax's review of the source's reputation as well as Equifax's "longstanding business re-
lationship." Id. ¶¶ 5, 8.1 Data furnishers must also agree to the terms of Equifax's standard
"subscriber agreements," according to which they must abide by "all applicable federal,
state and local laws, including the FCRA . . . , prepare and furnish consumer information
in a proper format, and notify Equifax promptly upon learning that information supplied is
inaccurate or incomplete." Id. ¶ 10. Three data furnishers relevant to this case—Hunter
Warfield, National Credit Services, and Columbia Debt Recovery—have each executed
such subscriber agreements with Equifax. Id. ¶¶ 9–10.
C. Reinvestigation Procedure
Consumers can dispute the accuracy of information reported in their credit files by
contacting Equifax through telephone, mail, or Equifax's webpage. Id. ¶ 13. Upon receipt
of notice of a dispute, Equifax locates the consumer's credit file and opens a "CCMS case"
to track ongoing progress in the reinvestigation. Id. ¶ 14. Thereafter, Equifax reviews "all
relevant information," which includes any supporting documentation submitted by the con-
sumer as well as the existing contents of the consumer's credit file. Id. ¶ 15. If and when
Equifax can verify and resolve the dispute based on the consumer's submissions, it updates
the consumer's credit file accordingly. Id. ¶ 16.
Equifax automatically suppresses disputed information associated with identity
theft so long as the consumer submits a police report, a Federal Trade Commission Identity
1 Equifax also asserts that it "regularly conducts computerized quality checks before adding infor-
mation from a data furnisher to its consumer database." Dkt. 46 at 12–13. However, the cited ma-
terial does not support this assertion. See Munson Decl. ¶ 8, dkt. 47-1.
Theft Report, or a qualifying "identity theft report," id. ¶¶ 36–37, which the FCRA defines
as "a copy of an official, valid report filed by a consumer with an appropriate Federal, State,
or local law enforcement agency." 15 U.S.C § 1681a(q)(4). Insofar as further investigation
is necessary to resolve a consumer's dispute, Equifax uses the standardized procedure
through e-OSCAR to electronically transmit an automated consumer dispute verification
("ACDV") form to the data furnisher (wherefrom the disputed information originated), no-
tifying it of the consumer's dispute and providing the documentation submitted by the con-
sumer. Munson Decl. ¶¶ 19–20, dkt. 47-1.
When data furnishers receive a dispute from Equifax, they are generally required,
both by contract and by the FCRA, to conduct their own investigation and to report the
results back to Equifax. Id. ¶ 22. Thereafter, Equifax will delete, update, or modify the
consumer's information, as directed by the data furnisher. Id. ¶ 23. When the reinvestigation
process is complete, Equifax sends the results to the consumer along with a summary of
the consumer's FCRA rights, an outline of additional steps (should the consumer be dissat-
isfied with the resolution), and a description of Equifax's reinvestigation procedures, if re-
quested by the consumer. Id. ¶ 24.
II. Mr. Virgil's Compromised Data & Equifax Credit Reports
Mr. Virgil currently lives in Indianapolis, Indiana, at The Whit apartment complex,
which has been his sole residence since March 2022. Virgil Decl. 2, dkt. 48-1.2 In October
2022, Mr. Virgil began receiving debt collection communications from Hunter Warfield
2 Equifax notes that Mr. Virgil's Declaration bears a post-discovery date of September 18, 2024,
but does not ask us to exclude the Declaration on that basis. Dkt. 51 at 11.
and Fair Collections Outsourcing, and, soon thereafter, Mr. Virgil discovered that more
than a dozen past-due apartment debts were affiliated with his name. Id.
On November 7, 2022, Mr. Virgil prepared a Federal Trade Commission Affidavit
attesting that he was a victim of identity theft and disclaiming the apartment debts, which
affidavit he submitted to Hunter Warfield and Fair Collections Outsourcing. Soon thereaf-
ter, Fair Collections Outsourcing closed and disaffiliated the debts associated with Mr. Vir-
gil. Hunter Warfield, however, maintained approximately thirteen debt collection accounts
under Mr. Virgil's name, including one on behalf of Crystal Square Apartments in Arling-
ton, Virginia, and another on behalf of Haden in McLean, Virginia. Id. at 2–3.
On December 8, 2022, Mr. Virgil accessed his Equifax credit report, which revealed
that Equifax had furnished Mr. Virgil's credit information to three tenant screening compa-
nies—identified as LeasingDesk, RentGrow, and SafeRent Solutions (hereinafter, the "Ten-
ant Screeners")—on fifty-three separate occasions within a six-month period from April
through October 2022. Id. at 3. In requesting (and obtaining) Mr. Virgil's credit information
from Equifax, the Tenant Screeners produced Mr. Virgil's PII, which evidently derived from
falsified apartment applications bearing Mr. Virgil's first and last name, social security
number, date of birth, and an incomplete prior address to a Chicago apartment that he had
leased until 2016. Id. at 2–3. According to Mr. Virgil, Equifax furnished his credit data to
the Tenant Screeners despite the obvious discrepancy between Mr. Virgil's known Indian-
apolis address (at The Whit) and the inaccurate Chicago address included in the falsified
apartment applications.
On December 29, 2022, Mr. Virgil again requested his Equifax credit report and
discovered that Equifax had been misreporting a previous Indianapolis apartment as his
current address. Id. at 3. Approximately two months later, on February 02, 2023, Mr. Virgil
requested a third Equifax credit report, which reflected an Alexandria, Virginia, address
unfamiliar to Mr. Virgil as well as two debt collection accounts with Hunter Warfield and
National Credit Systems, respectively. Id. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Virgil engaged legal coun-
sel to address these "ongoing identity theft implications," which, to him, "seemed to in
large part originate from Equifax disclosing [his] credit report information to [the Tenant
Screeners] without [his] authorization to apartments' [sic] that had been processing falsified
lease applications under [his] name." Id.
III. Mr. Virgil's Dispute & Equifax's Reinvestigation
On March 6, 2023, Mr. Virgil filed a dispute with Equifax, wherein he stated that he
is "a victim of identity theft" and requested the following information be removed from his
credit file: fifty-three "soft-labeled inquiries";3 an Alexandria, Virginia, address; and one
Hunter Warfield, one National Credit Services, and two Columbia Debt Recovery d/b/a
Genesis ("Genesis") collection accounts, each of which was affiliated with unpaid apart-
ment debts in his name. Dkt. 47-3 at 5. (Mr. Virgil avers that the Genesis accounts were
"duplicate[s]" of each other, dkt. 48 ¶ 24, though we cannot discern, based on the parties'
3 According to Equifax, "soft inquiries" occur when "Equifax, the consumer, or a third party views
a consumer's Equifax credit report . . . for reasons other than [determining] whether to extend
credit." Munson Decl. ¶ 37, dkt. 47-1. A soft inquiry "may be made," for instance, "from companies
making promotional offers of credit, periodic account reviews by an existing creditor, or a con-
sumer's own request to check his or her credit file. Soft inquiries have no impact on a consumer's
credit rating or credit score." Id.
presentations, the veracity or relevance of this assertion.) Mr. Virgil's dispute included the
following submissions: a notarized "Identity Theft Victim's Complaint and Affidavit," a
photocopy of his driver's license, a declaration of his insurance policy with State Farm Fire
and Casualty Company, a copy of his apartment lease agreement with The Whit, various
redacted e-mail correspondences with apartment complexes, and screenshots of his credit
files with other credit reporting agencies. See dkt. 47-3.
As Equifax initiated a reinvestigation based on the dispute filed by Mr. Virgil, it was
independently alerted through a fraud block notification from Trans Union that the Hunter
Warfield and National Credit Services accounts were affiliated with identity theft, and, on
March 11, 2023, Equifax removed both accounts from Mr. Virgil's credit profile accord-
ingly. Munson Decl. ¶ 34, dkt. 47-1; dkt. 47-4 (fraud block notification). Based on
Equifax's determination that Mr. Virgil's notarized identity theft complaint (and accompa-
nying submissions) did not constitute an "identity theft report," as defined in Equifax's
policies and the FCRA, Equifax did not update or suppress information about the Genesis
collection accounts. Id. ¶¶ 36–37. Additionally, Mr. Virgil failed to identify the Genesis
account numbers, further hindering Equifax's ability to review the dispute. Id.; dkt. 47-3 at
5.
On March 12, 2023, Equifax received two "fraud complaint referrals" from Ex-
perian: one indicating a dispute as to a Dallas, Texas, address appearing on Mr. Virgil's
credit profile; and a second indicating that a Genesis account ending in 7368 was affiliated
with identity theft in Mr. Virgil's name. Munson Decl. ¶ 35, dkt. 47-1; dkt. 47-5. On March
13, 2023, Equifax contacted Genesis through the ACDV system regarding the collections
account ending in 7368, which, at the time, reflected a $14,661 debt originating from a
defaulted lease with Abbotts Run Apartments Homes (hereinafter referred to as the "Gen-
esis/Abbotts Run" debt). Dkt. 47-7 at 2. Equifax included with the ACDV Mr. Virgil's dis-
pute submissions as well as the following dispute code: "CLAIMS TRUE IDENTITY
FRAUD – ACCOUNT FRAUDULENTLY OPENED INITIATE INVESTIGATION." Dkt.
47-7 at 2. The next day, on March 14, 2023, Genesis verified the Genesis/Abbotts Run
account "as reported." Id.; e.g., Munson Decl. ¶ 36, dkt. 47-1.
Several days later, on March 16, 2023—this time "as a result of the fraud referral it
received from Experian," Munson Decl. ¶ 35, dkt. 47-1—Equifax forwarded another
ACDV to Genesis, which again included Mr. Virgil's submissions and an identity-theft dis-
pute code. Dkt. 47-6 at 2. On March 21, 2023, Genesis verified the information. Id.; Mun-
son Decl. ¶ 35, dkt. 47-1. Thereafter, on March 28, 2023, Equifax deleted the Dallas, Texas,
address from Mr. Virgil's profile. Munson Decl. ¶ 35, dkt. 47-1.
On March 25, 2023, Equifax sent its reinvestigation results to Mr. Virgil, notifying
him that more than two dozen (unspecified) "disputed items" were "not currently reporting
on his Equifax credit file; that the disputed address(es) had been deleted; and that Genesis
had verified the Genesis/Abbotts Run debt. Dkt. 47-8 at 4–6.
IV. Subsequent Equifax Credit Reports
Mr. Virgil's Declaration reflects that, throughout 2023 and 2024, Mr. Virgil contin-
ued to monitor developments relating to his credit status. See Virgil Decl. 4–5, dkt. 48-1.
We summarize those efforts below.
On May 20, 2023, Mr. Virgil requested and reviewed his Equifax credit report,
which he maintains displayed the "wrongly verified" Genesis/Abbotts Run collection ac-
count. Id. at 4. In early June 2023, Mr. Virgil, through his legal counsel, contacted Equifax
about the ongoing inaccuracies in his credit report. Id.
One month later, on June 21, 2023, Mr. Virgil obtained a copy of his Equifax credit
report, which showed "double reporting" of the Genesis/Abbots Run debt as well as a
"fraud-related Woodland" apartments debt. The following day, Mr. Virgil's attorney con-
tacted Equifax again. Id.
From August 2, 2023, through December 18, 2023, Mr. Virgil's Equifax credit report
no longer included information regarding any apartment-related collections accounts. Id.
During this period, Mr. Virgil's Equifax credit score was 829. Id.
On March 6, 2024, Mr. Virgil discovered that his Equifax credit report reflected a
new $12,000 collections debt with Genesis, this time originating from a delinquent lease
with Ravens Crest apartments in Manassas, Virginia (hereinafter referred to as the "Gene-
sis/Ravens Crest" debt). Id. Mr. Virgil's attorney promptly contacted Equifax to dispute the
Genesis/Ravens Crest debt as well as the Tenant Screeners' soft inquiries, which (allegedly)
still appeared on Mr. Virgil's credit report. Id. at 4–5. When Mr. Virgil reviewed his Equifax
credit report on May 2, 2024, however, the Genesis/Ravens Crest collection account, the
related Manassas, Virginia, address, and the numerous soft inquiries had not been removed.
Id. at 5.
On August 26, 2024, Mr. Virgil filed identity theft disputes with Experian and Trans
Union challenging the Genesis/Ravens Crest debt and the Manassas, Virginia, address
discrepancy. Id. Shortly thereafter, on September 3, 2024, Mr. Virgil discovered that
Equifax had removed the Genesis/Ravens Crest debt from his profile, contributing to his
improved credit score of 826, though Equifax had continued to report the Manassas, Vir-
ginia address. Id. On September 7, 2024, Mr. Virgil received a mailed notice from Equifax,
wherein Equifax related that he "may have been a victim of fraud or identity theft" and
outlined "important information that may be helpful" to him. Id.
V. Mr. Virgil's Reported Injuries
A. Mortgage-Related Injuries
In early January 2023, Mr. Virgil applied for a "prequalification approval" from
Bank of America. Virgil Dep. 129:1–2, dkt. 47-9. In a January 4, 2023, email, Mr. Virgil's
financial advisor explained to him, "You are able to obtain a prequalification letter from
Bank of America to purchase a home. This letter would be based on information contained
in your credit report and the income and asset information provided on your application."
Dkt. 47-11 at 2. During his deposition, Mr. Virgil could not recall whether he submitted a
"formal mortgage application" with Bank of America. Virgil Dep. 126:1–14, dkt. 47-9. In
Mr. Virgil's Declaration, however, he states that, on February 1, 2023, he did apply for a
pre-approved mortgage with Bank of America. Virgil Decl. 3, dkt. 48-1. Due to "three col-
lective misreported collections accounts" (including "two from Equifax"), Mr. Virgil re-
ceived "adverse mortgage interest rate terms." Id. Mr. Virgil does not detail the nature of
the allegedly adverse interest rate terms, however.
In mid-March 2023, after initiating his dispute with Equifax, Mr. Virgil applied for
a mortgage with First Centennial Mortgage ("First Centennial"). On March 22, 2023, First
Centennial approved Mr. Virgil for a $719,200 mortgage at a 7.125% interest rate, based
on his Trans Union credit score of 680. Dkt. 47-10 at 5–6, 10. First Centennial's mortgage
loan officer informed Mr. Virgil that, "[i]f the score increased to 750, the interest rate would
be 6.625% . . . ." Id. at 5. Notably, the electronic correspondence relating to Mr. Virgil's
First Centennial loan application reveals references to Trans Union only: There is no ref-
erence to Equifax. See id. Additionally, Mr. Virgil's deposition testimony reveals that, in
March 2023, his Equifax credit score was 738. Virgil Dep. 121:1–7, dkt. 47-9.
B. Lost Wages & Financial Losses
Mr. Virgil avers that he suffered "lost commercial brokerage wages from distressed
time allocated to credit repair mitigation efforts, as well as expended money . . . navigating
the ongoing reporting issues." Compl. ¶ 105, dkt. 1. In Mr. Virgil's "conservative[ ]" esti-
mations, he has suffered approximately $100,000 in lost wages. Virgil Dep. 133:16–17,
dkt. 47-9.
In January 2023, after renewing his Indianapolis apartment lease for another "12- or
13-month" term, Mr. Virgil began traveling to Florida in search of a second home. Virgil
Dep. 107:7–24, dkt. 47-9. Mr. Virgil claims $15,000 to $25,000 in out-of-pocket expenses
resulting from his "driving to Florida, going on property tours," and staying at hotels and/or
AirBnBs on three to five separate occasions. Id. at 134:14–22. Additionally, in a self-di-
rected effort to improve his credit rating, Mr. Virgil expended approximately $20,000 in
"otherwise unneeded payments towards [his] auto loan and one of [his] credit cards." Virgil
Decl. 4, dkt. 48-1.
C. Emotional Distress
Mr. Virgil alleges that he suffered "distressed energy fruitlessly monitoring and dis-
puting the inaccurate reporting, impending fear of continually perpetuated identity theft
harm, and correlated mental and reputational anguish, including embarrassment from ad-
verse credit decisions and externally perceived financial instability." Compl. ¶ 106, dkt. 1.
At his deposition, Mr. Virgil generally described that the "serial identity theft . . . has di-
rectly affected [his] credit report and [his] day-to-day life" and has been "emotionally tax-
ing." Virgil Dep. 146:15–147:6, dkt. 47-9. Mr. Virgil also claims that his ongoing troubles
with Equifax have caused him "los[t] production and efficiency at work" as well as lost
sleep. Id. Aside from his own testimony, however, Mr. Virgil has not cited any medical
notes or other corroborating evidence pertaining to his alleged emotional distress.
VI. This Litigation
On August 23, 2023, Mr. Virgil filed this lawsuit against Equifax, asserting that
Equifax failed to maintain and follow reasonable procedures to assure the maximum pos-
sible accuracy of the information in Mr. Virgil's credit report, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §
1681e(b); failed to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation of disputed information, in viola-
tion of 15 U.S.C. § 1681i; and failed to maintain reasonable procedures to limit the fur-
nishing of consumer reports for permissible purposes only, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§
1681e(a), 1681b. Compl. ¶¶ 110–33, dkt. 1.4 Mr. Virgil further avers that Equifax's FCRA
4 Mr. Virgil has since withdrawn his additional claims against Equifax for alleged violations of 15
U.S.C. §§ 1681c-1, 1681c-2, and 1681g. Dkt. 48 at 1 n.1. Accordingly, summary judgment shall
be granted in Equifax's favor as to those claims.
violations were "willful," thereby entitling him to statutory or punitive damages. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681n.
On October 7, 2024, Equifax moved for summary judgment, arguing that the undis-
puted material facts do not support Mr. Virgil's claims, thus entitling Equifax to judgment
as a matter of law. Dkt. 45. Mr. Virgil filed his response brief on November 4, 2024, dkt.
48, and Equifax filed its reply on November 25, 2024, dkt. 51. Equifax's motion is thus
fully briefed and ripe for ruling.
DISCUSSION
Consumer reporting agencies, such as Equifax, "collect consumer information sup-
plied by furnishers, compile it into consumer reports, and provide those reports to author-
ized users." Denan v. Trans Union, LLC, 959 F.3d 290, 295 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Carvalho
v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892 (9th Cir. 2010)). In performing these tasks,
the Fair Credit Reporting Act requires consumer reporting agencies to "follow reasonable
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information" published to con-
sumers' credit reports, 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b); and, when a consumer disputes "the com-
pleteness or accuracy of any item of information contained" therein, to "conduct a reason-
able reinvestigation to determine whether the disputed information is inaccurate and record
the current status of the disputed information, or delete the item from the file . . . ," id. §
1681i(a)(1)(A). The FCRA further "prohibits consumer reporting agencies from furnishing
a 'consumer report,' except in enumerated circumstances—in other words, when there is a
permissible purpose." Persinger v. Sw. Credit Sys., L.P., 20 F.4th 1184, 1195 (7th Cir. 2021)
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)). Plaintiffs may be entitled to an award of "actual damages,"
costs, and attorney's fees for a credit reporting agency's negligent violation of the FCRA,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o, as well as punitive damages for a willful violation, id. § 1681n.
Here, Mr. Virgil contends that Equifax furnished his credit report to the Tenant
Screeners, despite obvious factual discrepancies between his actual address and the incor-
rect address provided in the apartment inquiries, which enabled dozens of fraudulent apart-
ment leases to be obtained and eventually turned over to collections as debts in Mr. Virgil's
name. Mr. Virgil also challenges Equifax's reinvestigation, which he alleges was inade-
quate based on Equifax's failure to remove the disputed Genesis account(s) from his credit
profile. We address Mr. Virgil's statutory claims below.
I. Section 1681e(a): Furnishing Consumer Reports for Permissible Purposes
Section 1681e(a) provides that all consumer reporting agencies "shall maintain rea-
sonable procedures designed . . . to limit the furnishing of consumer reports to the pur-
poses" enumerated in § 1681b of the FCRA. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a). "These procedures shall
require that prospective users of the information identify themselves, certify the purposes
for which the information is sought, and certify that the information will be used for no
other purpose." Id. "No consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report to any
person if it has reasonable grounds for believing that the consumer report will not be used
for" a permissible purpose. Id. One such "permissible purpose," as invoked (in passing) by
Equifax here, provides that consumer reporting agencies "may furnish a consumer report .
. . [t]o a person which" they have "reason to believe . . . intends to use the information in
connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer on whom the information is to
be furnished and involving the . . . collection of an account[ ] of the consumer . . . ." 15
U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A); see also id. § 1681b(c)(2) (outlining limitations on information
furnished in connection with credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the con-
sumer).
In seeking summary judgment on Mr. Virgil's §§ 1681e(a) and 1681b claims,
Equifax maintains that it "complied with its obligation to verify that a credit pull is made
for a permissible purpose . . . ." Dkt. 46 at 31. In support of its position, Equifax relies
exclusively upon Ms. Munson's Declaration, wherein she states that Equifax's policies re-
quire "new subscribers to certify the purposes for which such information will be obtained,
and certify that the information will be used for no other purpose." Munson Decl. ¶ 38, dkt.
47-1. Prior to furnishing consumer information, Equifax also "verif[ies] the identity of a
new prospective user" as well as the asserted purpose(s) for which the subscriber is seeking
consumer data. Id. Ms. Munson describes Equifax's adherence to these practices with re-
gard to the case at bar as follows:
Equifax followed these procedures in connection upon [sic] entering its sub-
scriber relationship with [the Tenant Screeners]. As a result of Equifax's thor-
ough procedures of certifying the information sought by [the Tenant Screen-
ers] satisfies [sic] the requirements of the FCRA, Equifax had a permissible
purpose for furnishing information to [the Tenant Screeners] relating to each
of the "Soft inquiries" on Plaintiff's Equifax credit file between April 13,
2022[,] and October 5, 2022. Further, Equifax did not have any reasonable
grounds to believe that information sought by [the Tenant Screeners] would
not be used for a permissible purpose.
Id. In its reply brief, Equifax also maintains that the Tenant Screeners "routinely screen
individuals seeking to apply for apartment housing[ ] and have passed Equifax's verifica-
tion process," thus demonstrating that Equifax had good reason to accept that Mr. Virgil's
consumer data would be used permissibly. dkt. 51 at 10,
Although Mr. Virgil alleges that Equifax failed to utilize reasonable procedures to
ensure that it furnished his credit report for permissible purposes only, he does not identify
which aspects of Equifax's stated certification procedure fell short of its legal obligations
under § 1681e(a). He argues, nonetheless, that "the nature, volume, and influx" of apart-
ment-related inquiries from April–October 2022, coupled with the indisputable "address
mismatch" (between his current address at The Whit and the partial Chicago address used
in the fraudulent apartment applications), demonstrate that "Equifax intentionally disre-
garded" obvious indications of fraud. Dkt. 48 at 17–18. Mr. Virgil also challenges the fac-
tual basis of Equifax's purported "permissible purpose," arguing that he himself "did not
authorize any one lease application" and thus was not "involve[ed]" in any credit transac-
tion, as § 1681b(a)(3)(A) requires. Id. at 19–20.
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Mr. Virgil, a reasonable factfinder
could conclude that Equifax overlooked the suspicious circumstances of the Tenant Screen-
ers' inquiries, in contravention of its duties under § 1681e(a). As reflected in the record, the
Tenant Screeners submitted fifty-three "soft labeled inquiries," seeking Mr. Virgil's credit
information on behalf of fifty-three corresponding apartment applications across Virginia
and Maryland within a six-month period. Coupled with the fact that the rental applications
supplied an improper address—a discrepancy which would have been apparent to Equifax
based on Mr. Virgil's known Indianapolis residence—a jury could find "reasonable grounds
for believing that [Mr. Virgil's] consumer report w[ould] not be used for" a permissible
purpose. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a).
Additionally, it remains unclear to us whether any permissible purpose under §
1681b was, in fact, established here. Although the parties make passing references to §
1681b(a)(3)(A) in their summary judgment briefs, they have not meaningfully developed
their respective legal arguments, nor have they cited to any binding legal authority (beyond
the statutes themselves) that establishes the merit of their arguments. Further factual and
legal development is therefore necessary before this claim can be conclusively resolved as
a matter of law.5
II. Section 1681e(b): Assuring Maximum Possible Accuracy
As noted above, § 1681e(b) requires consumer reporting agencies to "follow rea-
sonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information" published to
consumers' credit reports. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). Credit reporting agencies are "not auto-
matically liable even if the consumer proves that [they] prepared an inaccurate credit report
because the FCRA does not make reporting agencies strictly liable for all inaccuracies."
Sarver v. Experian Info. Sols., 390 F. 3d 969, 971 (7th Cir. 2004). Credit reporting agencies
are "not liable under the FCRA if [they] "followed reasonable procedures to assure maxi-
mum possible accuracy, but nonetheless reported inaccurate information in the consumer's
credit report." Id. Thus, to establish a violation of § 1681e(b) here, Mr. Virgil must prove
that (1) Equifax published an inaccurate consumer report to a third party; (2) Equifax failed
to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy in its reports; and
5 Equifax also asserts, without further elaboration, that "there is no evidence that Plaintiff suffered
damages resulting from this FCRA claim." Dkt. 46 at 31–32. In light of the deficiencies noted
above, a final determination of damages must also await further development.
(3) Equifax's failure to follow reasonable procedures caused actual damages to him. In
moving for summary judgment, Equifax asserts that Mr. Virgil cannot satisfy the second
and third elements of his § 1681e(b) claim. Dkt. 46 at 20 & n.6.
A. Reasonable Procedures
Section 1681e(b) "does not hold a reporting agency responsible where an item of
information, received from a source that it reasonably believes is reputable, turns out to be
inaccurate unless the agency receives notice of systemic problems with its procedures."
Sarver, 390 F.3d at 972 (internal citation omitted). In assessing the reasonableness of a
credit reporting agency's procedures, we must "balanc[e] the costs of a marginal return to
accuracy against the potential harm to consumers from declining to incur those costs."
Chaitoff v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 79 F.4th 800, 817 (7th Cir. 2023). "The reasonableness
of a reporting agency's procedures is normally a question for trial unless the reasonableness
or unreasonableness of the procedures is beyond question." Sarver, 390 F.3d at 971. In
other words, "summary judgment may be appropriate when a [credit reporting agency]
adopted procedures no jury could find unreasonable." Chaitoff, 79 F.4th at 816.
Equifax argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Mr. Virgil
has neither "obtain[ed] any testimony" nor "identified any experts to opine on the reason-
ableness of Equifax's procedures," meaning that Mr. Virgil therefore cannot support his §
1681e(b) claim with any evidence. Dkt. 46 at 21. According to Equifax, Ms. Munson's
Declaration conclusively establishes the reasonableness of its procedures and shows that it
had no reason to question the reliability of data furnished by Hunter Warfield, National
Credit Services, or Genesis, based on their known reputations and the fact that each had
entered into a subscriber agreement with Equifax. Munson Decl. ¶¶ 9–10, dkt. 47-1.
In opposing summary judgment, Mr. Virgil argues that Equifax's failure to take "rea-
sonable precautions," as § 1681e(b) requires, is evidenced by the inaccurate reporting of
"fraudulently derived addresses and fraudulently originated collection accounts." Dkt. 48
at 18. Mr. Virgil maintains that Equifax continued reporting "fraudulently procured" col-
lection accounts, despite "reasonable notice that it was reporting inaccurate information
predicated on identity theft." Id.
As recounted by Ms. Munson, Equifax collects consumer information from data
furnishers deemed "reliable" based on their reputations as well as the nature of their busi-
ness relationship with Equifax. Munson Decl. ¶ 8, dkt. 47-1. Hunter Warfield, National
Credit Services and Columbia Debt Recovery (doing business as Genesis) are three such
reliable data furnishers, according to Equifax. The reliability of these data furnishers is
bolstered by the fact that they have entered into subscriber agreements with Equifax, ac-
cording to which they agree to comply with "all applicable federal, state and local laws,
including the FCRA . . . , [to] prepare and furnish consumer information in a proper format,
and [to] notify Equifax promptly upon learning that information supplied is inaccurate or
incomplete." Id. ¶ 10. In light of Hunter Warfield's, National Credit Services's, and Gene-
sis's "demonstrated reliability," it was reasonable for Equifax to "trust that [their] original
information as complete and accurate." Chaitoff, 79 F.4th at 817.
Mr. Virgil, for his part, has adduced no evidence to refute Equifax's stated adherence
to its standard procedures, nor has he "proposed an additional measure [Equifax] could
have taken to detect" the inaccuracies he alleges. Id. In other words, Mr. Virgil has failed
to put forth any arguable basis on which to conclude that Equifax's initial reporting of the
collection debts was the result of unreasonable procedures. Absent grounds to question the
reasonableness of Equifax's procedures, we conclude that Mr. Virgil's § 1681e(b) claim
necessarily fails as a matter of law, and Equifax is entitled to judgment accordingly.6
III. Section 1681i: Reasonable Reinvestigation
"When a consumer disputes an item in his credit report with a [credit reporting
agency]," the agency's "first step is to transmit that dispute to the furnisher." Chaitoff, 79
F.4th at 817 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(2)). "The furnisher then investigates the consum-
er's dispute and reports its findings" to the credit reporting agency." Id. Thereafter, the
credit reporting agency "must conduct a 'reasonable reinvestigation' of the dispute." Id.
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A)).
Here, Mr. Virgil challenges the reasonableness of Equifax's reinvestigation of his
March 6th dispute. Equifax seeks summary judgment on the grounds that its reinvestigation
procedure is reasonable and that Mr. Virgil is unable to establish actual damages.
6 Because Equifax has conclusively established the reasonableness of its procedures for assuring
maximum possible accuracy under § 1681e(b), we do not address its additional argument regarding
damages with respect to this claim.
A. Reinvestigation Procedure
Once "a credit reporting agency . . . has been notified of potentially inaccurate in-
formation in a consumer's credit report," it "is in a very different position that one who has
no such notice." Id. (quoting Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 286 (7th Cir. 1994)
(citation modified). With the benefit of notice, a credit reporting agency "can target its
resources in a more efficient manner and conduct a more thorough investigation." Id. (quot-
ing Henson, 29 F.3d at 286–87). "Thus, reasonable procedures under § 1681e(b) are not
proof of a reasonable reinvestigation under § 1681i(b)." Id. "Although the parameters of a
reasonable investigation will often depend on the circumstances of a particular dispute, it
is clear that a reasonable reinvestigation must mean more than simply . . . making only a
cursory investigation into the reliability of the information that is reported to potential cred-
itors." Id. at 818 (quoting Cortez v. Trans Union LLC, 617 F.3d 688, 713 (3d Cir. 2010)).
In moving for summary judgment, Equifax maintains that it abided by reasonable
reinvestigation procedures in addressing Mr. Virgil's March 6th dispute. To support this
conclusion, Equifax cites to the uncontroverted fact that the Hunter Warfield and National
Credit Services accounts were unilaterally removed from Mr. Virgil's credit file. Equifax
also contends that its treatment of the disputed Genesis/Abbotts Run account(s) was rea-
sonable because Mr. Virgil failed to submit a qualifying "identity theft report" that would
have otherwise allowed Equifax to automatically delete or block the information; and be-
cause Equifax was entitled to rely on Genesis's verification of the information via the
ACDV system. Dkt. 46 at 28–29.
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Mr. Virgil, the non-movant, we
conclude that a reasonable jury could find that Equifax's reinvestigation of the Genesis/Ab-
botts Run debt(s) was unreasonable under the circumstances presented here. There can be
no dispute that Mr. Virgil's identity theft allegations, as documented in his March 6th dis-
pute, did not qualify for "automatic suppression" under Equifax's identity-theft policies
because no police report had been filed. Nevertheless, a factfinder could regard Equifax's
resort to Genesis's barebones ACDV verification as deficient in light of the extensive doc-
umentation Mr. Virgil provided in his March 6th dispute, wherein he outlines the nature
and scope of the debt liabilities he had incurred by virtue of his reported identity theft. See
Chaitoff, 79 F.4th at 818–19. Summary judgment is not appropriate in this context.
B. Damages Caused by Equifax
In order to prevail on his § 1681i(a) claim, Mr. Virgil "must show that [ ]he suffered
damages as a result of the inaccurate information." Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Info.
Sols., Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation modified). Absent "a causal relation
between the violation of the statute and the loss of credit, or some other harm, a plaintiff
cannot obtain an award of 'actual damages.' " Crabill v. Trans Union, LLC, 259 F.3d 664,
664 (7th Cir. 2001). A "FCRA violation may inflict pecuniary harm, like lost income or
out-of-pocket expenses caused by denials of credit, housing, or insurance." Persinger v.
Sw. Credit Sys., L.P., 20 F.4th 1184, 1194 (7th Cir. 2021). "Nonpecuniary harms, including
reputational damage and emotional distress, may also follow [a] FCRA violation, though
these harms must be described in 'reasonable detail'—conclusory statements are
insufficient." Id. "However the plaintiff frames her case, she bears the burden to prove
actual damages, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary." Id.
Equifax maintains that Mr. Virgil's FCRA claims fail as a matter of law because he
cannot establish that Equifax caused any of his purported damages. Starting with Mr. Vir-
gil's claimed mortgage-related injuries, Equifax contends, and we agree, that Mr. Virgil has
failed to demonstrate any causal chain between his alleged mortgage difficulties and
Equifax's reporting. Accepting Mr. Virgil's (conflicting) testimony as to whether he did, in
fact, apply for a mortgage with Bank of America, see Virgil Dep. 126:1–14, dkt. 47-9, his
vague statement about having received "adverse mortgage interest rate terms" falls demon-
strably short of showing that his Equifax credit report was the cause. Mr. Virgil's allegations
relating to his mortgage application with First Centennial are equally unavailing, as the
record evidence reveals that First Centennial based its assessment on Mr. Virgil's Trans
Union credit score only, see generally dkt. 47-10; and that Mr. Virgil's Equifax credit score
was higher than his Trans Union credit score, Virgil Dep. 121:1–7, dkt. 47-9. We likewise
can discern no plausible basis on which Equifax would be held responsible for the roughly
$15,000 to $25,000 in costs Mr. Virgil incurred in his Florida housing search.
Mr. Virgil's deposition testimony that he has suffered approximately $100,000 in
lost wages, Virgil Dep. 133:16–17, dkt. 47-9, is similarly unavailing due to the lack of
evidence revealing how Mr. Virgil reached that calculation. As Equifax highlights, Mr. Vir-
gil suggested during his deposition that he "can produce" the basis for his calculation but,
to date, apparently has not done so. See id. at 133:18–134:2. Likewise, Mr. Virgil has not
elaborated the underlying factual details regarding the approximate $20,000 in (admittedly)
unnecessary payments he made toward other outstanding loans, nor has he explained a
causal relationship connecting such any expenditure to Equifax's reporting practices. Virgil
Decl. 4, dkt. 48-1. It is well established that summary judgment is the "put up or shut up"
moment in a case that requires parties to show their evidence. Steen, 486 F.3d at 1022.
Here, Mr. Virgil's unsubstantiated and in our view clearly exaggerated claims for lost wages
and other financial losses therefore do not survive summary judgment.
Lastly, Mr. Virgil has failed to establish any entitlement to emotional damages.
Although a plaintiff's testimony may suffice to support an emotional distress award, the
Seventh Circuit requires "more than conclusory statements." Persinger, 20 F.4th at 1194.
Here, unfortunately for Mr. Virgil, his allegations lack the requisite specificity necessary
to demonstrate a legal entitlement to emotional distress damages. For instance, in his dep-
osition, he stated generally that he has experienced ongoing difficulties in his "day-to-day
life," which have been "emotionally taxing." Virgil Dep. 146:15–147:6, dkt. 47-9. Mr. Vir-
gil's standalone testimony, without further corroboration, does not meet the "high threshold
for proof of emotional distress." Ruffin-Thompkins, 422 F.3d at 610.
Because Mr. Virgil has failed to adduce sufficient evidence of his actual damages,
Equifax is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Mr. Virgil's § 1681i(a) claim based
on negligence. See Persinger, 20 F.4th at 1194.7
IV. Punitive Damages
7 The parties do not address the possibility that a "plaintiff may still seek statutory damages if the
actual damages caused by the violation are small or difficult to ascertain." Meyers v. Nicolet Rest.
of De Pere, LLC, 843 F.3d 724 729 n.5 (7th Cir. 2016).
"Even if a plaintiff cannot prove actual damages, she may still recover statutory or
punitive damages by proving that the defendant willfully violated the FCRA." Id. at 1194–
95 (citations omitted). The term "willfully," as used in § 1681n, means that a defendant
violated the FCRA knowingly or with reckless disregard of the law. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am.
v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 59 (2007). "A willful violation is one committed in 'reckless disregard
of [a credit reporting agency's] statutory duty.' " Chaitoff, 79 F.4th at 819 (quoting Burr,
551 U.S. at 57). "Reckless conduct is that which creates a risk substantially greater than
that necessary to render the conduct negligent." Id. (citing Burr, 551 U.S. at 69). In as-
sessing recklessness, we "also look[ ] to the social utility (or lack thereof) of the conduct
at issue." Id. (citation modified).
On the record before us, a reasonable jury could not conclude that Equifax "willfully
failed to undertake a reasonable reinvestigation" of his March 6th dispute. Id. Equifax has
demonstrated that it abided by its ordinary procedures for collecting and assessing con-
sumer data and consumer disputes. Moreover, there is no evidence that Equifax wholly
ignored Mr. Virgil's dispute: To the contrary, Equifax twice transmitted ACDV notices to
Genesis in March 2023, pursuant to its standard reinvestigation procedures. In sum, Mr.
Virgil has failed to identify any aspect of Equifax's conduct that constates a "gross deviation
from what might be reasonable," and, as such, Equifax is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law on Mr. Virgil's willfulness theory of recovery. Id.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explicated above, Equifax's Motion for Summary Judgment is
hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Dkt. 45. Equifax's motion is
GRANTED as to Mr. Virgil's §§ 1681e(b), 16811(a), 1681c-1, 1681c-2, and 1681g claims.
Equifax's motion is DENIED as to Mr. Virgil's §§ 1681e(a) and 1681b claims.
This case shall proceed accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: a 2 2 |
9/30/2025
SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Distribution:
Jibril Greene
Seyfarth Shaw LLP
jagreene@seyfarth.com
Neil Peluchette
TAFT STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER LLP (Indianapolis)
npeluchette@taftlaw.com
James Louis Policchio
Jl Policchio Law LLC
james@)louislaw.com
27