The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
SHANNON 6., )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:24CV299
)
FRANK BISIGNANO, )
Commissioner of Social Security,! )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Shannon S. (“Plaintiff”) brought this action pursuant to Sections 205(g) and
1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), as amended (42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and
1383(c)(3)), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
denying her claims for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security
Income (“SSI”) under, respectively, Titles I and XVI of the Act. The parties have filed cross-
motions for judgment, and the administrative record has been certified to the Court for review.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff protectively filed applications for DIB and SSI on September 13, 2021, alleging
a disability onset date of April 7, 2020 in both applications. (Tr. at 17, 239-49.)? Her
applications were denied initially (Tr. at 69-92, 121-30) and upon reconsideration (T'r. at 93-
' The United States Senate confirmed Frank Bisignano as the Commissioner of Social Security on May 6, 2025,
and he took the oath of office on May 7, 2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Frank Bisignano should be substituted as the Defendant in this suit. Neither the Court nor the parties need
take any further action to continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of section 205(¢) of the Social Security
Act, 42 US.C. § 405(g).
2 Transcript citations refer to the Sealed Administrative Record [Doc. #5].
120, 143-58). Thereafter, Plaintiff requested an administrative heating de novo before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. at 159-90.) On May 17, 2023, Plaintiff, along with
her attorney, attended the subsequent telephone hearing, at which both Plaintiff and an
impartial vocational expert testified. (Tr. at 17, 43-68.) Following this hearing, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act (Tr. at 35-36), and on
Februaty 7, 2024, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs request for review of the decision,
thereby making the ALJ’s conclusion the Commissionet’s final decision for purposes of
judicial review (Tr. at 1-6).
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal law “authorizes judicial review of the Social Security Commissionet’s denial of
social security benefits.” Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006). However, the
scope of teview of such a decision is “extremely limited.” Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 144
(4th Cir. 1981). “The courts are not to try the case de novo.” Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d
396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974). Instead, “a reviewing court must uphold the factual findings of the
ALJ 1f they are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the
correct legal standard.” Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation omitted).
“Substantial evidence means ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.” Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992)
(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971)). “It consists of more than a mere
scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Mastro v. Apfel, 270
F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) G@nternal citations and quotation marks omitted). “If there is
evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is
substantial evidence.” Hunter, 993 F.2d at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“In reviewing for substantial evidence, the court should not undertake to re-weigh
conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the
[AL]].” Mastro, 270 F.3d at 176 (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). “Where
conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the
responsibility for that decision falls on the ALJ.” Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472. “The issue before
[the reviewing court], therefore, is not whether [the claimant] is disabled, but whether the
AL)’s finding that [the claimant] is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was
reached based upon a cortect application of the relevant law.” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585,
589 (4th Cir. 1996).
In undertaking this limited review, the Court notes that “[a] claimant for disability
benefits bears the burden of proving a disability.” Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir.
1981). In this context, “disability” means the “‘inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
petiod of not less than 12 months.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)).3
3 “The Social Security Act comprises two disability benefits programs. The Social Security Disability Insurance
Program (SSDI), established by Title II of the Act as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., provides benefits to
disabled petsons who have contributed to the program while employed. The Supplemental Security Income
Program (SSI), established by Title XVI of the Act as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., provides benefits to
indigent disabled persons. The statutory definitions and the regulations promulgated by the Secretary for
determining disability, see 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 (SSDI); 20 C.E.R. pt. 416 (SSI), governing these two programs are,
in all aspects relevant here, substantively identical.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 1.1.
“The Commissioner uses a ftve-step process to evaluate disability claims.” Hancock,
667 F.3d at 472 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4); 416.920(a)(4)). “Under this process, the
Commissioner asks, in sequence, whether the claimant: (1) worked during the alleged period
of disability; (2) had a severe impaitment; (3) had an impairment that met or equaled the
requitements of a listed impairment; (4) could return to her past relevant work; and (5) if not,
could perform any other work in the national economy.” Id.
A finding adverse to the claimant at any of several points in this five-step sequence
forecloses a disability designation and ends the inquiry. For example, “[t]he first step
determines whether the claimant is engaged in ‘substantial gainful activity.’ If the [claimant] is
working, benefits are denied. The second step determines if the claimant is ‘severely’ disabled.
If not, benefits are denied.” Bennett v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1990).
On the other hand, if a clatmant carries his or her burden at the first two steps, and if
the claimant’s impairment meets or equals a “listed impairment” at step three, “the claimant
is disabled.” Mastro, 270 F.3d at 177. Alternatively, if a claimant clears steps one and two,
but falters at step three, 1.e., “[1]f a clatmant’s tmpairment is not sufficiently severe to equal or
exceed a listed impairment,” then “the ALJ must assess the claimant’s residual functional
capacity (RFC’).” Id. at 179.4 Step four then requires the ALJ to assess whether, based on
+ “RFC is a measurement of the most a claimant can do despite [the claimant’s] limitations.” Hines, 453 F.3d
at 562 (noting that administrative regulations require RFC to reflect claimant’s “ability to do sustained work-
related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis . . . [which] means 8
hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule” (internal emphasis and quotation marks
omitted)). The RFC includes both a “physical exertional or strength limitation” that assesses the claimant’s
“ability to do sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy work,” as well as “nonexertional limitations
(mental, sensory, or skin impairments).” Hall, 658 F.2d at 265. “RFC is to be determined by the ALJ only after
[the ALJ] considers all relevant evidence of a clatmant’s impairments and any related symptoms (¢.g., pain).”
Hines, 453 F.3d at 562-63.
that RFC, the claimant can “perform past relevant work”; if so, the claimant does not qualify
as disabled. Id. at 179-80. However, if the claimant establishes an inability to return to prior
work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth step, which “requires the [Government] to prove that
a significant number of jobs exist which the claimant could perform, despite the claimant’s
impairments.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 563. In making this determination, the ALJ must decide
“whether the claimant is able to perform other work considering both [the claimant’s RFC]
and [the clatmant’s] vocational capabilities (age, education, and past work experience) to adjust
to a new job.” Hall, 658 F.2d at 264-65. If, at this step, the Government cannot carry its
“evidentiary burden of proving that [the claimant] remains able to work other jobs available
in the community,” the claimant qualifies as disabled. Hines, 453 F.3d at 567.
III. DISCUSSION
In the present case, the AL] found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since her alleged onset date of April 7, 2020. The ALJ therefore concluded that
Plaintiff met her burden at step one of the sequential evaluation process. (Tr. at 19.) At step
two, the ALJ further determined that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments:
diabetes mellitus with neuropathy; obesity; hypertension; restless leg syndrome;
lumbar facet arthropathy; post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); anxiety;
depression; and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)[.]
(Tr. at 20.) The AL] found at step three that none of the impairments identified at step two,
individually or in combination, met or equaled a disability listing. (Tr. at 20-25.) The AL]
therefore assessed Plaintiff's RFC and determined that she could perform light work with the
following, additional limitations:
[Plaintiff is limited to] occasional climbing of ramps and stairs; occasionally
kneeling, crawling, crouching, and stooping; occasional balancing with standing
and walking on even terrain; [and] no climbing of ropes, ladders, and scaffolds[.]
[She] should avoid concentrated exposure to hazards such as unprotected
heights and moving machinery; [can] occasional|ly] use . .. foot pedals; and [can]
frequent[ly handle and finger]. [Plaintiff] can understand, remember, and carty
out simple instructions[. T]hey can be detailed but not complex; the work
should be simple, routine, and repetitive in nature; she can focus on tasks for
two houts at a time; she can learn by demonstration in 30 days or less; [Plaintiff
can have] no contact with the public [and] occasional contact with coworkers
and supervisors; [she is further limited to] routine changes in the work
environment.
(Tr. at 25.) Based on this determination and the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ
determined at step four of the analysis that Plaintiffs past relevant work as an accounting clerk
exceeded her RFC. (Tr. at 34.) However, the ALJ found at step five that, given Plaintiffs age,
education, work experience, RFC, and the testimony of the vocational expert as to these
factors, she could perform other jobs available in significant numbers in the national economy.
(Tr. at 34-35.) Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act.
(Tr. at 35-36.)
Plaintiff now contends that, in formulating the RFC, the ALJ erred “in assessing the
supportability and consistency of consultative examiner (CE) Philip Hattfield’s opinions,
preventing substantial evidence from supporting the ALJ’s decision.” (PL’s Br. [Doc. #9] at
2.) Dr. Hatfield is a Licensed Clinical Psychologist and addressed Plaintiffs mental
impaitments in two separate evaluations: the first in December 2021, and the second tn July
2022. (Tr. at 652-57, 857-62.) Notably, Plaintiff does not challenge any of the AL]’s
determinations or analysis as to Plaintiffs physical impairments, including her diabetes,
neuropathy, or back pain. Therefore, the Court considers here only the challenge raised by
Plaintiff, specifically regarding the AL]’s treatment of Dr. Hatfield’s opinion regarding
Plaintiffs mental impairments.
Under the applicable regulations for claims filed on or after March 27, 2017,
[The ALJ] will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including
controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s), including those from your medical sources. When a medical source
ptovides one or more medical opinions or prior administrative medical findings,
we will consider those medical opinions or prior administrative medical findings
from that medical source together using the factors listed in paragraphs (c)(1)
through (c)(5) of this section, as appropriate. .. .
(1) Supportability. The more relevant the objective medical evidence and
supporting explanations presented by a medical source ate to support his
ot her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the
more persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative medical
finding(s) will be.
(2) Consistency. The more consistent a medical opinion(s) orf prior
administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical
soutces and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the
medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.
(3) Relationship with the claimant .. . [which includes]: @) Length of the
treatment relationship. . . (1) Frequency of examinations. ... (it) Purpose
of the treatment relationship. . . . (tv) Extent of the treatment relationship.
. . [and] (v) Examining relationship. ...
(4) Specialization. The medical opinion or prior administrative medical finding
of a medical source who has received advanced education and training to
become a specialist may be more persuasive about medical issues related to
his or her atea of specialty than the medical opinion or prior administrative
medical finding of a medical source who is not a specialist in the relevant
atea of specialty.
(5) Other factors. ... This includes, but is not limited to, evidence showing a
medical soutce has familiarity with the other evidence in the claim or an
understanding of our disability program’s policies and evidentiary
requirements. ...
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a) and (c). The regulations also require decision-makers to “articulate
in... [their] decision[s] how persuasive [they] find all of the medical opinions .. . in [a
claimant’s] case record.” Id. § 404.1520c(b). Although all of the factors listed in paragraphs
(c)(1) through (c)(5) of § 404.1520c should be considered in making this determination, the
regulations specifically provide that the most important factors when evaluating the
petsuasiveness of an opinion are the first two: supportability and consistency. Id.
§ 404.1520c(a), 404.1520c(c)(1)-(c)(2).. Therefore, paragraph (b) further provides that ALJs
“will explain how [they] considered the supportability and consistency factors for a medical
soutce’s medical opinions .. . in [the] determination or decision.” Id. § 404.1520c(b)(2).
Express discussion of the remaining factors is not required. See id. § 404.1520c(b)(3); see also
Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01 (Jan.
18, 2017) (explaining that the final rules in § 404.1520c “requite our [AL]s] to consider all of
the factors” in § 404.1520c(c) “for all medical opinions and, at a minimum, to articulate how
they considered the supportability and consistency factors” in determining persuasiveness). In
other words, § 404.1520c(b)—(c) defines the “minimum level of articulation” an AL} must
include in her written decision “to provide sufficient rationale for a reviewing .. .
coutt.” Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-
01; see also Drumgold v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 144 F.4th 596, 605 (4th Cir. 2025) (“The AL]
only needs to say, for each “medical source” in the record, how each of the fitst two factors
applies—that is, whether that source’s conclusions ate supportable by medical evidence and
consistent with the rest of the record.”).
Here, the ALJ described and discussed CE Hatfield’s examination findings and
opinions at great length. In particular, the AL] explained as follows:
[Plaintiff] was seen for psychiatric consultative examinations in December of
2021 and July of 2022, both performed by Philip Hatfield, PhD. While within
these evaluations [Plaintiff] reported that she did very little by way of personal
cate ot household maintenance due to depression-induced fatigue and lack of
motivation, these reports are rather inconsistent with her own previous
statements made within her September 2021 function report. This report shows
[Plaintiff] to have made no significant complaints regarding memoty,
concentration, understanding, following instructions, or getting along with
others|,] and shows generally intact mental functional abilities and activities.
[Plaintiff's] own treatment notes also fail to show evidence as to any significantly
worsening mental health symptomology. At any rate, the psychiatric
consultative examinations were grossly consistent with each other, indicative of
generally stable mental functioning. [Plaintiff] presented with a depressed and
tearful affect and exhibited somewhat impaired immediate recall, attention, and
concentration. She exhibited some slow processing speed on calculations and
was further noted to have been functioning in the overall low range of
intellectual ability. However, [Plaintiff] further presented as fully orientated
with normal speech and exhibited normal thought processes and logical,
coherent, and goal directed thought content. Recent and remote memory were
generally intact, and she further exhibited adequate judgment and insight. In
both evaluations, the examiner diagnosed major depressive disorder, recurrent,
severe, without psychotic features.
(Tr. at 31) G@nternal citations omitted).
Later in her decision, when discussing the medical opinion evidence, the AL]
considered Dr. Hatfield’s two medical statements in even greater detail:
In connection with his December 2021 psychological consultative examination,
Dr. Hatfield opined [that Plaintiff] appeared to be generally capable of
understanding, retaining, and following simple, concrete instructions without
difficulty; likely to have mild difficulties utilizing sustained attention to perform
routine, repetitive tasks; likely to have significant difficulties forming effective
working relationships with co-workers, supervisors, and the general public; and
likely to have significant difficulties tolerating the usual stress and pressures of
a competitive workplace, including managing changes in the routine[,] but
capable of asking for assistance when needed.
In connection with his later July 2022 examination, Dr. Hatfield opined the
same with the exception as to his indicating [that Plaintiff was] likely to have
moderate difficulties utilizing sustained attention to perform routine, repetitive
tasks and likely to have moderate to episodically significant difficulties forming
effective working relationships with co-workers, supervisors, and the general
public. He further opined that [Plaintiff's] ability to complete a normal workday
without disruption ftom psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a
consistent pace without an unteasonable number of and length of rest periods
significantly impaired. [Plaintiffs] ability to be aware of normal hazards and
take appropriate precautions including asking for assistance when needed [was]
unimpaited[,] and [her] ability to travel to unfamiliar places and/or use public
transportation [was also] unimpaired. These opinions are found somewhat
persuasive to the extent that they are also suggestive of no more than moderate
mental functional limitations with the exception as to Dr. Hatfield’s opining
significant impairment in [Plaintiffs] ability to perform at a consistent pace
without an unreasonable number of and length of rest periods. As above, Dr.
Hatfield’s own clinical exam findings were not all that unchanged from each
other and fail to support this need for such greater restriction[. ‘The increased
restrictions] appeat|] to have been based more on [Plaintiffs] subjective reports
rather than clinical findings. Moreover, as detailed above, [Plaintiff] has
recetved nothing more than conservative medication management with no
evidence as to significant psychological complaints[. Her treatment notes]
instead note grossly normal mental status exam findings that are consistent with
the [RFC] findings herein. Additionally, [Plaintiffs] own reported activities of
daily living are consistent with the same.
(T'r. at 32-33) (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff now contends that “substantial evidence does not support the AL]’s decision
because in considering the supportability and consistency of Dr. Hatfield’s opinions, the AL]
failed to explain [her] reasoning and failed to resolve inconsistencies in the record due to the
inaccurate summary of the evidence.” (PI.’s Br. at 15.) In terms of supportability,
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to sufficiently explain “why ‘stable’ findings seven months
apart indicate[| less severe mental health limitations than Dr. Hatfield opined.” (PI.’s Br. at
16.) As for the consistency factor, Plaintiff contends that, in finding Plaintiffs description of
her symptoms and activities at her consultative examinations inconsistent with those described
in her September 2021 Function Report, the ALJ’s description “does not accurately reflect the
contents of the report.” (PI.’s Br. at 18.) These contentions fail to provide a basis for remand.
As set out above, the AL] provided myriad reasons for her assessment of Dr. Hatfield’s
opinions. Notably, the AL] did not, as Plaintiff contends, determine that “stable” findings
undermined Dr. Hatfield’s opinions regarding the overall severity of Plaintiffs mental
10
condition. Rather, the AL] found that the increased restrictions posited in Dr. Hatfield’s 2022
opinion were unsupported by his “own clinical exam findings,” which “were not all that
unchanged from each other and fail[ed] to support [a] need for such greater restriction” a mere
seven months after his initial, less restrictive opinion. (Ir. at 33 (emphasis added).) The ALJ
also emphasized, both here and elsewhere in her decision, that, throughout the time period at
issue, Plaintiff “has received nothing more than conservative medication management”
through her primary cate provider “with no evidence as to significant psychological
complaints.” (T'r. at 33; see also Tr. at 30, 31.) Plaintiffs treatment notes “instead note grossly
normal mental status exam findings” (Ir. at 33) with no “objective evidence as to any
slenificant worsening in [her] overall condition” over time (Tr. at 30, 31).
Nevertheless, the ALJ acknowledged that, in the course of her examinations by Dt.
Hatfield, Plaintiff exhibited “a depressed and tearful affect,” “somewhat impaired immediate
recall, attention, and concentration,’ “slow processing speed on calculations,’ and
“functioning in the overall low range of intellectual ability.” (Tr. at 31.) As set out above, Dr.
Hatfield concluded that Plaintiff was:
(1) capable of understanding, retaining, and following simple, concrete
instructions without difficulty;
(2) likely to have mild difficulties utilizing sustained attention to perform
routine, repetitive tasks;
(3) likely to have significant difficulties forming effective working relationships
with co-workers, supervisors, and the general public; and
(4) likely to have significant difficulties tolerating the usual stress and pressures
of a competitive workplace, including managing changes in the routine[.]
11
(See Tr. at 32.) The AL] likewise found, with specific reference to the consultative examination
as well as other evidence in the record, that Plaintiff had
(1) “moderate limitation” in “understanding, remembering, or applying information”
(Tr. at 23) but “can understand, remember, and catty out simple instructions”
(Tr. at 25, 31);
(2) “moderate limitation” in “concentrating, persisting, or maintain pace” (Tr. at 24)
so limited to work that is “simple, routine, and repetitive in nature” and can only
“focus on tasks for two hours at a time” (Tr. at 25, 31);
(3) “moderate limitations” in interacting with others with “some difficulty relating
and working with supervisors, co-workers, and the public” (Tr. at 23), such that
she should have “no contact with the public” and only “occasional contact with
coworkers and supervisors” (Tr. at 25, 31); and
(4) “moderate limitation” in managing herself and managing stress, but “reported
handling changes in routine “okay” and was limited to only “routine change in
the work environment” (Tr. at 24-25, 31).
These same limitations are likewise reflected in the opinion of the state agency psychologist,
Dr. Brooks, who considered Dr. Hatfield’s December 2021 evaluation and concluded that
Plaintiff could “sustain attention and concentration for short periods of time but would have
difficulty maintaining for extended periods of time,” and was “able to interact with others in
a setting that doesn’t require intensive interpersonal demands,” and ultimately was “capable
of performing [simple, routine, repetitive tasks] in a low stress setting with limited social
interaction.” (Tr. at 77-78.) Thus, the AL]’s RFC determination addressed all of Dr. Hatfield’s
2021 findings and largely adopted the findings of the State agency psychological consultants,
which, due to Plaintiffs lack of other psychiatric treatment, were based in large part on Dr.
Hatfield’s opinions.
12
Notably, the ALJ found Dr. Hatfield’s opinions persuasive “to the extent that they are
also suggestive of no more than moderate mental functional limitations” (Tr. at 33), but the
ALJ did not find persuasive the increased limitations in Dr. Hatfield’s July 2022 evaluation,
which opined that Plaintiffs ability to complete a normal workday without disruption from
psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable
number of and length of rest periods was significantly impaired. (Tr. at 33, 656.) The AL]
found that this aspect of the July 2022 evaluation was not consistent with Dr. Hatfield’s prior
evaluation, even though Plaintiffs condition was stable and the examinations were largely
unchanged. (Tr. at 33, 31.) The AL) further found that this aspect of the July 2022 evaluation
was not supported by the medical evidence, which reflected only conservative medical
management, no evidence of significant psychological complaints, and grossly normal mental
status exam findings. (Tr. at 33.) Thus, the AL]’s decision clearly explains the assessment and
weighing of Dr. Hatfield’s opinions, including specifically as to consistency and supportability,
and there is substantial evidence in the record to support those conclusions.
As a final matter, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s characterization of Plaintiffs Adult
Function Report, but these contentions fail to alter the above conclusions and provide no
basis for remand. Specifically, the ALJ noted that, in the September 2021 Adult Function
Report, Plaintiff “made no significant complaints regarding memory, concentration,
understanding, following instructions, or getting along with others[,] and shows generally
intact mental functional abilities and activities.” (Tr. at 31.) A review of the Function Report
itself reveals that, when asked to indicate “any of the following items that your illnesses,
injuties, or conditions affect,’ Plaintiff did not place a check mark next to memory,
13
concentration, understanding, following instructions, or getting along with others. (Tr. at 296.)
In the short answer questions that followed, she noted that she could only pay attention “30-
45 minutes” and that she was good at following written and spoken instructions. (Tt. at 296.)
Thus, the AL]’s statement was not a mistepresentation of the information in the Function
Report. Moreover, as set out above, the AL] adopted mental RFC findings consistent with
Dr. Hatfield’s clinical findings and related conclusions in the December 2021 evaluation, and
consistent with the opinions of the state agency psychologist, which included limitations
relating to concentration, following instructions, and social limitations. ‘Thus, the AL]’s
finding that Plaintiffs statements to Dr. Hatfield were “rather inconsistent” with her Function
Report appears to play little, if any, role in the AL]’s weighing of Dr. Hatfield’s opinions. ‘The
inconsistency noted in Plaintiff's statements instead appears to relate primarily to the AL]’s
determination that Plaintiffs “statements concerning the intensity, persistence[,] and limiting
effects of [her] symptoms [were] not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other
evidence in the record,” a finding which, notably, Plaintiff does not contest. (See Tr. at 26.)5
In sum, the AL] sufficiently explained her analysis of Dr. Hatfield’s opinions, and in
doing so, the ALJ not only resolved inconsistencies between the two opinions themselves, but
adequately explained the role of the supportability and inconsistency factors in her decision,
> The Court also notes that, while not material to the analysis of Dr. Hatfield’s opinions, the AL] reasonably
observed that Plaintiffs reports of her daily activities in her Function Report in September 2021 differed from
her report to Dr. Hatfield in December 2021. For example, in her September 2021 Function Report, Plaintiff
reported that she would get up and prepare breakfast, attempt chores, lay down for 2 hours, attempt to work
on chores, test again for 2 hours, and have dinner with her family. (Tr. at 292.) She also reported preparing
her own meals daily, cleaning, ironing, doing laundry, watering flowers indoors and outdoors, going outside at
least once a day, and shopping for groceries and household items. (Tr. at 293-94.) In contrast, three months
later tn December 2021, she reported to Dr. Hatfield that “[n]ine times out of ten” she just goes back to bed
and sleeps six or seven hours all day, does not clean or do anything else, does not put clothes on or shower,
and relies on her daughter to cook for her and shop for her. (Tr. at 858-59.) It was not a misrepresentation of
the evidence for the ALJ to conclude that those reports were “rather inconsistent.” (Tr. at 31.)
14
as tequited by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). Moreover, with respect to the specific contentions
raised by Plaintiff, the Court does not find any material misstatement or mistepresentation of
the evidence that would warrant remand.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Commissioner’s decision finding of no
disability is AFFIRMED, that Plaintiffs Dispositive Brief [Doc. #9] is DENIED, that
Defendant’s Dispositive Brief [Doc. #12] is GRANTED, and that this action is DISMISSED
with prejudice.
This, the 30% day of September, 2025.
nited States Magistrate Judge
15