The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JAYMZ BAGBY, }
}
Plaintiff, }
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v. } Case No.: 2:23-cv-01494-MHH
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MARK PETTWAY, in his official }
capacity as Sheriff of Jefferson }
County, Alabama, et al., }
}
Defendants. }
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Jaymz Bagby worked as a deputy sheriff for the Jefferson County
Sheriff’s Office. In his complaint, Deputy Bagby alleges that the defendants
discriminated against him based on his race. (Doc. 1). He contends that the
defendants violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 and 42 U.S.C. 2000e, as amended, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
(Doc. 1, pp. 1–2, ¶ 1). The defendants have asked the Court to enter judgment in
their favor on Deputy Bagby’s claims pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. (Doc. 8). Deputy Bagby has not responded to the motion. (See
Doc. 6, p. 2) (scheduling order setting deadline for summary judgment opposition
brief).
***
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for summary
judgment. Rule 56 provides that a court “shall grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To demonstrate
that there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact that precludes summary judgment,
a party opposing a motion for summary judgment must cite “particular parts of
materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for
purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). “The court need consider only the cited materials, but
it may consider other materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). When
considering a summary judgment motion, a district court must view the evidence in
the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Thai Meditation
Ass’n of Ala., Inc. v. City of Mobile, 83 F.4th 922, 926 (11th Cir. 2023). Consistent
with this standard, the Court views the evidence in this case in the light most
favorable to Deputy Bagby.
“If a party fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required
by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . grant summary judgment if the motion and
supporting materials — including the facts considered undisputed — show that the
movant is entitled to it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3). Even when a non-movant does
not oppose a summary judgement motion, the district court must evaluate the merits
of the motion. See Dunlap v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 629,
632 (11th Cir. 1988). Therefore, the Court must examine the defendants’ evidentiary
materials and “determine whether they establish the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.” U.S. v. One Piece of Real Prop., 363 F.3d 1099, 1102 (11th Cir.
2004) (quoting Jaroma v. Massey, 873 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1989)).
***
Here, the evidence shows that, on December 7, 2020, Jefferson County Sheriff
Mark Pettway, a Black male, hired Deputy Bagby, a white male, as a deputy sheriff.
(Doc. 9-3, p. 2; Doc. 27-1, p. 51, tp. 195). Deputy Bagby worked in the Corrections
Division of the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office. (Doc. 9-2 p. 2, ¶ 4).
On July 6, 2021, an inmate at the Jefferson County Jail, Kortdero Sillence,
injured his shoulder while horseplaying with Deputy Devonta Brown, a Black male
deputy. Deputy Bagby was on duty. (Doc. 9-3, p. 54, 63). Neither deputy reported
the incident nor requested medical assistance for Mr. Sillence. (Doc. 9-3, p. 63).
The following day while seeking medical treatment, Mr. Sillence stated that Deputy
Bagby had assisted in “popping” his shoulder back into place; Deputy Bagby denies
the allegation. (Doc. 9-3, p. 63).
Internal Affairs investigated the incident and suspended Deputy Brown for
three days. (Doc. 9-3, p. 57). Deputy Brown was suspended for one day for not
properly ensuring the safety of individuals in custody and two days for neglecting
his duties by engaging in horseplay with Mr. Sillence. (Doc. 9-3). As part of the
internal affairs investigation, Sgt. William Michael Schuelly, a white male,
conducted a polygraph test of Deputy Bagby because of discrepancies between
Deputy Bagby’s and Mr. Sillence’s accounts of the events following Mr. Sillence’s
injury. (Doc. 9-3, pp. 75–76). The results indicated that Deputy Bagby was
deceptive when asked whether he had helped pop Mr. Sillence’s shoulder back into
its socket. (Doc. 9-3, pp. 75–76).
Following a Loudermill hearing on May 19, 2022, Sheriff Pettway suspended
Deputy Bagby for 15 days for making false statements. (Doc. 9-3, p. 67). Deputy
Bagby also received written reprimands for failure to report the incident and failure
to safeguard Mr. Sillence. (Doc. 9-3, pp. 67–70). Deputy Bagby appealed the
suspension to the Personnel Board of Jefferson County, and a hearing officer
recommended overturning the suspension. (Doc. 9-3, pp. 78–79). Over objections
from Sheriff Pettway, the Personnel Board affirmed the hearing officer’s
recommendation and overturned the suspension. (Doc. 9-3, pp. 78–79).
Meanwhile, on January 21, 2022, on behalf of his son, inmate Chase LaFoy,
Steve LaFoy made a complaint of sexual harassment against Deputy Bagby. (Doc.
9-4, p. 45). Mr. LaFoy asserted that Deputy Bagby slapped Chase LaFoy on the
buttocks, made sexually explicit remarks, and used derogatory language. (Doc. 9-4,
p. 45). Several witnesses, including Deputy John Chapple and inmate Joseph Moore,
confirmed parts of the incident. (Doc. 9-4, pp. 46, 48). The JCSO Corrections
Division investigated the complaint. (Doc. 9-4, pp. 51–52, 58). Sgt. Brandon
Sunday and Sgt. Ali Daniels, Black males, investigated and concluded that there was
evidence of criminal misconduct. (Doc. 9-4, p. 50). In February 2022, a warrant
was issued for Deputy Bagby’s arrest. (Doc. 9-4, p. 41).
Following Deputy Bagby’s arrest, Internal Affairs Division Commander
NaShonda Howard, a Black female, instructed Deputy Bagby to surrender his badge,
commission, swipe card, and vehicle, and she placed him on paid administrative
leave. (Doc. 9-3, p. 36). After the administrative leave expired, Deputy Bagby was
assigned administrative duties in the property room pending the investigation of the
charges against him. (Doc. 9-5, p.15, tp. 53:3–13).
Internal Affairs Deputy Constance Echols, a Black female, interviewed Deputy
Bagby and witnesses and administered a polygraph test to Deputy Bagby. (Doc. 9-
3, pp. 15–31). The polygraph test indicated that Deputy Bagby’s denial of slapping
Chase LaFoy was not truthful. (Doc. 9-3, pp. 33–34). Deputy Echols concluded
that Deputy Bagby violated multiple JCSO policies and recommended discipline
including suspension and termination. (Doc. 9-3, p. 31).
On April 7, 2022, Deputy Bagby attended a Loudermill hearing with Sheriff
Pettway. (Doc. 9, p. 8, ¶ 20). Deputy Bagby contested the findings against him and
presented a statement from inmate Dazzmin Ford in which Mr. Ford recanted his
prior testimony. (Doc. 9, p. 8, ¶ 20.). Deputy Echols maintained her disciplinary
recommendations, and Deputy Bagby remained on administrative assignment.
(Doc. 9, p. 8, ¶ 20). Sheriff Pettway deferred disciplinary decisions pending the
outcome of the criminal proceedings concerning Deputy Bagby. (Doc. 9, p. 8, ¶ 21).
In July 2022, Deputy Bagby filed a charge of race discrimination with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. In the charge, Deputy Bagby
complained of race discrimination based on his arrest, prosecution, and disciplinary
actions. (Doc. 1-1).
On September 28, 2022, the criminal harassment case against Deputy Bagby
was dismissed with prejudice for want of prosecution. (Doc. 9-1, pp. 94–95). On
November 8, 2022, the presiding judge denied motions to reinstate the case. (Doc.
9-1, p. 96). On November 9, 2022, Sheriff Pettway suspended Deputy Bagby for
five days for conduct unbecoming a deputy but did not follow Internal Affairs’
recommendation for termination. (Doc. 9-1, p. 64; Doc. 9-7, p. 28, tpp. 106–108).
Deputy Bagby appealed the five-day suspension. (Doc. 9, p. 10, ¶ 26.). After
hearings, the hearing officer and the Personnel Board affirmed the suspension,
finding sufficient evidence of misconduct. (Doc. 9, p. 10, ¶ 26). The Personnel
Board also found that Mr. Ford’s recantation of his initial statement was not credible.
(Doc. 9, p. 10, ¶ 26). Deputy Bagby appealed to the Jefferson County Circuit Court,
and the state court upheld the Personnel Board’s decision. (Doc. 9-3, p. 52).
Deputy Bagby contends that he has suffered damages because of these actions,
including loss of overtime pay, denial of a 5% pay increase for Emergency Response
Team membership, loss of commendations and training opportunities, and severe
harm to his professional reputation. (Doc. 1, p. 8, ¶ 28). Deputy Bagby also alleges
that similarly situated Black deputies received more lenient discipline for
comparable misconduct. (Doc. 1, p. 8–9, ¶ 28).
In his complaint, Deputy Bagby asserts three claims against Mark Pettway in
his official capacity as Sherriff of Jefferson County: discriminatory discipline in
violation of Title VII, Title VII retaliation, and malicious prosecution. (Doc. 1, pp.
9–16, ¶¶ 31–68). Deputy Bagby asserts two claims against defendants Mark
Pettway, NaShonda Howard, Ali Daniels, and Constance Echols in their individual
capacities: malicious prosecution and violation of the Equal Protection Clause under
the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1, pp. 13–16, ¶¶
59–68).
***
For his Title VII official capacity race discrimination claim against Sheriff
Pettway, Deputy Bagby contends that his five-day suspension was motivated by
race. (Doc. 1, p. 9, ¶ 32). Employees who believe they have experienced racial
discrimination may submit direct evidence to support their claims. Flowers v. Troup
Cnty., Ga., Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 1327, 1335 (11th Cir. 2015). When an employee
relies on circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent, the employee may
proceed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework or present a
convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence from which a jury may infer
intentional discrimination. Tynes v. Fla. Dep’t of Juv. Just., 88 F.4th 939, 943-47
(11th Cir. 2023).
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Deputy Bagby must establish a
prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating that he belongs to a protected
class, he was qualified for his job, he experienced a negative employment action,
and he was treated less favorably than a similarly situated person outside his
protected class. Maynard v. Bd. of Regents, 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003)
(citing McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802). Here, Deputy Bagby has not
provided evidence to substantiate his allegation that Black employees received more
lenient discipline for a similar infraction.1 Deputy Bagby compares his situation
to proceedings involving Deputy Davis (Black female), Deputy Chestnut (Black
1 Sheriff Pettway identified these reasons for Deputy Bagby’s suspension: “(1) Deputy Bagby’s
co-worker, Deputy Chapple’s eyewitness statement and testimony; (2) Deputy Bagby’s failed
polygraph test; and (3) two other inmate witnesses (Joseph Moore and Dazzmin Ford).” (Doc. 11,
p. 22).
male), Deputy Terrance Smith (Black male), Deputy Quindarious Reeves (Black
male). (Doc. 1, p. 8, ¶ 29). None of the conduct attributed to these Black deputies
is as serious as the misconduct for which Deputy Bagby was disciplined. (Doc. 9-2,
p. 3, ¶ 9; see also Doc. 9-1, pp.11–12, tpp. 40:15-44:11). Additionally, Deputy
Bagby has not presented evidence to show that race was the real reason for the
discipline he received.
Therefore, Sheriff Pettway has demonstrated that there is not a genuine
dispute of material fact as to Deputy Bagby’s official capacity race discrimination
claim. The Court will enter judgment for Sheriff Pettway in his official capacity on
Deputy Bagby’s race discrimination claim.
***
For his Title VII official capacity retaliation claim against Sheriff Pettway,
Deputy Bagby alleges that Sheriff Pettway pursued unsupported criminal charges
against him because he (Deputy Bagby) filed a discrimination charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. (Doc 1, p. 12, ¶ 47). To establish a prima
facie case of retaliation under Title VII, Deputy Bagby must demonstrate that “(1)
he engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) he suffered an adverse
employment action; and (3) there is some causal relation between the two events.”
Olmsted v. Taco Bell Corp., 141 F.3d 1457, 1460 (11th
Cir. 1998) (citing Meeks v. Computer Associates Int’l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1021 (11th.
Cir. 1994)). “[T]o be actionable, any retaliatory actions must have occurred after
[Deputy Bagby’s] formal complaints were filed.” Cheatham v. DeKalb Cnty.,
Georgia, 682 Fed. Appx. 881, 887 (11th Cir. 2017).
Here, Deputy Bagby cannot establish a retaliation claim based on the criminal
proceedings against him because he filed his EEOC charge after criminal charges
were brought against him. A magistrate issued a warrant for Deputy Bagby’s arrest
on February 1, 2022. (Doc. 9-4, p. 41). Deputy Bagby did not file his EEOC charge
until July 28, 2022. (Doc. 1-1). Therefore, the Court will enter judgment for Sheriff
Pettway on Deputy Bagby’s official capacity retaliation claim.
***
For his malicious prosecution claim, Deputy Bagby asserts that the
defendants maliciously pursued a criminal charge against him without probable
cause. (Doc. 1, p. 14, ¶ 61). Deputy Bagby alleges that the charge against him was
unsubstantiated. (Doc. 1, p. 14, ¶ 61). Deputy Bagby also states that the criminal
proceeding ultimately ended in his favor. (Doc. 1, p. 14, ¶ 61).
To establish a malicious prosecution claim, Mr. Bagby must demonstrate that
an arrest warrant was “‘(i) instituted without any probable cause’; (ii) the ‘motive in
instituting’ the [charge] ‘was malicious,’ which [i]s often defined in this context as
without probable cause and for a purpose other than bringing the defendant to justice;
and (iii) the prosecution ‘terminated in the acquittal or discharge of the accused.’”
Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 44 (2022).
“At the Founding, the presence of a valid arrest warrant made an arrest
reasonable.” United States v. Phillips, 834 F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir. 2016). “The
Warrants Clause requires every warrant to be particular, sworn, and supported by
probable cause.” Phillips, 834 F.3d at 1180. “Therefore, an arrest warrant creates a
presumption, albeit a rebuttable one, that probable cause existed for the arrest.”
Turner v. Williams, 65 F.4th 564, 582 (11th Cir. 2023). As noted, a magistrate issued
a warrant for Deputy Bagby’s arrest on February 1, 2022. (Doc. 9-4, p. 41). Because
Deputy Bagby has not rebutted the presumption of probable cause for his arrest,
there is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding Deputy Bagby’s malicious
prosecution claim. Accordingly, the Court will enter judgment for the defendants
on that claim.
***
For his equal protection claim, Deputy Bagby alleges that the defendants
subjected him to unlawful race discrimination and retaliatory criminal prosecution.
(Doc. 1, p. 15, ¶ 67). “Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required
to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” Vill. of Arlington Heights v.
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977). Deputy Bagby must present
evidence, not mere allegations, showing both disparate treatment and discriminatory,
or retaliatory, animus. As discussed above, he has not done so. Conclusory
assertions of race discrimination or retaliation, unsupported by specific facts in the
record, do not create a genuine dispute of material fact. Therefore, the Court will
enter judgment for the defendants on Deputy Bagby’s equal protection claim.
RK
For the reasons discussed above, the Court grants the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on Deputy Bagby’s claims. The Court will enter a final
judgment. The Clerk shall please TERM Docs. 8 and 12.
DONE and ORDERED this September 30, 2025.
uae E HUGHES HAIKALA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
12