SUMMERS v. REMUS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

______________________________________________________________________________

GEORGE D. SUMMERS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:24-cv-2060-MSN-cgc

JURY DEMAND

HENDRELL REMUS, in his official capacity as

Chairman of the Tennessee Democratic Party;

LEXIE CARTER, in her official capacity as

Chair of the Shelby County Democratic Party;

MARK GOINS, in his official capacity as

Coordinator of Elections for the State of Tennessee;

STATE OF TENNESSEE; and

JAVIER BAILEY, in his official capacity as

Chairman of the Shelby County Democratic Primary Board,

Defendants.

______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO

DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

______________________________________________________________________________

Before the Court are the Motion of Defendants Mark Goins and State of Tennessee to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (ECF No. 52), Defendant Hendrell Remus’ Motion

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended [Complaint] Pursuant to Fed. [Rule] Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (ECF

No. 53), and Defendant Lexie Carter’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint

(ECF No. 54).1 Defendants Mark Goins, Hendrell Remus, and Lexie Carter are all sued in their

official capacities. Moving Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff George D. Summers’ Third

1 Collectively, the Court refers to Defendants Mark Goins, the State of Tennessee, Hendrell

Remus, and Lexie Carter as the “Moving Defendants.” Defendant Javier Bailey was first named

as a Defendant in the Third Amended Complaint; he filed an Answer on October 29, 2024 (ECF

No. 62). Defendant Bailey has not filed a motion to dismiss.

Amended Complaint (ECF No. 46, “Complaint”), which alleges Defendants violated Plaintiff’s

due process and equal protection rights when they disqualified and removed him from the

Democratic primary ballot as a candidate for Shelby County General Sessions Court Clerk. For

the reasons explained below, Defendants’ motions are GRANTED for Plaintiff’s claims under the

United States Constitution.

BACKGROUND

On December 12, 2023, Plaintiff filed a petition to run for Shelby County General Sessions

Court Clerk and received confirmation that he met all the requirements to be on the Democratic

primary ballot for the March 5, 2024, election. (ECF No. 46 at PageID 297–98.) Plaintiff asserts

that he is a bona fide member of the Tennessee Democratic Party and had voted in the last five

primaries as a Democrat. (Id. at PageID 298–99.) However, on December 19, 2023, Defendant

Hendrell Remus, Chairman of the Tennessee Democratic Party, sent Plaintiff a letter saying he was

disqualified from the Democratic ballot per Tennessee Code Annotated § 2-5-204. (Id. at PageID

292.) The letter gave no reason for removing Plaintiff from the ballot,2 but informed Plaintiff how

to appeal, stating as follows:

The candidate may appeal the determination in writing and must file

the original appeal with the executive committee and a copy of the

appeal with the coordinator of elections within two (2) days of

receipt of the notice from the executive committee.

(Id. at PageID 293.) Remus also sent a letter to Mark Goins, Coordinator of Elections for the State

of Tennessee, instructing him to remove Plaintiff from the ballot before March 5, 2024. (Id.)

Plaintiff did not appeal or take any action until January 30, 2024, when he filed this suit. (ECF

2 In a later pleading, Defendant Remus alleges that Plaintiff was disqualified because of

his “voting history” and recent removal from “the Grass Roots Council because of his election

activities with the Republican Party.” (ECF No. 31 at PageID 175.)

No. 53-1 at PageID 364.)

On February 7, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Emergency Motion for Immediate Injunctive Relief

(ECF No. 20), asking the Court to “enjoin the Defendants from enforcing an arbitrary and improper

ruling of the Tennessee Democratic Party that would prevent Plaintiff from appearing on the ballot

for the March 5, 2024, Democratic Primary election.” (ECF No. 20 at PageID 71.) At this point,

the deadline to finalize the ballot for voting machines was one week away and the county had

already printed and mailed absentee ballots. (ECF No. 23 at PageID 87–88.) Plaintiff asked the

Court to order election officials to update the voting machines with his name, discard all absentee

ballots, and reprint and remail new absentee ballots. (Id.) The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion

because he did not show a “strong likelihood of success for any of his claims” and was not facing

“imminent and irreparable injury.” (ECF No. 36 at PageID 195–96 & 200.)

On March 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion asking leave to amend his complaint again

(ECF No. 40), which the Court “reluctantly” granted (ECF No. 45). On September 2, 2024,

Plaintiff filed his Third Amended Complaint (ECF No. 46), which sues Defendants Remus, Carter,

and Goins in their official capacities, and the State of Tennessee. Defendants timely filed their

Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 52, 53, & 54). Plaintiff has yet to file a response, despite the Court

issuing an Order to Show Cause. (ECF No. 57.)3

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal for lack of

jurisdiction over the subject matter of a complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A Rule 12(b)(1)

3 Plaintiff responded to the Show Cause order, saying he would file his response to

Defendants’ motions “immediately” (ECF No. 58) but, to date, he has not filed a response.

motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be premised on a facial or factual

attack. See Cartwright v. Garner, 751 F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2014); Gentek Bldg. Prods., Inc. v.

Sherwin-Williams Co., 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007). A facial attack questions the sufficiency

of the pleading without disputing the facts alleged in it. See Gentek Bldg. Prods., Inc., 491 F.3d

at 330. A factual attack challenges the factual allegations underlying the assertion of jurisdiction.

See United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994). When reviewing a facial attack, a

district court takes the allegations of the complaint as true. Gentek Bldg. Prods., Inc., 491 F.3d at

330. A factual attack “controvert[s] the accuracy (rather than the sufficiency) of the jurisdictional

facts asserted by the plaintiff and proffer[s] materials . . . in support of that position.” Valentin v.

Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 363 (1st Cir. 2001).

B. Failure to State a Claim under Rule 12(b)(6)

In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the

court accepts the plaintiff’s “plausible factual allegations as true and draw[s] all reasonable

inferences” in the plaintiff’s favor. Marchek v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 118 F.4th 830, 833 (6th

Cir. 2024); Cook v. Ohio Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 961 F.3d 850, 855 (6th Cir. 2020). Using this

framework, the court determines whether the complaint alleges “sufficient factual matter, accepted

as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on

its face if “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A

complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations; however, a plaintiff’s “[t]hreadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In other words, “a plaintiff must allege facts that, when taken

as true, state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face and that rises above the speculative

level.” Bray v. Bon Secours Mercy Health, Inc., 97 F.4th 403, 410 (6th Cir. 2024) (citation

modified). If a court decides, in light of its judicial experience and common sense, that the claim

is not plausible, the case may be dismissed at the pleading stage. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s claims fall into three categories: (1) § 1983 claims against all Defendants for

violating Plaintiff’s procedural and substantive due process rights; (2) § 1983 claims against all

Defendants for denying Plaintiff equal protection of the laws; and (3) a constitutional challenge to

Tennessee Code Annotated § 2-5-204. For his § 1983 claims, Plaintiff appears to seek damages,

injunctive, and declaratory relief. For his challenge to Tennessee Code Annotated § 2-5-204,

Plaintiff seeks only declaratory relief.

All Plaintiff’s claims against the Moving Defendants are subject to dismissal for differing,

but overlapping, reasons: first, Plaintiff lacks standing for his requested declaratory relief; second,

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Goins and the State of Tennessee are barred by sovereign

immunity; third, Plaintiff has not alleged a property right or liberty interest protected by the Due

Process clause; and fourth, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to make his Equal Protection

claims plausible on their face. Because standing and sovereign immunity are issues that affect this

Court’s jurisdiction, they must be addressed first. Kanuszewski v. Mich. Dep’t of Health & Human

Servs., 927 F.3d 396, 405 (6th Cir. 2019) (explaining that standing is “jurisdictional and must be

addressed as a threshold matter”); Doe v. DeWine, 910 F.3d 842, 848 (6th Cir. 2018) (“Because the

Eleventh Amendment is a true jurisdictional bar, Defendants’ entitlement to sovereign immunity

must be decided before the merits.”(citation modified)); Morgan v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of the Supreme

Ct. of Tennessee, 63 F.4th 510, 515 (6th Cir. 2023) (“Before considering a suit against a state, a

federal court must determine whether the Eleventh Amendment bars jurisdiction.”).

A. Plaintiff Lacks Standing for His Claims Seeking Declaratory Relief

“To have standing, a plaintiff must allege (1) an injury in fact (2) that’s traceable to the

defendant’s conduct and (3) that the courts can redress.” Gerber v. Herskovitz, 14 F.4th 500, 505

(6th Cir. 2021) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–61 (1992)). “If a party does

not have standing to bring an action, then the court has no authority to hear the matter and must

dismiss the case.” Binno v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 826 F.3d 338, 344 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).

“The party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction bears the burden to demonstrate standing and he

‘must plead its components with specificity.’” Daubenmire v. City of Columbus, 507 F.3d 383,

388 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 494 (6th Cir. 1999) (further

citation omitted)). But a standing analysis “is not a merits inquiry.” Gerber, 14 F.4th at 505; see

Kanuszewski, 927 F.3d at 407 (“standing analysis does not consider the merits of Plaintiffs’

claims”). The plaintiff’s allegations in support of standing are analyzed for plausibility under the

same standard as a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Glennborough

Homeowners Assoc., 21 F.4th at 414 (explaining the standard for alleging facts supporting standing

aligns with that governing motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)); Ass’n of Am.

Physicians & Surgeons v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 13 F.4th 531, 545 (6th Cir. 2021) (noting

plaintiffs’ “theory fails to plausibly plead standing’s injury and causation element” (emphasis

added).) A plaintiff must have standing throughout every stage of the litigation for each claim and

form of relief sought. Uzuegbunam v. Praczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792, 801 (2021); Glennborough, 21

F.4th at 414 (“A plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim she seeks to press and for each

form of relief she seeks”). “As the Supreme Court has reminded us, ‘standing is not dispensed in

gross.’ Rather, plaintiffs ‘must demonstrate standing for each claim [they] seek[] to press.’”

Universal Life Church Monastery Storehouse v. Nabors, 35 F.4th 1021, 1031 (6th Cir. 2022)

(quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 n.6 (1996) and DaimlerChrysler Corp v. Cuno, 547

U.S. 332, 352 (2006)).

It is the last element of standing—redressability—that is lacking here for Plaintiff’s

requested declaratory relief. “Redressability is an irreducible component of standing,” so “no

federal court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment unless it provides a remedy that can redress the

plaintiff’s injury.” Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 592 U.S. 279, 291 (2021). “Whether an injury is

redressable” depends on “the relationship between the judicial relief requested and the injury

suffered.” California v. Texas, 593 U.S. 659, 671 (2021) (citation modified). The relevant

standard is likelihood—whether it is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will

be redressed by a favorable decision.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC)

Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000). The Declaratory Judgment Act does not change this standard.

Safety Specialty Ins. Co. v. Genesee Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 53 F.4th 1014, 1020–21 (6th Cir. 2022).

In the context of a declaratory judgment, redressability requires that “a declaratory judgment . .

.affect the behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff.” Id. at 1021 (citation modified).

Plaintiff requests numerous declarations for his relief, which are set forth in two sections

of his Complaint: first in “Count – II Declaratory Relief,” and second, in his “Prayer for Relief.”

(ECF No. 46 at PageID 306–08.) The specific wording varies slightly between the two sections,

but Plaintiff generally seeks declarations that Defendants acted in an arbitrary, capricious, and

discriminatory manner; that Defendants removal of him from the Democratic primary ballot was

unlawful and contrary to the United States and Tennessee Constitutions; that Defendants violated

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; and that Tennessee Code Annotated § 2-5-204 violates due

process in violation of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. (ECF No. 46 at PageID

306–08.) Plaintiff also requests a declaration “that he is an eligible candidate for the office of

Shelby County General Sessions Court Clerk as a Democrat in [the] Shelby County Primary on

March 5, 2024.” (ECF No. 46 at PageID 307.)

Plaintiff filed his Third Amended Complaint on September 2, 2024—nearly six months

after the Shelby County Democratic Primary for Shelby County General Sessions Court Clerk and

over a month after the Shelby County General Election for Shelby County General Sessions Court

Clerk. Plaintiff has not alleged that he plans to run for office again as a Democrat in Shelby

County, and his requested declaratory relief relates only to the Shelby County Democratic Primary

held on March 5, 2024. Plaintiff does not allege a current or future injury that his requested

declaratory relief would redress, nor does he allege how his requested declaratory relief would

redress his past injury. See Friends of Tims Ford v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 585 F.3d 955, 970–

71 (6th Cir. 2009); Brown v. Yost, 122 F.4th 597, 601–02 (6th Cir. 2024). Because Plaintiff’s

requested declaratory relief would not redress his injuries, he does not have standing for this form

of relief.4

B. Sovereign Immunity Bars Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claims Against Goins and the State of

Tennessee

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he Judicial

power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced

or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or

4 Plaintiff also requested injunctive relief, specifically “a temporary and permanent

injunction setting aside the results of the Shelby County Democratic Primary for Shelby County

General Sessions Court, and ordering that a special primary election be held placing the Plaintiff

on the ballot as a Democratic candidate.” (ECF No. 46 at PageID 307.) Although such an

injunction may redress Plaintiff’s alleged injury, it would be extraordinary relief. By the time

Plaintiff filed his Third Amended Complaint, the general election had been held, so the Court

would have to set aside the results of two elections to provide Plaintiff’s requested relief. And

because Plaintiff’s claims fail on the merits, the Court need not address whether the circumstances

here are extreme enough to warrant such extraordinary relief.

Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. “This immunity bars suits for injunctive,

declaratory or monetary relief,” and it applies not only to the state, but also “departments and

agents that are arms of the state, as well as state officers acting in their official capacity.” Morgan

v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of the Supreme Ct. of Tennessee, 63 F.4th 510, 515 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation

modified); Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes, 784 F.3d 1037, 1046–47 (6th Cir. 2015).

There are, however, a couple of exceptions to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh

Amendment. First, it does not apply if the state has waived its immunity or if Congress has

removed it by statute. Morgan, 63 F.4th at 515. But Tennessee has not waived its sovereign

immunity, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-13-102(a), and Congress did not remove states’ immunity

from suit when it enacted § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989)

(holding that § 1983 “does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a

State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties”).

Second, as set forth in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), sovereign immunity does not

“bar suits against state officials seeking equitable relief for ongoing violations of federal law.”

Morgan, 63 F.4th at 515 (citation modified). For Ex parte Young exception to apply, the plaintiff

must sue for “prospective injunctive relief to end a continuing violation of federal law,” and the

complaint must “make clear what those ongoing violations are.” Morgan, 63 F.4th at 515 (citation

modified); see Russell, 784 F.3d at 1046–47. In other words, the Ex parte Young exception does

not apply to “injunctive relief based entirely upon past acts.” Morgan, 63 F.4th at 515 (citation

modified); see S & M Brands, Inc. v. Cooper, 527 F.3d 500, 509–10 (6th Cir. 2008).

Again, Plaintiff’s declaratory relief relates only to past conduct. So, the Eleventh

Amendment bars Plaintiff’s claims against Goins and the State of Tennessee not only for damages,

but also for his requested declaratory relief.

C. Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claims Against All Defendants

Plaintiff’s claims against all Defendants are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Title

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to

be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

Section 1983 is not the source of any substantive right but provides a means of redress for

violations of rights conferred elsewhere in federal law. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94

(1989). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) a deprivation of a right “secured

by the Constitution and laws” (2) caused by a person acting under the color of state law. Kissinger

v. Mahoning Cnty. Republican Party, 677 F. Supp. 3d 716, 724 (N.D. Ohio 2023). Plaintiff asserts

that Defendants violated his procedural and substantive due process, as well as his equal protection

rights while acting under color of state law. The Court addresses each in turn below.

1. Violations of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

Plaintiff asserts claims for violations of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ due

process clauses. But the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause applies only to the federal

government. Myers v. Vill. of Alger 102 F. App’x 931, 933 (6th Cir. 2004). Defendants here are

not the federal government, so Plaintiff’s claims under the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause

fail.

The Fourteenth Amendment also protects individuals from the deprivation “of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const.. amend. XIV, § 1. The clause “has been

construed to include not only a procedural component, but also (although not obvious from its text)

a substantive one.” Green Genie, Inc. v. City of Detroit, 63 F.4th 521, 526 (6th Cir. 2023). The

procedural component is traditionally understood to require the government to provide a “fair

procedure” when depriving someone of life, liberty, or property, whereas the substantive

component protects fundamental rights against certain government actions notwithstanding the

adequacy of the procedures used. See EJS Properties, LLC v. City of Toledo, 698 F.3d 845, 855

(6th Cir. 2012). “No matter the nature of the due-process theory asserted, [the plaintiff] must show

a deprivation of a constitutionally protected right . . .” Green Genie, 63 F.4th at 526 (6th Cir.

2023).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated both his substantive and procedural due process

rights. According to Plaintiff, he “has a constitutionally protected property interest related to his

right to apply to be placed on the ballot and to appeal from a negative decision of the Executive

Board.” (ECF No. 46 at PageID 301–02.)

Substantive Due Process. The due process clause’s substantive component protects

fundamental rights. Fundamental rights are those specifically guaranteed by the United States

Constitution and those rights that are “implicit in concept of ordered liberty.” Dobbs v. Jackson

Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 231 (2022). Running for office—or being placed on the

ballot—is not a fundamental right. Fouts v. Warren City Council, 97 F.4th 459, 466 (6th Cir. 2024)

(citing Kowall v. Benson, 18 F.4th 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2021)). And voters also “have no fundamental

right to ‘vote for a specific candidate or even a particular class of candidates.’” Kowall, 18 F.4th

at 547 (citing Citizens for Legis. Choice v. Miller, 144 F.3d 916, 921 (6th Cir. 1998)).

The only rights that Plaintiff asserts Defendants violated are a right to run for office and a

right to appeal from a negative decision of the Tennessee Democratic Party Executive Committee.

But neither is a fundamental right protected by substantive due process, so his substantive due

process claims fail.

Procedural Due Process. To state a claim under the procedural component of the due

process clause, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he had a life, liberty, or property interest protected

by the due process clause; (2) he was deprived of this protected interest; and (3) the state did not

afford him adequate procedural rights prior to depriving him of the interest. Kaplan v. Univ. of

Louisville, 10 F.4th 569, 577 (6th Cir. 2021). Liberty interests “may arise from two sources—the

Due Process Clause itself and the laws of the States.” Miller v. Lorain Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 141

F.3d 252, 259 (6th Cir. 1998). And a person has a property interest protected by the procedural

component of the due process clause if he or she has “a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Bd.

of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Legitimate entitlement claims exist

through an independent source—such as state law or “mutually explicit understandings” that

support a person’s claim of entitlement; they do not stem from the Constitution itself. Id. For

example, “[a] property interest can be created by a state statute, a formal contract, or a contract

implied from the circumstances.” Singfield v. Akron Metro. Hous. Auth., 389 F.3d 555, 565 (6th

Cir. 2004).

Plaintiff makes no allegations against Goins other than to say that it is his duty as

Coordinator of Elections to “investigate or have investigated by local authorities the administration

of the election laws and report violations to the district attorney general or grand jury for

prosecution.” (ECF No. 46 at PageID 294 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-11-202(a)(5)(A)(i)).)

Plaintiff says that the State of Tennessee violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by “making

and enforcing a law that deprives Plaintiff and others of their property and rights without due

process of law” and by “enacting and enforcing the bogus finding of the Shelby County

Democratic Primary Board.” (Id. at PageID 304–05.) At bottom, Plaintiff’s allegations are based

on his claim that he has a “constitutionally protected property interest related to his right to apply

to be placed on the ballot.” (ECF No. 46 at PageID 301.) But that claim is foreclosed by Supreme

Court precedent. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7 (1944) (“[A]n unlawful denial by state action

of a right to state political office is not a denial of a right of property or of liberty secured by the

due process clause.” (citation omitted)); see Moncier v. Haslam, 570 F. App’x 553, 558–59 (6th

Cir. 2014) (citing Snowden and collecting cases in support); Mingo v. Baxter, 518 F. App’x 444,

445 (6th Cir. 2013) (“The district court correctly concluded that Mingo had no due process claim

because she had no property interest in being an elected official.” (citing Kurita v. State Primary

Bd. of Tenn. Democratic Party, 472 F. App’x 398, 398 (6th Cir. 2012)).); see also Newsom v.

Golden, 602 F. Supp. 3d 1073, 1083–84 (M.D. Tenn. 2022) (collecting cases).

Snowden is binding on this Court and dooms Plaintiff’s procedural due process claims.

Because Plaintiff has not identified a protected property or liberty interest that he was deprived of,

the Court need not address whether the process here was adequate under the due process clause.

2. Violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection

Clause does not, however, “require that all persons everywhere be treated alike.” Noble v. U.S.

Parole Comm’n, 194 F.3d 152, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Instead, it prohibits states from making

distinctions that “burden a fundamental right, target a suspect class, or intentionally treat one

differently from others similarly situated without any rational basis for the difference.”

Schellenberg v. Twp. of Bingham, 436 F. App’x 587, 591 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Radvanksy v.

City of Olmsted Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 312 (6th Cir. 2005)). And “to establish an equal protection

violation, a plaintiff must establish more than differential treatment alone—a discriminatory intent

or purpose is required.” Maye v. Klee, 915 F.3d 1076, 1085 (6th Cir. 2019).

Plaintiff’s allegations in support of his equal protection claim are as follows:

• “Defendants did not provide him notice of the reason for the decision to disqualify

him because of his race.” (ECF No. 46 at PageID 301.)

• Four of the other candidates for Shelby County General Sessions Court Clerk

“appear to be African American.” (Id.)

• “Plaintiff is not African American.” (Id.)

• Defendants violated “Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by disparately apply [sic] its

own rules because of race.” (Id. at PageID 306.)

• “Defendants’ refusal to allow [Plaintiff] to run for the office of Shelby County

General Sessions Court Clerk because of race will cause him imminent irreparable

harm.” (Id. at PageID 307.)

The above allegations fall short of pleading a plausible equal protection claim. Plaintiff

does not allege specific facts that would allow this Court to infer that Plaintiff’s race was a

motivating factor in Defendants actions. Instead, the Complaint contains only conclusory

statements that Defendants’ actions were based on Plaintiff’s race. (Id. at PageID 306–07.)

Missing from the Complaint are facts showing that Plaintiff was treated differently than other

similarly situated individuals or Defendants’ actions departed “from the normal procedural

sequence.” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1915

(2020). Without facts supporting a discriminatory intent or purpose, Plaintiff’s equal protection

claim fails.5

5 Plaintiff’s claims against Remus and Carter also likely fail for another reason: The Sixth

Circuit does not recognize political parties as state actors. See Kurita, 472 F. App’x at 398–99. In

Kurita, the district court held that there was no state action when the Tennessee Democratic Party

set aside the results of a primary election and selected a different candidate for the general election,

and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Id. In some circuits, political parties are state actors “insofar as

they [are] assigned to an ‘integral part’ in the election process, a government function.” Kissinger

v. Mahoning Cnty. Republican Party, No. 4:22-CV-00709, 2023 WL 4052730, at *6 (N.D. Ohio

June 16, 2023) (citing Banchy v. Republican Party of Hamilton Cnty., 898 F.2d 1192, 1196 (6th

Cir. 1990)). However, the Sixth Circuit makes a distinction between conducting a primary election

and handling internal affairs of the party. Banchy, 898 F.2d at 1196. The latter is not a

D. Plaintiff’s Claims for Violations of the Tennessee Constitution

The analysis above is limited to Plaintiff’s allegations that Moving Defendants violated his

rights under the United States Constitution. Plaintiff’s allegations that Moving Defendants

violated his rights under the Tennessee Constitution are best left to state courts. Moncier v.

Haslam, 570 F. App’x 553, 560 (6th Cir. 2014); Kowall, 18 F.4th at 549; see Moon v. Harrison

Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[A] federal court that has dismissed a plaintiff’s

federal-law claims should not ordinarily reach the plaintiff’s state-law claims.”). The Court is

dismissing all Plaintiff’s federal law claims against the Moving Defendants, and without an

independent basis for federal jurisdiction, the Court will follow the “usual Sixth Circuit practice”

and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims.

Crehan v. Davis, 713 F. Supp. 2d 688, 701 (W.D. Mich. 2010) (citing Moon v. Harrison Piping

Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006)).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Motion of Defendants Mark Goins and State of

Tennessee to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (ECF No. 52), Defendant Hendrell

Remus’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended [Complaint] Pursuant to Fed. [Rule] Civ. P.

12(b)(6) (ECF No. 53), and Defendant Lexie Carter’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third

Amended Complaint (ECF No. 54) are GRANTED for Plaintiff’s claims under the United States

Constitution, and those claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff’s claims against

“governmental function” and “intra party squabbles over the nominating procedures are to be

considered a political matter which are to be resolved by the party itself without judicial

intervention.” Kurita v. State Primary Bd. of Tenn. Democratic Party, No. 3:08-0948, 2008 WL

4601574, at *11 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 14, 2008), aff'd, 472 F. App’x 398 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting

Taylor v. State Democratic Exec. Comm., 574 S.W.2d 716, 717–718 (Tenn. 1978)). Political parties

are free to “determine who is qualified and whose name shall be placed on a primary ballot.”

Newsom, 602 F. Supp. 3d at 1078.

Moving Defendants for violations of his rights under the Tennessee Constitution are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 30th day of September, 2025.

s/ Mark S. Norris

MARK S. NORRIS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE