“Because we remand the case to the ALJ for the reasons stated, we 10 decline to reach [plaintiff’s] alternative ground for remand.”
How later courts described this case
- “Because we remand the case to the ALJ for the reasons stated, we 10 decline to reach [plaintiff’s] alternative ground for remand.”
- “the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency 21 for additional investigation or explanation”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1
FILED IN THE
2 EASTER U N . S D . I S D T I R S I T C R T I C O T F C W O A U S R H T I NGTON
Sep 30, 2025
3
4 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
6
JONAH H., No. 1:24-CV-03055-JAG
7
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’s
9 MOTION FOR SUMMARY
v. JUDGMENT AND REMANDING
10
FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
11 FRANK BISIGNANO,
Commissioner of Social Security,1
12
13 Defendant.
14
15 BEFORE THE COURT are Plaintiff’s Opening Brief and the
16 Commissioner’s Brief in response. ECF Nos. 10, 13. Attorney James Tree
17
represents Jonah H. (Plaintiff); Special Assistant United States Attorney David J.
18
Burdett represents the Commissioner of Social Security (Defendant).2 The parties
19
have consented to proceed before a magistrate judge by operation of Local
20
Magistrate Judge Rule (LMJR) 2(b)(2), as no party returned a Declination of
21
Consent Form to the Clerk’s Office by the established deadline. ECF No. 3. After
22
23
1 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security May 6,
24
2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Frank
25
26 Bisignano is substituted as the defendant in this suit. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
27
2 Attorney David J. Burdett entered a notice of substitution on September 19, 2025.
28 ECF No. 15.
reviewing the administrative record and the briefs filed by the parties, Plaintiff’s
1
2 Motion requesting remand is GRANTED in part and denied in part, and
3 Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED in part, such that the case is REMANDED
4 FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
5 I. JURISDICTION
6 Plaintiff filed applications for Supplemental Security Income on August 16,
7 2017, and for child’s insurance benefits on December 20, 2017, alleging disability
8 since July 2, 2006. Plaintiff’s claims were denied initially and on reconsideration.
9 Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Virginia M. Robinson held a hearing on
10 November 26, 2019, and issued an unfavorable decision on January 8, 2020, Tr,
11
20-35. The Appeals Council denied review on July 30, 2020. Tr. 1-4. The ALJ’s
12
decision became the final decision of the Commissioner, which is appealable to the
13
district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff filed action for judicial
14
review on September 15, 2020. Tr 590-592 (1:20-CV-03149-JAG). On
15
September 13, 2022, this Court issued an Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for
16
Summary Judgement and Remanding for Additional Proceedings. Tr. 573-587
17
(1:20-CV-03149-JAG). On remand, ALJ Allen Erickson held a hearing on
18
November 2, 2023, and issued an unfavorable decision on February 14, 2024.
19
Tr. 446-466. Plaintiff appealed this final decision of the Commissioner on April
20
18, 2024. ECF No. 1.
21
22
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
23 The facts of the case are set forth in detail in the transcript of proceedings
24 and are briefly summarized here. Plaintiff filed for disability with an alleged onset
25 of July 2, 2006. Benefits were initially denied on November 8, 2017, and Plaintiff
26 appealed. ALJ Robinson held a hearing on November 26, 2019, and denied
27 benefits on January 8, 2020. Plaintiff appealed and the Court issued an Order
28 Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Remanding for Additional
Proceedings. Tr 573-587. In that order, the Court instructed the ALJ to:
1
2 1) reconsider Dr. Bowes’ opinion, taking into consideration the factors required by
3 the regulations and considering the record as whole; 2) carefully reevaluate Dr.
4 Cline’s opinion in the context of the entire record; 3) reconsider the persuasiveness
5 of the medical opinion evidence in the file, utilizing the assistance of medical
6 expert testimony; and, 4) carefully reevaluate Plaintiff’s symptom claims in the
7 context of the entire record. Id. On November 2, 2023, ALJ Erickson held a
8 hearing and issued a decision denying benefits on February 14, 2024. Tr. 446-466.
9 At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was 25 years old. The record before the Court
10 shows Plaintiff has a 10th grade education and minimal work history during the
11
closed period. Tr. 239-40, 249-53. Plaintiff’s mental health diagnoses include
12
depression, generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder, social anxiety disorder,
13
borderline personality disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Tr. 323, 329,
14
333-351, 402. Treatment has included psychiatric hospitalization, counseling, and
15
medications including Fluoxetine. Tr. 323, 333-351, 373. Plaintiff saw significant
16
improvement in 2023, including a quick promotion at his job, and requested a
17
closed period of disability ending May 17, 2023. ECF 10 at 3.
18
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
19
The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in
20
medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035,
21
1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ’s determinations of law are reviewed de novo, with
22
23 deference to a reasonable interpretation of the applicable statutes. McNatt v. Apfel,
24 201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000). The decision of the ALJ may be reversed
25 only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error.
26 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is
27 defined as being more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Id. at
28 1098. Put another way, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v.
1
2 Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). If the evidence is susceptible to more than one
3 rational interpretation, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
4 ALJ. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097; Morgan v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin.,
5 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). If substantial evidence supports the
6 administrative findings, or if conflicting evidence supports a finding of either
7 disability or non-disability, the ALJ’s determination is conclusive. Sprague v.
8 Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-1230 (9th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, a decision
9 supported by substantial evidence will be set aside if the proper legal standards
10 were not applied in weighing the evidence and making the decision. Brawner v.
11
Secretary of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988).
12
IV. SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS
13
The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process
14
for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a),
15
416.920(a); see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). In steps one
16
through four, the burden of proof rests upon the claimant to establish a prima facie
17
case of entitlement to disability benefits. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99. This
18
burden is met once a claimant establishes that a physical or mental impairment
19
prevents him from engaging in past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4),
20
416.920(a)(4). If a claimant cannot do his past relevant work, the ALJ proceeds to
21
step five, and the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that (1) the claimant
22
23 can make an adjustment to other work; and (2) the claimant can perform specific
24 jobs that exist in the national economy. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
25 359 F.3d 1190, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 2004). If a claimant cannot make an adjustment
26 to other work in the national economy, the claimant will be found disabled. 20
27 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v).
28
1
V. CHILDHOOD DISABILITY INSURANCE BENEFITS
2 Title II of the Social Security Act provides disabled child’s insurance
3 benefits based on the earnings record of an insured person who is entitled to old-
4 age or disability benefits or has died. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d); 20 C.F.R. § 404.350(a).
5 The same definition of “disability” and five-step sequential evaluation outlined
6 above governs eligibility for disabled child’s insurance benefits. See 42 U.S.C. §
7 423(d); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1)-(5). In addition, in order to qualify for
8 disabled child’s insurance benefits several criteria must be met. 20 C.F.R. §§
9 404.350(a)(1)-(5). As relevant here, if the claimant is over 18, the claimant must
10 “have a disability that began before [he] became 22 years old.” 20 C.F.R. §
11
404.350(a)(5).
12
VI. ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS
13
On February 14, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff was not
14
disabled as defined in section 223(d) of the Social Security Act prior to July 1,
15
2020, the date he attained age 22. Tr. 446-473.
16
At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not attained age 22 as of July
17
1, 2016, and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since that date.
18
Tr. 449.
19
At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the severe impairments of major
20
depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder
21
(PTSD). Tr. 449.
22
23 At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment
24 or combination of impairments that meets or medically equal one of the listed
25 impairments in 20 C.F.R., Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d),
26 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926). Tr. 450.
27
28
The ALJ also found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity
1
2 (“RFC”) to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, with the following
3 non-exertional limitations:
4 the claimant can understand, remember, and apply short and simple
instructions and can perform routine, predictable tasks; not in a fast-
5
paced, production-type environment. He can make simple decisions
6 and can be exposed to occasional, routine workplace changes; and can
have occasional interaction with the general public.
7
Tr. 452.
8
At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had no past relevant work.
9
Tr. 465.
10
11 At step five, the ALJ found that, based on the testimony of the vocational
12 expert, and considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC,
13 Plaintiff was capable of performing jobs that existed in significant numbers in the
14 national economy that Plaintiff could perform, specifically identifying the
15 representative occupations of janitor, store laborer, and kitchen helper.
16 Tr. 465-466
17 The ALJ thus concluded Plaintiff was not under a disability within the
18 meaning of the Social Security Act at any time from the alleged onset date through
19
the date of the decision. Tr. 466.
20
VII. ISSUES
21
The question presented is whether this Court should remand for benefits or
22
for further proceedings, as both the Plaintiff and Defendant agree that reversible
23
legal error has occurred in the ALJ’s decision.
24
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by: (1) not properly assessing claimant
25
testimony; and, (2) not properly assessing the medical opinions and Listings and
26
that reversal for benefits is the appropriate remedy.
27
28
Defendant contends that the ALJ erred by not offering the supplemental
1
2 hearing and further consideration of Dr. Rubin’s testimony and that reversal for
3 further administrative proceedings is the appropriate remedy.
4 VIII. DISCUSSION
5 A. Medical Opinions
6 Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by improperly evaluating the opinions of S.
7 Rubin, Ph.D.; T. Bowes, Psy.D.; R.A. Cline, Ph.D.; S. Haney, M.D.; and R.
8 Eisenhauer, Ph.D. ECF No. 10 at 14-20.
9 For claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, the ALJ must consider and
10 evaluate the persuasiveness of all medical opinions or prior administrative medical
11
findings from medical sources. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a) and (b), 416.920c(a)
12
and (b). The factors for evaluating the persuasiveness of medical opinions and
13
prior administrative findings include supportability, consistency, the source’s
14
relationship with the claimant, any specialization of the source, and other factors
15
(such as the source’s familiarity with other evidence in the file or an understanding
16
of Social Security’s disability program). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)-(5),
17
416.920c(c)(1)-(5).
18
Supportability and consistency are the most important factors, and the ALJ
19
must explain how both factors were considered. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2),
20
416.920c(b)(2). The ALJ may explain how the ALJ considered the other factors,
21
but is not required to do so, except in cases where two or more opinions are equally
22
23 well-supported and consistent with the record. Id. Supportability and consistency
24 are explained in the regulations:
25 (1) Supportability. The more relevant the objective medical evidence
and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to
26
support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
27 finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior
administrative medical finding(s) will be.
28
1
(2) Consistency. The more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior
2 administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other
3 medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more
persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
4
finding(s) will be.
5
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)-(2), 416.920c(c)(1)-(2).
6
The Ninth Circuit has addressed the issue of whether the regulatory
7
framework displaces the longstanding case law requiring an ALJ to provide
8
specific and legitimate reasons to reject an examining provider’s opinion. Woods
9
v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 787 (9th Cir. 2022). The Court held that the 2017
10
regulations eliminate any hierarchy of medical opinions, and the specific and
11
legitimate standard no longer applies. Id. at 788-89, 792. The Court reasoned the
12
“relationship factors” remain relevant under the new regulations, and thus the ALJ
13
can still consider the length and purpose of the treatment relationship, the
14
frequency of examinations, the kinds and extent of examinations that the medical
15
source has performed or ordered from specialists, and whether the medical source
16
has examined the claimant or merely reviewed the claimant’s records. Id. at 790,
17
18 792. Even under the new regulations, an ALJ must provide an explanation
19 supported by substantial evidence when rejecting an examining or treating doctor’s
20 opinion as unsupported or inconsistent. Id. at 792.
21 1. S. Rubin, Ph.D.
22 Dr. Rubin was the Medical Expert at the hearing on November 2, 2023. Dr.
23 Rubin opined that Plaintiff was not able to work during the time period in question.
24 Tr. 487. Dr. Rubin did not agree with Dr. Bowes who found severe limitations, but
25 did find that they were certainly marked. Tr. 490-491. Specifically, Dr. Rubin
26
stated Plaintiff had moderate limitations in cognitive abilities, marked limitations
27
28
in interacting with others, and marked limitations in concentration, persistence, or
1
2 pace. Tr 489.
3 At the conclusion of the hearing, the ALJ stated “If I do not find disability or
4 can’t find it yet, we will have a supplemental hearing for the ME to – because he
5 believes that there is a disability. So, if I disagree with that we’re going to have a
6 supplemental hearing.” Tr 517. The ALJ did not hold another hearing, but
7 ultimately found Dr. Rubin’s opinion was “not persuasive because it is neither well
8 supported nor consistent with the record as a whole.” Tr 452. Since there was no
9 supplemental hearing held, Plaintiff asserts his due process rights were violated
10 and that Dr. Rubin’s testimony should be credited as true. ECF No. 10 at 14-15.
11
Defendant concedes legal error by the ALJ in not offering a supplemental hearing
12
and asserts further consideration of Dr. Rubin’s testimony is necessary. ECF
13
No. 13 at 2.
14
Supportability is one of the most important factors an ALJ must consider
15
when determining how persuasive a medical opinion is. 20 C.F.R. §§
16
404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2). The more relevant objective evidence and
17
supporting explanations that support a medical opinion, the more persuasive the
18
medical opinion is. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1). The ALJ stated
19
that Dr. Rubin’s opinion did not have sufficient evidence or support and was
20
conclusory and speculative. Tr 463. Dr. Rubin testified, however, that he
21
reviewed the medical evidence in the case, Tr. 486, and the ALJ’s reasoning is not
22
23 supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ failed to provide proper reasons for
24 discounting the testimony of Dr. Rubin and did not discuss the consistency of Dr.
25 Rubin’s opinion with other medical opinions, specifically Dr. Bowes’ opinions.
26 The ALJ also failed to provide specific reasoning and examples as to why he found
27 Dr. Rubin’s testimony inconsistent with the record as a whole. And, as conceded
28 by Defendant, the ALJ further failed to hold a supplemental hearing with Dr.
Rubin, as he stated he would if he did not find disability, noting that Dr. Rubin
1
2 testified to claimant being disabled at the hearing. Tr. 517. A supplemental
3 hearing with Dr. Rubin would serve to further develop the record.
4 The ALJ erred by not holding a supplemental hearing and not properly
5 assessing Dr. Rubin’s opinion under the factors required by the regulations. On
6 remand, the ALJ shall hold a supplemental hearing with Dr. Rubin in order to
7 further develop the record with respect to Dr. Rubin’s testimony. The ALJ is
8 further ordered to reconsider Dr. Rubin’s testimony in light of the record as a
9 whole, considering the consistency of Dr. Rubin’s testimony with other medical
10 opinions.
11
2. T. Bowes, Psy.D.
12
Dr. Bowes, Psy.D. evaluated the claimant in 2018 and found he had marked
13
limitations in: tasks following detailed instructions, adapting to changes in a
14
routine work setting, asking simple questions or requesting assistance,
15
communicating and performing effectively in a work setting, and maintaining
16
appropriate behavior in a work setting; and she found severe limitations in:
17
performing activities within a schedule, maintaining regular attendance, and being
18
punctual within customary tolerances without special supervision, and completing
19
a normal work day and work week without interruptions from psychologically
20
based symptoms. Tr. 402. The ALJ did not find Dr. Bowes’ opinion persuasive
21
because it was expressed in a checkbox form and relied primarily on the claimant’s
22
23 subject reports. Tr. 463.
24 The Court first notes that the prior order for remand specifically instructed
25 the ALJ to reconsider Dr. Bowes’ opinion, taking into consideration the factors
26 required by the regulations and considering the record as a whole. Tr. 583. The
27 order found “the ALJ’s findings that the record as a whole is inconsistent with Dr.
28 Bowes’ opinion is not supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ also erred in
citing portions of the record showing milder findings while the longitudinal record
1
2 showed more mixed results, leading to a characterization of the medical evidence
3 as whole that is not supported by substantial evidence.” Tr. 582. The ALJ failed
4 to follow this instruction and again failed to provide sufficient reasoning for
5 discounting Dr. Bowes’ opinion and has also failed to assess the consistency of Dr.
6 Bowes’ opinion with the medical expert testimony.
7 Second, the ALJ found Dr. Bowes unpersuasive because she expressed her
8 opinion in the form of a check-box. This is not a sufficient reason to discount Dr.
9 Bowes’ opinion. “[T]here is no authority that a ‘check-the-box’ form is any less
10 reliable than any other type of form.” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 677 n.4
11
(9th Cir. 2017). Here, Dr. Bowes conducted a psychological interview, mental
12
status exam and provided an explanation of her findings, as discussed infra.
13
Tr. 399-404. The ALJ’s finding that Dr. Bowes’ opinion was unpersuasive
14
because she used a check-box form is not supported by substantial evidence.
15
Third, the ALJ found Dr. Bowes unpersuasive because “she did not review
16
any records in evaluating claimant, which indicates that she relied primarily on the
17
claimant’s subject reports, yet she noted that his score on the BDI was above the
18
cutoff score to render it invalid and also noted that there were no records to
19
corroborate the diagnoses he reported.” Tr. 463. In the same sentence the ALJ
20
states that Dr. Bowes relied only on the claimant’s subject reports and referenced
21
an objective test used in evaluating claimant. Id. This is contradictory. Further,
22
23 this assessment is not supported by the record. Dr. Bowes is a mental health
24 specialist, who performed an exam, including history and mental status exam, as
25 well as psychological testing. Dr. Bowes made clinical findings, completed an
26 MSE, and specifically included a section in the records for “Objective Data
27 Collected.” Tr. 401. Here, Dr. Bowes recorded results on psychological tests
28 including Trails A and B, Rey, Beck Depression Inventory, and Becks Anxiety
Inventory. Id. The conclusion that Dr. Bowes relied primarily on Plaintiff’s self-
1
2 report is therefore not supported by the record. Further, as noted in the Plaintiff’s
3 Opening Brief, ECF No. 10 at 17, the ALJ’s statement that Dr. Bowes noted the
4 BDI score above the cutoff score was invalid is a misstatement of the record. That
5 notation is from Dr. Cline’s records. Tr 412. Dr. Bowes found claimant was
6 “clearly extremely depressed- very low energy/presence/agency in the room,” Tr.
7 403, which is consistent with the results of the BDI administered by Dr. Bowes
8 resulting in a severe score.
9 The Ninth Circuit in Ghanim contemplated that medical sources rely on self-
10 reports to varying degrees and held that an ALJ may reject a medical source’s
11
opinion as based on unreliable self-reports only when the medical source relied
12
“more heavily on a patient’s self-reports than on clinical observations.” Ghanim v.
13
Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2014). There is no indication that Dr.
14
Bowes relied more heavily on Plaintiff’s self-reports than clinical observations.
15
The ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Bowes’ opinion, is therefore, not supported.
16
Upon remand, the ALJ is, again, instructed to reconsider Dr. Bowes’ opinion,
17
taking into consideration the factors required by the regulations and considering the
18
record as a whole, including the issues noted above as well as other aspects of Dr.
19
Bowes’ opinion.
20
3. R.A. Cline, Psy.D.
21
The ALJ found Dr. Cline’s opinion to be persuasive in part because it was
22
23 consistent with the record as a whole, but found it not entirely persuasive because
24 she did not provide narrative explanation or cite objective support for the
25 limitations she assessed. Tr 463. First, the Court notes the prior order for remand
26 specifically instructed the ALJ to carefully reevaluate Dr. Cline’s opinion in the
27 context of the entire record and reconsider the persuasiveness of the medical
28 opinion evidence in the file, utilizing the assistance of medical expert testimony to
assist in interpretation of mental health testing and other findings relevant to
1
2 Plaintiff’s mental health impairments. Tr 584-585. The ALJ failed to follow this
3 instruction and has therefore failed to provide sufficient reasoning for discounting
4 Dr. Cline’s opinion and has also failed to assess the consistency of Dr. Cline’s
5 opinion with the medical expert testimony.
6 Dr. Cline is a mental health specialist, who performed an exam, including
7 history and mental status exam, as well as psychological testing. Dr. Cline
8 reported Plaintiff’s scores on Rey, BAI and BDI. Tr 328. The ALJ’s conclusion
9 that Dr. Cline did not cite objective support for the limitations she assessed is not
10 supported by substantial evidence. Upon remand, the ALJ is instructed to
11
reconsider Dr. Cline’s opinion, taking into consideration the factors required by the
12
regulations and considering the record as a whole, including the issues noted above
13
as well as other aspects of Dr. Cline’s opinion.
14
B. Plaintiff’s Testimony.
15
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by improperly assessing Plaintiff’s testimony.
16
ECF 10 at 2-13. It is the province of the ALJ to make determinations regarding a
17
claimant’s subjective statements. Andrews, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995).
18
However, the ALJ’s findings must be supported by specific, cogent reasons.
19
Rashad v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990). Once the claimant
20
produces medical evidence of an underlying medical impairment, the ALJ may not
21
discredit testimony as to the severity of an impairment merely because it is
22
23 unsupported by medical evidence. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir.
24 1998). Absent affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting
25 the claimant’s testimony must be “specific, clear and convincing.” Smolen v.
26 Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834
27 (9th Cir. 1996). “General findings are insufficient: rather the ALJ must identify
28 what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s
complaints.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 834; Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir.
1
2 1993).
3 In the Court’s prior order for remand, the Court found:
4 The ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s symptom claims and the resulting
limitations largely relies on the ALJ’s assessment of the medical
5
evidence. Having determined a remand is necessary to readdress the
6 medical opinion evidence, any reevaluation must necessarily entail a
reassessment of Plaintiff’s subjective symptom claims. Thus, the Court
7
need not reach this issue and on remand the ALJ must also carefully
8 reevaluate Plaintiff’s symptom claims in the context of the entire
9 record. See Hiler v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012)
(“Because we remand the case to the ALJ for the reasons stated, we
10 decline to reach [plaintiff’s] alternative ground for remand.”).
11 Tr 585-586. For the same reasons, the Court need not reach this issue and on
12
remand the ALJ is again directed to reassess Plaintiff’s subject symptom claims.
13
IX. CONCLUSION
14
“The decision whether to remand a case for additional evidence, or simply to
15
award benefits is within the discretion of the court.” Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d
16
1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Stone v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 530 (9th Cir.
17
1985)). When the Court reverses an ALJ’s decision for error, the Court “ordinarily
18
must remand to the agency for further proceedings.” Leon v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d
19
1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2017); Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595 (9th Cir.
20
2004) (“the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency
21
for additional investigation or explanation”); Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
22
Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014). However, in a number of Social
23
Security cases, the Ninth Circuit has “stated or implied that it would be an abuse of
24
25 discretion for a district court not to remand for an award of benefits” when three
26 conditions are met. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014)
27 (citations omitted). Under the credit-as-true rule, where (1) the record has been
28 fully developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful
1 || Purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting
evidence, whether claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly
3|| discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the
4|| claimant disabled on remand, the Court will remand for an award of
5|| benefits. Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 668 (9th Cir. 2017).
6 Plaintiff urges remand for immediate benefits based on the rejection of
medical opinions and claimant testimony, ECF Nos. 10, 13. However, the Court
8|| finds that further development of the record, including additional medical expert
9 testimony, is required. As such, the first prong of the credit-as-true doctrine is not
met. Accordingly, the case is remanded for additional proceedings consistent with
this Order.
12 Having reviewed the record and the ALJ's findings, the Court concludes the
I3 ALJ's decision 1s not supported by substantial evidence and is based on legal error.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff's Motion, ECF No. 10, is GRANTED IN PART.
: 2. Defendant’s Motion, ECF No. 13, is GRANTED IN PART.
13 3. The Commissioner’s decision is REVERSED and the matter is
19 REMANDED to the Commissioner for additional proceedings consistent with this
0 Order.
1 4. An application for attorney fees may be filed by separate motion.
72 Judgment shall be entered for PLAINTIFF and the file shall be CLOSED.
23 DATED September 30, 2025.
25 JAMES A. GOEKE
26 a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
27
28
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION