Little v. Dauphin County

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KANI LITTLE, et al.,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:24-CV-2169

Plaintiffs,

v. (MEHALCHICK, J.)

DAUPHIN COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

On December 17, 2024, Plaintiffs Kani Little, Hector Ramos, and James Patterson

(collectively, “Plaintiffs”), filed this class action lawsuit on behalf of themselves and similarly

situated individuals against Defendants Dauphin County, Gregory Briggs (“Briggs”), Lionel

Pierre (“Pierre”), Roger Lucas (“Lucas”), Mark Skelton (“Skelton”), and John Does #1-12

(collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. 1). Presently before the Court is a report and

recommendation filed by Magistrate Judge Leo A. Latella (“the Report”) recommending that

the Court deny Dauphin County, Briggs, Pierre, Lucas, and Skelton’s (collectively, “Moving

Defendants”) request to deny class certification, and grant in part and deny in part Moving

Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Doc. 34). On September 2, 2025, Moving Defendants filed a

timely objection to the Report along with a brief in support. (Doc. 38; Doc. 39). Based on the

Court's review of the relevant filings along with the Report, Moving Defendants’ objection

(Doc. 38) is OVERULED, and the Report (Doc. 34) will be ADOPTED IN ITS ENTIRETY.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

“A district court may ‘designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings, including

evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and

recommendations for the disposition’ of certain matters pending before the court.” Brown v.

Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)). Within fourteen

days of being served a Report and Recommendation, “any party may serve and file written

objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court.” 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). When a party timely files objections, the district court is to conduct a de

novo review of the challenged portions of the Magistrate Judge’s findings unless the objection

is “not timely or not specific.” Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 6–7 (3d Cir.1984); 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1). The Court may then “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and

recommendations.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “Although the standard is de novo, the extent of

review is committed to the sound discretion of the district judge, and the court may rely on

the recommendations of the magistrate judge to the extent it deems proper.” Rahman v.

Gartley, No. CV 3:23-363, 2024 WL 555894, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2024) (citing United v.

Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980)).

II. DISCUSSION

Since the Report correctly states the procedural and factual background of this case, it

will not be repeated in its entirety here. (Doc. 34). However, the necessary background for the

purpose of the instant Memorandum is as follows. Plaintiffs and the purported class members

in this case are pre-trial detainees and post-sentence inmates who were held in the Dauphin

County Prison restrictive housing unit (“RHU”) at some point between 2023 through 2024

for approximately three to five months. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 19-21). Plaintiffs allege that they suffered

inhumane conditions and violations of their constitutional rights while housed in the RHU.

(Doc. 1, ¶¶ 59-65). Plaintiffs specifically allege that in November 2023, prison officials became

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concerned about RHU inmates smoking synthetic marijuana and began to seize tablets from

all RHU inmates. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 66-68). According to Plaintiffs, Dauphin County Prison inmates

are not allowed have physical documents because of drug smuggling concerns and because of

this, RHU inmates can only access physical reading materials through tablets. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 42-

44, 69-74.) This includes communications with individuals outside the facility, recreational

materials, mental health materials, legal materials, and religious texts. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 42-44, 69-

74).

Plaintiffs further allege that in November 2023, Dauphin County Prison officials

seized all RHU inmates’ personal belongings including hygiene products, legal paperwork,

writing materials, cold temperature clothing, sneakers, sheets, pillows, and blankets in

response to the concerns about synthetic marijuana. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 77-88). Plaintiffs also allege

that Dauphin County Prison officials responded to the concerns about synthetic marijuana

by refusing to let RHU inmates out of their cells, even to shower. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 89-91). Plaintiffs

claim that even after they were eventually allowed out of their cells to shower, it was only for

fifteen minutes every three days, and the showers had black mold. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 93-94). Plaintiffs

next allege that in December 2023, Defendants ordered all electricity to RHU units be cut off

which led to days of RHU inmates living in near complete darkness for fourteen hours a day

in very cold conditions. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 99-117). Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants cut off

water from the RHU, prison food contained debris and bugs, and Defendants did not deliver

RHU inmates’ medication when it was needed. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 118-31).

Plaintiffs filed the operative complaint on December 17, 2024. (Doc. 1). In the

complaint, Plaintiffs seek class certification for “all persons confined at Dauphin County

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Prison in Units P-3, P-5, and/or P-6 of the Restrictive Housing Unit at any point from

November 16, 2023, to December 19, 2023.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 254). Plaintiffs further seek to

represent three subclasses consisting of 1) class members whose constitutional claims arise

under the Fourteenth Amendment, 2) all class members whose constitutional claims arise

under the Eighth Amendment, and 3) all class members “who had a diagnosed mental health

condition reflected in their official [Dauphin County Prison] records during the Class Period.”

(Doc. 1, ¶ 255). Plaintiffs assert eight counts under federal law. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 263-323).

Only Counts I, II, and VII are relevant to Moving Defendants’ objection. (Doc. 38;

Doc. 39). In Count I, Plaintiffs allege Briggs and Pierre violated the Fourteenth Amendment

by unreasonably depriving Plaintiffs and subclass members of basic human needs. (Doc. 1, ¶¶

263-70). In Count II, Plaintiffs allege Briggs and Pierre violated the Eighth Amendment by

depriving Plaintiffs and subclass members of basic human needs and by being deliberately

indifferent to Plaintiffs health and safety. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 271-77). In Count VII, Plaintiffs allege

Dauphin County is liable for its knowledge of and acquiescence to Dauphin County Prison

officials’ unconstitutional mistreatment of Plaintiffs and class members. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 314-18).

Moving Defendants object to three portions of the Report. (Doc. 39). First, Moving

Defendants object to Judge Latella’s recommendation that the Court deny Moving

Defendants’ request to deny class certification. (Doc. 39, at 10-16). Next, Moving Defendants

object to Judge Latella’s recommendation that the Court deny Moving Defendants’ motion

to dismiss Count VII. (Doc. 39, at 16-21). Finally, Moving Defendants object to Judge

Latella’s recommendation that the Court deny Moving Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts

I and II. (Doc. 3, at 21-25). The Court will assess each issue in turn.

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A. JUDGE LATELLA CORRECTLY CONCLUDED DENYING CLASS

CERTIFICATION IS PREMATURE.

Judge Latella concluded that denying class certification is premature because the

parties have not had the opportunity to conduct discovery. (Doc. 34, at 13-18). Judge Latella

acknowledged that the Local Rule 23.3 requires Plaintiffs to file a motion for class certification

within ninety days of filing a complaint but determined that Courts should rarely deny class

certification prior to discovery. (Doc. 39, at 13-18). Moving Defendants aver that Judge

Latella incorrectly interpreted Local Rule 23.3 as a suggestion rather than a requirement and

argued that under the rule, Plaintiffs were required to file either a motion for class certification

within ninety days of filing the complaint or file a motion for extension of time. (Doc. 39, at

10-16).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs class certification and states “[a]t an early

practicable time after a person sues or is sued as a class representative, the court must

determine by order whether to certify the action as a class action.” While Rule 23 does not

provide a specific timeline for when a court must determine whether class certification is

warranted, Courts have recognized that class certification is a fact-intensive inquiry and “Rule

23 gives no license to shy away from making factual findings that are necessary to determine

whether the Rule's requirements [for class certification] have been met.” Marcus v. BMW of N.

Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 591 (3d Cir. 2012); see also Richardson v. Bledsoe, 829 F.3d 273, 288

(3d Cir. 2016) (noting that courts typically require a developed factual record to determine

class certification); see also Seplow v. Closing Pro, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 3d 427, 436 (E.D. Pa. 2024)

(finding defendants face a high bar to strike class action allegations prior to discovery).

Because of this, courts should rarely deny class certification prior to discovery. See Richardson,

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829 F.3d at 288–89 (stating “‘a court should typically await the development of a factual

record before determining whether the case should move forward on a representative basis’”

(quoting Manning v. Bos. Med. Ctr. Corp., 725 F.3d 34, 59 (1st Cir. 2013)); see also Seplow, 717

F. Supp. 3d at 436 (stating “class allegations are rarely struck prior to the class certification

stage”).

Moving Defendants’ objection to the Report is based on Local Rule 23.3. Local Rule

23.3 provides:

Within ninety (90) days after filing of a complaint in a class action, unless this

period is extended on motion for good cause appearing, the plaintiff shall move

for a determination under subdivision (c)(1) of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, as to whether

the case is to be maintained as a class action. In ruling upon such a motion, the

court may allow the action to be so maintained, may disallow and strike the

class action allegations, or may order postponement of the determination

pending discovery or such other preliminary procedures as appear to be

appropriate and necessary in the circumstances. Whenever possible, where it is

held that the determination should be postponed, a date will be fixed by the

court for renewal of the motion before the same judge.

L.R. 23.3

Moving Defendants argue that Judge Latella wrongly stated that under this rule, a

plaintiff “should” file a motion for class certification when the rule states the plaintiff “shall”

file a motion for class certification. (Doc. 39, at 10-12). Moving Defendants further aver that

Judge Latella erred in sua sponte granting Plaintiffs an extension to the ninety-day deadline

without Plaintiffs filing a motion for an extension of time. (Doc. 39, at 12-16).

As an initial matter, the Court disagrees with Moving Defendants’ assertion that Judge

Latella interpreted Local Rule 23.3 as more of a suggestion than a requirement. (Doc. 39, at

10-12). Although Judge Latella stated in a footnote that under the rule a plaintiff “should”

file a motion for class certification within ninety days, in the body of the Report, Judge Latella

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quoted Local Rule 23.3 verbatim. (Doc. 34, at 15). Further, Judge Latella acknowledged that

Plaintiffs did not comply with Local Rule 23.3. (Doc. 34, at 15, 17-18). Citing Wright &

Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure, Judge Latella noted that a plaintiff’s noncompliance

with a local rule regarding class certification is generally not alone a sufficient basis for

prematurely denying class certification. (Doc. 34, at 15).

While the Court acknowledges that Plaintiffs should have filed a motion for extension

of time under Local Rule 23.3, district courts have discretion in determining the “appropriate

sanction for such noncompliance” with local rules. Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d

604, 613 (3d Cir. 2018); see also Regassa v. Brininger, No. 4:14-CV-01122, 2019 WL 3824229,

at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2019), aff'd, No. 20-2642, 2021 WL 4738820 (3d Cir. Oct. 12, 2021).

“[A] district court can depart from the strictures of its own local procedural rules where (1) it

has a sound rationale for doing so, and (2) so doing does not unfairly prejudice a party who

has relied on the local rule to his detriment.” United States v. Eleven Vehicles, Their Equip. &

Accessories, 200 F.3d 203, 215 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Regassa, 2019 WL 3824229, at *3.

Here, Judge Latella articulated a sound rationale for excusing Plaintiffs’

noncompliance with Local Rule 23.3. (Doc. 34, at 13-18). Judge Latella correctly determined

that adjudication of class certification would need to be delayed until after discovery

regardless of whether Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification and that class certification

should rarely be denied prior to discovery. (Doc. 34, at 13-18); see Richardson, 829 F.3d at 288–

89; see also Seplow, 717 F. Supp. 3d at 436. Because of this, Judge Latella also correctly

determined that Moving Defendants are not prejudiced by Plaintiffs’ noncompliance with

Local Rule 23.3 because the Court would not resolve class certification at this early stage

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regardless of Plaintiffs’ compliance with the rule. (Doc. 34, at 17). Accordingly, the Court

ADOPTS the Reports recommendation that the Court DENY Moving Defendants’ request

to deny class certification. (Doc. 34, at 13-18).

B. JUDGE LATELLA CORRECTLY DETERMINED PLAINTIFFS STATE A

MUNICIPAL LIABILITY CLAIM.

In Count VII, Plaintiffs allege Dauphin County is liable for its knowledge of and

acquiescence to Dauphin County Prison officials’ unconstitutional mistreatment of Plaintiffs

and class members. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 314-18). Judge Latella recommended the Court deny dismissal

of this claim because Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that the Dauphin County Jail Oversite Board

(the “Oversite Board”) had knowledge of and acquiescence to the relevant conditions in the

RHU to state a claim for municipal liability. (Doc. 34, at 49-51). Moving Defendants aver

that Judge Latella incorrectly determined that Plaintiffs state a claim because the allegations

in the complaint regarding Dauphin County’s involvement in, knowledge of, and

acquiescence to the relevant conditions in the RHU are conclusory and threadbare recitations

of the elements of a municipal liability claim. (Doc. 39, at 16-21).

“To plead a municipal liability claim, a plaintiff must allege that ‘a [local]

government's policy or custom. . . inflict[ed] the injury’ in question.’” Est. of Roman v. City

of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New

York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). A custom may be established through a municipalities’

“knowledge and acquiescence” to governmental actions and “a single application of the

custom suffices to establish” municipal liability. Fletcher v. O'Donnell, 867 F.2d 791, 793 (3d

Cir. 1989); see also Williams v. City of Philadelphia, No. CV 24-3068, 2025 WL 1758618, at *3

(E.D. Pa. June 25, 2025). “Municipal liability under § 1983 ‘is generally not amenable to

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resolution at the pleading stage, as it requires a plaintiff to plead facts outside his or her

personal knowledge.’” Crosland v. City of Philadelphia, 676 F. Supp. 3d 364, 380 (E.D. Pa.

2023) (quoting 3909 Realty LLC v. City of Philadelphia, No. CV 21-0030, 2021 WL 2342929,

at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 8, 2021)); see also Williams, 2025 WL 1758618, at *4 (finding that

somewhat general allegations regarding a municipal policy or custom are sufficient to survive

a motion to dismiss because a plaintiff requires discovery to understand municipal customs

and policies).

As noted by Judge Latella, Plaintiffs allege that the Oversite Board was aware of

Dauphin County Prison depriving RHU residents of their possessions and imposing a

“blackout.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 315; Doc. 34, at 49-51). Plaintiffs further allege that the Oversite Board

ratified the prison officials’ actions by refusing to intervene or discipline those responsible.

(Doc. 1, ¶ 315). Plaintiffs also allege that the Oversite Board is the final policy maker “for

matters of prison management and administration,” and that it is widely known that Dauphin

County Prison has poor conditions relative to other prisons. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 31-42). Moving

Defendants aver these allegations are too general, conclusory, and threadbare to survive a

motion to dismiss. (Doc. 39, at 16-21). However, Judge Latella correctly credited Plaintiffs’

somewhat general allegations of knowledge and acquiesce for purposes of evaluating Moving

Defendants’ motion to dismiss because municipal liability claims are “‘generally not

amenable to resolution at the pleading stage.’” Crosland, 676 F. Supp. 3d at 380 (quoting 3909

Realty LLC, 2021 WL 2342929, at *4); see also Williams, 2025 WL 1758618, at *4. Accordingly,

the Court ADOPTS the Report’s recommendation that the Court DENY Moving

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count VII. (Doc. 34, at 49-51).

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C. JUDGE LATELLA CORRECTLY DETERMINED DISMISSAL OF

COUNTS I AND II IS INAPPROPRIATE.

In Count I, Plaintiffs allege Briggs and Pierre violated the Fourteenth Amendment by

unreasonably depriving Plaintiffs and subclass members of basic human needs. (Doc. 1, ¶¶

263-70). In Count II, Plaintiffs allege Briggs and Pierre violated the Eighth Amendment by

depriving Plaintiffs and subclass members of basic human needs and by being deliberately

indifferent to Plaintiffs’ health and safety. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 271-77). Judge Latella recommended

the Court deny Moving Defendants’ motions to dismiss both counts. (Doc. 34, at 21-30).

Moving Defendants object to this recommendation because, according to Moving

Defendants, Plaintiffs fail to allege that Briggs and Pierre were personally involved in the

alleged constitutional violations. (Doc. 39, at 21-25).

“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged

wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior. Personal

involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge

and acquiescence.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations

omitted); see Rhines v. Ball, No. CV 3:18-1643, 2021 WL 880524, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 9,

2021). “A plaintiff makes sufficient allegations of a defendant's personal involvement by

describing the defendant's participation in or actual knowledge of and acquiescence in the

wrongful conduct.” Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dep't of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015);

see Bravo v. City of Philadelphia, No. CV 22-5190, 2023 WL 6133171, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 19,

2023).

Here, Plaintiffs allege “[o]n information and belief” that Briggs and Pierre directed

staff to seize the RHU inmates’ tablets and personal belongings. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 68, 78). Plaintiffs

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further allege “[o]n information and belief” that Briggs made the decision to cut the power to

the RHU and Pierre participated in making that decision. (Doc. 1, ¶ 101). These allegations

are sufficient to plead personal involvement because Plaintiffs allege Briggs and Pierre directly

participated in the alleged illegal conduct. See Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 222 (finding allegations

that an individual participated in illegal conduct establishes personal involvement); see Bravo,

2023 WL 6133171, at *3 (same).

Moving Defendants aver that these allegations are insufficient because they are made

“[o]n information and belief.” (Doc. 39, at 21-25). However, allegations in a complaint can

be based on information and belief. See McDermott v. Clondalkin Grp., Inc., 649 F. App'x 263,

267 (3d Cir. 2016) (nonprecedential) (stating “[defendant’s argument] insinuating that the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not permit facts pleaded upon information and belief to

serve as the sole basis for relief—is plainly incorrect”); see also In re SoClean, Inc., Mktg., Sales

Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2-MC-152, 2023 WL 8006602, at *40 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2023)

(stating “permitting allegations on information and belief is a practical necessity”). A plaintiff

may make allegations on information and belief “‘[w]here it can be shown that the requisite

factual information is peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge or control’—so long as

there are no ‘boilerplate and conclusory allegations’ and ‘[p]laintiffs ... accompany their legal theory

with factual allegations that make their theoretically viable claim plausible.’” McDermott, 649 F.

App'x at 267–68 (quoting In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 311 F.3d 198, 216 (3d Cir.

2002) (emphasis in original)).

Here, Plaintiffs do not just assert boilerplate and conclusory allegations; they allege

Pierre and Briggs directed specific allegedly unconstitutional acts and made the decision to

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cut power to the RHU together. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 68, 78, 101). Further, information about Briggs

and Pierre’s actions directing prison officials is necessarily within Defendants’ knowledge and

control and not Plaintiffs’ because Plaintiffs were housed in high-security isolation cells when

these actions were taken. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 19-21, 135-36, 186-87, 223). Thus, Judge Latella

correctly determined that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged Briggs and Pierre had personal

involvement in allegedly unconstitutional actions. (Doc. 34, at 28-30). The Court ADOPTS

the Report’s recommendation that the Court DENY Moving Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Counts I and II. (Doc. 34, at 21-30).

III. CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, the Court agrees with the Report’s sound reasoning and

discerns no error of law. (Doc. 34). Accordingly, the Report (Doc. 34) is ADOPTED IN ITS

ENTIRETY as the opinion of the Court. Moving Defendants’ objection is OVERRULED.

(Doc. 38). Moving Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 16) is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part. Moving Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Counts III and

IV of the complaint and Counts III and IV are DISMISSED without prejudice. (Doc. 1, ¶¶

278-94). Moving Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED regarding the remaining counts

and Moving Defendants’ request to deny class certification is DENIED. Plaintiffs are granted

leave to file an amended complaint within 21 days, or on or before October 20, 2025.

An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: September 29, 2025 s/ Karoline Mehalchick

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

United States District Judge

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