Angel-Tapia v. Westlake

1uesday, 5V septeMmpel, 2025

Clerk, U.S. District Court, IL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

MARISOL ANGEL-TAPIA and )

VICTOR LUCHA, individually and _)

as parents and next best friends )

of G.L., )

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Case No. 24-cv-1335

)

ANGELA WESTLAKE, et al., )

Defendants. )

OPINION

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge:

Before this Court is Defendants’! Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 20).

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed a five-count complaint against the

Defendants—who all work for the Department of Children and Family Services

(“DCFS")—in their individual capacities. (Doc. 1). In Count I, Plaintiffs argue that

Defendants Angie Hamm and Tara Geving conspired with one another to unlawfully

seize G.L., who is Plaintiffs’ child, from Plaintiffs’ custody in violation of their Fourth

Amendment rights, and Hamm knowingly and materially withheld information which

could have exonerated Plaintiffs during a court hearing. (Id. at 98-103). In Count II,

1 The Defendants in this matter are Angie Hamm (listed in this Complaint as “Angela Westlake”), Tara

Geving, Tiffany Baker (listed in the Complaint as “Tiffany Nowacki”), and Jenny Metzroth (listed in the

complaint as “Jessy Mezroth”). (Doc. 20 at 1). This Court will refer to the Defendants by their names as

reflected in the Motion to Dismiss. The Clerk is DIRECTED to amend the names in the docket to reflect the

correct names.

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Plaintiffs argue all Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of their Fourteenth Amendment right

to raise and nurture G.L. (Id. at (104-116). Plaintiffs also alleged state law claims of

negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress in the remaining counts. (Id. at

117-129).

Il. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Illinois Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act

To protect children from abuse and neglect, Illinois enacted the Abused and

Neglected Child Reporting Act (“ANCRA”), 325 ILCS 5/1 et seq. Pursuant to ANCRA,

DCFS receives reports of child abuse and neglect. 325 ILCS 5/2. DCFS is statutorily

mandated “to protect the health, safety and best interests of the child in all situations in

which the child is vulnerable to child abuse or neglect, offer protective services in order

to prevent any further harm to the child and to other children in the same environment

or family, stabilize the home environment and preserve family life whenever possible.”

Id. Certain people under the Act, including medical personnel, are considered “mandated

reporters,” who are required to report to DCFS if they have “reasonable cause to believe

a child known to them in their professional or individual capacity may be an abused child

or a neglected child.” 325 ILCS 5/4. Upon receiving a report about a child who may have

been abused, DCFS’s Child Protective Services Unit initiates an investigation. 325 ILCS

5/7.2.

If the Child Protective Services Unit's initial investigation finds a good-faith

indication of child abuse or neglect, then a formal investigation begins. 325 ILCS

5/7.4(b)(3). If a child is endangered in his home, an “officer of a local law enforcement

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agency” or a “designated employee of the Department” is authorized to take “temporary

protective custody of the child without the consent of the person responsible for the

child’s welfare.” 325 ILCS 5/5. Protective custody is authorized if the person taking it “(1)

has reason to believe that the child cannot be cared for at home or in the custody of the

person responsible for the child’s welfare without endangering the child’s health and

safety; and (2) there is not time to apply for a court order under the Juvenile Court Act of

1987 for temporary custody of the child.” Id.

Protective custody may be taken prior to the commencement of juvenile court

proceedings, but a child taken into protective custody must be taken before a judicial

officer for a temporary custody hearing to determine whether custody of the child

remains necessary. 705 ILCS 405/2-9. At the temporary custody hearing, a state juvenile

court may order a child to be removed from a parent's custody upon finding: (1) “there

is probable cause to believe that the minor is abused, neglected or dependent,” (2)

“[removal] is a matter of immediate and urgent necessity for the safety and protection of

the minor,” and (3) “reasonable efforts have been made or that . . . no efforts reasonably

can be made to prevent or eliminate the necessity of removal of the minor from his or her

home.” 705 ILCS 405/2-10(2).

“When [DFCS] first assumes custody of a child, in placing that child under [the]

Act, [DCFS] shall make reasonable efforts to identify, locate, and provide notice to all

adult grandparents and other adult relatives of the child who are ready, willing and able

to care for the child.” 20 ILCS 505/7(b). Those efforts must be renewed each time the child

requires a placement change. Id. Additionally, DCFS “must document its efforts to

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identify, locate, and provide notice to such potential relative placements and maintain

the documentation in the child’s case file.” Id. If DCFS “determines that a placement with

any identified relative is not in the child’s best interests or that the relative does not meet

the requirements to be a relative caregiver, as set forth in Department rules or by statute,

[DCFS] must document the basis for that decision and maintain the documentation in the

child’s case file.” Id.

B. Relevant Facts

Plaintiffs Marisol Angel-Tapia and Victor Lucha are the biological parents of G.L.,

who was born in 2022 into a Spanish-speaking household. (Doc. 1 at § 23, 27, 55), On

July 11, 2023, when G.L. was seven months old, Angel-Tapia took him to a clinic because

she had concerns about a potential sunburn on his right arm and armpit area. (Id. at □□

23-25). While assessing the injuries, Nurse Practitioner Courtney Elliot noticed bruising

in the shape of a handprint on G.L.’s right leg and that he had a limited range of motion

in his right arm. (Id. at { 26). Angel-Tapia reasoned the bruising was probably due to

mosquito bites. (Id. at J 28).

NP Elliot was concerned about Angel-Tapia’s explanation of G.L.’s condition, so

she made a hotline call to DCFS to report potential signs of abuse or neglect. (Id. at § 29).

DCFS began an investigation into these allegations. (Id. at { 33). Defendants Hamm and

Geving were assigned to the investigation. (Id. at {| 34-35). G.L. was taken into custody

by DCFS and transferred to St. John’s Hospital, where Angel-Tapia was not allowed to

be alone with him. (Id. at 4] 31-32). She was also not allowed to breastfeed him. (Id. at J

41). When hospital staff attempted to bottle-feed him, G.L. could not adjust to the bottle

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and formula, so he was not able to eat. (Id.). When Lucha arrived at St. John’s Hospital,

he told investigators G.L. burned his arm on a metal pole. (Id. at { 39).

On July 12, 2023, Hamm and Geving took G.L. into protective custody pending

results of further medical consultations. (Id. at § 43). Hamm requested a consultation

from Dr. Channing Petrak, who acts as a forensic consultant for DCFS. (Id. at 44-45).

Dr. Petrak indicated the burn to G.L.’s right arm “does not appear to be inflicted due to

no [sic] pattern; the burn is of an unknown origin”; and “the marks on [G.L.’s] leg are not

bruising, the distribution of the marks is odd to be an inflicted injury.” (Id. at 4 48). Dr.

Petrak had also asked whether G.L. had contact with citrus juice, consistent with a skin

condition called phytophotodermatitis. (Id. at {] 47, 79-80, 85-86).

On July 13, 2023, a temporary custody hearing was held in Cass County Circuit

Court. ([d. at 51). During the hearing, Hamm testified but failed to mention Dr. Petrak’s

findings or the absence of evidence for acute or old fractures. (Id. at ¢ 52-53). That same

day, G.L. had a feeding tube inserted due to his failure to eat. (Id. at | 54). On July 17,

2023, G.L. was released from St. John’s and placed into an English-speaking foster

household, despite the availability of family members who were able to take G.L. into

their homes. (Id. at 55-56).

On July 20, 2023, Defendants Metzroth and Baker were assigned to G.L.’s case. (Id.

at 7 58). Plaintiffs gave Baker a list of potential family members who were able to take in

G.L. and asked her to screen those family members for placement. (Id. at { 59).On August

4, 2023, G.L. was placed with his cousin Yulissa Miron. (Id. at | 64). DCFS later began an

investigation into Miron for medical neglect after she waited three days to take GL. to

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the hospital after G.L. pulled out his feeding tube. (Id. at 65-66). As a result, G.L. was

removed from Miron’s care by Hamm and Geving. (Id. at | 68, 71). After the

investigation, Hamm and Geving recommended G.L. be placed in a traditional foster

home, without any family members. (Id. at § 74). “All [three] homes in which G.L. was

placed from August 2023, until October 3, 2023, were non-Spanish speaking [foster]

homes.” (Id. at { 84).

On September 22, 2023, Lucha requested a service appeal challenging the validity

of his indication for medical neglect. (Id. at { 78). On September 22, 2023, during a hearing

on the appeal, Dr. Bryan Albracht testified the marks on G.L.’s leg and arm, were

consisted with phytophotodermatitis, which causes the pigmentation of the skin to

change upon contact with citrus. (Id. at || 79-80). On October 2, 2023, Dr. Petrak ordered

further testing and noted the injuries could be consistent with phytophotodermatitis. (Id.

at 85-86). On October 3, 2023, the Cass County State’s Attorney’s Office moved to

dismiss the Petition for Adjudication of Wardship, which the court granted. (Id. at J 87).

On December 11, 2023 and January 19, 2024, the cases against Lucha and Angel-Tapia,

respectively, were dismissed by DCFS as unfounded. (Id. at 91-92).

Ill. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint. See

Christensen v. Cnty. of Boone, Ill., 483 F.3d 454, 458 (7th Cir. 2007). When considering a

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court construes the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true, and construing

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all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. Christensen, 483 F.3d at 458. To state a claim

for relief, a plaintiff need only provide a short and plain statement of the claim showing

he is entitled to relief and giving defendants fair notice of the claims. Maddox v. Love, 655

F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2011). However, the complaint must set forth facts that plausibly

demonstrate a claim for relief. See Bell Ail. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). A

plausible claim is one that alleges factual content from which the court can reasonably

infer that defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009).

B. Exhibits Attached to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

In support of their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants provide several documents

from the underlying custody case. These documents include: the petition for adjudication

of wardship; a transcript of the proceedings on July 13, 2023; the temporary custody order

entered on July 13, 2023; and appearance orders from July 26, 2023, and August 16, 2023.

Rule 201(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits a court to take judicial

notice of facts which “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Generally, a court may not consider exhibits

attached to a motion to dismiss without converting it into a motion for summary

judgment. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp, v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1080 (7th Cir.

1997). But it is “well established that judges may take judicial notice of matters of public

record when ruling on a motion to dismiss” without converting it into a motion for

summary judgment. Fosnight v. Jones, 41 F.4th 916, 922 (7th Cir. 2022).

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Here, Plaintiffs do not dispute these documents may be judicially noticed. Instead,

Plaintiffs argue the Court should not consider these exhibits because they were created

after the date in which Plaintiffs allege their claims originate, making the exhibits

“extraneous.” But Plaintiffs fail to cite to any case to support their temporal argument as

preventing judicial notice. Therefore, the Court will take judicial notice of the juvenile

court documents.

C. Analysis

Section 1983 holds defendants acting under color of state law liable where they

“subjected or caused to be subjected, any citizen... or other person . . . to the deprivation

of any rights” guaranteed by federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In this case, Plaintiffs assert

violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendants argue the

claims against them should be dismissed for several reasons. First, Hamm and Geving’s

decision to take G.L. into protective custody was reasonable given the opinion of his

treating physician, and thus did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Second, Defendants’

actions did not violate Plaintiffs’ substantive or procedural due process rights under the

Fourteenth Amendment. Third, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits Plaintiffs’ claims

against Defendants because it is nominally a suit against DCFS, a state agency. Finally,

the state law claims are barred by sovereign immunity.”

? Defendants also argue that several facts alleged by Plaintiffs are conclusory or unsupported. To the extent

that the allegations are conclusory, the Court shall disregard them. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-

79 (2009).

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1. Fourth Amendment Claim

The Fourth Amendment, incorporated against the States by the Fourteenth

Amendment, guarantees the right to be free from “unreasonable searches and seizures.”

US. Const. amend. IV. The prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures

applies to both civil and criminal investigations conducted by the government and

therefore applies to DCFS employees. Heck, 327 F.3d at 509. In the context of a DCFS

investigation, a seizure under the Fourth Amendment occurs when a child is removed

from their home and family. Hernandez v. Foster, 657 F.3d 463, 474 (7th Cir. 2011).

Defendants’ removal of G.L. from his parents’ custody thus qualifies as a seizure. See

Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000).

In addition to proving a seizure has occurred, a plaintiff must demonstrate that

the seizure was unreasonable. Id. To be considered reasonable, the seizure must either be

pursuant to a court order, justified by exigent circumstances, or supported by probable

cause. Hernandez, 657 F.3d at 474-75. Here, Defendants contend the seizure was

supported by probable cause.

A probable cause analysis is an objective inquiry. Siliven v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Serv.,

635 F.3d 921, 927 (7th Cir. 2011). A court's “focus is on the facts and circumstances known

to defendants at the time they decided to remove [the child], and whether a prudent

caseworker (meaning one of reasonable caution) could have believed that [the child]

faced an immediate threat of abuse based on those facts.” Id. “Unreasonableness” under

the Fourth Amendment “is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application,

and its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each

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particular case.” Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1010 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396

(1989).

According to the Complaint, G.L. was removed from their custody after NP Elliot

noticed the burn on his arm, bruising in the shape of a handprint on his right leg, and a

limited range of motion in his right arm. Angel-Tapia stated the cause of the injuries were

sunburns and mosquito bites. Based on her medical experience, NP Elliot was concerned

about Angel-Tapia’s explanation, so she called DCFS. Although there was a language

barrier, Angel-Tapia does not allege that NP Elliot misunderstood her. In fact, at St. John’s

Hospital, the admitting physician also believed the sunburn explanation was inconsistent

with G.L.’s condition. Additionally, when Lucha arrived, he provided a different

explanation for the source of the burn—stating it was caused by a hot metal pole. Based

on the conflicting statements and the opinions of the medical providers, a reasonable

caseworker could have believed G.L. faced an immediate threat of abuse at the time of

the seizure.

However, even if probable cause justified G.L.’s seizure, the manner in which the

defendants seized G.L. may still make his seizure unreasonable. See Id.at 1011 (citing

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (“[R]easonableness depends on not only when a

seizure is made, but also how it is carried out[.]”)). Plaintiffs argue the manner in which

G.L. was seized was unreasonable for several reasons. Plaintiff Angel-Tapia was unable

to breastfeed G.L. or provide her pumped breastmilk to him because Defendants

3 Because Dr. Petrak’s findings were communicated to DCFS after the seizure occurred, it is not appropriate

to consider those findings for purposes of the reasonableness analysis, as only those facts and circumstances

known at the time of the seizure are relevant. See Siliven, 655 F.3d at 927,

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allegedly prevented her from doing so. As a result, G.L. required a feeding tube because

he was not adjusting to a provided bottle-fed formula. Plaintiffs cite Brokaw in support of

the proposition, but that case concerned how the defendants unreasonably seized the

minor: “dressing in plain clothes, driving an unmarked car, entering his home in the

evening without knocking or identifying themselves, and then refusing to do so when

asked” and finally “remov[ing] the screaming children from the home without

explanation.” Id. at 1012. The Seventh Circuit described the manner in which the minor

was seized as akin to kidnapping. Id. Plaintiffs here allege no facts to suggest that the

manner in which Defendants seized G.L. was unreasonable and, as a result, fail to state a

Fourth Amendment claim.

2. Substantive Due Process Claim

In addition to their Fourth Amendment claim, Plaintiffs assert a Fourteenth

Amendment substantive due process claim. To the extent that claim is premised on the

seizure of G.L., however, it cannot succeed because “substantive due process should not

be called upon when a specific constitutional provision protects the right allegedly

infringed upon. Id. at 1017 (citing United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997)). A

portion of Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment arguments focus on the lack of probable

cause to support the initial seizure. Those issues cannot be considered under the

Fourteenth Amendment’s framework because the Fourth Amendment protects those

rights. Id. However, Plaintiffs also assert their rights were violated during the entire

period of government-forced separation, which does implicate their Fourteenth

Amendment rights.

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The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State may “deprive any person of

life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

Plaintiffs allege substantive due process claims based on Defendants’ infringement of

their familial rights. See Hernandez, 657 F.3d at 478. “The Supreme Court has long

recognized, as a component of ‘substantive’ due process, that parents have a liberty

interest in familial relations.” Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 517 (7th Cir. 2003). This right is

an aspect of substantive due process and includes the parents’ right “to bear and raise

their children” and the child’s right “to be raised and nurtured by his parents.” Id, at 517-

18. However, this right is “limited by the compelling governmental interest in the

protection of children particularly where the children need to be protected from their

own parents.” Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1019. However, it “does not include the right to be free

from child abuse investigations.” Heck, 327 F.3d at 520.

“TWlhen analyzing a familial relations claim, a ‘balance must be reached between

the fundamental right to the family unit and the state’s interest in protecting children

from abuse.” Id. (quoting Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1019). To achieve this balance, caseworkers

must have “some definite and articulable evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion

that a child has been abused or is in imminent danger of abuse.” Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1019.

The caseworker must have “more than a hunch but less than probable cause.” Xiong v.

Wagner, 700 F.3d 282, 291 (7th Cir. 2012). But even when the initial seizure is supported

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by reasonable suspicion, “the continued withholding of a minor may constitute a

constitutional violation where . . . reasonable suspicion dissipates.”4 Id. at 291.

For example, in Hernandez, the Seventh Circuit found although there was probable

cause when a child was initially seized, the probable cause had dissipated by the next

day. 657 F.3d at 480. In that case, an orthopedic doctor informed the caseworker after the

seizure that the child’s injury “did not look like any abuse or neglect.” Id. Later, a full-

body x-ray revealed normal results. Id. Based on that, the State’s Attorney did not file a

petition for protective custody. Id. Nevertheless, the caseworker did not release the child

to his parent's custody. Id. As a result, the Seventh Circuit found that a trier of fact could

determine that probable cause dissipated and the caseworkers were no longer justified in

withholding the child. Id.

As discussed, the DCFS agents had probable cause—more than reasonable

suspicion — to justify their initial decision to remove G.L. from his parents’ custody. As

the investigation went on, however, the DCFS agents sought Dr. Petrak’s opinion, which

indicated G.L.’s injuries were inconsistent with abuse. Dr. Petrak also specifically asked

whether G.L. came into contact with citrus juice, which suggests he believed

phytophotodermatitis could have been a factor in the injuries rather than any abuse. X-

rays additionally showed that G.L. did not have any broken bones. When construing

‘To clarify the applicable legal standards, the Seventh Circuit has explained that parents’ claims concerning

“continuing separation” from their children are “properly analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment”

where the proper standard is reasonable suspicion. Xiong, 700 F.3d at 291-92. A child’s claim for “continued

withholding” is instead analyzed for probable cause under the Fourth Amendment. Id. Allegations

concerning the initial removal of a child, moreover, are evaluated under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 291

n.2.

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these facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs and accepting all well-pleaded facts as

true, a reasonable caseworker could have believed that reasonable suspicion and even

probable cause dissipated after the initial seizure. See Xiong, 700 F.3d at 292. Therefore,

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is denied as to this count.

3. Procedural Due Process Claim

The Fourteenth Amendment protects against the deprivation of constitutionally

protected interests without due process of law. Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1020. Due process

claims are subject to a two-part inquiry. Id. The Court must determine (1) whether

plaintiffs were deprived of a protected liberty or property interest and, if so, (2) the Court

must then decide what process was due. Id.

Plaintiffs allege a deprivation of their right to familial relations, which is a

protected liberty interest. Id. at 1020. In considering what process is due for the

deprivation of this liberty interest, the Seventh Circuit has reasoned that both parental

rights, and a child’s right to be nurtured by his parents cannot be denied “without an

opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way.” Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.

319, 333 (1976)). The amount of due process required varies with any particular situation

and is a “flexible” concept. Id. At a minimum, however, due process in this setting

“requires that government officials not misrepresent the facts in order to obtain the

removal of a child from his parents.” Id.; see also Hernandez, 657 F.3d at 484.

In Brokaw, the Seventh Circuit found the plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to

state a procedural due process claim. 235 F.3d at 1021. Specifically, the allegations

“call[ed] into question the constitutional adequacy of the post-deprivation hearing: [the

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plaintiff] contended] the defendants filed or conspired to file false statements with the

court”; “the social study prepared concerning [the minor] and his sister was not provided

to his parents prior to the custody hearing”; and “the court relied in part on this study to

order him a ward of the state.” Id. The Seventh Circuit, however, explained that while the

social worker would not be protected by absolute immunity for her role in initiating the

removal or gathering evidence, she would be absolutely immune as to her involvement

in the judicial process. Id. at 1014 n.10.

Absolute immunity “confers complete immunity from suit, not just a mere defense

to liability and is applicable in suits under section 1983... .” Dawson v. Newman, 419 F.3d

656, 660 (7th Cir. 2005). For example, “social workers and like public officials are entitled

to absolute immunity in child custody cases on account of testimony and other steps

taken to present the case for decision by the court.” Millspaugh v. Cty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare

of Wabash Cty., 937 F.2d 1172, 1176 (7th Cir. 1991).

In Millspaugh, the Seventh Circuit considered allegations that a social worker

pursued custody proceedings involving the plaintiffs’ children because she disliked the

plaintiffs’ religion, “failed to furnish the court with material which would have been

favorable to the plaintiffs during the custody proceedings,” and “neglected to ensure that

the [plaintiffs] received adequate notice of [the custody] hearings.” Id. at 1175. The

plaintiffs argued that even though the social worker’s actions occurred in connection with

judicial proceedings, the actions were so clearly unlawful that absolute immunity should

not apply. Id. The Seventh Circuit disagreed, reasoning that “immunity that applies only

when the defendant did no wrong is no immunity at all.” Id. The court found that “[the

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social worker's] motives in asking the court to do certain things, and her selection of

evidence to present, lie at the core of the subjects to which absolute immunity

applies.” Id. The court reasoned that even assuming the social worker acted out of

improper motive and misled the court, “social workers and like public officials are

entitled to absolute immunity in child custody cases on account of testimony and other

steps taken to present the case for decision by the court.” Id. at 1176.

Here, like Millspaugh, Plaintiffs allege Hamm misled the court by presenting

incomplete testimony during the protective custody hearing. Because these allegations

involve her “testimony and other steps taken to present the case for decision by the

court,” she is shielded by absolute immunity for her testimony. Millspaugh, 937 F.2d at

1176; see also Brewer v. Sproat, No. 15-3332, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79414, at *11 (C.D. IIL.

May 24, 2017) (citing Millspaugh, 937 F.2d at 1175-76; Pelham v. Albright, No. 11 CV 99,

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63848 (N.D. Ind. May 4, 2012)) (child welfare specialist found

absolutely immune from damages action after “allegedly lying under oath and

presenting allegedly false drug test results to the juvenile court judge”). Accordingly, the

Motion to Dismiss is granted with respect to the procedural due process claim against

Hamm.

4. Eleventh Amendment

Defendants argue that, even though they are being sued for damages in their

individual capacities, they are still shielded by the Eleventh Amendment. “The Eleventh

Amendment bars private litigants’ suits against nonconsenting states in federal courts,

with the exception of causes of action where Congress has abrogated the states’

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traditional immunity through its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Joseph v.

Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 432 F.3d 746, 748 (7th Cir. 2005). State officials sued in

their individual capacities “are ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983” and the “Eleventh

Amendment does not bar such suits.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 US. 21,31 (1991). “But even when

a suit is against a public officer in his or her individual capacity, the court is obliged to

consider whether it may really and substantially be against the state.” Luder v. Endicott,

253 F.3d 1020, 1023 (7th Cir. 2001). “[A] suit is against the sovereign if the judgment

sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public

administration, or if the effect of the judgment would be to restrain the Government from

acting, or to compel it to act.” Id. (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465

US. 89, 102 n.11 (1984)). That said, “[t]he general rule is that” suits against state officials

in their individual capacities “are not barred by the [Eleventh] [A]mendment, because

the plaintiff is seeking damages from individuals rather than from the state treasury.” Id.

at 1022-23, This is true even if “the state chooses to indemnify its employees” and “the

judgment may exceed the employee-defendant’s capacity to pay unless he is

indemnified.” Id. at 1023.

Here, Defendants argue the practical effect of this suit deters other DCFS agents

from their enforcement of ANCRA. But the Complaint does not amount to the type of

“generalized attack on” DCFS that the Eleventh Amendment bars; it instead alleges “the

manner in which the individual DCFS employees administered the reporting and

investigatory scheme” violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Doyle v. Camelot Care Ctrs.,

Inc., 305 F.3d 603, 613 n.9 (7th Cir. 2002). Thus, the suit here is properly against

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Defendants in their individual capacities, and these Defendants are not protected by the

Eleventh Amendment. See Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2002)

(“[I]ndividual capacity suits do not implicate the Eleventh Amendment's protections[.]”);

Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1009 (permitting familial integrity claim against state officials in their

individual capacities).

5. State Law Claims

Finally, Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ state law claims are ones against the State,

subject to sovereign immunity.

The State Lawsuit Immunity Act provides in part that “the State of Illinois shall

not be made a defendant or party in any court.” 745 ILCS 5/1. The Illinois Court of Claims

has “exclusive jurisdiction” over “[a]ll claims against the State founded upon any law of

the State of Illinois.” 705 ILCS 505/8(a). In T.S. v. County of Cook, the Seventh Circuit held

that “[t]he prohibition against making the State of Illinois a party to a suit cannot be

evaded by making an action nominally against the agents of the State when the real claim

is against the State itself... .” 67 F.4th 884, 891 (7th Cir. 2023). The Court explained that

a lawsuit brought against a state employee is considered, for these purposes, one

impermissibly against the State when:

[T]here are (1) no allegations that an agent or employee of the State acted

beyond the scope of his authority through wrongful acts; (2) the duty

alleged to have been breached was not owed to the public generally

independent of the fact of State employment; and (3) where the

complained-of actions involve matters ordinarily within that employee's

normal and official functions of the State.

Id. at 892 (quoting Healy v. Vaupel, 133 IIL. 2d 295, 309 (III. 1990)).

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In addressing whether a state employee acted beyond the scope of her authority,

the relevant inquiry is whether “the employee intended to perform some function within

the scope of his or her authority when committing the legal wrong.” Id. The State, through

DCES, has the sole authority to investigate allegations of child abuse and take action to

remove children from their guardians if necessary. 20 ILCS 505/21. Thus, the instant

allegations all occurred during the scope of Defendants’ authority as DCFS workers. And

as to the official-functions element, the relevant inquiry is whether the breach involved

matters “ordinarily within . . . the normal and official functions” of Defendants’ roles at

DCFS. T.S., 67 F.4th at 893. The investigation here into allegations of child abuse and the

removal of G.L. involved the normal functions of Defendants’ roles as DCFS workers.

Where the alleged wrongful conduct “arose out of the State employee’s breach of

a duty that is imposed on [them] solely by virtue of [their] State employment,” sovereign

immunity bars the action in circuit court. Id. at 892. But “where the employee is charged

with breaching a duty imposed on [them] independently of [their] state employment,

sovereign immunity will not attach.” Id. Plaintiffs argue that Paulinski v. Paulinski, No.

2024-L-241 (Cir. Ct. Cook County), establishes that DCFS workers are held to a separate

duty of care based on the Child Welfare Education Licensure standards. However,

Plaintiffs did not allege in the Complaint that Defendants breached those standards.

Instead, Plaintiffs cite to numerous statutes establishing guidelines for how DCFS

workers should determine placement for children and how they should conduct their

investigations. Therefore, the source of the duty which was imposed was based solely by

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virtue of their position as DCFS employees. Because all three elements are satisfied, the

state law claims are dismissed pursuant to IIlinois’s State Lawsuit Immunity Act.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 20) is GRANTED

in part as to Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim, Fourteenth Amendment procedural

due process claim, and state law claims. Plaintiffs’ state law claims are dismissed with

prejudice. Plaintiffs may amend their Complaint within 21 days after the entry of this

order to cure deficiencies. Defendants’ Motion is DENIED in part as to Plaintiffs’

Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim.

ENTER: September 30, 2025 ~

COLLEEN R. LAWL

ITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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