Ibarra v. Lee

nited States District Court

for the SQorthern District of Oklahoma

Case No. 4:20-cv-598-JDR-SH

ROSALINDA IBARRA, @s the special administratrix of THE ESTATE OF

JORGE MARTINEZ, DECEASED,

Plaintiff,

versus

CHEYENNE LEE; THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF

ROGERS COUNTY,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

While serving a protective order, Deputy Cheyenne Lee of the Rogers

County Sheriff’s Office entered the home of Jorge Martinez. In the ensuing

altercation, Deputy Lee fatally shot Mr. Martinez. Plaintiff Rosalinda Ibarra,

special administratrix of the estate of Mr. Martinez, and Defendants Deputy

Lee and the Board of County Commissioners of Rogers County have filed

motions in limine in preparation for trial. Dkts. 66, 67.' Ms. Ibarra and De-

fendants oppose each other’s motions. Dkts. 68, 69. The motions are granted

in part, denied in part, and reserved for trial in part, as set forth below.

Ms. Ibarra has filed seven motions in limine and seeks to exclude (a)

evidence of Mr. Martinez’s prior arrests, violence, tattoos, and drug use, (b)

government determinations of the reasonability of Deputy Lee’s actions, and

' All citations use CM/ECF pagination.

No. 20-cv-598

(c) information about the protective order. Dkt. 66. Defendants oppose all of

the requested exclusions. Dkt. 69. The Court will consider each in turn.

Ms. Ibarra first moves to exclude “‘any reference to any prior criminal

record, incarceration, arrests or interaction with law enforcement officers by”

Mr. Martinez. Dkt. 66 at 9. She argues that this material is irrelevant because

Deputy Lee knew nothing of Mr. Martinez’s background, and it could not

have affected his decision making during the incident. /d. at 9-10. She further

objects that the material would be unduly prejudicial. /d. at 11. Defendants

respond that Mr. Martinez’s criminal record is relevant to numerous issues,

including Ms. Ibarra’s damages calculations for loss of companionship and

lost income, the “threat level” posed by Mr. Martinez, and Mr. Martinez’s

motive to resist arrest. Dkt. 69 at 19-21. The Court agrees that Mr. Martinez’s

prior criminal history may be relevant to disputed issues at trial, particularly

Ms. Ibarra’s damages claim. The Court recognizes that the prejudicial effect

of this evidence may, in some cases, exceed its probative value. But the Rule

403 analysis is best performed in the context of trial. The Court denies Ms.

Ibarra’s request for a blanket prohibition and reserves this issue for trial.

Ms. Ibarra next moves to exclude evidence of “any previous fights, al-

tercations, acts of violence or threats involving” Mr. Martinez on the basis

that their introduction would be both more prejudicial than probative and vi-

olate Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)’s prohibition on character evidence.

Dkt. 66 at 11. She also argues that these statements qualify as hearsay. Jd. Ms.

Ibarra does not identify any prior threats to which this prohibition would ap-

ply. Defendants respond that they seek to introduce only the statements made

by Mr. Martinez to Sara Chapa, who sought the protective order Deputy Lee

went to enforce. Dkt. 69 at 22. Defendants argue that Deputy Lee was aware

Mr. Martinez had threatened and assaulted Ms. Chapa when he went to serve

the protective order, and his knowledge is relevant to the jury’s determination

No. 20-cv-598

of whether Deputy Lee’s actions were “ ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the

facts and circumstances confronting [him].” Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles,

64 F.3d 1323, 1328 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,

387 (1989)); Dkt. 69 at 22.

The Court agrees with the Defendants. Deputy Lee’s knowledge of

Mr. Martinez’s previous conduct is relevant to the reasonableness of his

choices at the time of the altercation. The statements are also not excludable

as hearsay because they are not offered to show Mr. Martinez actually threat-

ened or assaulted Ms. Chapa, but to show Deputy Lee’s state of mind during

the altercation. Meek ». Martin, 450 F. Supp. 3d 1232, 1253 (E.D. Okla. 2020),

aff’d, 74 F.4th 1223 (10th Cir. 2023) (Finding that “state of mind [is] a firmly

established exception to the inadmissibility of hearsay.”). The Court will per-

mit this testimony.

Ms. Ibarra next objects to “any reference to any determination by [a

government entity] that the shooting death of [Mr.] Martinez was justified,

reasonable or within policy” as hearsay. Dkt. 66 at 12. She further argues that

those reports are irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative. /d. at 12-13.

The Defendants argue that the documents are admissible as public records

under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8). Dkt. 69 at 24-25.

For a document to be admissible as a public record, it must conform to

Rule 803(8)’s requirements to be a public record:

Arecord or statement of a public office if: (A) it sets out: (i) the

office's activities; (11) a matter observed while under a legal duty

to report, but not including, in a criminal case, a matter ob-

served by law enforcement personnel; or (iii) in a civil case or

against the government in a criminal case, factual findings

from a legally authorized investigation; and (B) the oppo-

nent does not show that the source of the information or other

circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.

@

No. 20-cv-598

(emphasis added). The materials in question are factual findings from multi-

ple legally authorized investigations by the Rogers County Sheriff’s Office,

Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation, and the Rogers County District At-

torney’s Office, and Ms. Ibarra has not shown any evidence indicating a lack

of trustworthiness. The materials are admissible under Rule 803(8).

Although the reports themselves may be admissible, a hearsay-within-

hearsay issue remains because both provided reports are based on testimony

of and contain statements from Deputy Lee, Isidra Mitchell, and Maria Mar-

tinez. Dkt. 66-2; Dkt. 66-3. Those statements do not independently qualify

under the public records exception in Rule 803(8) and are properly analyzed

under Rule 803(6). United States v. DeLeon, 316 F. Supp. 3d 1303, 1306

(D.N.M. 2018) (excluding investigative report in its entirety due to hearsay-

within-hearsay not admissible under Rule 803(6)). Rule 803(6) permits ad-

mitting hearsay evidence if the declarant “was reporting the information in

the regular course of regularly conducted activity.” Jd. at 1307. Neither party

has presented evidence that Deputy Lee, Ms. Mitchell, or Ms. Martinez reg-

ularly provides testimony to internal police investigations, and so the hearsay

within the materials is inadmissible under Rule 803(6).

The Court also finds that admitting multiple summaries of police in-

ternal investigations is likely to confuse and prejudice the jury, while the doc-

uments have little independent probative value. The Court also notes that the

documents would provide cumulative testimony. The Court will exclude

these documents in their entirety but permit witness testimony to the conclu-

sions of the investigations.

Ms. Ibarra next moves to exclude any references to communications

with Judge Stephen Pazzo regarding the service of the protective order. She

argues that the evidence, which includes text messages between Judge Pazzo

and an Undersheriff, is hearsay and irrelevant to the case. Dkt. 66 at 14-15.

No. 20-cv-598

Defendants argue that the messages and accompanying order are not hearsay

because they are not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted and “are

relevant to the timing of the service of the protective order.” Dkt. 69 at 26.

The Court will reserve this matter for trial. The text messages and or-

der provided by Ms. Ibarra are not clearly relevant but are also not clearly

irrelevant. Dkt. 66-5. There is little indication of exactly how this evidence

would be used at trial and what disputed matter the evidence would be rele-

vant to. The admissibility of this evidence is best assessed in the context of

trial.

Ms. Ibarra next moves to exclude any testimony about the “source,

origin or meaning” of any of Mr. Martinez’s tattoos. She argues that this ev-

idence would be more prejudicial than probative. Dkt. 66 at 16. Defendants

argue the tattoos are probative. Instead, they contend Ms. Ibarra’s request to

prohibit “any testimony, questions or arguments” about the tattoos is over-

broad and would preclude accurate expert witness testimony about potential

bruising—or lack thereof—on Mr. Martinez’s hands. Dkt. 69 at 27.

The Court concurs with Ms. Ibarra that any in-depth discussion about

the source, origin, or meaning of Mr. Martinez’s tattoos would be irrelevant

and unduly prejudicial. The Court will grant Ms. Ibarra’s motion and prohibit

any testimony, questions, or argument about Mr. Martinez’s tattoos except

as it pertains to photographs of Mr. Martinez or the expert’s medical testi-

mony.

Ms. Ibarra next argues that any evidence about Mr. Martinez’s use of

drugs or alcohol is irrelevant and prejudicial. Dkt. 66 at 16-18. Defendants

contend that (a) Mr. Martinez’s drinking and use of methamphetamine is rel-

evant to the issuance of the protective order, (b) Ms. Ibarra has alleged that

Mr. Martinez “may have been crashing from a drug high” and evidence about

No, 20-cv-598

Mr. Martinez’s use of drugs and alcohol will be needed for rebuttal, and (c)

Mr. Martinez’s “inebriation” may “explain[] his aggressive and resistive con-

duct.” Dkt. 69 at 27-29.

The Court finds that Ms. Ibarra’s motion is overbroad. Deputy Lee’s

knowledge of Mr. Martinez’s use of drugs prior to and at the time of the al-

tercation is relevant to the reasonableness of his conduct. Endicott v. Choctaw

Cnty. City of Hugo Hosp. Auth., No. 21-cv-319-RAW, 2025 WL 1505419, at *2

(E.D. Okla. May 27, 2025) (allowing evidence of prior use of drugs in wrong-

ful death case when relevant to both defenses and damages calculation). Fur-

ther, as Ms. Ibarra opened the door to the issue of Deputy Lee’s knowledge

of Mr. Martinez’s drug use in her summary judgment briefing, the Court is

unwilling to close it completely at trial. Dkt. 69 at 29. Ms. Ibarra may object

to the admissibility of particular evidence of Mr. Martinez’s drug use at trial.

See Aguilar v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 17-4382-CBM-MRW, 2018 WL

10017337, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2018) (permitting evidence of decedent’s

drug use at the time of death but excluding prior drug use as more prejudicial

than probative).

Last, Ms. Ibarra argues that the petition for the protective order and

the protective order itself should be excluded on the basis that Deputy Lee

did not see the petition nor know its contents at the time of the altercation.

Dkt. 66 at 18-19. Defendants respond that the petition is relevant to Deputy

Lee’s knowledge prior to the incident, Ms. Ibarra’s unlawful arrest and dam-

ages claims, and Mr. Martinez’s motive for resisting arrest. Dkt. 69 at 29-31.

Defendants’ argument regarding the petition is unavailing. They do

not rebut Ms. Ibarra’s objection that Deputy Lee was not aware of the con-

tents of the petition and had not read it at the time of the altercation. Jd. at

29-30. All the information that Defendants claim Deputy Lee was aware of

came from sources other than the petition itself, and Deputy Lee can

No. 20-cv-598

independently testify about his personal knowledge at trial. Jd. The petition

is unnecessary, cumulative, and lacks probative value.

The protective order itself may be relevant to Defendants’ rebuttal of

Ms. Ibarra’s claim for loss of consortium between Mr. Martinez and his fam-

ily. The Court will reserve ruling on Ms. [barra’s motion to exclude for trial.

Defendants have filed nine motions in limine. Dkt. 67. Of those, four

relate to evidence solely supporting Ms. Ibarra’s Monell claims. Id. at 1-2, 3-

5, 6-7, 8.* As Ms. Ibarra did not include these claims in the most recent Joint

Status Report, the Court finds these claims are no longer active and will grant

the motions to exclude. The Court will consider the remaining five motions

in turn.

Defendants move to exclude photos of Mr. Martinez, his family, and

his children as irrelevant. Dkt. 67 at 5-6. Although the Tenth Circuit has not

found reversible error in permitting the display of pre-death photos of murder

victims with their families in criminal cases, see United States v. Pettigrew, 468

F.3d 626, 638 (10th Cir. 2006), this is not a criminal homicide. And even in

Pettigrew the court of appeals “admonish[ed] the Government” for its deci-

sion to display a photo of the decedent with her family. □□□ The Court will

exclude the photos of Mr. Martinez’s family and children and will reserve its

decision on the photo of Mr. Martinez himself for trial.

Next, Defendants move to exclude unidentified “portions” of Deputy

Lee’s personnel file. Dkt. 67 at 6. Ms. Ibarra responds that she intends to offer

2 These motions are to exclude evidence about (a) a subsequent police shooting in-

volving Deputy Lee [Dkt. 67 at 1-2], (b) nine prior use-of-force incidents by Rogers County

Sheriff’s Office deputies [Jd. at 3-5], (c) the Rogers County Sheriff’s Office manual of pol-

icies and procedures [/d. at 6-7], and (d) the Rogers County Sheriffs’ Office’s review and

investigation of the shooting [Jd. at 8].

No. 20-cv-598

records showing that Deputy Lee did not receive training on the use of deadly

force. Dkt. 68 at 13. Neither party attached the objected-to documents to their

motions or provided the Court with a docket citation identifying the chal-

lenged evidence. The Court cannot determine the relevance of information

without reviewing it and will reserve this matter for trial.

Defendants next move to exclude “any testimony that there were less

forceful options available to Deputy Lee” as irrelevant. Dkt. 67 at 9. Defend-

ants argue that “the clearly established law in the Tenth Circuit holds that the

Fourth Amendment does not require an officer to use the least or a less force-

ful alternative” in an altercation. Mata v. City of Farmington, 798 F. Supp. 2d

1215, 1229 (D.N.M. 2011) (citing Blossom v. Yarbrough, 429 F.3d 963, 968

(10th Cir. 2005), Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1133 (10th Cir. 2001), and

Jiron v. City of Lakewood, 392 F.3d 410, 414 (10th Cir. 2004)). Ms. Ibarra ar-

gues that this testimony is relevant to the objective reasonableness of Deputy

Lee’s actions. Dkt. 68 at 17-18.

The Court concurs with Ms. Ibarra. The case law cited by Defendants

precludes the introduction of evidence of less forceful alternatives, “so long

as the force used by the officer is reasonable.” Mata, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1229.

“The availability of non-lethal means tends to show that [an officer’s] use of

lethal force was unreasonable.” Branson v. Price, No. 13-cv-03090-REB-

NYW, 2015 WL 5562174, at *5 (D. Colo. Sept. 21, 2015).

Although law enforcement is given deference in tense, rapidly evolving

situations, Ms. Ibarra has alleged that there were non-lethal means that were

available to Deputy Lee, and his failure to use those was unreasonable. The

Court will permit the jury to consider the options available to Deputy Lee to

determine if his chosen course of action was objectively reasonable.

No. 20-cv-598

Next, Defendants seek to exclude “any references to the alleged denial

of medical care after the shooting” as “irrelevant” and “unduly prejudicial.”

Dkt. 67 at 12. They argue both that Ms. Ibarra has abandoned her claim of a

constitutional violation by failing to present any arguments regarding it in the

summary judgment briefing and that “the gun shot was not survivable even

with immediate medical care” and so any denial was irrelevant. Jd.

Although the parties’ joint status report does not include the original

claim of a constitutional violation, the complaint in this case pleads the “fail-

ure to provide prompt medical care to the Decedent” as part of its “Negli-

gence/ Wrongful Death/Survival” claim for relief. Dkt. 2 at 24-25. This claim

is present in part on the joint status report, which lists “State Law Tort

Claims of False Arrest, Battery and Negligence” against both Defendants.

Dkt. 106 at 1-2. The Court will reserve the question of the relevance of a de-

nial of medical care to Ms. Ibarra’s negligence claims for trial.

Last, Defendants move to exclude “any allegations that Defendant

Rogers County ‘ratified’ unconstitutional conduct” on the basis that those

claims have been abandoned. Dkt. 67 at 13. Much like Ms. Ibarra’s Monell

claims, there is no claim in the Joint Status Report that aligns with Rogers

County “ratifying” unconstitutional conduct—the only claims that remain

against Rogers County are state law tort claims subject to the Oklahoma Gov-

ernment Tort Claims Act. Dkt. 106 at 1-2. The allegations of ratification are

therefore irrelevant to the remaining claims, and the Court will exclude them.

III

For the reasons discussed above, the Court disposes of each motion as

follows:

(1) Ms. Ibarra’s Motions in Limine [Dkt. 66]:

a. Denied as to the categorical exclusion of Mr. Martinez’s

criminal record and associated information;

Qo

No. 20-cv-598

b. Denied as to the categorical exclusion of Mr. Martinez’s

history of threats and violence;

c. Granted as to the exclusion of Rogers County Sheriff’s Of-

fice, Rogers County District Attorney’s Office and OSBI re-

ports on the shooting;

d. Reserved as to the admissibility of communications be-

tween Undersheriff Sappington and Judge Pazzo;

e. Granted as to the exclusion of Mr. Martinez’s tattoos from

evidence, except as needed in medical expert testimony;

f. Denied as to the admissibility of Mr. Martinez’s use of

drugs and alcohol; and

g. Reserved as to the admissibility of the protective order and

petition for a protective order.

(2) Defendants’ Motions in Limine [Dkt. 67]:

a. Granted as to the exclusion of the second shooting from ev-

idence due to the lack of an extant Monell claim;

b. Granted as to the exclusion of nine noted prior use of force

incidents due to the lack of an extant Monell claim;

c. Granted as to the exclusion of photos of Mr. Martinez’s

children and family, and reserved as to the admissibility of a

photo of Mr. Martinez;

d. Reserved as to the admissibility of portions of Deputy Lee’s

personnel file;

e. Granted as to the exclusion of the Rogers County Sheriff’s

Office policy and procedures manual due to the lack of an

extant Monell claim;

f. Granted as to the exclusion of evidence about the Rogers

County Sheriff’s Office investigation of the shooting due to

the lack of an extant Monell claim;

g. Denied as to the exclusion of testimony that there were less-

lethal options available to Deputy Lee;

Wn

No. 20-cv-598

h. Reserved as to the exclusion of testimony about Deputy

Lee’s failure to provide medical care; and

i. Granted as to the exclusion of testimony that Rogers

County ratified unconstitutional conduct.

For the motions denied or reserved, the Court’s rulings are prelimi-

nary. The Court reminds the parties of their continued obligation to reassert

evidentiary challenges at trial to preserve the challenges for appeal.

DATED this 30th day of September 2025.

Tt yw» ——

JOHN D. RUSSELL

United States District Judge

a1