Payne v. Hughes

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

KRAIG PAYNE, Y40610, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 25-cv-881-DWD

)

LATOYA HUGHES, )

JEREMIAH BROWN, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Kraig Payne, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC)

currently detained at Lawrence Correctional Center, brings this civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights.

Plaintiff’s original complaint was dismissed as insufficient to state a claim (Doc. 14), and

he has now filed a timely amended pleading (Doc. 17). Plaintiff’s amended complaint

(Doc. 17) is now before the Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter out

non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b). Any portion of a complaint that is

legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief must

be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii). At this juncture, the

factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v.

Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

The Amended Complaint1

The initial complaint alleged that Plaintiff had some issue with transmitting mail

at the prison, but it also suggested he might have caused his own problem by placing the

mail in the incorrect receptacle. In the amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that in

February of 2025, he deposited a document for mailing on his way to yard. He alleges it

was a response to an affirmative defense, and a certificate of service. (Doc. 17 at 4). He

alleges the certificate of service was “violated” by counselor Tate, a non-party. He goes

on to allege that his conduct was not intentional, and he placed his documents for mailing

without realizing people “do cruel things.” (Doc. 17 at 5). He faults other officers for

failing to speak up and alleges Defendant Brown (the Warden) knew about it but did

nothing. (Doc. 17 at 5). He further alleges that he filed a report that got appealed to

Defendant Hughes (IDOC Director), but she lied and did not investigate his issue. (Doc.

17 at 4, 6). Plaintiff seeks monetary compensation.

Analysis

Plaintiff’s complaint is still insufficient as pled. Inmates have a constitutional right

to access the courts, including the right to have “basic scribe materials,” such as paper

and writing utensils. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 414-15 (2002); Lewis v. Casey,

518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996); Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 558 (7th Cir. 1995). To state a

claim of denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff must allege that he was, or is, suffering

an ‘actual injury’ by being ‘frustrated’ or ‘impeded’ in bringing a non-frivolous claim

1 Plaintiff transmitted two amended complaints (Docs. 15, 17), but they both appear identical in substance,

so the Court focused on the newest pleading (Doc. 17).

regarding his criminal conviction, sentence or conditions of confinement. Lewis, 518 U.S.

353-55. Moreover, the injury must be a specific hinderance related to a lawsuit, Owens v.

Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 565 (7th Cir. 2017), and cannot be a speculative, future harm, Marshall

v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 969-70 (7th Cir. 2006).

Here, Plaintiff complains that he was impeded in sending a response to an

exhaustion motion, which suggests he was trying to mail a court document, but he does

not explain how this hinderance harmed him. Specifically, he does not claim that this

incident harmed his ability to pursue a meritorious claim in another lawsuit. Plaintiff

attributes the problem to counselor Tate, a person he did not name as a party in the case

caption, but even if he had properly named Tate, there is no adequate claim. He alleges

that he deposited his mail into a box and does not explain how or why he knows that

Tate was involved in the problems with his mail being transmitted.

As to Defendant Brown, Plaintiff alleges he knew about the incident and did

nothing, but he does not say how he notified Brown of the problem. Merely being a

prison supervisor is not sufficient to create liability, and high-level officials may delegate

many tasks to employees of the organization. See e.g., Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 594-

96 (7th Cir. 2009) (public employees are liable for their own misdeeds but not for anyone

else’s). As for Latoya Hughes, Plaintiff faults her for not providing a satisfactory response

to an “appeal” or possibly a grievance about the mail issue. Because high-level prison

officials are not liable for the misconduct of others, an inmate may only possibly establish

liability against such an official if he or she can point to a highly detailed correspondence

that informs them of a serious situation but is ignored. See e.g., Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d

768 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding that multiple highly detailed grievances about a serious

medical issue were sufficient to potentially hold the grievance officials liable for alleged

deliberate indifference). Plaintiff says he complained to Hughes, but he does not explain

when he complained or what he said. The Court does not find it plausible that a single

grievance or message about one missing piece of mail constitutes a serious situation, to

which Hughes was deliberately indifferent. Many individuals both within and outside

of prison experience occasional problems with lost mail. All Plaintiff says about Hughes’

role is that he was dissatisfied with the outcome. This is insufficient to demonstrate

deliberate indifference to a serious problem, as opposed to a routine role in grievance

processing. See e.g., Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953-54 (7th Cir. 2011) (the alleged

mishandling of a grievance is not enough to state a claim).

Having reviewed Plaintiff’s amended complaint, the Court finds that it is not

necessary to afford further opportunities to amend because it is not apparent that there

is any set of related facts that would be sufficient to sustain a constitutional claim. See e.g.

Zimmerman v. Bornick, 25 F.4th 491, 494 (7th Cir. 2022) (amendment would be futile if

plaintiff already had multiple chances to cure deficiencies); Always Towing & Recovery,

Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2 F.4th 695, 707 (7th Cir. 2021) (courts may deny leave to amend

if an amendment would be futile); McCree v. Grissom, 657 F.3d 623, 624 (7th Cir. 2011)

(leave to amend shall be granted where justice so requires, but leave to amend need not

be given if an amendment to the complaint would be futile). As such, this case is now

dismissed for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. This dismissal shall count

as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

Disposition

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 17) is DISMISSED with prejudice for failure

to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff’s Motion for an Extension of Time to

Amend (Doc. 16) is GRANTED instanter because the Court received and reviewed the

pleading. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment and CLOSE this case.

If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this Order, he must file a notice of appeal with this

Court within thirty days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). If Plaintiff

chooses to appeal, he will be liable for the $605.00 filing fee irrespective of the outcome

of the appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d

724, 725-56 (7th Cir. 2008). Moreover, if the appeal is found to be nonmeritorious, Plaintiff

may incur another “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A proper and timely motion filed

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may toll the 30-day appeal deadline.

FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4). A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no later than 28 days after the

entry of judgment, and this 28-day deadline cannot be extended.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 29, 2025 /s David W. Dugan

__________________________

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge