Murphy v. Forest River Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

WARREN MURPHY,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 1:24-CV-170-HAB

FOREST RIVER INC.,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

Threatening to shoot co-workers—or, at least, screaming out loud in a work setting that

co-workers should be shot—might reasonably be considered a fireable offense. But although

Plaintiff Warren Murphy (“Murphy”), who co-workers knew to be a gun aficionado, did just that,

he insists his blowup is not why Defendant Forest River Inc., (“Forest River”) let him go. Instead,

Murphy claims his outburst and the months of dialogue that followed exposed his disability to

Forest River, and that it discriminatorily fired him on that basis. He sued alleging the company

violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, and

the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601.

Before the Court is Forest River’s motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 24). The

company argues that Murphy’s tirade disqualified him from ADA protection, that it did not

discriminate even if he was qualified, and that Murphy has not established an actionable FMLA

claim. For the reasons below, the motion will be GRANTED.

I. Factual Background

On May 24, 2023, Murphy, an assistant director of parts, service, and warranty at Forest

River, had a “complete meltdown” in his office when he lost work on his computer. (ECF No. 26,

¶¶ 4, 38). This five-minute long screaming episode—which happened in earshot of co-workers—

featured Murphy unleashing vulgar and threatening language at Forest River’s IT employees. Id.

¶¶ 39–41. Murphy and Forest River dispute what exact words were uttered. But all agree Murphy called

the IT employees “motherfuckers” and said that “they should be shot.”1 Id. ¶¶ 39–40. This tirade violated

Forest River’s Workplace Violence Policy, and Murphy concedes this violation gave Forest River

authority to fire him. (ECF No. 28, ¶¶ 96–97). After his outburst, Murphy removed himself from the

situation. (ECF No. 26, ¶ 43). He left the office for a time, self-reported the incident to one of his

supervisors, and returned later that day. (ECF No. 28, ¶¶ 124–25). While he was gone, he made an

appointment with his therapist Julie Albano (“Albano”), who he had been seeing for about three

months. (ECF No. 26, ¶ 44; No. 28, ¶ 104).

The next day, Murphy met with another supervisor, Doug Gaeddert (“Gaeddert”), and two

members of Forest River’s Department of Human Resources (“HR”)—David Besinger

(“Besinger”) and Jorje Lizarazo (“Lizarazo”)—to discuss his outburst. (ECF No. 26, ¶ 46). Murphy

did not mention any disability or medication in this meeting. Id. ¶¶ 49–50. When the meeting ended,

Murphy was told to work from home while HR investigated the incident. Id. ¶ 51. Albano shortly

thereafter sent a letter to Forest River, advising the company that Murphy was her patient and that

they had been working on managing Murphy’s anger. (ECF No. 28-16). The letter suggested ways

Forest River could help Murphy avoid letting his anger boil over again. Id. Murphy had years

earlier received diagnoses for major depressive disorder and anxiety, but the letter did not mention

any disability or mental health diagnosis. (ECF Nos. 28-6, at 8–10; 28-16). After Albano sent this

1 In his Response to Statement of Material Facts, Murphy disputes the admissibility of statements he made that can be

found in his therapist’s notes. (ECF No. 28, ¶ 39). Whether this is hearsay or not, this argument is a red herring. The

therapy notes were shown to Murphy during his deposition, and those notes do reference Murphy’s recollection of

what he said during his outburst. (ECF No. 26-1, at 64). But nonetheless, Murphy admitted having said “they should

be shot” in response to a question that did not refer to the content of the notes. Id. at 22:9–11.

letter, two processes began: Forest River’s investigation of the incident and the dialogue between

Forest River and Murphy.

The investigation did not involve many components. Lizarazo spoke to a handful of

employees who heard Murphy’s blowup and followed up with them two months later about the

possibility of Murphy returning to work. (ECF No. 26, ¶¶ 53, 81). Each time, Lizarazo reported his

findings to Besinger. Id. ¶ 53. The investigation also revealed that Murphy was known to be an

avid gun owner, as he often talked about guns with co-workers and handed out cards for his

gunsmithing business. Id. ¶ 34. Murphy estimates that he owned at least twenty-five guns at the

time of the outburst. Id. ¶ 31.

The dialogue, on the other hand, was much more drawn out. After Murphy worked from

home for a short time and spent two weeks away for National Guard training, he and Albano had

a phone call with Besinger and Lizarazo to discuss how Murphy might return to work. (ECF No.

28, ¶¶ 148–49). Albano suggested that Murphy be allowed to work from home. Id. ¶ 152. Forest

River promptly shot that idea down, and informed Murphy that Albano’s other suggestions from

her letter in May were also unworkable. (ECF No. 26, ¶¶ 68–69). At the end of the meeting, Forest

River told Murphy that he would need to submit “something, anything . . . saying that . . . [he] was

able to return to work” and “wouldn’t harm himself or someone else.” (ECF No. 28, ¶¶ 67, 151).

The company also informed him that he would be placed on FMLA leave while the investigation

continued. Id. ¶ 190.

Besinger then filled out the required designation notice to put Murphy on FMLA leave.

(ECF No. 28-8). The form included boxes for whether Forest River would or would not require

Murphy to provide a fitness-for-duty certification from a healthcare provider verifying that he

could resume work. Id. at 2. Forest River policy requires a certification in all situations where an

employee takes health-related leave,2 but Besinger left both boxes blank. Id. He would later assert

this was an “administrative error.” (ECF No. 26-2, at 18:18–24). Murphy’s FMLA leave began a

few days later. (ECF No. 28-8, at 2).

Four days into his leave, Murphy sent a “Safety Plan” to Forest River’s HR for review.

(ECF No. 26-1, at 87–90). The plan described how Murphy could identify triggers and warning

signs, use coping strategies, contact certain people, and do certain activities to avoid future anger

outbursts. Id. It did not say Murphy was safe to return to work. Id. Lizarazo promptly informed

Murphy that the Safety Plan was likely insufficient, a conclusion Besinger also reached a couple

of weeks later. (ECF No. 26, ¶¶ 78–79). After notifying Murphy of this, Besinger worked to connect

him with professionals who could provide the certification he needed. (ECF Nos. 28-9, 28-15). He

also clarified the request, saying Forest River needed “a healthcare provider to tell us you are not

a threat to yourself or others and that you are able to return to work.” (ECF No. 28-9). Murphy

emailed Besinger over the next week to tell him he attended group therapy and update him on

efforts to schedule other appointments. (ECF Nos. 28-13, 28-15). The parties did not speak again

more than a month. (ECF No. 28, ¶¶ 172–73).

In early September, Besinger emailed Murphy a letter and a questionnaire. (ECF No. 28-

11, at 2–5). The letter notified Murphy that his FMLA leave was about to expire and directed him

to have a healthcare professional fill out the questionnaire within the next five business days. Id.

at 4. The questionnaire asked whether Murphy could safely return to work and, if so, whether he

would only be able to do so with restrictions. Id. at 5. By the time Murphy received this email, he had

already accepted another job. (ECF No. 28, ¶ 86). Even so, he sent a long reply which expressed

2 “If you take leave because of your own serious health condition[,] . . . you are required, as are all employees returning

from other types of medical leave, to provide medical certification that you are fit to resume work. . . . [Y]ou will not

be permitted to resume work until it is provided.” (ECF No. 26-1, at 73).

frustration about being put on leave, accused Forest River of not being clear with him about how

he could return to work, and stated his intention to retain counsel. (ECF No. 28-11, at 1–2).

Besinger respected his wish to seek counsel but noted that they were “in this situation because

[Murphy] threatened to shoot [Forest River’s] IT team in front of multiple witnesses.” Id. at 1.

Besinger wrote Murphy a few weeks later saying that he had still not received the

questionnaire. (ECF No. 28-14). He said Murphy would be fired in one week if he could not

provide the questionnaire and explain why there was a delay. Id. Murphy let the deadline pass,

and he was fired. (ECF No. 26, ¶¶ 87–95).

Murphy then sued Forest River, alleging disparate treatment and failure to accommodate

under the ADA as well as retaliation and interference under the FMLA. (ECF No. 1). Forest River

now moves for summary judgment on all claims. (ECF No. 24).

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if a moving party can demonstrate “that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, evidence must be

viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655–

56 (2014). Put another way, a court will only grant summary judgment “if, on the evidence

presented, no reasonable juror could return a verdict in [the non-moving party's] favor.” Sorensen

v. WD–40 Co., 792 F.3d 712, 722 (7th Cir. 2015).

The Court does not supersede the jury’s role in making credibility determinations and

weighing the evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). This is

especially true in employment discrimination cases, where “issues of intent and credibility are

especially crucial.” Wright v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrs., 204 F.3d 727, 730 (7th Cir. 2000). And of course,

“a court may consider only admissible evidence in assessing a motion for summary judgment.”3

Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d 979, 985 (7th Cir. 2009).

III. Discussion

Murphy argues Forest River is liable for disparate treatment and failure to accommodate

under the ADA. He also asserts Forest River engaged in interference and retaliation in violation of

the FMLA. The Court addresses each claim in turn.

A. Murphy’s ADA Disparate Treatment Claim

To prove his ADA disparate treatment claim, Murphy must show that “(1) he is disabled;

(2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable

accommodation; and (3) the adverse job action was caused by his disability.” Roberts v. City of

Chi., 817 F.3d 561, 565 (7th Cir. 2016). The ADA’s text defines a “disability” as:

(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life

activities of such individual;

(B) a record of such an impairment; or

(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.

42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). An individual is “regarded as having” a disability if they are discriminated

against “because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment” regardless of whether

“the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A).

3 The Court notes this because both sides contest the admissibility of some facts and exhibits on hearsay grounds.

(ECF Nos. 28, 30). Many objections relate to two things: (1) notes of conversations a Forest River HR employee had

with Murphy’s co-workers and (2) purported quotes from various meetings after the incident. Id. The Court believes

it does not need these facts and statements to reach its decision. Accordingly, the Court will not mention statements

alleged to be hearsay unless a basis exists in the record for admitting them that would not pose a hearsay issue. See,

e.g., footnote 1 of this opinion.

Here, the parties dispute whether Murphy is disabled. To suggest he is not, Forest River

points out that Murphy never told them he was disabled, never referenced a disability when

requesting accommodations, and has not claimed to be disabled to either his new employer or the

National Guard. But the record shows Murphy had been diagnosed with major depressive disorder

and anxiety years before the incident. (ECF No. 28-6, at 8–10). He was also on medication for

those conditions. Id. at 10. And although Murphy never explicitly proclaimed himself disabled in

the months of back-and-forth dialogue with Forest River, much of it centered around him going to

therapy, Forest River communicating with his therapist, and Forest River trying to connect him

with a psychologist. (ECF Nos. 28-9, 28-15, 28-16). Given this context, a jury could reasonably

conclude that Forest River knew Murphy was disabled or regarded him to be.

But Murphy’s real or perceived disability is only relevant to his ADA claim if he was still

“otherwise qualified” to do his job and his firing “was caused by his disability.” Roberts, 817 F.3d

at 565 (emphasis added). These two prongs are where the rubber of Murphy’s claim fails to meet

the road.

First, precedent is clear: “threatening other employees disqualifies one” from protection

under the ADA. Palmer v. Cir. Ct. of Cook Cnty., Ill., 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir. 1997). Any rule

to the contrary “would place the employer on a razor’s edge—in jeopardy of violating the Act if it

fired such an employee, yet in jeopardy of being deemed negligent if it retained him and he hurt

someone.” Id. “[R]etention of such an employee would” also “cause justifiable anxiety to

coworkers and supervisors.” Id. at 353. All these concerns laid out in Palmer v. Cir. Ct. of Cook

Cnty., Ill. are relevant to Forest River’s decision to fire Murphy.

While Murphy attempts to distinguish his case from Palmer and its progeny, he does not

do so convincingly. Sure, Palmer and another case Forest River relies on, Felix v. Wis. Dep't of

Transp., 828 F.3d 560 (7th Cir. 2016), both involve more factually extreme scenarios. Palmer

featured an employee who repeatedly targeted a specific supervisor for six months, threatening to

assault and kill her multiple times even after being suspended and transferred to a new location.

117 F.3d at 351–52. And in Felix, an employee with a known and accommodated disability cut herself

in the bathroom and uttered alarming statements that seemed both suicidal and made her co-workers feel

unsafe.4 828 F.3d at 563–64. That employee had to undergo an independent medical examination before

returning to work, and the results indicated she still posed a heightened risk for violence against herself

or her co-workers. Id. at 564–65. But these are distinctions of degree, not substance. Like the plaintiffs

in Palmer and Felix, Murphy threatened his co-workers with violence. He can dispute the intent behind

his statements. He can insist that he was “just blowing off steam.” He cannot change the fact that the

words were said.

Second, the causation element is a “but for” test. This means Murphy must show that Forest

River “would not have fired him but for his actual or perceived disability; proof of mixed motives

will not suffice.” Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010). And

because the Court is ruling on Forest River’s motion for summary judgment, “the ultimate question

. . . is ‘[w]hether a reasonable juror could conclude that [Murphy] would have kept his job if he

[was not disabled], and everything else had remained the same.’” Graham v. Arctic Zone Iceplex,

LLC, 930 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2019) (alterations in original) (quoting Ortiz v. Werner Enters.

Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2016)).

4 Felix’s supervisor recalled hearing her say “[y]ou all hate me ... they all hate you ... everybody hates you” and “[t]hey

think you're crazy ... you all think I'm crazy ... they want to get rid of you.” also said, “I want my insurance ... they

will take your insurance ... don't let them take your insurance ...” Felix, 828 F.3d at 563–64. She also blurted out “I

need to get my money—don't take my money ... they don't trust you ... they steal your money,” “[t]hey're too dull ...

the knives were too dull,” and “God let me die ... I just want to die.” Id. at 564.

On this prong, Murphy argues that his claim should survive summary judgment because

there is a genuine dispute over “whether Forest River genuinely believed Murphy was a threat

requiring termination.” (ECF No. 27, at 10). To press the point, Murphy highlights facts that would

seem to downplay how seriously Forest River perceived his conduct and minimize the threat he

could have practically posed. Id. But this argument does not address the relevant legal issue. The

only inquiry for this Court is whether a reasonable juror could conclude Murphy would have kept

his job but for his real or perceived disability.

Disabled or not, Murphy concedes that his threats of violence gave Forest River grounds

to fire him. (ECF No. 28, ¶¶ 96–97). To think that played no role in Forest River’s decision to

terminate him is inapposite. And because “proof of mixed motives [does] not suffice,” Serwatka

v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d at 962, Murphy would have to establish not only that Forest

River fired him because he was disabled, but that the company did not even consider his

objectively fireable offense when doing so. This Court cannot conceive of a jury that could make

such a finding.

Nor can Murphy effectively argue that Forest River did not actually take the statements made

during his tirade seriously. Murphy owned more than two dozen firearms at the time of his outburst, a

fact well-known by other Forest River employees. (ECF No. 26, ¶¶ 31–34). He even had a gunsmithing

business that he handed out business cards for at the office. Id. ¶¶ 33–34. Of course, Murphy is

entitled to legally own firearms. It also means he had the instruments to carry out his threats. And

Murphy himself concedes that his co-workers had reasons to be concerned about what he said.5 Id.

¶ 45.

5 The Court does not rely on the statements made by Murphy’s co-workers to Forest River HR, which Murphy argues

are hearsay. It only notes Murphy’s admission to this in his own deposition. (ECF No. 26-1, at 23:14–20).

Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Murphy, the Court concludes

he has not presented any genuine dispute of material fact and his ADA disparate treatment claim fails as

a matter of law.

B. Murphy’s ADA Reasonable Accommodation Claim

The Court need not dwell much on Murphy’s failure to accommodate claim. To prevail,

Murphy must show (1) he was a qualified individual with a disability; (2) Forest River was

aware of his disability; and (3) Forest River failed to accommodate his disability reasonably.

Scheidler v. Indiana, 914 F.3d 535, 541 (7th Cir. 2019).

As discussed above, even if Murphy is disabled, he is not a “qualified individual.” He lost

that status when he shouted for his co-workers to be shot. Because he cannot succeed on that prong,

he cannot prove his case even if Forest River was aware of his disability and failed to accommodate

it. 6 Further, Forest River engaged in good faith in the interactive process prescribed by the ADA.

The company spoke with Murphy and Albano. When Forest River rejected Albano’s suggestion

that Murphy work remotely, the company claimed such an arrangement was incompatible with his

job. (ECF No. 26, ¶¶ 68–69). Maybe it was, maybe it was not. Either way, Albano did not say

remote work was necessary to accommodate Murphy’s disability. If that is what she meant, she

could have said so. And if remote work—or anything else for that matter—was necessary to

accommodate Murphy, Forest River gave him three months to have Albano or another healthcare

provider say so. The company even gave him a form for a healthcare provider to fill out where any

work restrictions could be identified. (ECF No. 28-11, at 5).

6 Forest River’s decision not to fire Murphy right away does not work against them. The company’s authority to

terminate Murphy’s employment was not a use-it-or-lose-it proposition when the incident took place. They chose to

investigate first, put him on leave while doing so, and chose to go ahead with letting him go. Even if the Court could

view what happened and glean out a fact pattern where Forest River fired him for being disabled, he was still not a

qualified employee, and Forest River’s original grounds to fire him did not disappear.

At every avenue, Murphy either failed to satisfy a reasonable request from Forest River or

failed to tie accommodation requests to his disability. ADA “regulations envision an interactive

process that requires participation by both parties.” Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d

1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 1996). That process requires “a great deal of communication,” Bultemeyer v.

Fort Wayne Comm. Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir.1996),” and “a party that obstructs or delays

the interactive process is not acting in good faith.” Beck, 75 F.3d at 1135. While Murphy

communicated with Forest River, his messages were not responsive to what the company needed

to return him to work. Forest River solely sought assurance that Murphy could return to work

without being a danger to himself or others. The company tried to facilitate care and streamline

the process of getting that assurance. But despite these efforts, Murphy never did what was asked

of him. Nor did he present any new information to verify his purported need for a work-from-home

accommodation. These failures effectively thwarted the interactive process.

Thus, Murphy’s reasonable accommodation claim also fails.

C. Murphy’s FMLA Claims

Murphy also claims that Forest River violated his FMLA rights, alleging both interference

and retaliation. He argues several actions by Forest River prove his claims, including that Besinger

improperly forced him to take involuntary leave; that the company wrongly refused to reinstate

him; that the company could not require him to provide a fitness-for-duty certification because

Besinger did not check the box for that on his FMLA designation notice; and that the company

retaliated against him by firing him.

1. FMLA Interference

To establish an interference claim, Murphy must show (1) he was eligible for FMLA

protection, (2) the FMLA covered Forest River, (3) he was entitled to FMLA leave, (4) he gave

enough notice of his intent to take leave, and (5) Forest River denied him FMLA benefits he was

entitled to. Burnett v. LFW Inc., 472 F.3d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 2006).

Forest River placed Murphy on FMLA leave on its own accord, so no one disputes that the

first, second, and third prongs are satisfied. For the same reason, the fourth prong is irrelevant.

Thus, Murphy’s entire claim hinges on whether Forest River denied him benefits he was entitled

to. He argues—without citing any supporting caselaw—that involuntarily putting him on leave,

refusing to reinstate him, and requiring a medical certification without having checked the box on

a form each provide him a viable interference claim. None of them do.

In opposing Forest River’s motion for summary judgment, he spilled significant ink

quibbling with one case Forest River cited, Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161 (2d Cir.

2006), and contends no caselaw gave Forest River authority to certify Murphy’s FMLA leave.

Murphy is right that Sista, a Second Circuit case, does not bind the Court. (ECF No. 27, at 23).

Still, the Court agrees with its assertion that the FMLA “says nothing about an employer's ability

to ‘force’ an employee to take such leave, and such forced leave, by itself, does not violate any

right provided by the FMLA.” Sista, 445 F.3d at 175 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611 et seq.). Yet

Murphy still insists that being involuntarily placed on FMLA leave was itself an FMLA violation.

To the contrary, most courts have held that forced FMLA leave does not deny an employee

FMLA benefits unless “the employee’s leave was exhausted before claiming interference.”

McManus v. Saint Mary's Coll., 611 F. Supp. 3d 586, 598 (N.D. Ind. 2020). Murphy exhausted his

leave here, but typically “an involuntary-leave interference claim ripens only when and if the

employee seeks FMLA leave at a later date, and such leave is not available because the employee

was wrongfully forced to use FMLA leave in the past.” see also Huffman v. Speedway LLC, 621

Fed. App'x 792, 797 (6th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations omitted). Murphy does not argue that his

exhaustion created an inability to take more FMLA leave in the future. Rather, he maintains that

the forced leave alone establishes claim. Murphy’s complaint that he was granted benefits, albeit

unwillingly, cannot on its own prove he was denied those benefits.

Murphy was also not entitled to reinstatement. The FMLA provides that an employee

returning from leave “shall be entitled ... to be restored by the employer to the position of

employment held by the employee when the leave commenced” or “an “equivalent position.” 29

U.S.C. §§ 2614(a)(1)(A), (B). But the “right to reinstatement is not absolute.” Goelzer v.

Sheboygan Cnty., Wis., 604 F.3d 987, 993 (7th Cir. 2010); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.216 (“An

employee has no greater right to reinstatement . . . than if the employee had been continuously

employed during the FMLA leave period.”). Rather, “regardless of whether [an employee]

exercised FMLA rights,” they are “not entitled to reinstatement” when they are “discharged for

poor performance or because of disruptive conduct in the workplace.” Felix v. Wisc. Dep’t of

Transp., 104 F. Supp. 3d 945, 958 (E.D. Wisc. 2015). Because Murphy’s threats gave Forest River

grounds to fire him, Forest River’s failure to reinstate him did not deny him FMLA benefits.

Lastly, Murphy argues that if Forest River required Murphy to provide a fitness-for-duty

certification before returning to work, the company would have had to give him notice of that

requirement in writing with his FMLA designation notice.7 On the designation notice itself, there

are two boxes side-by-side, one saying a certification

“will be” required and another saying one “will not be.” (ECF No. 28-8, at 2). Besinger left both

7 See 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(d)(3)–(4) (“If an employer will require the employee to present a fitness-for-duty

certification to be restored to employment, the employer must provide notice of such requirement with the designation

notice. . . . The designation notice must be in writing.”); id. § 825.312(b) (“An employer may seek a fitness-for-duty

certification only with regard to the particular health condition that caused the employee's need for FMLA leave. The

certification from the employee's health care provider must certify that the employee is able to resume work.”); id. §

825.312(d) (“The designation notice required in § 825.300(d) shall advise the employee if the employer will require

a fitness-for-duty certification to return to work.”). In his brief, Murphy only argues that the box on his FMLA

designation notice would have needed to be checked. (ECF No. 27, at 12, 16). Since this opens the door to roughly

the same analysis anyway, the Court construes the argument more broadly in this way.

boxes blank. Id. No other contemporaneous writing laying out fitness-for-duty requirements has

been produced. Although Besinger attributes this omission to “administrative error,” (ECF No. 26,

¶ 72), the Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to Murphy. Thus, the Court

assumes—for the purpose of this opinion—that Forest River failed to provide written notice.

But employers need not provide written notice if their handbook contains leave policies

that clearly specify when fitness-for-duty certifications are required. 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(d)(3).

Forest River had such a policy, and it applied to Murphy, so Forest River only needed to provide

Murphy oral notice of the policy. Id. Murphy insists Forest River only informed him of this

requirement later and that no one ever told him what exactly he needed to provide. To support

these assertions, he points only to Forest River’s failure to check a box on his designation notice,

an email he sent nearly three months into his leave, and cherry-picked deposition excerpts meant

to imply Forest River’s HR employees did not know what they were asking for. (ECF No. 28-8, at

2; No. 28-11, at 2; No. 27, at 16–18). This evidence is scant. More importantly, it fails to mention

Forest River’s request, made the day before putting Murphy on leave, for “something, anything . .

. saying that . . . [he] was able to return to work” and “wouldn’t harm himself or someone else.”

(ECF No. 28, ¶ 67, 151). This, combined with the ensuing months of communications, heavily

suggests he received oral notice.

Even if Forest River failed to comply with the FMLA notice requirements, that only

constitutes interference if Murphy shows “some impairment of his rights and resulting

prejudice.” Barrett. v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrs., 803 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Ragsdale v.

Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 122 (2002)); see Ridings v. Riverside Med. Ctr., 537

F.3d 755, 764 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that an employer’s failure to provide notice did not

constitute interference because it did not prejudice the employee). Murphy cannot make such a

showing. Forest River’s preexisting grounds for firing Murphy already negated his right to

reinstatement. Felix, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 958. And despite Murphy’s accusations that Forest River

kept moving the goalposts, he immediately behaved as if he understood at least roughly what

would satisfy Forest River’s requirements.

The day before being put on leave, Murphy knew Forest River wanted something saying

he was safe to return to work. (ECF No. 28, ¶ 67). Within days of being placed on leave, Murphy

sent his “Safety Plan” to Besinger and Lizarazo for review. (ECF No. 26-1, at 87–90). This sparked

a months-long dialogue, which involved many efforts from Forest River to help Murphy submit

what he needed. After deeming the Safety Plan insufficient, Besinger stated Forest River’s request

more clearly.8 The company offered to connect him with healthcare professionals who could

provide that certification. (ECF Nos. 28-9, 28-15). Forest River even sent Murphy a questionnaire

he could give to a healthcare provider of his choosing, which included questions about whether he

could safely return to work and, if so, whether he could only do so with restrictions. (ECF No. 28-

11, at 5).

Despite more than four months passing after the incident—three of which were spent on

leave— Murphy could not provide this basic assurance. (ECF No. 28, ¶¶ 90–95). He was warned

when his leave would expire and when he would be fired if he did not satisfy Forest River’s

request.9 (ECF No. 28-11, at 4; No. 28-14). Murphy let both deadlines pass, and he was fired. Id.

¶¶ 87–95.

Given the extent of these discussions, Murphy’s behavior, the passage of time, and the

efforts made by Forest River, the Court concludes that a reasonable jury cannot find that Forest

8 “We need a healthcare provider to tell us you are not a threat to yourself or others and that you are able to return to

work. If the provider has concerns about you returning to work, we can discuss what the provider recommends.” (ECF

No. 28-9).

9 Of course, Forest River did not know Murphy had accepted another job. (ECF No. 28, at ¶ 86).

River failed to provide Murphy notice of the certification requirement. And even if one could, that

factual dispute is immaterial because Murphy’s rights were not prejudiced. Accordingly, this too

cannot constitute a claim for FMLA interference.

2. FMLA Retaliation

Murphy’s FMLA retaliation claim also fails. An employee has a retaliation claim if they

can show that their employer fired them or otherwise retaliated against them for exercising FMLA

rights. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2). This can be demonstrated either directly or indirectly. Burnett v.

LFW Inc., 472 F.3d 471, 481–82 (7th Cir. 2006). But because Murphy has identified no other

Forest River employee treated differently in similar circumstances, he must prove his retaliation

claim directly. Id. at 482.

Under the direct method, Murphy must show “(1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2)

his employer took an adverse employment action against him; and (3) there is a causal connection

between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Pagel v. TIN Inc., 695 F.3d

622, 631 (7th Cir. 2012). Murphy took FMLA leave, and Forest River fired him, so the Court’s

only focus is on the causal link. To prove causation, Murphy must show evidence that Forest River

“took materially adverse action against him on account of his protected activity.” Burnett, 472

F.3d at 481. Essentially, Forest River would have to directly admit it fired Murphy for taking

FMLA leave, or Murphy would have to paint “a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence”

allowing this Court to make that inference. Pagel, 695 F.3d at 631; Ridings, 537 F.3d at 771.

Here, Forest River has made so much admission, and Murphy points to no evidence

suggesting he was fired for taking FMLA leave. He only alleges Forest River fired him because of

his disability. (ECF No. 27, at 24–25). In fact, Murphy’s FMLA complaint largely lies in being

forced to use the benefits in the first place. Id. The Court has explained why that does not constitute

interference, and it is impossible to conceive that Murphy was fired for using the benefits he did

not want to take. Thus, like all other claims, Murphy’s retaliation claim fails as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Forest River’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 24) is

GRANTED.

SO ORDERED on September 29, 2025.

s/ Holly A. Brady

CHIEF JUDGE HOLLY A. BRADY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT