The opinion
OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
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The State ex rel. Martines, Appellant, v. Board of Education of
the Cleveland City School District et al., Appellees.
[Cite as State ex rel. Martines v. Cleveland City School Dist.
Bd. of Edn. (1994), Ohio St.3d .]
Mandamus to compel Cleveland City School District Board of
Education to reinstate administrator to his position and
payment of lost wages and benefits -- Writ denied when
R.C. 3319.02(D) does not impose the duty sought to be
compelled, the renewal of the administrator's contract.
(No. 93-1811 -- Submitted June 29, 1994 -- Decided
September 28, 1994.)
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No.
64837.
O'Malley, Lenahan, Gill & Lentz and Mary A. Lentz, for
appellant.
Duvin, Cahn, Barnard & Messerman, Kenneth B. Stark and
George S. Crisci, for appellees.
Per Curiam. Francis S. Martines, appellant, sought a writ
of mandamus against the Cleveland City School District Board of
Education and to members, appellees, to compel his
reinstatement as an administrator and payment of his lost wages
and benefits. The Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County granted
the board's motion to dismiss his complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to
Civ.R. 12(B)(6).
For a writ of mandamus to issue, Martines must establish
(1) a clear legal right to the relief he seeks, (2) the board's
corresponding duty to perform as requested, and (3) the absence
of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State
ex rel. Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers
Internatl. Union, Local 333, AFL-CIO, CLC v. State Emp.
Relations Bd. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 157, 158, 609 N.E.2d 1266,
1267. A complaint is dismissable for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted when the material factual
allegations are taken as admitted and all reasonable inferences
are drawn in his favor, but it still appears beyond doubt from
the complaint that the plaintiff cannot prove facts entitling
him to recovery. O'Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union,
Inc. (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 71 O.O.2d 223, 327 N.E.2d 753.
In granting the motion to dismiss, the court of appeals
accepted as true the allegations that Martines began working
for the board of education in 1960 and that he became the
Director of School Based Management in November 1983. The
court noted that he did not allege that the board had failed to
timely advise him of its decision not to renew his contract for
the 1992-1993 school year. The court also accepted as true
Martines's representation that the board had not complied with
the evaluation and hearing requirements of R.C. 3319.02(D).1
However, it found that Martines had not stated a cognizable
claim for a writ of mandamus because R.C. 3319.02(D) does not
impose the duty he sought to compel -- in essence, the renewal
of his adminstrator's contract.
We agree. Recently, in State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton
City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 217, 631
N.E.2d 150, we rejected part of the argument Martines asserts
here -- that a board of education's failure to observe the
evaluation requirements of R.C. 3319.02(D) voided its decision
not to renew an administrator's contract. We explained:
"Although R.C. 3319.02(D) mandates the evaluation
procedure, it provides no remedy of reemployment for failure on
the part of the board to comply with that procedure. Indeed,
R.C. 3319.02(C) deems an administrator reemployed by operation
of law only if a timely written notice of the board's intention
not to reemploy is not given. By contrast, * * * R.C. 3319.11
specifically provides that a board's failure to comply with the
teacher evaluation requirements of R.C. 3319.111 results in
reemployment of the teacher. In other words, if the General
Assembly had intended that board compliance with the
administrative evaluation provisions of R.C. 3319.02(D) be a
prerequisite to a valid board decision not to renew an
administrative contract, it would have so provided, as it did
in R.C. 3319.11 for teachers' contracts."
"Furthermore, R.C. 3319.02(D) expressly states that
'[n]othing in this section shall prevent a board of education
from making the final determination regarding the renewal of or
failure to renew the contract of any assistant superintendent,
principal, assistant principal, or other administrator.' This
manifestly indicates that noncompliance with any or all of the
R.C. 3319.02(D) evaluation procedures does not invalidate a
board's action not to renew an administrative contract. * *
*." Id. at 222, 631 N.E.2d at 154.
Martines also argues that multiple violations of the
duties imposed by R.C. 3319.02(D), i.e., noncompliance with the
evaluation and hearing requirements of the statutes, confers a
right to contract renewal. He relies on our discussion in
State ex rel. Smith v. Etheridge (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 501, 605
N.E.2d 59, which states:
"While the * * * statutory language requires the board to
consider the administrator's evaluation, it does not require
the board to base its decision on such evaluations. * * *
[T]he * * * language indicates that even if a board did not
consider an administrator's evaluation in voting to nonrenew a
contract, such failure does not by itself undermine a board's
decision to nonrenew an administrative contract." (Emphasis
added.) Id. at 508, 605 N.E.2d at 64-65.
The administrator in Cassels made a similar argument,
asserting that violation of the evaluation requirements, plus
prejudice, is enough to cause contract renewal. We disagreed,
stating:
"[T]he State ex rel. Smith language should be interpreted
to mean that a failure to comply with the R.C. 3319.02(D)
evaluation procedures will not invalidate a board's action not
to renew an administrative contract. This result comports with
the language of R.C. 3319.02(C) and (D). But, cf., State v.
Arnold (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 175, 178, 573 N.E.2d 1079, 1082
(it is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that a statute
shall be construed, if practicable, [so] as to give some effect
to every part of it). Since [the administrator] never alleged
anything in addition to the failure of [the board] to comply
with R.C. 3319.02(D) and readily admitted that she was sent
timely notice of nonrenewal pursuant to R.C. 3319.02(C), she
was, as a matter of law, not entitled to a writ of mandamus to
compel her reemployment as * * * [an administrator]. In short,
she has demonstrated neither a clear legal right to renewal of
her * * * [administrative] contract, nor a corresponding clear
legal duty on the part of * * * [the board] to provide it."
Id., 69 Ohio St.3d at 222, 631 N.E.2d at 154.
Cassels establishes that, as between violations of R.C.
3319.02(C) and (D), only the failure to provide timely written
notice of a board of education's intention not to renew an
administrator's contract will require the remedy for which
Martines asks -- a writ of mandamus to compel contract renewal,
including reinstatement, back pay and benefits. Conversely,
noncompliance with other requirements in those subsections, to
the extent such requirements are not expressly linked to
contract renewal, is not a basis for this relief. Accordingly,
the court of appeals correctly dismissed Martines's complaint
on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.
Judgment affirmed.
Moyer, C.J., A.W. Sweeney, Wright and Pfeifer, JJ., concur.
Douglas, Resnick and F.E. Sweeney, JJ., dissent.
FOOTNOTE
1 R.C. 3319.02(D) states:
"Each board of education shall adopt procedures for the
evaluation of all assistant superintendents, principals,
assistant principals, and other administrators and shall
evaluate such employees in accordance with those procedures.
The evaluation based upon such procedures shall be considered
by the board in deciding whether to renew the contract of
employment of an assistant superintendent, principal, assistant
principal, or other administrator. The evaluation shall
measure each assistant superintendent's, principal's, assistant
principal's, and other administrator's effectiveness in
performing the duties included in his job description and the
evaluation procedures shall provide for, but not be limited to,
the following:
"(1) Each assistant superintendent, principal, assistant
principal, and other administrator shall be evaluated annually
through a written evaluation process.
"(2) The evaluation shall be conducted by the
superintendent or his designee.
"(3) In order to provide time to show progress in
correcting the deficiencies identified in the evaluation
process the completed evaluation shall be received by the
evaluatee at least sixty days prior to any action by the board
of education on the employee's contract of employment.
" * * *
"Before taking action to renew or nonrenew the contract of
an assistant superintendent, principal, assistant principal, or
other administrator under this section and prior to the last
day of March of the year in which such employee's contract
expires, the board of education shall notify each such employee
of the date that his contract expires and that he may request a
meeting with the board. Upon request by such an employee, the
board shall grant the employee a meeting in executive session
to discuss the reasons for considering renewal or nonrenewal of
his contract."
Douglas, J., dissenting. I respectfully dissent. In
deciding as the majority does in today's opinion (and as we did
in State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of
Edn. [1994], 69 Ohio St.3d 217, 631 N.E.2d 150), we render
meaningless the following language of R.C. 3319.02(D):
"(1) Each assistant superintendent, principal, assistant
principal, and other administrator shall be evaluated annually
through a written evaluation process.
"(2) The evaluation shall be conducted by the
superintendent or his designee.
"(3) In order to provide time to show progress in
correcting the deficiencies identified in the evaluation
process the completed evaluation shall be received by the
evaluatee at least sixty days prior to any action by the board
of education on the employee's contract of employment."
(Emphasis added.)
The clear language found in R.C. 3319.02(D)(3) makes
evaluation a condition precedent to any action by a board of
education on an affected employee's contract. Today's decision
does not give efficacy to the language of the statute.
Did the General Assembly really intend that this language
could be ignored with impunity?
Resnick and F.E. Sweeney, JJ., concur in the foregoing
dissenting opinion.