United States v. Raleigh Jackson

USCA11 Case: 25-10990 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 09/30/2025 Page: 1 of 6

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 25-10990

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RALEIGH JACKSON,

a.k.a. Raleigh McCranny,

a.k.a. Pokey,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:03-cr-00081-TWT-LTW-1

____________________

Before BRANCH, LAGOA, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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2 Opinion of the Court 25-10990

Raleigh Jackson, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals

the denial of his second motion for compassionate release under 18

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The government moves for summary affir-

mance. We grant the government’s motion and affirm.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

In 2003, Jackson pleaded guilty to several counts stemming

from bank robberies he committed in 2002 and 2003: two counts

of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), four counts of

armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), (d), and

one count of possessing a firearm during the commission of a

crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(C)(1)(a)(ii). At the time of the

offenses, Jackson was on federal supervised release for the armed

robbery of a postal employee. Jackson was sentenced to 400

months’ imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised re-

lease.

In 2021, Jackson filed a motion for compassionate release un-

der 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Jackson argued that certain medical

conditions, together with the risks posed by COVID-19, consti-

tuted extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduc-

tion, and that he had been rehabilitated. The Government op-

posed the motion noting, among other things, Jackson’s extensive

criminal history and continued “defiant behavior as shown by two

2020 altercations in his disciplinary history.” The district court de-

nied the motion, finding that Jackson had not shown an extraordi-

nary and compelling reason for release, and even if he did, he posed

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22-14340 Opinion of the Court 3

a danger to the community under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) and the §

3553(a) factors weighed against his release.

Three years later, Jackson filed his second motion for com-

passionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). There, Jackson

argued that extraordinary and compelling reasons warranted a sen-

tence reduction for two reasons. First, citing United States v.

Cochran, 2018 WL 1709506 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2018), Jackson claimed

he was no longer a career offender, so his sentence would be sub-

stantially lower today under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6). Second, un-

der U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5), Jackson argued his age, medical cir-

cumstances, and rehabilitation were “other reasons” to establish an

extraordinary and compelling reasons for release. The Govern-

ment again opposed. The district court denied Jackson’s second

motion for compassionate release, finding that he failed to show:

(1) an extraordinary and compelling reason for release under

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6); 1 (2) that he was not a danger to the com-

munity; and (3) that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors supported a sen-

tence reduction considering, among other things, Jackson’s “far

from spotless” criminal history.

1 On appeal, Jackson does not challenge the district court’s finding that he still

qualifies as a career offender under our decision in United States v. Brooks. 112

F.4th 937, 945 (11th Cir. 2024) (holding that a conviction for robbery by use of

force is a crime of violence). Although this Court will “liberally construe pro

se pleadings,” holding them to “less stringent standards” than to those formally

drafted by lawyers, we cannot “rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading to sus-

tain an action.” Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d 903, 911 (11th Cir. 2020). Jack-

son has therefore abandoned that argument.

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4 Opinion of the Court 25-10990

Jackson appealed and the Government has moved for sum-

mary affirmance.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a sen-

tence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).” United States v.

Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021). “After eligibility is es-

tablished, we review a district court’s denial of a prisoner’s

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for abuse of discretion.” Id. “A district

court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard,

follows improper procedures in making its determination, or

makes clearly erroneous factual findings.” Id.

Summary disposition is appropriate where time is of the es-

sence, including “situations where important public policy issues

are involved or those where rights delayed are rights denied,”

where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter

of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the out-

come of the case, or where . . . the appeal is frivolous.” Groendyke

Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). 2

III. ANALYSIS

Jackson argues first that the district court violated his rights,

and our decision in Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 936 (11th Cir. 1992)

(en banc), by failing to address the merits of his claim that an ex-

traordinary and compelling reason for release existed under

2 Groendyke Transportation is binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit under

Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

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22-14340 Opinion of the Court 5

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5). He also argues that the district court erred

by relying on the 2018 version of the § 1B1.13 policy statement to

find that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors disfavor a sentence reduc-

tion and that he remains a danger to the community. Jackson’s

arguments lack merit.

A district court may grant a sentence reduction under 18

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) if: (1) an extraordinary and compelling rea-

son exist for doing so; (2) a sentencing reduction would be con-

sistent with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; and (3) the § 3553(a) factors weigh

in favor of a sentence reduction. United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th

1234, 1237-38 (11th Cir. 2021). These factors may be considered in

any order, but where the district court finds even one lacking, it

need go no further. See id.

The § 1B1.13 policy statement maintains that a defendant’s

sentence may be reduced if extraordinary and compelling reasons

warrant the reduction, the defendant is not a danger to the safety

of any other person or to the community as provided in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3142(g), and the court considers the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a). In 2023, the Sentencing Commission

amended § 1B1.13, adding to the new subsection (a) that a motion

for reduction in a prison term may be brought by a defendant, and

adding subsections (b)–(e). Compare U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (2018), with

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (2023).

Summary affirmance is appropriate here. See Groendyke

Transp., 406 F.2d at 1162. To start, even if we were to “liberally

construe” Jackson’s briefing as challenging the district court’s

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6 Opinion of the Court 25-10990

findings on dangerousness or the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a), see Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d 903, 911 (11th Cir.

2020), we see no abuse of discretion given the violent nature of

Jackson’s crimes, his disciplinary history, and his several probation

violations. Nor did the district court, as Jackson contends, rely on

the outdated § 1B1.13 policy statement, and even if it had, the 2023

amendment did not affect the provisions regarding Jackon’s danger

to the community or the weighing of the § 3553(a) factors. Compare

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (2018), with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (2023).

Jackson’s remaining arguments fare no better. First, our de-

cision in Clisby offers him no help, as it applies only in habeas pro-

ceedings. See Rhode v. United States, 583 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir.

2009). Second, the district court was not required to address Jack-

son’s argument under § 1B1.13(b)(5). Having found that Jackson

remained a danger to the community or that the § 3553(a) factors

disfavored a reduction, “compassionate release was foreclosed.”

See Giron, 15 F.4th at 1350.

Because the government’s position is “clearly right as a mat-

ter of law,” we GRANT the government’s motion for summary af-

firmance. Groendyke Transp., Inc., 406 F.2d at 1162.

AFFIRMED.