Felton v. Hill

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHREVEPORT DIVISION

JAMINE FELTON CASE NO. 5:23-CV-00293

VERSUS JUDGE EDWARDS

LAJOEY HILL ET AL MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM RULING AND ORDER

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Doc. 67) filed by

defendants, LaJoey Hill (“Hill”) and the State of Louisiana through the Louisiana

Department of Public Safety and Corrections (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff

Jamine Felton (“Plaintiff” or “Felton”) opposes the motion (R. Doc. 76).

After reviewing the applicable law and memoranda, the Defendants’ motion is

DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On November 15, 2021, Plaintiff was housed as an inmate at David Wade

Correctional Center (“DWCC”) in Homer, Louisiana. According to Plaintiff, he called

out to Hill from his cell and requested to see mental health services. In response, Hill

allegedly threatened him by saying, “you keep asking for mental health, I’m going to

give you a reason to talk to him.”1 Hill then placed Plaintiff in cuffs and directed

Plaintiff to proceed to the back of the cell, face the wall, and kneel. Plaintiff alleges

that once he was on his knees, Hill used his hand radio to strike Plaintiff in the back

1 Doc. 76-1, p.15.

of the head two times causing him to bleed “all over the place.”2 Hill pressed an

unknown substance into his wounds to worsen the pain. While this was happening,

Hill repeatedly told Plaintiff to “stop banging your head to the wall.”3 Plaintiff was

brought to DWCC’s medical staff for evaluation. Plaintiff’s head injury ultimately

required stitches and he was placed on suicide watch following the incident.4

Defendants deny the events described by Plaintiff. Defendants point to the

affidavits of Hill and Master Sergeant Demarcus Warren (“Warren”), a purported

eyewitness, to support their version of events. In his affidavit, Hill explains that while

doing his rounds, he observed Plaintiff’s bed sheets bundled in such a way that

indicated to him that Plaintiff may be concealing something in his cell.5 Hill decided

to search Plaintiff’s cell, with Warren’s assistance. After refusing repeated orders to

come to the cell door to be restrained before the search, Plaintiff finally approached

the cell door to be handcuffed. After Plaintiff was cuffed, Hill instructed him to get on

his knees so that leg restraints could be applied. It was at this time that Plaintiff

shouted, “I got y’all now,” and proceeded to “bang his head” against the wall.6 Hill

asserts he never hit Plaintiff, and he never applied any substance to Plaintiff’s head.

Warren supports Hill’s version of events.7 Warren also asserts that Hill repeatedly

ordered Plaintiff to stop banging his head against the wall and eventually Plaintiff

stopped.8

2 Doc. 76-1, p. 15.

3 Doc. 76-1, p. 16.

4 Doc. 76-1, p. 21.

5 Doc. 67-5, p. 2.

6 Doc. 67-5, p. 2.

7 Doc. 67-6.

8 Doc. 67-6, 2.

This § 1983 civil rights suit followed.9 Defendants filed the instant Motion for

Summary and aver that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by qualified immunity.

II. LAW

Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows “that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.”10 “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit

under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”11

“A dispute is genuine if the summary judgment evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”12 In evaluating a motion for

summary judgment, the court “may not make credibility determinations or weigh the

evidence” and “must resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible inferences in

favor of the non-moving party.”13

“[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility

of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those

portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of

a genuine issue of material fact.”14 “The moving party may meet its burden to

9 Doc. 1-2.

10 Fed. R. Civ. P 56(a).

11 Hyatt v. Thomas, 843 F.3d 172, 177 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the

outcome of the lawsuit under applicable law in the case.”

12 Id. (internal quotations omitted).

13 Total E&P UDS Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corp., 719 F.3d 424, 434 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal

citations omitted).

14 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247).

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact by pointing out that the

record contains no support for the non-moving party's claim.”15 Thereafter, if the non-

movant is unable to identify anything in the record to support its claim, summary

judgment is appropriate.16

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that: “Every person who, under color of [law] . . .

subjects . . . any . . . person . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured

. . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Importantly, “§ 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights,

but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.”17

Here, Felton contends that the acts of Defendants violated his rights guaranteed by

the Fourth and/or Eighth Amendments.18

Cutting against recovery under § 1983, however, is the law of Harlow:

“[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded

from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.”19 This is more commonly known as the doctrine of “qualified

immunity.”20 Accordingly, “officers are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983

unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the

15 Stahl v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 263 (5th Cir. 2002).

16 Id. See also Hamilton v. Segue Software, Inc. 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2000). The opposing party

must show, with significant probative evidence, that a genuine issue of material fact exists to rebut a

properly supported motion for summary judgment.

17 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (cleaned up) (emphasis added).

18 Doc. 1-2, p. 8.

19 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (citations omitted).

20 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524 (1985).

unlawfulness of their conduct was “clearly established at the time.”21 The two steps

of the qualified immunity inquiry may be performed in any order.22

When a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the

plaintiff to demonstrate that the defense does not apply.23 Even in this context,

however, the allegations “must be taken in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff.24

“To prevail on an excessive force claim, a plaintiff must show (1) an injury that

(2) resulted directly and only from the use of force that was excessive to the need and

that (3) the force used was objectively unreasonable.”25 Excessive force claims are

necessarily fact-intensive; whether the force used is “excessive” or “unreasonable”

depends on “the facts and circumstances of each particular case.”26

III. ANALYSIS

1. Excessive Force Claim against Hill

Defendants bear the burden of demonstrating to the Court that the record is

free from a genuine issue of material fact; they do not meet this burden. Importantly,

Plaintiff disputes that his injuries were self-inflicted and asserts that they were

caused by Hill. The credibility of the witnesses necessarily must be weighed

considering the contradicting versions of events from the Plaintiff and Defendants.

These credibility determinations are not proper in deciding a motion for summary

21 D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018) (citing Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)).

22 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)).

23 Cantrell v. City of Murphy, 666 F.3d 911, 918 (5th Cir. 2012).

24 Anderson v. Valdez, 845 F.3d 580, 600 (5th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up).

25 Sam v. Richard, 887 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Windham v. Harris Cnty., 875 F.3d 229, 242 (5th Cir.

2017) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

26 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); see also Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (observing

that this “area is one in which the result depends very much on the facts of each case.”).

judgment. Further, the Court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all

permissible inferences in favor of Plaintiff. Taking the Plaintiff's allegations as true,

that he was repeatedly struck in the back of the head by Hill with a hand-radio after

being restrained and in a kneeling position, a reasonable fact finder could return a

verdict in his favor on his excessive force claim against Hill.

2. Claims against the State of Louisiana through the Department of Public

Safety and Corrections

Defendants assert that Plaintiff cannot bring a claim under § 1983 against the

Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“DOC”) because is it not a “person” for

the purposes of § 1983 liability and is otherwise entitled to qualified immunity to

Plaintiff's excessive force claims.2’7 Plaintiff responds that he has not asserted any

constitutional claims against DOC.?8 The Court agrees with Plaintiff. A review of

Plaintiffs allegations confirm that the only claims made against DOC are based on

vicarious liability as Hill’s employer for Plaintiffs tort claims. Accordingly, there is

no § 1983 claim against DOC to dismiss.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Doc.

67) is DENIED.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers this 29th day of September 2025.

won Laer dn

JYVPGEQUBRRY EDWARDSVIR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

28 Doc. 76, p. 7.