The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION
KIMBERLY D MALONE CASE NO. 3:21-CV-03882
VERSUS JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY
LOUIS DEJOY MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D.
MCCLUSKY
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 42]
filed by Defendant Louis DeJoy (“DeJoy” or “Defendant”), in his official capacity as
the Postmaster General of the United States. Plaintiff Kimberly Malone (“Malone” or
“Plaintiff”) filed an Opposition [Doc. No. 44]. Defendant filed a Reply [Doc. No. 47].
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a Caucasian female, was employed by the United States Postal
Service (“USPS”) for a total of twenty-six years, which were mostly served in
Mississippi.1 The date and location subject to the present claim began around April
13, 2020, through July 27, 2020, in Monroe, Louisiana.2 During Plaintiff’s brief time
1 [Doc. No. 3, p. 2].
2 [Doc. No.13-4, pp. 1–2].
spent at the Monroe location, Sharon Williams (“Williams”) served as Postmaster.3
Despite being Postmaster, Williams was not responsible for hiring clerk assistants.4
During the time of the COVID-19 pandemic (“COVID-19”), the USPS office in
Monroe had a special need for a temporary worker due to the increased absences of
employees under the “liberal leave policies.”5 The temporary position was titled
“Clerk Assistant (E6-07),”6 and Plaintiff was the only temporary Clerk Assistant
hired at the Monroe location.7 The job description stated that the “position [was] to
be used for temporary support employees for the purpose of COVID-19 work during
the exception period only.”8 Specifically, it was agreed that the temporary
appointment was to end on May 25, 2020.9 Although the extension was not
guaranteed, William Waldroup (“Waldroup”),” who was also a Caucasian and
supervisor to Plaintiff during her tenure at USPS, informed Plaintiff that her
appointment was extended to September 25, 2020.10
Despite the temporary extension, Plaintiff’s position was relieved on July 27,
2020, because the Monroe Post Office was “overbudget on allotted hours by two
employees” and because employees were returning to work from the pandemic.11
Although it is alleged that a “work needed” advertisement was placed on a public site
3 [Id. at p. 4].
4 [Id.]
5 [Id.].
6 [Id. at p. 3].
7 [Id. at p. 4].
8 [Id.]
9 [Id. at p. 1].
10 [Id. at p. 2]; [Doc. No. 19-6, p. 76].
11 [Doc. No. 13-4, p. 5]
after Plaintiff’s termination, no records show that any person was hired to replace
Plaintiff’s temporary position.12
During Plaintiff’s brief tenure with the USPS, she was tasked with separating
packages by throwing parcels into particular carts.13 Plaintiff alleges that one
morning when throwing packages, a co-employee named Vince Howard (“Howard”)
told a “vulgar story.”14 Plaintiff does not claim that the story involved race or anything
of that nature.15 Plaintiff did not report it to management.16 On June 4, 2020, Plaintiff
alleged Howard was throwing packages at her, but she did not report it to
management because she felt that Williams did not have a friendly demeanor about
her.17 Plaintiff allegedly spoke to Royce Randall Reppond (“Reppond” ), a store
steward, about Howard throwing packages in passing, yet Reppond could not recall
such conversation.18 However, Reppond admitted that Howard did have anger
management issues.19 Plaintiff stated in her deposition that, despite the alleged
conversation, she never told Reppond that Howard was throwing packages at her
because of her race.20 Thereafter, Plaintiff alleged that Howard stated “all white
people needed to get out of that office and Plaintiff had white privilege.”21 Again,
Plaintiff did not report this statement to management.22 Plaintiff also alleges Ms.
12 [Id.]; [Doc. No. 19-4, p. 21]
13 [Doc. No. 19-5, p. 5].
14 [Id. at p. 10].
15 [Doc. No. 19-5, p. 10].
16 [Id.]
17 [Id. at pp. 21, 25].
18 [Doc. No. 19-9, p. 8].
19 [Id. at p. 11].
20 [Doc. No. 19-5, p. 23].
21 [Doc. No. 3, p. 3].
22 [Doc. No. 19-5 p. 10].
Jackson (“Jackson”),23 an African American female, made derogatory comments and
threatened to slash Plaintiff’s tires.24 Plaintiff alerted her supervisor, Waldroup, of
the racially motivated remarks made by coworkers made between April 20 to July 18,
2020.25
Although Plaintiff alleges Waldroup and she “had discussed race and problems
here before,”26 Plaintiff sent a text message to Waldroup on July 14th, 2020, stating
she “had enough of Vince buzzing packages over [her] head,” but did not disclose any
racial issue therein.27 On July 18th, 2020, Plaintiff texted Waldroup to complain
about harassment from Jackson and about the Post Office being a “hostile work
environment.”28 She remarks to Waldroup that she wished he wouldn’t bring up “the
race problems” because of Jackson’s feelings towards her, saying she did not want to
work with Jackson.29 On July 19th, 2020, Plaintiff texted Waldroup to verify that she
was removed from the work schedule according to “the [P]ostmaster[’]s instructions
to [him].”30 Her text details she spoke on the phone with Waldroup earlier that day
to discuss her refusal to work at the Post Office without a supervisor present and how
she brought to “[Waldroup] & the [P]ostmaster[’]s attention the numerous USPS
23 It is ambiguous as to the proper spelling of the first name. In Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’
Alleged Undisputed Facts [Doc. No. 19-2], the name is spelled “Shannon.” In Plaintiff’s Complaint
[Doc. No. 3, p. 4], the name is spelled Chimere. In Plaintiff’s deposition, the name was spelled Shemear
[Doc. No. 19-5, p. 2].
24 [Doc. No. 3, p. 4].
25 [Doc. No. 38-1, p. 4].
26 [Doc. No 19-6, pp. 16, 10]
27 [Doc. No. 39-2, p. 23]; [Doc. No. 19-5, p. 23].
28 [Doc. No. 39-2, pp. 24–26].
29 [Id.].
30 [Doc. No. 39-2, p. 28].
policy violations, the harassment [she’s] receiving & the hostile work environment.”31
Waldroup responded to Plaintiff’s messages less than two hours later on Sunday, July
19th at 8:31 PM to confirm she would not be on the schedule.32
On or around July 27, 2020, Plaintiff filed a formal complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).33 Plaintiff brought a claim for
racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Plaintiff alleged
Defendant discriminated against her based on her race and that she was subject to a
racially hostile work environment. After complaining of such, Plaintiff alleged that
Defendant retaliated against her. Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment34
on July 6, 2023, arguing that Plaintiff does not have probative evidence in
establishing a racial discrimination or hostile work environment claim and cannot
show that she was discharged in retaliation for making a complaint of discrimination.
The Court granted Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment regarding the racial
discrimination and racially hostile work environment claims, but denied the
retaliation claim.35 Defendant filed this instant motion on June 5, 2025, arguing that
Plaintiff cannot show that termination of her temporary position with USPS was
motivated by retaliation for her filing of an EEO complaint because no relevant
individual knew of Plaintiff’s protected activity prior to her termination.36
The issue has been briefed, and the Court is prepared to rule.
31 [Doc. No. 39-2, p. 28].
32 [Id. at p. 29].
33 [Doc. No. 3, p. 5].
34 [Doc. No. 13]
35 [Id.].
36 [Doc. No. 42-1 p. 7].
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence before a court shows
“that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of
its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the lawsuit under applicable
law in the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute
about a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder
could render a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
“[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility
of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those
portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of
a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)
(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247). “The moving party may meet its burden to
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact by pointing out that the
record contains no support for the non-moving party’s claim.” Stahl v. Novartis
Pharm. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 263 (5th Cir. 2002). Thereafter, if the non-movant is
unable to identify anything in the record to support its claim, summary judgment is
appropriate. Id. “The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider
other materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, courts “may not make
credibility determinations or weigh the evidence” and “must resolve all ambiguities
and draw all permissible inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Total E & P
USA Inc. v. Kerr–McGee Oil and Gas Corp., 719 F.3d 424, 434 (5th Cir. 2013)
(citations omitted). While courts will “resolve factual controversies in favor of the
nonmoving party,” an actual controversy exists only “when both parties have
submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little v. Liquid Air. Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,
1075 (5th Cir. 1994). To rebut a properly supported motion for summary judgment,
the opposing party must show, with “significant probative evidence,” that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. Hamilton v. Segue Software, Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th
Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). “‘If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not
significantly probative,’ summary judgment is appropriate.” Cutting Underwater
Tech. USA, Inc. v. Eni U.S. Operating Co., 671 F.3d 512, 517 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
Relatedly, there can be no genuine dispute as to a material fact when a party
fails “to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23. This is true “since a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all
other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323.
B. Analysis
1. Retaliation
Title VII “prohibits an employer from discriminating against an
employee … because that individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in a Title VII proceeding or investigation.” Ladner v. Walmart, 834 F.
App’x. 893, 895–96 (5th Cir. 2020). The two categories of protected activity under
Title VII are: “1) opposition to any practice rendered unlawful by Title VII
(“opposition clause”), and 2) making a charge, testifying, assisting, or participating in
any investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII (“participation clause”).”
Rodrigue v. PTS Mgmt. Grp., LLC, 550 F. Supp. 3d 376, 400 (W.D. La. 2021). Where
the retaliation claim is “based on circumstantial evidence, we apply the McDonnell
Douglas framework.” Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 969 F.3d 571, 577 (5th Cir.
2020); see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973). McDonnell
Douglas provides a three-step framework for analyzing retaliation claims. First, the
Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation. Brown, 969 F.3d
at 577. Second, if the Plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the Defendant to produce a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse
employment action. Id. Finally, if the Defendant makes this showing, the burden
shifts back to the Plaintiff to prove that the proffered reason was pretext for unlawful
retaliation. Id. To survive a motion for summary judgment, the Plaintiff must
demonstrate “a conflict in substantial evidence on the question of whether the
employer would not have taken the adverse employment action but for the protected
activity.” Id. (internal quotations omitted); see Univ. of Tex. Southwestern Med. Ctr.
v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013).
a. Prima Facie Case of Retaliation.
An employee establishes a prima facie case for unlawful retaliation by proving:
(1) that she engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) that an adverse employment
action occurred; and (3) that a causal link existed between the protected activity and
the adverse employment action. Rayborn v. Bossier Parish School Board., 881 F.3d
409, 415 (5th Cir. 2018).
i. Plaintiff Engaged in Protected Activity.
Plaintiff argues her retaliation claim is not limited to the EEO filing and
should include her internal complaints made to her supervisor, Waldroup, prior to
her termination.37 Defendant asserts Plaintiff’s Title VII claim is limited to
retaliation for the protected activity of filing her EEO complaint.38 The Court agrees
with the Plaintiff that she engaged in protected activity when she complained to her
supervisor on July 18, 2020, and when she filed her EEO complaint on July 27, 2020.
1. Internal Complaints to Waldroup
When an employee makes a vague complaint, without referring to an unlawful
employment practice under Title VII, the complaint does not constitute protected
activity. Harris-Childs v. Medco Health Solutions, Inc., 169 F. App’x. 913, 916 (5th
Cir. 2006). The Fifth Circuit held in Harris-Childs that the plaintiff had not engaged
in protected activity when she complained to management about unfair treatment
and harassment because she did not specifically mention race or sex in her
37 [Doc. No. 44, p. 1].
38 [Doc. No. 47, p. 1].
complaints. Id. As plaintiff did not specifically complain of racial or sexual
harassment, she failed to “put her employer on notice that her complaint was based
on racial or sexual discrimination.” Id. Moreover, general allegations of hostility are
not enough, an employee must at least refer to conduct that could be plausibly
considered discriminatory in intent or effect to be sufficiently able to alert the
employer of its discriminatory practices. Saketkoo v. Administrators of the Tulane
Education Fund, 31 F.4th 990, 1000 (5th Cir. 2022).
In the present case, Defendant alleges Waldroup was not aware of racial issues
within the post office39, but Waldroup’s EEO Investigative Affidavit answers show
Malone told him of “some racial remarks that were made” by coworkers at the post
office between April 20, 2020 to July 18, 2020.40 Specifically, Plaintiff notified
Waldroup of derogatory comments made by Jackson to Plaintiff on July 14, 2020.41
When questioned by Waldroup, Jackson stated Plaintiff was lying.42 Waldroup
informed Williams about Plaintiff’s complaints about racial comments made to her.43
While the Affidavit inquires about what policies or practices management followed
regarding the handling of Plaintiff’s complaint, Waldroup answers that “the
Postmaster spoke with the employees allegedly involved,”44 but Postmaster Williams
39 [Doc. No. 13-4, p. 10].
40 [Doc. No. 38-1, p. 4].
41 [Id. at p. 5].
42 [Id.].
43 [Id.].
44 [Id. at p. 6].
stated in her affidavit that she did not conduct an investigation into [Malone’s]
allegations of harassment/hostile work environment.45
On July 18th, 2020, Plaintiff sent a text to Waldroup complaining how
Jackson’s harassment of her had created a “hostile work environment” at the post
office.46 She goes on to say while she asked Waldroup to not address the “race
problems” with Jackson, Plaintiff was later subjected to harassment by Jackson, with
the coworker warning others to not discuss “anything about race” because Plaintiff
was a “snitch.”47 While Waldroup testifies he did not ask Plaintiff what she meant by
“racial problems” in her text message from July 18th, 2020,48 Plaintiff maintains
Waldroup “knew there were racial issues” and she would tell Waldroup she was being
discriminated against because she was white.49 Waldroup recalls talking to Williams
after receiving the text messages on July 18th, 2020, and was told by Williams to “put
[Malone] off the schedule” after Plaintiff complained.50
On July 19th, 2020, Plaintiff texted Waldroup at 6:49 PM to verify that she
was removed from the schedule according to “the [P]ostmaster[’]s instructions to
[him].”51 She detailed in the text message that she spoke on the phone with Waldroup
earlier that day to discuss her refusal to work at the Post Office without a supervisor
present and how she has brought to “[Waldroup] & the [P]ostmaster[’]s attention the
45 [Doc. No. 45-2, p. 5].
46 [Doc. No. 19-8, p. 28].
47 [Id. at pp. 28–30.].
48 [Doc. No. 19-8, pp. 11–12].
49 [Doc. No. 19-6, pp. 10–11].
50 [Doc. No. 19-8, p. 13].
51 [Doc. No. 39-2, p. 28].
numerous USPS policy violations, the harassment [she’s] receiving & the hostile work
environment.”52 Waldroup responded to Malone’s messages less than two hours later
on Sunday, July 19th at 8:31 PM to confirm she would not be on the schedule and
that there would not be a supervisor at 2:00 AM when she was scheduled.53
Plaintiff’s text message complaint on July 18th, 2020, to Waldroup, her
supervisor, about the hostile environment and race problems she was experiencing at
work demonstrates that she sufficiently placed her employer on notice of racial
discrimination within the post office. Therefore, the internal complaint to Waldroup
is a protected activity under the opposition clause of Title VII and is considered when
evaluating the Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. See Rodrigue, 550 F. Supp at 400.
2. Plaintiff’s EEOC Complaint
Plaintiff’s filling of an EEO complaint on July 27th, 2020, is protected activity
under the participation clause of Title VII. Defendant does not contest that Plaintiff’s
filing of EEO complaint was a protected activity under the participation clause of
Title VII. See id.
ii. Plaintiff Suffered an Adverse Employment Action.
Turning to the second prong needed to establish a prima facie case of
retaliation, the plaintiff has the burden to show she suffered an adverse employment
action. Brown, 969 F.3d at 577. Following Plaintiff’s text messages to Waldroup sent
on July 18th, 2020, complaining about the “hostile work environment” within the post
office, Waldroup relayed the messages to Williams who told Waldroup to “put
52 [Id.].
53 [Doc. No. 39-2, p. 29].
[Malone] off the schedule.”54 Plaintiff filed a formal EEOC complaint on July 27th,
2020.55 Plaintiff’s employment was terminated by Williams the very same day.56
Therefore, the second prong is established because the Plaintiff engaged in protected
activity under Title VII and her employment at the post office was terminated nine
days later.
iii. Causal Link Existed Between the Protected Activity and
the Adverse Employment Action.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot show a causal link between her
protected activity and her termination because there was no knowledge of Plaintiff’s
protected activity prior to her termination.57 Plaintiff argues the causation element
is met because of the temporal proximity between Plaintiff’s complaint of racial
discrimination to Waldroup and her termination.58 The Court agrees with the
Plaintiff that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the causation element.
“[A]t the prima facie case [stage], a plaintiff can meet his burden of causation
by showing close enough timing between his protected activity and his adverse
employment action.” Brown, 969 F.3d at 577 (citing Garcia v. Professional Contract
Services, Inc., 938 F.3d 236, 243 (5th Cir. 2019)).” “Temporal proximity between
protected activity and an adverse employment action, by itself, does not constitute
sufficient evidence to satisfy the prima facie burden unless that proximity is ‘very
close.’” Everett v. Central Mississippi, Inc. Head Start Program, 444 F. App’x. 38, 46
54 [Doc. No. 19-8, p. 13].
55 [Doc. No. 3, p. 5 at ¶ k].
56 [Doc. No. 13-3, p. 3 at ¶ 13].
57 [Doc. No. 42-1 p. 7].
58 [Doc. No. 44 p. 3].
(5th Cir. 2011) (citing Clark County School Dist. V. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001)).
In Garcia v. Professional Contract Services, Inc., the Fifth Circuit stated that up to
four months could “cause there to be an inference of proximity of causation from
proximity in time.” 938 F.3d at 243. However, even very-close temporal proximity
does not establish causation as a rule. Ladner 834 F. App’x at 897. The Fifth Circuit
maintains that even at the prima facie stage, temporal proximity can only establish
a causal link when it is connected to the decision maker’s knowledge of the protected
activity. Dearman v. Stone County School District, 832 F.3d 577, 582 (internal
quotations omitted.).
In the case at hand, Plaintiff informed Waldroup of racial discrimination on
July 18th and her adverse employment action occurred on July 27th, the same day of
Plaintiff’s filing of the EEOC complaint.59 Thus, the temporal proximity was “very
close.” Everett, 444 Fed. App’x. at 46. Moreover, Plaintiff asserts that she “was
separated from her employment as soon as [Waldroup] told the Postmaster of
complaints of racial discrimination.”60 In the EEO Investigative Affidavit, Waldroup
testifies he informed the Postmaster of Plaintiff’s complaints about Jackson’s
derogatory comments.61 While Waldroup reported on the EEO Investigative Affidavit
that “the Postmaster spoke with the employees allegedly involved,”62 Postmaster
Williams stated in her affidavit that she did not conduct an investigation into
59 [Doc. No. 19-8, pp. 28–30]; [Doc. No. 13-3, p. 3 at ¶ 13].
60 [Doc. No. 19-2, p. 2 at ¶ 12].
61 [Doc. No. 38-1, p. 5].
62 [Doc. No. 38-1, p. 6].
[Malone’s] allegations of harassment/hostile work environment.63 Moreover, Malone
complained to Waldroup via text message on July 18th, 2020, discussing the hostile
environment within the post office.64 The very next day, Plaintiff texts Waldroup at
6:49 PM to verify that she was removed from the schedule according to “the
[P]ostmaster[’]s instructions to [him].”65 Plaintiff detailed in her message that she
spoke on the phone with Waldroup earlier that day to discuss her refusal to work at
the Post Office without a supervisor present and how she has brought to “[Waldroup]
& the [P]ostmaster[’]s attention the numerous USPS policy violations, the
harassment [she’s] receiving & the hostile work environment.”66 Waldroup responded
to Malone’s messages less than two hours later on Sunday, July 19th at 8:31 PM to
confirm she would not be on the schedule and that there would not be a supervisor at
2:00 AM when her she was scheduled.67 While Waldroup testified that he spoke with
Postmaster Williams about Plaintiff’s complaints, Williams testified in her affidavit
that Malone never reported harassment, and “she could not recall [Malone] telling
her that her or anyone else’s’ actions constituted a harassment/hostile work
environment for [Malone].”68
Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to Waldroup’s and
Williams’ knowledge of Plaintiff’s protected activity prior to her termination. As such,
the Motion for Summary Judgment for Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is DENIED.
63 [Doc. No. 45-2, p. 5].
64 [Doc. No. 19-8, p. 28-30].
65 [Doc. No. 39-2, p. 28]; Waldroup confirms in his deposition that Postmaster Williams told him to
“put [Malone] off the schedule” after Malone complained on July 18th, 2020. [Doc. No. 19-8 p. 13].
66 [Doc. No. 39-2 p. 28].
67 Id. at p. 29.
68 [Doc. No. 45-2, p. 5].
b. USPS’ legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action
Assuming, arguendo, Plaintiff proved the burden of prima facie case of
retaliation, the employer must then articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for its actions. Brown 969 F.3d at 577. While the defendant’s reason for
termination must be clear and reasonably specific, the burden on the defendant is
one of production, not persuasion. Shahrashoob v. Tex. A&M Univ., 125 F.4th 643,
653 (5th Cir. 2025). In Shahrashoob v. Texas A&M University, the University
reasoned that they fired Shahrashoob because of budgetary constraints and teaching
needs and the Fifth Circuit held these were legitimate and nonretaliatory reasons for
terminating Shahrashoob’s not renewing her contract. Id.
Here, Defendant states their reason for terminating Plaintiff’s employment
was due to “lack of work,” which is seen on the USPS’ Notification of Personnel
Action.69 Defendant’s first Motion for Summary Judgment goes on to say Postmaster
Williams had to terminate Malone because the post office was “over budget on allotted
hours and the only way to reduce those hours was to reduce temporary personnel.”70
The Fifth Circuit has held the elimination of an employee’s position as a result of a
reorganization or reduction-in-force is a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for
termination. Musser v. Paul Quinn Coll., 944 F.3d 557, 561 (5th Cir. 2019). As
Defendant fired Plaintiff because the post office was “over budget on allotted hours”
69 [Doc. No. 13-4 p. 2].
70 [Doc. No. 13-1 p. 9].
and it was “the only way to reduce those hours,” Defendant’s reason for termination
is legitimate and non-discriminatory.71
c. Defendant’s proffered reason was pretext for unlawful
retaliation
As the Defendant produced a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
termination of Plaintiff, the burden shifts back to the Plaintiff for the third step in
the McDonnell Douglass test—to prove that the proffered reason given by the
Defendant was pretext for unlawful retaliation. Brown 969 F.3d at 577.
Pretext can be proven by any evidence that casts doubt on the credence of the
employer’s proffered justification for the adverse employment action. Id. at 578. To
satisfy the final step of the McDonnell Douglass test and survive a motion for
summary judgment, the plaintiff must demonstrate “a conflict in substantial
evidence” on the question of whether the employer would not have taken the adverse
employment action “but for” the protected activity. Musser v. Paul Quinn Coll., 944
F.3d 557, 561 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d
644, 658 (5th Cir. 2012)). While temporal proximity alone is enough to meet the
burden of causation to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, temporal proximity
is “relevant to, but not alone sufficient” to show a defendant’s neutral explanation
was pretext. Brown 969 F.3d at 579. See also Shahrashoob, 125 F.4th at 653–54
(recognizing that a plaintiff can show pretext through temporal proximity plus
significant record evidence.).
71 [Id.].
Therefore, the Court must consider whether Malone’s other evidence, in
combination with this temporal proximity, is sufficient for a reasonable jury to find
but-for causation. Factors to consider include: the strength of plaintiff’s prima facie
case, the probative value of the proof that the employer’s explanation is false, and
any other evidence that supports the employer’s case and that properly may be
considered. Brown 969 F.3d at 578. While the temporal proximity between Plaintiff’s
complaints and her formal dismissal of employment from Williams is “very close,”
there are discrepancies in the decisionmaker’s knowledge of Plaintiff’s protected
activity. While Waldroup’s EEO Investigative Affidavit answers show Malone told
him of “some racial remarks that were made” by coworkers at the post office between
April 20, 2020 to July 18, 2020.72 While the Affidavit inquires about what procedures
management followed regarding Plaintiff’s complaint, Waldroup answers that “the
Postmaster spoke with the employees allegedly involved.”73 However, Postmaster
Williams stated in her affidavit that she did not conduct an investigation into
[Malone’s] allegations of harassment/hostile work environment and that Malone
never reported harassment in the post office.74 While Defendant cites the non-
discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff’s employment was lack of work,
Plaintiff saw job openings posted for the Monroe Post Office.75 In contrast to
Defendant’s assertion that there was a lack of work at the time of Plaintiff’s
termination, Waldroup told Plaintiff in July 2020 that her contract was extended to
72 [Doc. No. 38-1, p. 4].
73 [Id. at p. 6].
74 [Doc. No. 45-2, p. 5].
75 [Doc. No. 39-2, p. 20].
September 25, 2020.76 Additionally, Plaintiff submits a copy of the USPS’ NonCareer
Separation/Termination Rehire Break In Service Request that states the Plaintiffs
name, termination date, reason for termination, and instructs the Human Resources
Shared Service Center to “please do not rehire [Malone] for Monroe.””? The phone
number of the submitter matches the contact number of Postmaster Williams given
to Malone in the emailed instructions on how to enter the Monroe Post Office prior to
her first day.78 As Plaintiff has provided evidence to cast doubt on the Defendant’s
non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff and the credibility of Postmaster
recollection of not recalling any of Plaintiff's complaints about racial discrimination,
there “a conflict in substantial evidence” on the question of whether Williams had
knowledge of Malone’s complaints of racial harassment and whether Williams would
have terminated Malone if she had not complained.
Hil. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reason, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc.
No.42] is DENIED regarding the retaliation claim.
MONROE, LOUISIANA, this 29th day of September 2025.
(ste erry A. Doug’
i States District Jud
76 [Id. at p. 4].
77 [Id].
78 [Doc. No. 39-2, pp. 5, 18].
19