Bishop v. Boyer

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

FREDERICK BISHOP, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. 19-cv-06640

v. )

)

JUSTIN BOYER, et al., ) Judge Jeffrey I. Cummings

)

Defendants. )

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Frederick Bishop (“Bishop” or “plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. §1983 alleging that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when Chicago police

officers stopped the car he was riding in on July 3, 2019 to conduct a traffic stop to investigate

suspected narcotics activity reported by defendant Sergeant Johnny Christian (“Sergeant

Christian”). Plaintiff also brings a state law claim for false arrest after defendant officer Justin

Boyer (“Officer Boyer”) found a defaced gun in the car he was riding in and defendant Detective

Scott Konior (“Detective Konior”) created an investigative alert with probable cause to arrest

plaintiff. Defendants moved for summary judgment, (Dckt. #119), arguing that the claims are

barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), supported by reasonable suspicion, and that

defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, among other reasons. For the reasons set forth

below, the Court grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s federal claim

and dismisses plaintiff’s state law claim for false arrest without prejudice pursuant to Heck v.

Humphrey.

I. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party shows “that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). “A genuine dispute is present

if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, and a fact is material if it

might bear on the outcome of the case.” Wayland v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 94 F.4th 654, 657 (7th

Cir. 2024); FKFJ, Inc. v. Vill. of Worth, 11 F.4th 574, 584 (7th Cir. 2021) (the existence of a

factual dispute between the parties will not preclude summary judgment unless it is a genuine

dispute as to a material fact); Hottenroth v. Vill. of Slinger, 388 F.3d 1015, 1027 (7th Cir. 2004)

(issues of material fact are material if they are outcome determinative).

When the moving party has met that burden, the non-moving party cannot rely on mere

conclusions and allegations to concoct factual issues. Balderston v. Fairbanks Morse Engine

Div. of Coltec Indus., 328 F.3d 309, 320 (7th Cir. 2003). Instead, it must “marshal and present

the court with the evidence [it] contends will prove [its] case.” Goodman v. Nat. Sec. Agency,

Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). Thus, a mere “scintilla of evidence” supporting the non-

movant’s position does not suffice; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably

find for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In determining whether a genuine

issue of material fact exists, all facts and reasonable inferences must be drawn in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. King v. Hendricks Cty. Commissioners, 954 F.3d 981, 984

(7th Cir. 2020). Yet, the nonmovant “is not entitled to the benefit of inferences that are supported

only by speculation or conjecture.” Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 916 (7th Cir. 2016).

Ultimately, summary judgment is granted only if “no reasonable trier of fact could find in favor

of the non-moving party.” Hoppe v. Lewis Univ., 692 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up).

II. FACTUAL RECORD

The pertinent facts, construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, are as follows.

A. Sergeant Christian’s Observations of Plaintiff’s Activities

On July 3, 2019, Sergeant Christian was performing surveillance and observed a SUV

parked in front of him. (Dckt. #127, Plaintiff’s response in opposition to defendants’ Local Rule

56.1 statement of material facts (“DSOF Resp.”), ¶9). He saw plaintiff exit the backseat of the

vehicle on the driver’s side, cross the street, meet another individual, and exchange an unknown

object for U.S. currency before returning to the SUV. (Id.; Dckt. #131, Defendants’ response in

opposition to plaintiff’s Local Rule 56.1 statement of additional material facts (“PSAF Resp.”),

¶6). Sergeant Christian subsequently watched plaintiff engage in two additional exchanges, one

approximately thirty seconds later and the other approximately a minute later, and both within a

few blocks of each other. (DSOF Resp. ¶¶10–11). For all three encounters, Sergeant Christian

testified that he saw plaintiff place “his right hand on his hip area,” before reentering the car. (Id.

¶¶9–11). Sergeant Christian then observed the car drive off but maintained surveillance of the

car. (Id. ¶11).

Sergeant Christian relayed to fellow officers Boyer, Suggs, and Howard that he observed

plaintiff engage in what he believed to be three separate hand-to-hand narcotics transactions and

that plaintiff “might be armed based on Plaintiff’s motions to his right hip.” (Id. ¶¶12-13).

Sergeant Christian instructed the officers to pull the SUV over for a narcotics investigation. (Id.

¶14). These observations formed the sole basis to pull over the car. (PSOF Resp. ¶¶12–14).

B. Defendant Boyer and Officers Howard and Suggs Pull Over the SUV

Defendant Boyer, along with officers Suggs and Howard, thereafter pulled the SUV over

and ordered plaintiff out of the vehicle. (DSOF Resp. ¶14, 16). Plaintiff was placed in handcuffs

near the rear of the car and patted down, “[b]ased on Sergeant Christian’s observations that had

been relayed over the radio, and for officer safety.” (Id. ¶16). The SUV’s driver consented to a

vehicle search, although plaintiff disputes that the driver’s consent was “knowing and voluntary

after being fully apprised of her rights.” (Id. ¶17).

The officers did not find any narcotics during the stop. (PSAF Resp. ¶15). At his

deposition, Sergeant Christian conceded that he could have been witnessing entirely lawful

activity. (See id. ¶12; Dckt. #121-4 at 49–51). The officers searched the car and officer Boyer

found a Ruger semiautomatic handgun with a defaced serial number located underneath a child

seat occupying the SUV’s passenger-side back seat. (DSOF Resp. ¶18; see Dckt. #122, Ex I, at

4:55–5:45). Plaintiff – who was handcuffed near the back of the car – thereafter started running

and he outran all of the officers who were pursuing him despite the fact that his wallet and ID

dropped to the ground while he fled.1 (DSOF Resp. ¶¶19–20, 30).

C. The Investigative Alert

Detective Konior was assigned the investigation and met with officers Boyer, Suggs, and

Howard and Sergeant Christian. (Id. ¶21). Detective Konior reviewed the officers’ body-cam

footage, positively identified plaintiff, and created an “investigative alert with probable cause to

arrest Plaintiff” on July 4, 2019. (Id. ¶23). The officers did not obtain a warrant and Detective

Konior testified at his deposition that arrest warrants are “very difficult within Cook County” to

obtain. (PSAF Resp. ¶16).

On July 6, 2019, officers Jurado and Najarro responded to a call that “an African

American male with a white hat and neon vest was illegally selling residential parking permits

1 Plaintiff responds to these facts by asserting his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.

However, plaintiff’s run, and the officers’ failure to catch him, are captured on the officers’ body worn

camera. (See Dckt. #122). This video evidence is sufficient to establish there facts for purposes of

summary judgment. See, e.g., Smith v. Finley, 10 F.4th 725, 730 (7th Cir. 2021).

for the White Sox game.” (DSOF Resp. ¶24). They observed plaintiff in a neon vest with a

handmade “parking tenant” name tag holding U.S. currency in one hand and residential parking

passes in the other. (Id. ¶25). After examining the passes, the Officers believed they were fake

and detained plaintiff. (Id. ¶26). While detained, plaintiff admitted to making photocopies of

parking passes and selling them. (Id.). The officers placed plaintiff in custody for soliciting

unlawful business and obtained plaintiff’s name and information to perform a name check, which

informed them of the investigative alert to arrest plaintiff related to his July 3, 2019 escape. (Id.

¶¶26–27). Detective Konior was notified of plaintiff’s arrest, went to interview him, and then

contacted the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office, which approved felony charges against

plaintiff for unlawful use of a weapon, escape, and possession of a defaced firearm. (Id. ¶¶28–

29, 32).

In May 2021, plaintiff ultimately pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of being a felon in

possession of a firearm in Cook County Criminal Court. (DSOF Resp. ¶32). Plaintiff filed a

post-conviction petition, People v. Bishop, No. 1-22-1917 (Ill. App. Ct.), but voluntarily

withdrew the petition on April 9, 2025.2

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff brings a Section 1983 illegal seizure claim and a state law false arrest claim

alleging that he was unlawfully pulled over by defendants and later falsely arrested pursuant to

an illegal investigative alert. Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that

plaintiff’s claims are barred by (1) the Heck doctrine; (2) collateral estoppel; (3) the existence of

2 The Court may take judicial notice of the state court record to the extent the facts’ “accuracy cannot

reasonably be questioned,” Ocasio v. Turner, 19 F. Supp. 3d 841, 845 (N.D. Ind. 2014), such as plaintiff’s

criminal case docket. General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1080 (7th

Cir. 1997). “The most frequent use of judicial notice of ascertainable facts is in noticing the contents of

court records.” Id. at 1081 (cleaned up).

reasonable suspicion and probable cause; and that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity

and not subject to suit for plaintiff’s state law claim pursuant to the Illinois Tort Immunity Act.

Because plaintiff’s Section 1983 illegal seizure claim cannot survive if defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity, the Court addresses that argument first.

A. Defendants are Entitled to Qualified Immunity for Plaintiff’s Illegal Search and

Seizure Claim.

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil

damages in situations in which their conduct does not violate a clearly established statutory or

constitutional right. Gupta v. Melloh, 19 F.4th 990, 1000 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)); see also Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778 (2014).

“[O]nce the defense is raised, it becomes the plaintiff’s burden to defeat it.” Smith v. Finkley, 10

F.4th 725, 737 (7th Cir. 2021). “There are two inquiries in determining whether qualified

immunity applies: [1] whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting

the injury show that the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right; and [2] whether the right

at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the officer’s alleged misconduct.” Tousis v.

Billiot, 84 F.4th 692, 698 (7th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). Therefore, the Court begins with an

analysis of whether defendants’ actions in pulling over the SUV violated plaintiff’s constitutional

rights.

1. The Constitutional Right at Issue for Purposes of Qualified Immunity is the

Fourth Amendment.

Plaintiff’s illegal search and seizure claim alleges that defendant Boyer unlawfully pulled

over the SUV plaintiff was in to conduct an investigatory stop premised on suspected narcotics

activity. Defendants argue that they had reasonable suspicion to pull the car over. Plaintiff does

not address reasonable suspicion in his response brief, but rather focuses on probable cause,

which is relevant to his arrest, but not required for the initial investigative stop.

“The Seventh Circuit recognizes three types of police-citizen encounters: a consensual

encounter, an investigatory stop, and an arrest.” United States v. Hammonds, 418 F.Supp.3d

292, 295 (N.D.Ill. 2019). The parties do not dispute that pulling plaintiff’s car over was an

investigative stop, also called a “Terry stop.” (Dckt. ##120 at 9–10; 126 at 5). A Terry stop

allows an officer to “conduct a brief, non-intrusive detention of a person if the officer has

specific and articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has

committed or is committing a crime.” Hammonds, 418 F.Supp.3d at 295 (cleaned up). Under

the Fourth Amendment, “[r]easonable suspicion is more than a hunch but less than probable

cause and ‘considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Snow, 656

F.3d 498, 500 (7th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). Crucially, reasonable suspicion turns on “an

objective inquiry into all of the circumstances known to the officer at the time he stopped the

defendant, including information relayed to him by fellow officers and police dispatchers.”

Snow, 656 F.3d at 500 (cleaned up); Jewett v. Anders, 521 F.3d 818, 823 (7th Cir. 2008)

(reasonable suspicion requires “some minimal level of objective justification for making a stop,

given the totality of the circumstances.”) (cleaned up).

Therefore, to avoid summary judgment on his claim, plaintiff must ultimately show that

there was no reasonable suspicion to pull over the SUV or that a disputed material fact precludes

a finding of reasonable suspicion.

2. Plaintiff Has Failed to Produce Sufficient Evidence that Would Permit a

Reasonable Jury to Find that Defendants Lacked Reasonable Suspicion to

Conduct the Investigatory Stop.

The Court must examine the record to determine whether plaintiff proffered sufficient

evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find in his favor. See Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529,

533 (7th Cir. 2010). Again, the Court’s inquiry looks to the totality of the circumstances. See

Jewett, 521 F.3d at 823. The inquiry for plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim therefore turns on

whether reasonable suspicion existed to pull plaintiff’s car over for a narcotics investigation.

Again, all that is needed for the stop are “specific and articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a

reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or is committing a crime.” Hammonds, 418

F.Supp.3d at 295.

The undisputed facts relevant to this claim are as follows:

On July 3, 2019, Sergeant Christian observed plaintiff exit a parked SUV, cross the street

to meet another individual, exchange an object for money, and return to the car. (DSOF Resp.

¶9; PSOF Resp. ¶6). Sergeant Christian observed two more exchanges both within a matter of

minutes and within a few blocks from each other. (DSOF Resp. ¶¶10–11). For all three

encounters, Sergeant Christian testified that he saw plaintiff place “his right hand on his hip

area,” before reentering the car. (Id. ¶¶9–11). Sergeant Christian relayed his observations to

officers Boyer, Suggs, and Howard and instructed them to conduct a traffic stop. He

communicated that he believed he observed plaintiff engage in narcotics transactions and that

plaintiff “might be armed based on Plaintiff’s motions to his right hip.” (Id. ¶13). After pulling

the car over, plaintiff was ordered out of the vehicle and placed in handcuffs near the rear of the

car and patted down. (Id. ¶16).3

3 Plaintiff attempts to lump the initial traffic stop together with the subsequent vehicle search. This is

inappropriate for purposes of determining whether reasonable suspicion existed for the traffic stop

Defendants argue that reasonable suspicion is a low standard and has been found in

similar situations. They rely on United States v. Davis, which found that officers had reasonable

suspicion to conduct a narcotics investigatory stop after an officer observed two cars meet and

the drivers exchanged something by sticking their hands out the window and driving off. No. 21

CR 85, 2021 WL 5168893, at *4–5 (E.D.Wis. July 28, 2021), report and recommendation

adopted, 2021 WL 6495129 (E.D.Wis. Sept. 28, 2021). Similarly, in U.S. v. Jones, the court

found that arresting officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Jones after observing two suspected

drug transactions where Jones met with an individual, received currency, and then retrieved a

small item from behind his car’s tire to give to the individual. No. 7 CR 432, 2009 WL 424469,

at *3 (N.D.Ill Feb. 19, 2009).

Seventh Circuit precedent is in accord with finding that the defendants here had

reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. United States v. Ruiz, 785 F.3d 1134,

1143 (7th Cir. 2015) (reasonable suspicion met for narcotics-based Terry stop where officers saw

defendant interact with three different vehicles, suggestive of a drug operation); United States v.

Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1013 (7th Cir. 2011) (reasonable suspicion met where officer observed

suspect making brief visits to residences and hosted brief meetings in his vehicle).

Plaintiff relies on Hammonds to argue otherwise. But there, the defendant officer

claimed to have observed a drug transaction, relying only upon observing an individual “walking

away from another individual and placing an unidentified object in his mouth.” 418 F.Supp.3d at

notwithstanding the fact that the evidence regarding the stop and vehicle search overlap to some extent

because the recovered gun formed the basis for plaintiff’s later criminal charges and is thus relevant to his

false arrest claim. See, e.g., Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1423–24 (10th Cir. 1997) (“A determination

of whether Spiegel was entitled to qualified immunity for claims arising out of the strip search would not

necessarily determine whether Spiegel had sufficient reason to arrest Foote or whether Howe had

sufficient reason to stop her.”); Gentry v. Sevier, 597 F.3d 838, 847 (7th Cir. 2010) (Subsequent

“discoveries cannot be used in retrospect to justify an initial search.”).

298. The officer “may very well have believed that a drug transaction had just occurred,” but

could not identify any individual involved, and did not see any exchange of material. Id.

Hammonds stands in stark contrast to plaintiff’s situation where Sergeant Christian can point to

three specific instances where he observed plaintiff meeting and making an exchange with

another person.

Plaintiff also points to Reid v. Georgia, which found that no reasonable suspicion existed

to stop an airport traveler where he fit the “so called ‘drug courier profile,’” appeared to be trying

to conceal the fact that he and his companion were traveling together, and the two travelers did

not have luggage other than their shoulder bags. 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980).4 This case is

factually inapposite. Again, plaintiff was observed in what appeared to be a serious of hand-to-

hand exchanges with three other persons, and while he repeatedly stresses that Sergeant Christian

did not specifically identify what was exchanged and that no narcotics were ultimately

recovered, it matters not whether the reasonable suspicion for narcotics activity actually resulted

in finding narcotics. Id. (“[T]here could, of course, be circumstances in which wholly lawful

conduct might justify the suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.”); United States v. Baskin,

401 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[B]ehavior which is susceptible to an innocent explanation

when isolated from its context may still give rise to a reasonable suspicion when considered in

light of all the factors at play.”). (citing United States v. Williams, 627 F.3d 247, 252 (7th Cir.

2010)).

In sum: Sergeant Christian testified that he observed three hand-to-hand exchanges

suggesting that plaintiff was performing drug transactions, and officers Boyer, Suggs, and

4 The other cases upon which plaintiff relies relate to his argument that defendants lacked probable cause

to search the SUV. (Dckt. #126 at 5, 7–8 (citing cases)). These cases are immaterial to the question of

whether there was reasonable suspicion to justify the preceding traffic stop. Supra, at n.3.

Howard learned about such observations and conducted an investigative stop.5 Plaintiff has not

presented any evidence to dispute the specific and articulable facts that defendants rely upon to

show that they had reasonable suspicion to make the traffic stop.

3. Plaintiff Failed to Establish that Defendant’s Investigative Stop Violated a

Clearly Established Right.

Even if plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to show that defendants’ investigative stop

lacked reasonable suspicion (and he has failed to do so), defendants would be entitled to

qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim if plaintiff cannot show that defendants’

conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right such that they were on notice that their

conduct would be clearly unlawful. Siler v. City of Kenosha, 957 F.3d 758, 757 (7th Cir. 2020)

(citing Saucier v. Katz, 457 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2001)); Dockery v. Blackburn, 911 F.3d 458, 466

(7th Cir. 2018) (plaintiff bears the burden to show that a right is clearly established). “‘Clearly

established’ means that, at the time of the officer’s conduct, the law was sufficiently clear that

every reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is unlawful.” Tousis, 84 F.4th at

698 (cleaned up).

A plaintiff can show that a right is “clearly established” by statute or the Constitution in

at least two ways: (1) pointing to an analogous case establishing the right to be free from the

conduct at issue; or (2) showing that the conduct was “so egregious that no reasonable person

could have believed that it would not violate clearly established rights.” Steidl v. Fermon, 494

5 Officers Boyer, Suggs, and Howard were permitted to rely on Sergeant Christian’s relayed observations

to perform the investigatory stop despite not observing any suspected criminal activity themselves. See,

e.g., Davis, 2021 WL 5168893, at *4 (The collective knowledge doctrine “permits an officer to stop,

search, or arrest a suspect at the direction of another officer or police agency, even if the officer himself

does not have firsthand knowledge of facts that amount to the necessary level of suspicion to permit the

given action.”)

F.3d 623, 632 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff’s burden on this point is rigorous. As the Seventh Circuit

has explained:

[A] right is clearly established for qualified immunity purposes if its contours were

sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have

understood that he was violating it. In other words, existing precedent must have

placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. And in order to

answer the question beyond debate, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized

that the clearly established law must share specific details with the facts of the case

at hand. Though to defeat a defendant’s assertion of qualified immunity plaintiffs

need not produce a case directly on point, defining the applicable law at a high level

of generality simply will not do. Only in the rare obvious case will the unlawfulness

of the officer’s conduct be sufficiently clear without existing precedent . . .

addressing similar circumstances. This sounds like a high bar because it is—

qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

violate the law.

Doxtator v. O’Brien, 39 F.4th 852, 863 (7th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up).

Plaintiff devotes a significant portion of his brief to arguing that “investigatory alerts” do

not comport with the Illinois Constitution6 and therefore defendants should not be granted

immunity. This argument is both incorrect and irrelevant to plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim.

First, plaintiff’s argument is no longer based on current law—the Illinois Supreme Court recently

determined that “there is no basis to hold that arrests pursuant to investigative alerts violate the

Illinois Constitution.” See People v. Clark, __ N.E.3d __, 2024 WL 5163470, at *15 (Ill. Dec.

19, 2024); People v. Chavez, 262 N.E.3d 753, 783 (Ill.App.Ct. 2025) (same). Second, Detective

Konior did not create an investigative alert until after plaintiff ran from police, i.e., after the

relevant facts for his Fourth Amendment claim. (DSOF Resp. ¶¶21–23).

6 Plaintiff additionally argues that investigative alerts do not comport with the U.S. Constitution but his

argument is premised solely on a prior order of this Court which only discussed state law and which says

nothing about its application to the U.S. Constitution or federal law. (See Dckt. #126 at 3, quoting Dckt.

#53 “the state of Illinois law on this issue can best be described as unsettled.”).

Furthermore, plaintiff does not mention the doctrine of qualified immunity or otherwise

address any precedent sufficiently particularized to the facts of this case. Doxtator, 39 F.4th at

863. The Court has otherwise failed to find any case law that would have warned defendants that

their actions amounted to an improper stop. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to satisfy the “high

bar” required to defeat defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity. Id.; Schimandle v. Dekalb

Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 114 F.4th 648, 656 (7th Cir. 2024) (“Although the plaintiff need not point to

an identical case finding the alleged conduct unlawful, he must point to precedent placing the

statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”) (cleaned up).

B. Plaintiff’s State Law Claim for False Arrest is Barred by Heck.

Plaintiff’s remaining claim for false arrest arises under state law. Plaintiff’s claim is

premised on Detective Konior issuing an investigative alert after officers recovered the defaced

gun. Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477

(1994), whereas plaintiff argues that “if the arrest lacked probable cause or was based upon an

unconstitutional investigative alert, then Plaintiff’s complaint should not necessarily suffer from

the Heck bar.” (Dckt. #126 at 9).

The critical question here is whether plaintiff’s claim “necessarily impl[ies]” the

invalidity of his conviction. McCann v. Neilsen, 466 F.3d 619, 622 (7th Cir. 2006); see Mannie v.

Campos, No. 16 C 1068, 2022 WL 5183879, at *5 (N.D.Ill. Oct. 5, 2022). In other words,

plaintiff’s false arrest claim cannot proceed if plaintiff has “affirmatively [pleaded] himself out

of court.” Hyson USA, Inc. v. Hyson 2U, Ltd., 821 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up).

To reiterate, plaintiff pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a

firearm in Cook County Criminal Court. (DSOF Resp. ¶32). The conviction is premised on

defendants’ July 3, 2019 SUV vehicle search discussed above, and in particular, the recovered

defaced semiautomatic which weapon was found on the seat next to plaintiff under the child seat.

Detective Konior then created an investigative alert for plaintiff’s arrest. A few days later,

plaintiff was arrested for selling illegal parking passes. Once detained, officers searched

plaintiff’s name, discovered the investigative alert, and notified Detective Konior, who

interviewed plaintiff and then contacted the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office, which

approved felony charges for unlawful use of a weapon, escape, and possession of a defaced

firearm. In May 2021, plaintiff pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of being a felon in possession

of a firearm. The stipulated facts underlying the plea include the vehicle search which resulted in

the defaced gun and the issuance of the investigative alert. (Dckt. #121-6 at 17–18).

Here, plaintiff’s challenge to probable cause is intertwined with his conviction and to

challenge probable cause for his arrest would necessarily challenge his conviction. A finding

that plaintiff’s investigative alert was illegal or that probable cause was lacking would make the

gun inadmissible and thus negate plaintiff’s conviction. See Ocasio v. Turner, 19 F.Supp.3d 841,

852 (N.D.Ind. 2014). “Under Heck, until his conviction for resisting law enforcement is

reversed, expunged, or invalidated by a state tribunal or called into question by a federal habeas

writ, [plaintiff] cannot seek damages.” Id.

Plaintiff correctly points out, however, that not all claims are inconsistent with Heck,

including his federal illegal seizure claim relating to the traffic stop. (Dckt. #126 at 8–9). That

claim does not rely on allegations wholly inconsistent with his conviction. The same cannot be

said for plaintiff’s false arrest claim which targets the probable cause and investigative alert

leading to his May 2021 guilty plea. See Ocasio, 19 F.Supp.3d at 852 (A “false arrest claim is

not automatically Heck-barred by a subsequent conviction for the same offense, but, in those

cases in which the grounds for the conviction flow from the same facts underlying the allegations

of false arrest, the claim 1s barred.”).

Any separate attack on plaintiff’s investigative alert based on its alleged non-compliance

with the Illinois Constitution likewise fails. While this Court previously found that

constitutionality of investigative alerts in Illinois was “unsettled,” that is no longer the case

because it has now been determined that such alerts do not violate the Illinois Constitution. See

Clark, 2024 WL 5163470, at *15; Chavez, 262 N.E.3d at 783.’

CONCLUSION

For all of the above reasons, the Court grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment,

(Dckt. #119), as to plaintiff’s Section 1983 illegal seizure claim and it dismisses plaintiff’s state

law false arrest claim without prejudice because it is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477

(1994).

Date: September 26, 2025

United States District Court Judge

’ Because plaintiff’s federal claim fails to proffer sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find a Fourth

Amendment violation and because plaintiff’s state law claim is premised on allegations which undermine

his conviction in contravention to Heck, the Court need not address defendants’ remaining arguments

conceming collateral estoppel and the Illinois Tort Immunity Act.

15