"The fact that a party was named in the original complaint is irrelevant; an amended pleading supersedes the original."
How later courts described this case
- "The fact that a party was named in the original complaint is irrelevant; an amended pleading supersedes the original."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
WILLIAM S. BOYD, Case No.: 2:24-cv-00616-AN
Plaintiff,
v.
OPINION AND ORDER
WARREN ROBERTS, PATRICK MANEY, and
TLC COMMITTEE BOARD,
Defendants.
Self-represented plaintiff William S. Boyd brings this action against defendants Warren
Roberts ("Roberts"), Patrick Maney ("Maney"), and the Therapeutic Levels of Care Committee Board
("TLC Committee"),1 seeking injunctive relief and damages for alleged violations of his civil rights under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 The Court appointed pro bono counsel for plaintiff on September 3, 2025, and appointed
counsel requested termination of the appointment due to capacity on September 11, 2025. That request
remains pending before the Court.
Plaintiff has filed three successive motions for leave to amend the complaint, as well as
voluminous supplemental pleadings. Defendants filed a motion to strike certain of plaintiff's supplemental
pleadings. For the following reasons, plaintiff's motions for leave to amend are DENIED with leave to
renew within sixty (60) days of the date that appointment of pro bono counsel is accepted, and defendants'
1 In the caption of the complaint, plaintiff names "TLC COMMITTEE BOARD, ET AL." Compl., ECF [1]. In the
body of the complaint, plaintiff lists the entity "TLC COMMITTEE BOARD, ET AL (ODOC)" and individually lists
the following alleged members of the TLC Committee: "Doctor Beamor," "Davies," "Drollinger," "Doctor Evers,"
"Patrick Maney, NP," "Meying," "Peh," "Doctor Bristol," "Bailey," "White," "Doctor Dornbusch," "Pinkham," and
"R. Owens TRCI." Id. ¶¶ 7-19. It is not clear whether plaintiff intends to sue the TLC Committee Board as an entity
or whether he intends to sue each individual member. The caption of the complaint must, however, name all parties.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Accordingly, the Court considers plaintiff's claims only as alleged against the TLC Committee
as an entity, and not against the individual members who are not otherwise individually named in the caption of the
complaint.
2 Plaintiff initially named a fourth defendant, Charles Cox, but later voluntarily dismissed him from the action. See
Pl. Mot. to Dismiss Charles Cox, ECF [59]; Order of May 9, 2025, ECF [98]. All references to "defendants" in this
Opinion and Order include only the remaining named defendants in the operative complaint: Roberts, Maney, and the
TLC Committee.
motion is DENIED.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Pleadings
1. Amending Pleadings
A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within certain time parameters.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Otherwise, "a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written
consent or the court's leave." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). "The court should freely give leave when justice so
requires." Id. In deciding whether to give leave to amend, courts in the Ninth Circuit consider five factors:
"bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of amendment, and whether the plaintiff
has previously amended the complaint." Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004). Of
these factors, "[t]he consideration of prejudice to the opposing party carries the greatest weight." Sonoma
Cnty. Ass'n of Retired Emps. v. Sonoma County, 708 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2013). Additionally, "futility
of amendment alone can justify the denial of a motion [for leave to amend]." Ahlmeyer v. Nev. Sys. of
Higher Educ., 555 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2009). Ultimately, a "trial court's discretion to deny [a motion
for leave to amend] is particularly broad where . . . a plaintiff previously has been granted leave to amend."
Griggs v. Pace Am. Grp., Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 879 (9th Cir. 1999).
Courts must issue a scheduling order in each case which includes a deadline to amend the
pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b). The "schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge's
consent." Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). As a result, when a motion to amend is filed after the deadline to amend
the pleadings, the court must consider the requirements of both Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a) and
16(b)(4). "Good cause" is primarily determined by "the diligence of the party seeking the amendment."
Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992).
2. Supplementing Pleadings
Under Rule 15(d), the court may permit a party, "on motion and reasonable notice[, and]
on just terms" to "serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that
happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented." "'Rule 15(d) permits the filing of a
supplemental pleading which introduces a cause of action not alleged in the original complaint and not in
existence when the original complaint was filed.'" Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 382
(9th Cir. 1998) (quoting U.S. for Use of Atkins v. Reiten, 313 F.2d 673, 674 (9th Cir. 1963)).
3. Joining Additional Defendants
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 permits a court, "[o]n motion or on its own, [and] on
just terms, [to] add or a drop a party." A defendant may appropriately be joined to other defendants in an
action if "([1]) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect
to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and ([2]) any
question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 21(a)(2).
4. Striking Pleadings
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) permits a court to "strike from a pleading . . . any
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter," either on its own or on motion made by a party
before filing a responsive pleading or, of no response is allowed, within twenty-one days after being served
with the pleading. Generally, "[m]otions to strike are disfavored and infrequently granted." Legal Aid
Servs. of Or. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 561 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1189 (D. Or. 2008) (citations omitted). "'A
motion to strike should not be granted unless it is clear that the matter to be stricken could have no possible
bearing on the subject matter of the litigation.'" Biggs v. City of St. Paul, No. 6:18-cv-506-MK et al, 2019
WL 1114868, at *1 (D. Or. Mar. 8, 2019) (quoting Contreras ex rel Contreras v. County of Glen, 725 F.
Supp. 2d 1157, 1159 (E.D. Cal. 2010)).
B. Self-Represented Litigants
Pleadings filed by self-represented litigants "are held to a less stringent standard than those
drafted by lawyers." Graves v. Nw. Priority Credit Union, No. 3:20-cv-00770-JR, 2020 WL 8085140, at
*2 (D. Or. Dec. 12, 2020) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). "In cases involving a [self-
represented] plaintiff, the court construes the pleadings liberally and affords the plaintiff the benefit of any
doubt." Kali v. Bulk Handling Sys., No. 6:18-cv-02010-AA, 2019 WL 1810966, at *4 (D. Or. Apr. 23,
2019) (citing Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 392 (9th Cir. 2004)).
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff alleges the following facts. Plaintiff is an adult in custody ("AIC") at Two Rivers
Correctional Institution ("TRCI") and a dialysis patient who was diagnosed with end stage renal failure
prior to his incarceration. Am. Compl., ECF [6], at 1-2 (all references in this Opinion and Order to ECF
pagination). He has received dialysis treatment at TRCI since August of 2021. Id. at 6.
Plaintiff requested evaluation for a kidney transplant from his nephrologist, Dr. Seth Thaler
("Dr. Thaler"). Id. Dr. Thaler wrote an order referring plaintiff to the Oregon Health & Science University
("OHSU") Transplant Program. Id. at 7. Plaintiff’s medical file includes a note by Dr. Thaler dated
December 13, 2022, which mentions the referral. Id. Plaintiff expected to see TRCI Nurse Practitioner
Patrick Maney ("Maney") after the referral, but he did not see any provider about his transplant referral for
nearly a year. Id. at 4, 7. Plaintiff alleges that Maney "signed off on the order" but forgot it was written
and never presented it to the TLC Committee, which determines whether AICs receive care from providers
outside of TRCI. Id. at 7, 11.
Plaintiff asked Dr. Thaler and Charles Cox ("Cox"), a nurse manager, why he had not begun
transplant testing, and they advised him to pursue the issue through the grievance process. Id. at 7. Before
doing so, plaintiff wrote to Maney stating that he had been waiting a year for the transplant testing. Id.
Maney did not respond. Id. Plaintiff filed a grievance on November 16, 2023. Id. On December 11, 2023,
R. Owens, a nurse manager at TRCI, responded that testing would begin as soon as "orders are received
from OHSU kidney transplant team" and "prior to [p]laintiff being placed on the kidney transplant list." Id.
at 8. Plaintiff told Dr. Thaler about this response, and Dr. Thaler informed him that OHSU could not issue
any orders without a referral. Id.
Plaintiff filed another grievance on December 11, 2023. Id. Roberts responded, stating
that plaintiff would have an appointment with Maney. Id. At that appointment, which occurred in January
of 2024, plaintiff asked Maney why a meeting wasn't held soon after the referral, and Maney "responded
that he must have forgot." Id. Maney also told plaintiff that TRCI "does not recommend patients for
transplant," and that although Maney was on the TLC Committee "he did not know what to do." Id. at 8-
9.
Plaintiff wrote a communication to R. Owens stating that "Dr. [] Thaler said [p]laintiff's
life expectancy is [sixty percent] of any [eighty]-year-old man and was concerned that [] Maney[] still HAD
NOT referred [p]laintiff to [the] OHSU Transplant Program like he should have." Id. at 9 (capitalization
in original). He received a "communication form from TRCI" stating "that they didn't know of any
upcoming meeting with TLC Committee." Id. Plaintiff then sent a final appeal. Id. He received a response
on March 12, 2024, from the Assistant Director of Health stating that he would see Maney again. Id. On
February 27, 2024, plaintiff was informed that the TLC Committee had determined that plaintiff would
continue dialysis treatment and would not be referred to OHSU's Transplant Program. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that although the TLC Committee "is ostensibly a committee," it is
typically Roberts alone who decides whether inmates will receive treatment. Id. at 10-11. Plaintiff alleges
that the TLC Committee aims to keep the percentage of cases in which inmates require off-site medical
care below one percent, and that Roberts denied his transplant referral pursuant to this practice. Id. at 11.
Plaintiff asserts that by remaining on the less efficacious dialysis treatment rather than receiving a
transplant, he must experience painful dialysis, a diminished quality of life, and a significantly reduced life
expectancy. Id. at 12. Plaintiff states that he is aware of instances in which other TRCI inmates have
received kidney transplants. Id.
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on April 11, 2024, naming as defendants Roberts,
Maney, the TLC Committee, and Cox. Compl., ECF [1]. On May 14, 2024, the Court ordered plaintiff to
show cause why this case should not be dismissed as duplicative of another case he filed, Boyd v. Reyes, et
al., No. 2:23-cv-01284-AN ("Boyd v. Reyes"), which is also related to the dialysis care he receives from
TRCI and NaphCare, Inc. Order of May 14, 2024, ECF [4]. Plaintiff responded by filing the first amended
complaint, which alleges that the Boyd v. Reyes litigation does "not pertain[] to the issues complained of in
this civil action." Am. Compl. ¶ 23. Defendants filed their answer to the first amended complaint on
October 14, 2024. Answer to Am. Compl., ECF [26]. Cox moved to dismiss the amended complaint, Cox
Mot. to Dismiss, ECF [37], and defendants joined in the motion, Defs. Mot. for Joinder to Mot. to Dismiss,
ECF [41].
Plaintiff has filed three separate motions relating to amendment of the operative complaint,
as well as voluminous supplemental pleadings and other filings in support. Plaintiff first moved for leave
to amend on February 18, 2025, and attached a proposed second amended complaint. Pl. 1st Mot. for Leave
to Amend ("Pl. 1st Mot."), ECF [39]. The first motion for leave to amend states that plaintiff discovered
"new evidence" related to his claims, including evidence showing "Joe Bugher's ["Bugher"] direct
involvement in critical decisions that delayed necessary transplant evaluations and treatments." Id. at 2.
The attached proposed second amended complaint adds Bugher as a defendant and sets forth additional
allegations as to Bugher's involvement. See id. at 12. It also includes new allegations regarding plaintiff
being hospitalized in January and February 2025 due to Roberts and Bugher's failure to provide safe and
appropriate dialysis and cardiac care. Id. at 18-19. Neither the Oregon Department of Corrections
("ODOC") nor Dr. Thaler are named as defendants in this version of the proposed second amended
complaint, but plaintiff nonetheless purports to bring a negligence claim against ODOC, alleging that it
withheld medically necessary treatment that Dr. Thaler ordered for plaintiff. Id. at 27-29. In addition to
the motion and proposed second amended complaint, plaintiff filed many supplemental pleadings. See ECF
[48], [49], [50], [51], [52], [53], [54], [55], [56], [57].
Plaintiff then moved to voluntarily dismiss Cox. Pl. Mot. to Release Cox as Def., ECF
[59]. Thereafter, defendants moved to strike plaintiff's voluminous supplemental pleadings. Mot. to Strike,
ECF [61], at 4. In the motion to strike, defendants objected to plaintiff's first motion for leave to amend,
arguing that plaintiff sought amendment only in an improper attempt "to nullify" Cox's motion to dismiss.
Id. at 2.
Without waiting for a decision on his first motion, plaintiff filed a second motion for leave
to amend the complaint on March 19, 2025, along with a new version of the proposed second amended
complaint (the "second version of the proposed second amended complaint"3). Pl. 2d Mot. for Leave to
Amend ("Pl. 2d Mot."), ECF [63]. In these versions, plaintiff removes Cox as a defendant but retains the
additional allegations set forth in the first version of the proposed second amended complaint. See id. at 2-
3, 5, 19-20. He also includes additional allegations regarding the TLC Committee, Roberts, and Bugher's
roles. See id. at 20-22, 27-30. As in the prior version, the second version of the proposed second amended
complaint does not name ODOC as a defendant but nonetheless purports to bring a negligence claim against
it. Id. at 31-32. In addition to the second motion and second version of the proposed second amended
complaint, plaintiff also filed more supplemental pleadings, "Affidavits of Harm," and exhibits not
associated with any particular motion or filing. See ECF [72], [75], [78], [83], [84], [86], [102], [103],
[104], [105], [106], [107], [117].
On June 16, 2025, with the prior two motions still pending, plaintiff filed a third motion
for leave to amend to join ODOC as a defendant, as well as a third version of the proposed second amended
complaint. Pl. 3d Mot. for Leave to Amend ("Pl. 3d Mot."), ECF [126]. The third version of the proposed
second amended complaint includes new allegations, not in the operative complaint, pertaining to both
ODOC and other proposed defendants. See id. at 5-8. However, the third version of the proposed second
amended complaint is significantly shorter than the previous versions and includes significantly fewer
allegations. In addition to the third motion and third version of the proposed second amended complaint,
plaintiff also filed more supplemental pleadings, exhibits, and briefing, ECF [127], [128], [131]. Among
the supplemental pleadings is a filing captioned "Supplemental Pleading to the [Proposed] Fourth
Ame[n]ded Complaint Against the Oregon Department of Corrections," ECF [128], which purports "to
clarify and assert an independent Monell claim against [ODOC]" pursuant to Rule 15(d).
This Court last modified the case management scheduling order on March 4, 2025, and, in
3 For clarity, the Court notes that plaintiff captions the proposed complaint attached to the second motion for leave to
amend as a "(Proposed) Third Amended Complaint." Because there was no operative second amended complaint,
however, the Court considers the proposed complaint attached to the second motion for leave to amend to be a second
version of plaintiff's proposed second amended complaint. Likewise, plaintiff captions the proposed complaint
attached to the third motion for leave to amend as a "(Proposed) Fourth Amended Complaint," and the Court considers
it to be a third version of the proposed second amended complaint.
relevant part, set the deadline to amend the pleadings as March 28, 2025. Order of March 4, 2025, ECF
[46].
DISCUSSION
A. Motions for Leave to Amend and Proposed Second Amended Complaints
Plaintiff filed multiple motions for leave to amend and proposed second amended
complaints without waiting to receive a ruling on the prior motions. It is well settled law that "[t]here can
only be one operative complaint." Griffin v. Herzog, No. 3:17-cv-5394 RBL-TLF, 2017 WL 3503333, at
*2 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 16, 2017); see, e.g., Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967) (collecting cases)
("[An] amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent."),
overruled in part on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012); Hal
Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richer Feiner and Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The fact that a party
was named in the original complaint is irrelevant; an amended pleading supersedes the original."); Local
R. 15-1(a)(3) ("An amended or supplemental pleading may not incorporate by reference any part of the
prior pleading, including exhibits."). It follows that there can only be one operative proposed complaint,
as the Court must know which proposed complaint would supersede the operative complaint. Furthermore,
the "operative complaint must contain all claims, attachments, and requests for relief that Plaintiffs wish
the Court to consider." Varner v. Strawter, No. 2:24-cv-00537-JAD-DJA, 2024 WL 1606997, at *1 (D.
Nev. Apr. 12, 2024). In a similar vein, Local Rule 7-1(c) requires that a motion be supported by one legal
memorandum, combined as a single document.
Plaintiff's successive pleadings render difficult the question before the Court. On the one
hand, the Court might interpret plaintiff's successive pleadings as successive attempts to set forth his desired
claims, i.e., as reflecting an intention that the last-filed motion for leave to amend and attached third version
of the proposed second amended complaint be considered the operative motion and version. On the other
hand, based on the variation between the various defendants named, allegations made, and claims presented
in the various motions, versions of the proposed second amended complaint, and supplemental pleadings,
it instead appears that plaintiff intends the successive versions to rely upon the allegations within the
previous versions and the currently operative complaint. Even when construing plaintiff's pleadings
liberally, it is simply unclear to the Court exactly what plaintiff seeks to allege and against whom plaintiff
seeks to allege it. As such, the Court denies plaintiff's motions for leave to amend the complaint.
However, considering plaintiff's self-represented status, the ongoing effort to appoint
plaintiff pro bono counsel, and the lack of clarity regarding defendants' position on amendment,4 the Court
sua sponte grants plaintiff leave to renew the motion after the appointment of pro bono counsel is accepted.
Any such renewed motion for leave to amend should be filed within sixty days of the date that appointment
of pro bono counsel is accepted. Plaintiff may attach a new proposed second amended complaint to that
renewed motion.
B. Motion to Strike
Defendants' motion to strike is denied. Defendants move to strike the supplemental
pleadings plaintiff submitted in support of his first motion for leave to amend, which generally purport to
add and clarify claims against defendants. Defendants, however, primarily categorize these supplemental
pleadings as "declarations," and argue that they should be stricken as improper because they are not
incorporated in the operative complaint or first version of the proposed second amended complaint and thus
inappropriately attempt to belatedly modify the first version of the proposed second amended complaint.
Defendants do not explain why these filings are "redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(f).
The Court also takes this opportunity to remind defendants that under Local Rule 7-1(b),
motions may not be combined with any response, reply, or other briefing. As such, it was not proper to
4 It is not clear whether defendants oppose plaintiff's motion. Defendants did not file a response in opposition to any
of plaintiff's motions for leave to amend. However, defendants did object to plaintiff's first motion for leave to amend
via an objection lodged within their motion to strike. To the extent defendants intend for the motion to strike to also
serve as a response in opposition to plaintiff's first motion for leave to amend, this is improper. Under Local Rule 7-
1(b), "[m]otions may not be combined with any response[.]" Additionally, under Local Rule 7-1(e)(1), any response
to a motion, other than a motion for summary judgment, must be filed within fourteen days after service of the motion
in question. Here, plaintiff filed the first motion for leave to amend on February 18, 2025, and defendants filed the
motion to strike on March 17, 2025. No extension of the deadline to respond was requested.
include within the motion to strike a second of argument regarding an unrelated motion to dismiss.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's Motions for Leave to File Amended Complaint, ECF
[39], [63], and [126], and defendants’ Motion to Strike, ECF [61], are DENIED. The Court sua sponte
GRANTS plaintiff leave to file a renewed motion for leave to file a second amended complaint after the
appointment of pro bono counsel is accepted. Any such renewed motion must be filed within sixty (60)
days of the date that appointment of pro bono counsel is accepted and should address the applicable factors
relating to amendment under Rule 15(a) and whether and why there is good cause to allow amendment
under Rule 16(b)(4). The renewed motion may attach a new proposed version of the second amended
complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 29th day of September, 2025-)
‘Adrienne Nelson
United States District Judge
10