Sadiq v. U.S. Courts

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

IN RE: QADIYR SADIQ

Debtor. Bankruptcy Case No. 3:24-bk-2053-BAJ

_______________________________

QADIYR SADIQ,

Appellant,

v. Case No. 3:24-cv-1025-MMH

U.S. COURTS,

Appellee.

_______________________________

QADIYR SADIQ,

d/b/a Sadiq’s Bistro,

Appellant,

v. Case No. 3:24-cv-775-MMH

DOUGLAS W. NEWAY,

Appellee.

_______________________________

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Hon. Jason Burgess’s Response to

Appellant’s Opening Brief, and Motion to Strike Demand for Sanctions (Doc.

11; Bankruptcy Judge’s Response and Motion), filed September 13, 2024.1 The

Court directed Appellant, Qadiyr Sadiq, to respond to the Bankruptcy Judge’s

Response and Motion. See Order (Doc. 13), entered October 7, 2024. Sadiq

timely filed a response. See Appellant’s Supplemental Response to Judges

Order to Respond & Motion for a Change of Venue (Doc. 16; Sadiq’s Response),

filed October 30, 2024. Accordingly, this matter is ripe for review.

In this consolidated appeal, Appellant Qadiyr Sadiq challenges the

Bankruptcy Court’s order striking Sadiq’s Form 101A2 as well as the

Bankruptcy Court’s final judgment dismissing his case and barring him from

filing future bankruptcy petitions in the United States Bankruptcy Court for

the Middle District of Florida. See Debtor’s Notice of Appeal of Non-Final Order;

Motion for San[c]tions; Motion to Stay All Action (Doc. 9; First Appeal Notice),

1 This case is a consolidated appeal of Case No. 3:24-cv-775-MMH (the First Appeal)

and 3:24-cv-1025-MMH (the Second Appeal). See Order (Doc. 12), filed December 19, 2025. In

this Order, unless otherwise noted, citations to document numbers refer to the docket in the

Second Appeal. Many of the pertinent documents were originally filed in the First Appeal. As

such, citations to the dates that documents were filed refer to the dates the documents were

originally filed in the First Appeal, not to the dates the documents were docketed in the Second

Appeal.

2 Official Form 101A is a debtor’s “Initial Statement About an Eviction Judgment

Against You.”

filed in Bankruptcy Court on July 30, 2024; Order Striking Official Form 101A

(Doc. 4-11; 101A Order), entered in Bankruptcy Court on July 19, 2024;

Appellant’s Initial Brief (Doc. 10; Sadiq’s Initial Brief), filed August 30, 2025;

see generally the First Appeal; the Second Appeal; Case No. 3:24-bk-2053-BAJ

(the Bankruptcy Case). In striking Sadiq’s Form 101A, the Bankruptcy Judge

noted that “Form 101A does not apply to residential tenants in Florida.” See

101A Order at 2. Sadiq contends that the 101A Order violated his due process

rights because the Bankruptcy Judge entered the order without providing him

notice or a hearing. See Sadiq’s Initial Brief at 6, 8. Sadiq further appears to

argue that he was treated differently in the Bankruptcy Case because of his

status as a minority. Id. at 9 (citing In re: Jefferey Leon Sutton, CN, Case No.

3:23-bk-334-JAB (M.D. Fla. Bankr.)).3 In addition to asking the Court to vacate

the 101A Order, Sadiq requests that the Court impose a $50,000 sanction

against the Bankruptcy Judge. Id. at 8.

In support of this request for sanctions, in a conclusory fashion, Sadiq

contends that the imposition of this sanction is warranted under Rule 11,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Civil Rule(s)). See id. Although his briefing is

3 Sadiq attaches to his Initial Brief a partial transcript of a proceeding held in In re

Sutton on August 9, 2025. The complete transcript can be found at Case No. 3:23-bk-334-JAB

(M.D. Fla. Bankr.), Doc. 62.

difficult to understand, he appears to suggest that the imposition of the sanction

is warranted because, by striking Sadiq’s Form 101A, the Bankruptcy Judge

violated his procedural due process rights and also discriminated against him

due to his status as a minority. See id. at 8–9.

In response to Sadiq’s Initial Brief, the Bankruptcy Judge filed the

Bankruptcy Judge’s Response and Motion, in which he moves to strike Sadiq’s

request for the imposition of sanctions against him. See Bankruptcy Judge’s

Response and Motion at 1.4 In doing so, the Bankruptcy Judge contends that

striking the request is warranted because “a) he is not a litigant subject to

sanctions and equally fundamentally, b) [he] is entitled to absolute immunity.”

See Bankruptcy Judge’s Response and Motion at 3. Notably, in Sadiq’s Reply

Brief and in Sadiq’s Response, he repeats his request for the imposition of

sanctions, each time increasing the amount demanded. See Appellant’s Reply

Brief (Doc. 14; Sadiq’s Reply Brief), filed October 21, 2024, at 7 (requesting the

imposition of $10,000,000 in sanctions); Sadiq’s Response at 5 (requesting the

4 The Bankruptcy Judge makes a limited appearance, arguing that the Court lacks

personal jurisdiction over him because he was not served. See Bankruptcy Judge’s Response

and Motion at 1 n.1.

imposition of $50,000,000 in sanctions).5 However, he provides no applicable

legal authority supporting these requests.

Upon review, the Court concludes that Sadiq’s requests for the imposition

of sanctions against the Bankruptcy Judge are due to be stricken because they

are procedurally improper and because Sadiq has failed to identify any legal or

factual basis to support the imposition of sanctions. As to the procedural

shortcomings of Sadiq’s requests, Sadiq cites Civil Rule 11 but fails to explain

the applicability of Civil Rule 11 to bankruptcy appeals, which generally are

governed by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (Bankruptcy Rule(s))

and those Civil Rules that the Bankruptcy Rules specifically incorporate. See

Sadiq’s Initial Brief at 8; see generally Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8001 et seq. Notably,

the Bankruptcy Rules do not incorporate Civil Rule 11, see generally Fed. R.

Bankr. P. 1001 et seq., but in any event, both Civil Rule 11 and Bankruptcy

Rule 9011 require that a request for sanctions “be made separately from any

other motion,” “describe the specific conduct that allegedly violates” the rule,

and be served on the adverse party under the relevant Bankruptcy or Civil Rule

(Bankruptcy Rule 7004 in bankruptcy proceedings and Civil Rule 5 in civil

5 Sadiq made his first request in this Court for the imposition of sanctions against the

Bankruptcy Judge in his First Appeal Notice, in which he requested the imposition of $500,000

in sanctions. See First Appeal Notice at 2.

proceedings). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011(c). Sadiq’s

requests for sanctions against the Bankruptcy Judge are not “made separately

from any other motion or request,” see Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011(c)(2)(A); instead,

they are simply embedded into other filings—first his First Appeal Notice, then

in his briefs on the merits of his First Appeal, and again in response to the

Bankruptcy Judge’s Response and Motion. See First Appeal Notice at 2; Sadiq’s

Initial Brief at 8; Sadiq’s Reply Brief at 7; Sadiq’s Response at 5. As to the legal

basis for the imposition of sanctions, Sadiq fails to explain why, even if the

Bankruptcy Court violated his due process or equal protection rights by

entering the 101A Order, the imposition of sanctions against the Bankruptcy

Judge would be an appropriate remedy.6 Under Bankruptcy Rule 8013, a

motion made on appeal “must state with particularity the grounds for the

motion, the relief sought, and the legal argument supporting it.” Fed. R. Bankr.

P. 8013(a)(2); see also Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681

(11th Cir. 2014) (“We have long held that an appellant abandons a claim when

he either makes only passing references to it or raises it in a perfunctory

manner without supporting arguments and authority.”). Although Sadiq cites

In re Sutton and provides a partial transcript of a hearing from that case, absent

6 The Court emphasizes that at this time, it need not and does not address the merits

of Sadiq’s appeal or whether the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment is due to be reversed on due

process or equal protection grounds.

from the discussion and decision reproduced in that transcript is any mention

of when or why the imposition of sanctions against a United States Bankruptcy

Judge would be proper. See generally Sadiq’s Initial Brief at 13–80 (the partial

transcript of a proceeding in In re Sutton); see also Case No. 3:23-bk-334-JAB

(M.D. Fla. Bankr.), Doc. 62 (the complete transcript of the proceeding). No other

legal basis for Sadiq’s request for the imposition of sanctions against the

Bankruptcy Judge is apparent.7 In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes

that Sadiq’s requests for the imposition of sanctions against the Bankruptcy

Judge are due to be stricken.

In the Bankruptcy Judge’s Response and Motion, he also moves to be

dismissed from the First Appeal because he “is not a proper party to this appeal

and the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him, due to defective service.”

See Bankruptcy Judge’s Response and Motion at 2–3. Sadiq does not respond

to this argument in his response, nor does he argue that the Bankruptcy Judge

is properly designated as an appellee. See generally Sadiq’s Response. Indeed,

7 In the concluding paragraph of Sadiq’s Initial Brief, he states, “[s]anctions pursuant

to IN re: Paul Mann Case No. 03-82973 Bankr. M.D. N.C.” See Sadiq’s Initial Brief at 10.

Sadiq does not explain the relevance of the cited bankruptcy docket, nor identify any

particular proceeding of relevance in that case, but he may be referring to In re Mann, No.

03-82973 C-13, 2004 WL 574354 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Mar. 8, 2004). In that case, the bankruptcy

court sanctioned a creditor for violating the automatic stay. The Court finds the case has no

applicability to whether the imposition of sanctions against the Bankruptcy Judge would be

proper.

Sadiq provides no authority to support the proposition that a bankruptcy judge

may properly be designated as an appellee in the appeal of one of the

bankruptcy judge’s orders. The Court concludes that the Bankruptcy Judge is

due to be dismissed as an appellee because Sadiq has failed to explain why his

designation is proper and because the Bankruptcy Judge is immune from

Sadiq’s requests for monetary relief.

Although Sadiq describes his requests for money from the Bankruptcy

Judge as requests for sanctions, in essence Sadiq seeks damages arising from

the Bankruptcy Judge’s entry of the 101A Order, which Sadiq contends violated

his constitutional rights. But judges—including United States Bankruptcy

Judges—are immune from suit for such damages. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.

547, 553–54 (1967), overruled in part on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982) (“Few doctrines were more solidly established at

common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts

committed within their judicial jurisdiction … .”); see also Bush v. Wash. Mut.

Bank, 177 F. App’x 16, 17 (11th Cir. 2006) (applying judicial immunity in

affirming the dismissal of an action against a United States Bankruptcy

Judge).8 “As early as 1872, the Court recognized that it … [is] ‘a general

8 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent; however, they

may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a particular point. See

McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 2022); see generally Fed. R. App. P.

principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that

a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, [should] be free to

act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences

to himself.’” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355 (1978) (second alteration in

original) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871)). For these reasons,

the Supreme Court has determined that judges cannot be held liable for their

judicial acts even if those acts are corrupt, done with malice or in excess of the

judges’ jurisdiction. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 356; see also Wahl v. McIver, 773

F.2d 1169, 1172 (11th Cir. 1985). “Judges are entitled to absolute judicial

immunity from damages for those acts taken while they are acting in their

judicial capacity unless they acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”

William B. Cashion Nev. Spendthrift Tr. v. Vance, 552 F. App’x 884, 885–86

(11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000)).9

32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36–2 (“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they

may be cited as persuasive authority.”).

9 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that strong public policy

arguments support upholding the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity:

In Stump, the Supreme Court recognized a two-part test to be used in

determining whether a judge is absolutely immune from potential civil liability.

See Stump, 435 U.S. at 356–62. The reviewing court must ask whether the

judge was acting in a judicial capacity while dealing with the plaintiff, and

whether the judge acted in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. at 356–57,

360. Only in circumstances where a judge acted in the “clear absence of all

jurisdiction” or dealt with the plaintiff in a non-judicial capacity can the judge

face civil liability for actions taken. See id. at 356–62.

Applying this framework, the Court readily concludes that judicial

immunity bars Sadiq’s requests for the imposition of sanctions against the

Bankruptcy Judge. In striking Sadiq’s Form 101A, the Bankruptcy Judge

performed the normal judicial function of managing his docket and he engaged

First, and foremost, a judge must be free to act upon his own convictions,

without apprehension of personal consequences; second, the controversiality

and importance of the competing interests in a case before a court make it likely

that the losing party may be overly willing to ascribe malevolent motives to the

judge; third, judges faced with the prospect of defending damages actions and,

perhaps, satisfying money judgments would be driven to wasteful and

destructive self-protection devices and, moreover, may be less inclined to

administer justice; fourth, alternative remedies such as appeal and

impeachment reduce the need for private rights of action against judges; and

fifth, the ease of alleging bad faith would make a qualified “good faith”

immunity virtually worthless because judges would constantly be forced to

defend their motivations in court.

Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 949 (11th Cir. 1985).

with Sadiq in a purely judicial capacity. Id. at 356–57; see also Bush, 177 F.

App’x at 17–18 (“[I]ssuing an order is one of the ‘paradigmatic judicial acts

involved in resolving disputes between parties who have invoked the

jurisdiction of a court.’” (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988)).

Notably, a United States Bankruptcy Judge has explicit statutory authority to

“issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry

out the provisions of [the Bankruptcy Code].” 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). When the

Bankruptcy Judge struck Sadiq’s Form 101A, he exercised that authority in a

judicial capacity. Moreover, Sadiq does not contend that the Bankruptcy Judge

was acting in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. See generally Sadiq’s Initial

Brief; Sadiq’s Response; Sadiq’s Reply Brief. Nor could he, considering that the

Bankruptcy Judge had jurisdiction over Sadiq’s Chapter 13 case. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 157(b). Indeed, even if the Bankruptcy Judge struck Sadiq’s Form 101A in

error or with malice, judicial immunity would bar Sadiq from seeking relief

against him for that act. See William B. Cashion Nevada Spendthrift Trust, 552

F. App’x at 886 (“A judge is entitled to immunity ‘even when the judge’s acts are

in error, malicious, or were in excess of his or her jurisdiction.’” (quoting Bolin,

225 F.3d at 1239)). Having determined that the requests for the imposition of

sanctions against the Bankruptcy Judge are due to be stricken and noting that

the Bankruptcy Judge is entitled to judicial immunity for requests for damages

arising out of his striking Sadiq’s Form 101A, the Court concludes that the

Bankruptcy Judge is due to be dismissed from the First Appeal.

In resolving the request for relief set forth in the Bankruptcy Judge’s

Response and Motion, the Court emphasizes that at this time, the Court does

not address the merits of Sadiq’s appeals. Instead, the Court simply

determines that the requests for sanctions against the Bankruptcy Judge are

due to be stricken and the Bankruptcy Judge to be dismissed from this action.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. Hon. Jason Burgess’s Response to Appellant’s Opening Brief, and

Motion to Strike Demand for Sanctions (Case No.

3:24-cv-1025-MMH, Doc. 11) is GRANTED to the extent Appellant,

Qadiyr Sadiq’s requests for the imposition of sanctions against the

Honorable Jason Burgess (Case No. 3:24-cv-1025-MMH, Doc. 9 at

2, Doc. 10 at 8, Doc. 14 at 7, and Doc. 16 at 5; Case No.

3:24-cv-775-MMH, Doc. 1 at 2, Doc. 2 at 8, Doc. 9 at 7, and Doc. 11

at 5) are STRICKEN and the Honorable Jason Burgess is

DISMISSED as an appellee from Case No. 3:24-cv-775-MMH.

2. In all other respects, Sadiq’s appeals are TAKEN UNDER

ADVISEMENT.

3. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to terminate U.S. Courts

as an appellee in Case No. 3:24-cv-775-MMH.

4. When making future filings, the parties are DIRECTED to use the

case caption used in this Order.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida this 26th day of

September, 2025.

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD

United States District Judge

1e33

Copies to:

Pro Se Party

Counsel of Record

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