Opinion

Maxwell v. Tuskegee University (MAG+)

Court: District Court, M.D. Alabama
Filed: Aug 29, 2025
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 39.5%

explaining that “evidence of only a tagalong ‘forbidden consideration’ cannot meet [the] summary judgment burden”

How later courts described this case

explaining that “evidence of only a tagalong ‘forbidden consideration’ cannot meet [the] summary judgment burden”
“Stated another way, a plaintiff must prove that had she not complained, she would not have been fired.”
“The standards for judging hostility are intended to be ‘sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII does not become a “general civility code.”’”
discussing “the common-sense rule that the context of offending words or conduct is essential to the Title VII analysis”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

MIA MAXWELL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:23-cv-472-ECM-CWB

)

TUSKEGEE UNIVERSITY, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. Introduction

Mia Maxwell, acting pro se, filed this action on August 8, 2023 to assert claims against

Tuskegee University, Reginald Ruffin, and Kymberly Holland arising out of her employment

as Tuskegee University’s Title IX Coordinator. (See Doc. 1). Each of the defendants now has

moved for summary judgment. (See Docs. 58, 60, & 62). Upon careful review and consideration,

the Magistrate Judge will recommend that the motions be granted such that summary judgment

is entered in favor of all defendants on all claims.

II. Jurisdiction

Because Counts 1, 2, and 3 seek relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by

28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising

under the … laws… of the United States.”). Count 4 arises under Alabama state law but is

“so related to” the federal law claims that it forms “part of the same case or controversy.”

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). No defendant has contested personal jurisdiction or venue, and the

record evidence is adequate to support both. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391; Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A).

III. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute “is ‘genuine’ if the record as a whole could lead a reasonable trier

of fact to find for the nonmoving party… . [A fact] is ‘material’ if it might affect the outcome of

the case under the governing law.” Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489,

1496 (11th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).

The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for the motion.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323 (1986). That responsibility includes identifying the portions of the record illustrating the

absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Id. Alternatively, a movant who does not have

a trial burden of production can simply assert that the nonmoving party “cannot produce

admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56

advisory committee’s note (“Subdivision (c)(1)(B) recognizes that a party need not always point

to specific record materials. … [A] party who does not have the trial burden of production may

rely on a showing that a party who does have the trial burden cannot produce admissible evidence

to carry its burden as to the fact.”). Under either scenario, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving

party to establish that a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to each element of the underlying

claims. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).

To establish a genuine dispute of material fact, the nonmoving party must produce such

evidence as would be sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to return a verdict in its favor. See

Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001); Josendis v.

Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1315 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Once the moving

party makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to rebut that showing

by producing affidavits or other relevant and admissible evidence beyond the pleadings.”).

When evaluating whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the court must view all of the

evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all justifiable inferences from the

evidence in the nonmovant’s favor. See McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234,

1243 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Nonetheless, “[w]hen opposing parties tell

two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable

jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a

motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

IV. Factual Background1

Plaintiff was hired by Tuskegee University to serve in the role of its Title IX Coordinator

on or about November 15, 2021. (Doc. 64-2 at p. 40). At that time, the position was within the

External Affairs and General Counsel office, reported to Tuskegee University’s General Counsel,

and involved overseeing Title IX complaints/investigations, developing and providing Title IX

training, and ensuring compliance with Title IX reporting requirements. (Id.; Doc. 64-3 at

pp. 2-6). A determination later was made that having the Title IX Coordinator report to the

General Counsel presented a conflict of interest (Doc. 64-1 at pp. 14-16), and direct reporting

from the Title IX Coordinator was transferred to Tuskegee University’s Chief Operating Officer

and Vice President for Student Affairs, Dr. Rolundus Rice, in December 2022 (id.; Doc. 64-10 at

p. 2). Plaintiff was informed of the change by Tuskegee University President Charlotte Morris

on December 8, 2022. (Doc. 64-6 at p. 36).

1 The facts as stated herein are taken from the evidentiary exhibits attached to the parties’

summary judgment filings, reflect the facts deemed material to a proper resolution of the

summary judgment issues, and are construed most favorably to Plaintiff.

In the summer of 2022, Plaintiff approached Tuskegee University’s Athletic Director,

Reginald Ruffin, regarding the nonrenewal of a student’s scholarship and a potential violation

of NCAA requirements for providing such students with prompt written notice. (Doc. 64-1 at

pp. 25-28). After an in-person meeting, Plaintiff sent Ruffin an email summarizing her

concerns and recommending that the student’s scholarship be reinstated. (Doc. 64-3 at pp. 14-15).

Ruffin responded, “[i]t’s however the University would like to proceed I have no complaints”

but “[i]f you going to give it to him then give it to all the student athletes in the same situation

just my opinion.” (Id. at p. 14). Plaintiff replied, “[i]f there are other students who are similarly

situated then the awards should be reinstated.” (Id.). The exchange concluded with the following

email from Ruffin to Plaintiff:

Well all of them in every sport and I said this is going to get ugly. I’m forwarding

to the NCAA because to cover myself you are suggesting it’s a NCAA violation

and for my career and protection I need for them to be fully aware. This doesn’t

look good and I want to be fair with this process for everyone. This is the way it

has taken place every year here and with all athletic coaches.

(Id.).

On August 20, 2022, Plaintiff spoke with Ruffin about another student’s allegations against

an assistant football coach. (Doc. 64-1 at pp. 28-32). During the ensuing five-minute conversation

in Ruffin’s office, Ruffin allegedly “started talking … about what [female students] wear, and

inappropriate outfits, and [how] he doesn’t take meetings with women in the office because

women will complain about sexual harassment.” (Id. at p. 29). Ruffin further allegedly told

Plaintiff that female students’ clothing “invit[ed] men to say things to them.” (Id. at p. 30).

Ruffin denies making those statements. (Doc. 64-8 at pp. 4-5, ¶ 8).

After the conversation in his office, Ruffin allowed Plaintiff to speak with the coaches to

discuss Title IX issues generally. (Id. at p. 30). Plaintiff then met privately with the coach against

whom a specific allegation had been made. (Id. at pp. 31-32). The coach went home afterward

rather than to a scheduled scrimmage—but the parties dispute whether he was expressly instructed

to do so by Plaintiff. (Doc. 64-1 at p. 32; Doc. 64-8 at p. 6, ¶ 13). The following day, Ruffin sent

an email to Plaintiff, General Counsel Crystal James, and Tuskegee University President Morris

stating as follows:

Good morning Attorney James,

On yesterday I was informed about a situation with one of my coaches and

Mrs. Maxwell came to the office to discuss and meet with the assistant coach

and with my entire staff. I want to be very clear in asking is there a[n] investigation

ongoing and my assistant coach was sent home by Mrs Maxwell. I was not notified

by HR nor the General Counsel that it was an investigation ongoing and that he

needed to go home. I’m just trying to follow policies and procedures and protocol

mandated in the faculty and staff handbook. As stated by Mrs Maxwell I’m not

liked at Tuskegee University and I’m ok with that because I’m here in be a servant

to these students, athletes, staff, and this university. More importantly do the job I

was hired and assigned to do from President Morris. It’s not a popularity contest

for me. I had to leave to speak at the Montgomery Tuskegee Alumni Luncheon on

yesterday at 12:30pm but I asked Mrs Maxwell to contact me if she needed anything

else from me. Once I arrived at the scrimmage at Auburn University the assistant

coach informed me he had to go home and could not be at work. I just need to

know what to tell him because he’s called and asked when should he come back to

work. There’s a lot of missing pieces and just want to be on the same page. We are

in this together and I will follow your guidance on this matter.

(Doc. 64-3 at p. 17). James responded that “[n]o one other than the Chief Human Resources

Officer or President Morris has the authority to unilaterally send home an employee.” (Id. at

p. 16).

On August 22, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Ruffin with Tuskegee University’s

Chief Human Resources Officer, Cassandra Tarver-Ross, alleging that Ruffin’s July 27, 2022

and August 21, 2022 emails constituted “harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII.”

(Doc. 64-3 at pp. 18-33). After investigating, Tarver-Ross “determined that the complaint

[was] unsubstantiated.” (Id. at p. 34). Plaintiff next filed a Charge of Discrimination with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on November 21, 2022 asserting that Ruffin’s

conduct constituted “harassment and intimidation … on the basis of [her] sex [that] created a

hostile work environment in which the terms and conditions of [her] employment [were] altered.”

(Id. at pp. 71-72). On June 23, 2023, a Determination and Notice of Rights letter was issued by

the EEOC. (Id. at pp. 75-76). After Plaintiff received the EEOC’s right to sue letter, Dr. Rice

allegedly “encouraged [her] not to move forward with it and just kind of let things go” and

suggested that she “should not take that drastic step [of litigation] because it would make

things worse in his estimation.” (Doc. 64-1 at pp. 50-51). Plaintiff nonetheless filed this action

on August 8, 2023. (See Doc. 1).

Plaintiff later was accused by a co-employee of providing alcoholic beverages to a

student during a September 23, 2023 football game—resulting in a verbal altercation between

Plaintiff and the co-employee that escalated until an on-duty law enforcement officer intervened.

(Doc. 64-1 at p. 57). The co-employee promptly filed an internal complaint against Plaintiff on

September 25, 2023, accusing her of “unlawful possession of alcohol and serious breach of

conduct with a colleague.” (Doc. 64-3 at pp. 80, 92; Doc. 64-1 at p. 58). On September 26, 2023,

Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave without pay while the complaint was investigated.

(Doc. 64-3 at pp. 80-81). An independent third-party investigator ultimately submitted a

written report concluding that Plaintiff “did engage in unacceptable behavior on Saturday,

September 23, 2023” and “violated the Code of Conduct Policy by initiating a verbal altercation

with [a co-employee], making rude, threating or offensive comments or actions towards a

staff member.” (Doc. 64-9 at pp. 3-4, ¶¶ 8-9; id. at pp. 29-30). During the investigation period,

it was separately discovered that Plaintiff had received an email from a co-employee containing

sensitive information pertaining to the Presidential search that was then underway by the

Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees. (Id. at ¶ 10; see also Doc. 64-10 at p. 4, ¶¶ 6-7 &

Doc. 64-6 at p. 53).

Based upon a combination of the investigative findings and discovery of the email,

Plaintiff’s employment was terminated. (Doc. 64-9 at p. 4, ¶ 11). Plaintiff was informed of the

termination by letter dated October 16, 2023:

I am writing to inform you of the completion of the investigation into a complaint

filed against you on September 25, 2023. … [I]t was determined that the claim

of a serious breach of acceptable behavior was substantiated. … Specifically,

you initiated a verbal altercation with a Tuskegee University staff employee by

making rude, threatening, or offensive comments or actions towards the staff

employee to which you acknowledged in writing. The investigation also uncovered

that you received confidential information that you were not authorized to receive

and failed to report to your supervisor. Accordingly, your employment as the

Title IX Coordinator for Tuskegee University will end October 16, 2023. This

termination is for cause based on a serious breach of acceptable behavior on

September 23, 2023, and breach of trust and unauthorized possession, use,

or copying of records that are property of Tuskegee University.

(Doc. 64-3 at p. 97). The employee who sent Plaintiff the email likewise was terminated “for

sharing confidential information with [Plaintiff].” (Doc. 64-9 at p. 5, ¶ 12; see also Doc. 64-6 at

pp. 54-55).

V. Discussion

The First Amended Complaint (Doc. 25) filed on October 27, 2023 asserts four claims:

Count 1 against Tuskegee University for allegedly violating Title VII by permitting a hostile

work environment (see id. at pp. 26-27); Count 2 against Tuskegee University for allegedly

violating Title VII by retaliating against her for engaging in protected activity (see id. at pp. 27-

29); Count 3 against Tuskegee University for allegedly violating Title IX by retaliating against

her for engaging in protected activity (see id. at pp. 29-32); and Count Four against Ruffin and

Kymberly Holland2 for allegedly defaming her (see id. at pp. 32-34).

2 Kymberly Holland at all relevant times was employed by Tuskegeee University as Coordinator

of Alumni Affairs and Reunion Programs. (See Doc. 64-7 at p. 2, ¶ 2). Holland’s only factual

involvement in the underlying events is discussed in Section V.B.2.

A. Count 1

In Count 1 for “Discrimination Harassment and Intimidation in Violation of Title VII,”

Plaintiff alleges that Tuskegee University “fail[ed] to provide a work environment free from

unlawful harassment and intimidation and fail[ed] to take any corrective action regarding the

harassment and intimidation by Reginald Ruffin directed at Plaintiff on the basis of her sex.”

(Doc. 25 at p. 26, ¶ 58). In opposing summary judgment (see Doc. 68 at p. 20), Plaintiff points to

three instances of conduct by Ruffin as constituting unlawful harassment and creating a hostile

work environment: (1) the July 27, 2022 email wherein Ruffin stated “this is going to get ugly”

(see Doc. 64-3 at pp. 14-15); (2) statements during the August 20, 2022 meeting wherein Ruffin

allegedly described female students as wearing “inappropriate outfits” that “invit[ed] men to say

things to them” (see Doc. 64-1 at pp. 29-30); and (3) the August 21, 2022 email wherein Ruffin

stated that Plaintiff had “sent home” one of his assistant football coaches (see Doc. 64-3 at p. 17).3

Under Title VII, employers are prohibited from “discriminat[ing] against any individual

with respect to [the] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of

such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Title VII has been held to prohibit “the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women

in employment, which includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive

environment.” Mendoza v. Borden, 195 F.3d 1238, 1244 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Harris v.

Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)); see also Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.,

594 F.3d 798, 809 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining that a “hostile work environment” can arise when

3 Plaintiff’s summary judgment opposition also references a Facebook post made by Ruffin

(see Doc. 68 at p. 21), but the content of the Facebook post cannot fairly be said to derogatory

toward women generally or Plaintiff specifically such that it might bolster an offensive

interpretation of the emails and statements giving rise to Plaintiff’s claim in Count 1.

“members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which

members of the other sex are not exposed”) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshores Svcs., Inc.,

523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)).

But “Title VII is not a civility code, and not all profane or sexual language or conduct will

constitute discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment.” Reeves, 594 F.3d at 807;

see also Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1245 (“[H]arassment constitutes sex discrimination only when

the harassment alters the terms or conditions of employment.”). “A plaintiff wishing to establish

a gender-based hostile work environment claim must show that: (1) she belongs to a protected

group; (2) she has been subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on her

gender; (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions

of employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5) the employer

is responsible for such an environment.” Galdamez v. DHL Air Exp. USA, 578 F. App’x 887,

896 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Reeves, 594 F.3d at 808). Tuskegee University argues that Plaintiff

has not provided sufficient evidence of the third and fourth elements. (See Doc. 59 at p. 14).

1. Whether Ruffin’s conduct was based on gender

When assessing a claim for unlawful harassment under Title VII, courts do not consider

“[i]nnocuous statements or conduct, or boorish ones that do not relate to the sex of the actor or of

the offended party.” Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 583 (11th Cir. 2000) overruled

on other grounds as recognized by Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 973-74 (11th Cir. 2008).

Rather, the alleged conduct must have a “sexual or other gender-related connotation[] to be

actionable.” Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1247; see also Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ala.,

480 F.3d 1287, 1301 (11th Cir. 2007) (“It would be paradoxical to permit a plaintiff to prevail

on a claim of discrimination based on indiscriminate conduct.”); Ambus v. AutoZoners, LLC,

71 F. Supp. 3d 1280, 1299-30 (M.D. Ala. 2014) (limiting analysis of a hostile work environment

claim to harassment that was based on a protected characteristic). The context of a comment or

conduct informs whether it is based on the alleged victim’s sex or gender. See, e.g., Tonkyro v.

Sec’y, Dept. of Veterans Affs., 995 F.3d 828, 838 (11th Cir. 2021) (finding that alleged conduct

did not amount to actionable harassment when viewed in the surrounding context); see also Reeves,

594 F.3d at 810 (discussing “the common-sense rule that the context of offending words or conduct

is essential to the Title VII analysis”); see also Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81-82 (“The real social

impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances,

expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words

used or the physical acts performed.”).

Ruffin’s emails of July 27, 2022 and August 21, 2022 cannot be deemed gender-based

so as to amount to Title VII harassment. Plaintiff construes the phrase “this is going to get ugly”

as “threatened physical and/or professional harm … meant to intimate and harass her … on the

basis of her sex.” (Doc. 25 at p. 26, ¶ 58). But nothing in the phrase “this is going to get ugly” or

the context of the email as a whole contains a “sexual or other gender-related connotation[].”

Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1247. Nor does the context of the email reasonably suggest a threat.

The phrase “this is going to get ugly” pertains to a potential action being proposed by Plaintiff that

would require the reinstatement of financial awards to all qualifying athletes in every sport.

(Doc. 64-3 at p. 14). Ruffin’s email statement that Plaintiff directed a coach to go home likewise

contains no type of “sexual or other gender-related connotation[].” Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1247.

Moreover, even construed most favorably to Plaintiff, the facts of record are insufficient to support

a reasonable inference that Ruffin sent the July 27, 2022 email or the August 21, 2022 email

because Plaintiff was a woman or that he would have used different language had Plaintiff not

been a woman. See Ambus, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 1300 (recognizing that statements and conduct not

expressly related to a protected characteristic “may sometimes constitute … harassment” but

explaining that “there must be a surrounding context in which it is clear that a comment is

‘intended as a[n] … insult’”). Here, Plaintiff admits that her interpretation is based on conjecture

(Doc. 64-1 at pp. 35, 41) and that another potential motivation was possible (id. at pp. 28, 36).

As to Ruffin’s alleged August 20, 2022 statements to Plaintiff regarding female students’

attire and women making false allegations of sexual harassment, the Eleventh Circuit has found

that gender specific comments can constitute harassment even if “not directed specifically at”

the alleged victim. Reeves, 594 F.3d at 811-13 (finding that frequent use of the “terms ‘whore,’

‘bitch,’ and ‘cunt,’” along with “vulgar discussion of women’s breasts, nipples, and buttocks”

and displaying a “pornographic image of a woman,” could support a reasonable inference

of “repeated and intentional discrimination directed at women as a group”). Ruffin’s alleged

statements from August 20, 2022 therefore potentially could serve as the necessary predicate for

a harassment claim based on gender. Gupta, 212 F.3d at 583 (“[T]he statements and conduct must

be of a sexual or gender-related nature … before they are considered in determining whether the

severe or pervasive requirement is met.”).

2. Whether Ruffin’s conduct was severe or pervasive

Harassment must be “sever[e] or pervasive[]” to create a hostile work environment under

Title VII. Reeves, 594 F.3d at 808 (emphasis in original). “The environment must be one that

‘a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive’ and that ‘the victim ... subjectively perceive[s]

... to be abusive.’” Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1246 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21). To determine

whether harassment was severe or pervasive, courts consider the following non-exhaustive factors:

“(1) the frequency of the conduct; (2) the severity of the conduct; (3) whether the conduct is

physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and (4) whether the conduct

unreasonably interferes with the employee’s job performance.” Id. Because these factors cannot

be applied with “mathematical precision,” courts must consider the “totality of the circumstances.”

Smelter v. S. Home Care Servs. Inc., 904 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations

and citations omitted). Generally, “[o]ne isolated incident of … inappropriate behavior will not

amount to actionable … harassment unless the incident is ‘extremely serious.’” McMillian v.

Postmaster Gen., U.S. Postal Serv., 634 F. App’x 274, 277 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Faragher v.

City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)).

Harassment is severe when it egregiously violates social norms and pervasive when it

repeatedly occurs. See Reeves, 594 F.3d at 811-12; see also Smelter, 904 F.3d at 1285-87

(finding that hearing racist comments daily and being directly called a demeaning racial epithet

could constitute severe and pervasive harassment). But harassment is not severe or pervasive

when it is minimally offensive or occurs on a limited basis. McMillian, 634 F. App’x at 277

(finding that “one-time, ambiguous comment was insufficiently severe to amount to actionable

sexual harassment”); Cheatham v. Dekalb Cnty., Ga., 682 F. App’x 881, 888 (11th Cir. 2017)

(finding statements from a male captain to a female firefighter that “the only reason why a woman

is in the fire service is to cook and do clerical work” and that he “didn’t want a woman riding

on his [fire truck]” were insufficient evidence of severe or pervasive harassment); Jackson v.

Ala. Dep’t of Corrs., 643 F. App’x 889, 892 (11th Cir. 2016) (finding that three or four instances

of supervisor asking the plaintiff to sit close to him “after tightening his pants around his crotch

displaying the outline of his genitals,” two instances of standing so close to the plaintiff that

she “could feel his breath on the back of her neck,” and four instances of telling the plaintiff

that she “looked good or smelled good” were not severe or pervasive enough to constitute a

hostile work environment).

Even construed most favorably to Plaintiff, the conduct at issue in this case is not so

objectively severe or pervasive to be actionable—regardless of how strong Plaintiff’s subjective

views might be (see Doc. 68 at p. 22). First, the alleged harassment was not sufficiently

“frequen[t].” Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1246; see also McMillian, 634 F. App’x at 277; compare

Smelter, 904 F.3d at 1285. Additionally, the alleged conduct was not sufficiently “sever[e].”

Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1246; see also Jackson, 643 F. App’x at 892; compare Reeves,

594 F.3d at 811-12. Third, Ruffin’s statements cannot reasonably be deemed as “physically

threatening or humiliating.” Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1246. Viewed in context, Ruffin’s statements

on August 20, 2022 at most could be characterized as an isolated offensive utterance. Mendoza,

195 F.3d at 1246; see also Gupta, 212 F.3d at 585. Although Plaintiff does assert that her

complaint against Ruffin affected her job duties (see Doc. 68 at p. 23), she does not indicate that

any harassment by Ruffin affected her job performance. Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1246. The court

also is required to “view the evidence ‘cumulatively and in the totality of the circumstances,’”

Smelter, 904 F.3d at 1285 (quoting Reeves, 594 F.3d at 808), which here must include a recognition

that all of the conduct alleged against Ruffin occurred over a span of approximately one month

and did not permeate Plaintiff’s two-year period of employment)—weighing strongly against the

extent of its pervasiveness and impact. (See Doc. 64-1 at pp. 38, 36).

B. Count 2

In Count 2 for “Retaliation in Violation of Title VII,” Plaintiff alleges multiple adverse

actions by Tuskegee University taken in retaliation for protected activity. (Doc. 25 at pp. 27-29,

¶¶ 61-62). Title VII prohibits “employer retaliation on account of an employee’s having opposed,

complained of, or sought remedies for, unlawful workplace discrimination.” Univ. of Tex. Sw.

Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 342 (2013) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). Most commonly,

to prevail on a Title VII retaliation claim “[t]he plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case of

retaliation, showing (1) that she engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) that she suffered

an adverse action, and (3) that the adverse action was causally related to the protected activity.”

Patterson v. Ga. Pac., LLC, 38 F.4th 1336, 1344-45 (11th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).

The burden then shifts to the employer “to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason

or reasons for the retaliation.” Id. at 1345. The plaintiff in turn must show “that each reason is

merely a pretext and that the real reason was retaliation.” Id. Alternatively, a plaintiff may

demonstrate circumstantial evidence that presents a “convincing mosaic” of unlawful retaliation.

See Yelling v. St. Vincent’s Health Sys., 82 F.4th 1329, 1342 (11th Cir. 2023). Regardless of the

approach taken, the burden of persuasion is upon the plaintiff to demonstrate “that his or her

protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.” Nassar,

570 U.S. at 360; see also Yelling, 82 F.4th at 1340 (explaining that “evidence of only a tagalong

‘forbidden consideration’ cannot meet [the] summary judgment burden”) (citation omitted).

1. Suspension and termination of employment

It is not disputed that Plaintiff submitted an internal complaint against Ruffin on

August 22, 2022 purporting to assert violations of Title VII. (See Doc. 64-9 at pp. 2-3, 8). Nor is

it disputed that Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC on November 21, 2022.

(See Doc. 64-3 at pp. 71-72). It appears from Plaintiff’s summary judgment opposition that she is

basing her retaliation claim upon the suspension and termination of her employment following

those events. (See Doc. 68 at pp. 25-27). However, Plaintiff has not presented evidence that would

reasonably support a conclusion that protected activity was a but-for cause of such adverse

employment actions. See Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 924 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Stated

another way, a plaintiff must prove that had she not complained, she would not have been fired.”).

The record reflects that Tuskegee University suspended Plaintiff in late September 2023

in response to a written complaint submitted by a co-employee regarding an incident that occurred

during a September 23, 2023 football game. (See Doc. 64-9 at pp. 3, 24). The complaint alleged

that Plaintiff provided an alcoholic beverage to a student and also initiated a verbal altercation

with a co-employee that resulted in law enforcement intervention. (See Doc. 64-9 at pp. 24-25).

An independent investigation reported that the allegation regarding alcohol could not be

substantiated but that Plaintiff admitted to initiating an altercation and making a threatening

statement toward a co-employee, i.e., “We can go right here.” (Doc. 64-9 at pp. 29, 42, 46).

The report from the investigation further noted that Tuskegee University’s disciplinary action

guidelines provided as follows: “Any employee whose conduct, actions or performance violates

or conflicts with Tuskegee University’s policies may be terminated immediately and without

waiting”; and “Dismissal of an employee: Fighting or serious breach of acceptable behavior.”

(Id. at p. 30). And while the independent investigation was taking place during September and

October 2023, Plaintiff’s supervisor discovered that Plaintiff had received an email from a

co-employee containing sensitive information related to official Tuskegee University affairs.

(Id.; see also id. at p. 4).

Upon completion of the independent investigation, Tuskegee University issued a letter

to Plaintiff dated October 16, 2023 terminating her employment and informing her that the

investigation had confirmed that “you initiated a verbal altercation with a Tuskegee University

staff employee by making rude, threatening, or offensive comments or actions towards the staff

employee.” (Id. at p. 48). The termination letter also stated that the decision was being based

upon receipt of “confidential information that you were not authorized to receive[] and failed

to report to your supervisor.” (Id.). The record further reflects that the other employee involved

in the unauthorized transmission of confidential information likewise was terminated promptly.

(Id. at p. 5; see also id. at p. 51: “Specifically, you shared Board of Trustee confidential information

that you were not authorized to share with another Tuskegeee University employee and failed

to report to your supervisor that you shared the information.”).

When an employer defendant proffers a reason for termination that “might motivate a

reasonable employer,” the plaintiff “must meet that reason head on and rebut it.” Gogel v.

Kia Mfg. of Ga, Inc., 967 F.3d 1121, 1136 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Chapman v. Al Transp.,

229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)). Stated differently, “a plaintiff must demonstrate

such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the

employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find

them unworthy of credence.” Id. Plaintiff thus must point to evidence that would be sufficient

to overcome the official explanation for her suspension and termination and that would permit

a reasonable conclusion of protected activity as an actual but-for cause.

Plaintiff references a conversation with Tuskegee University personnel in the aftermath

of her EEOC charge as a basis to discount the justifications set out in the termination letter.

(See Doc. 68 at p. 26). Plaintiff contends that she was told by Dr. Rice that her continued success

and employment could be negatively impacted by proceeding with a lawsuit and that someone had

made a suggestion to “just fire her and deal with the fallout.” (Id.). Plaintiff’s sworn testimony,

however, undermines her allegation of what was said in that regard. (See Doc. 64-1 at p. 51: “He

was very vague. It was unclear whether that was his impression or his opinion of what to do or

if somebody else had shared that with him.”). Even to the extent a most favorable construction

of the evidence might suggest that Dr. Rice attempted to dissuade Plaintiff from filing a

discrimination lawsuit or that some other unknown person possibly suggested Plaintiff’s

termination in connection with protected activity, there simply is no evidence that either Dr. Rice

or such other person was the ultimate decisionmaker or had any influence on the termination

decision. See Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1270 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Where a

decisionmaker conducts his own evaluation and makes an independent decision, his decision is

free of the taint of a biased subordinate employee.”). Nor would the timing of the suspension and

termination alone be sufficient. See Yelling, 82 F.4th at 1341 (citing Gogel, 967 F.3d at 1137 n.15:

“[T]emporal proximity alone is insufficient.”). Under these circumstances, and additionally

considering that an independent investigation concluded that intervening events warranted

termination, it would not be reasonable to conclude that protected activity was a but-for cause

of the adverse actions about which Plaintiff is complaining—regardless of whether addressed

through burden shifting or a convincing mosaic analysis. See Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP,

84 F.4th 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2023) (“[T]he intervening discovery of employee misconduct can

sever the causal inference created by close temporal proximity.”). Put simply, there is no evidence

that Plaintiff did not engage in the cited conduct or that she would not have been suspended and

terminated for the cited reasons in the absence of any preceding protected activity. See Joseph v.

Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 121 F.4th 855, 873 (11th Cir. 2024) (“[Plaintiff’s] strained

inferences of a predetermined outcome, manipulation, and disbelief cannot rebut the Board’s

legitimate reasons for terminating her.”).

Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that her burden is merely to demonstrate that “retaliation was

a motivating factor for the defendant’s adverse employment action.” (Doc. 68 at pp. 30-34) (citing

Quigg v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2016)). But that standard—

known as the mixed-motive theory—only permits liability for Title VII discrimination and

“does not apply to Title VII retaliation claims.” Yelling, 82 F.4th at 1338 (citing Nassar,

570 U.S. at 360) (emphasis added). “Rather, to succeed on her retaliation claim, [Plaintiff] must

show that her protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action,” which means

“that had she not [engaged in the protected activity], she would not have been fired.” Id.

(quotations and citations omitted). For the reasons set out above, Plaintiff as a matter of law cannot

make that required showing.

2. Retaliatory hostile work environment

In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Tuskegee University engaged in other forms of

retaliation such as “refusing to pay for [her] bar application fees,” “fail[ing] to inform [her]

of a meeting request from the university President for the purpose of making [her] appear

insubordinate,” “repeatedly encourag[ing] her to quit pursuing her legal claim,” and “creating a

retaliatory hostile work environment through an escalating pattern of retaliatory conduct.”

(Doc. 25 at pp. 27-28, ¶¶ 61-62). However, none of those allegations were argued in her

summary judgment opposition. (See Doc. 68 at pp. 24-29). It is well settled that a party waives

any argument that is not asserted in the brief in opposition to summary judgment. See T.R. by

and through Brock v. Lamar Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 25 F.4th 877, 884-85 (11th Cir. 2022) (stating

that because the appellant “did not raise this argument before the district court in her brief in

opposition to the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment …, she waived this argument

below”); Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1329 (11th Cir. 2009) (“A party cannot readily complain

about the entry of a summary judgment order that did not consider an argument they chose not

to develop for the district court at the time of the summary judgment motions.”); Johnson v.

Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1264 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Plaintiffs moved for

final summary judgment … . Accordingly, it became incumbent upon the Intervenors to respond

by, at the very least, raising in their opposition papers any and all arguments or defenses they felt

precluded judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor.”). Any arguments for retaliation based upon conduct

other than the suspension and termination of Plaintiff’s employment thus have been abandoned

and are deemed waived. See Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding

claim abandoned where the plaintiff failed to discuss it in her initial opposition to the defendant’s

motion for summary judgment) (citation omitted); Bogle v. Ala. Law Enf’t Agency, No. 22-cv-256,

2023 WL 7190496, *4 n.4 (M.D Ala. Nov. 1, 2023) (finding argument abandoned where party

“gives it only one general sentence of reference in his summary judgment [opposition]”).

Regardless, the evidence of record would be insufficient to support a retaliatory hostile

work environment claim. A hostile work environment can constitute actionable retaliation if

it “might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of

discrimination.” Monaghan v. Worldpay US, Inc., 955 F.3d 855, 861 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting

Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)). But “petty slights or minor

annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees experience” do not constitute an

actionable retaliatory hostile work environment, and “a plaintiff must show that a reasonable

employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse.” Burlington, 548 U.S. at

68. All of the other allegedly retaliatory conduct listed in the Complaint could be described as

such “petty slights” or “minor annoyances.” See Harris v. Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin.,

611 F. App’x 949, 952-53 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding lowered performance evaluations, criticisms

from supervisor, and changing supervision organization were “petty and trivial actions” that

did not constitute a materially adverse action); see also Terrell v. Sec’y, Dep’t Veterans Affairs,

98 F.4th 1343, 1356 (11th Cir. 2024) (“The standards for judging hostility are intended to be

‘sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII does not become a “general civility code.”’”)

(quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)). The evidence of record

likewise is insufficient to establish protected activity as a but-for cause of any of the alleged

retaliatory conduct. (See Doc. 59 at pp. 19-20; see also Doc. 64-11 at pp. 4-7, ¶¶ 8, 10, 17).

C. Count 3

In Count 3 for “Retaliation in Violation of Title IX,” Plaintiff alleges that she suffered

unlawful retaliation from Tuskegee University in response to engaging in conduct protected under

Title IX. (See Doc. 25 at pp. 29-35, ¶¶ 64-72). Among the alleged retaliatory acts were that

“General Counsel interfer[ed] with the Title IX process” and “bec[ame] visibly angry with

Plaintiff in meetings and humiliat[ed] Plaintiff in front of students,” “provided directives to other

Tuskegee University officials that purposefully conflicted with the information provided by

[Plaintiff],” and “took over space utilized by Plaintiff for Title IX hearings and training leaving

Plaintiff without space to perform essential work functions thereby preventing Plaintiff from

performing her job duties successfully.” (Id. at p. 30, ¶ 68). Plaintiff additionally alleges that

“General Counsel also advised the Athletic Director and Head Football Coach to not allow

Plaintiff to conduct student athlete Title IX training.” (Id.). Finally, Plaintiff alleges that her

“direct supervisor threatened [her] with adverse employment consequences both before and after

filing the instant lawsuit” and “followed through with said threat and fired [her] when she both

refused to not pursue her claim in court and later informed him of a possible investigation into his

conduct that may violate the Tuskegee University Title IX Policy.” (Id.).

Although it has been held that claims under Title IX for employment discrimination are

preempted by the remedies available under Title VII, see Joseph, 121 F.4th at 867-70, Title IX

retaliation claims are not preempted by Title VII when based upon complaints asserting non-

employment Title IX violations, see Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 171 (2005)

(finding that Title IX provides a right of action for retaliation over an employee’s complaint

about discrimination against students); Blalock v. Dale Cnty. Bd. of Edu., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1291,

1300 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (“Plaintiff’s claim that she was retaliated against for complaining about

alleged Title IX violations survives Title VII’s preemption, because Plaintiff does not have a

remedy under Title VII for this claim.”). So, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to proceed

on a theory of Title IX retaliation unrelated to complaints about her own employment conditions,

she is not preempted.4

As with Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim, however, the only retaliatory conduct argued

in opposition to summary judgment is Plaintiff’s suspension and termination. (See Doc. 68 at

pp. 27-29). Also as with Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim, the record evidence is insufficient

to support a reasonable conclusion that protected activity was a but-for cause of those adverse

actions in light of the intervening events and independent investigation—despite the close

temporal proximity. And as with Plaintiff’s Title VII claim, all other potential examples of

retaliatory conduct alleged in the Complaint have been abandoned and otherwise would constitute

merely the type of “petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and

that all employees experience”—not any type of conduct that reasonably could deemed

“materially adverse” or that would dissuade protected activity. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68;

Monaghan, 955 F.3d at 861. The record further would preclude a finding that any of the other

instances reasonably could be deemed a but-for result of protected activity divorced from any

legitimate business motivation. (See Doc. 59 at pp. 19-20 & Doc. 64-11 at pp. 4-7, ¶¶ 8, 10, 17).5

4 Title IX provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded

from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any

education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a);

see also Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171 (“We consider here whether the private right of action implied

by Title IX encompasses claims of retaliation. We hold that it does.”).

5 The same substantive standard applies to retaliation claims under Title IX as those arising under

Title VII. See Joseph, 121 F.4th at 871; Blaylock, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 1309.

D. Count 4

Count 4 of the First Amended Complaint purports to assert claims for defamation against

two of Plaintiff’s co-employees. (See Doc. 25 at pp. 32-34, ¶¶ 73-76). It is firmly established

under Alabama law that defamation requires: “1) a false and defamatory statement concerning

the plaintiff; 2) an unprivileged communication of that statement to a third party; 3) fault

amounting to at least negligence on the part of the defendant; and 4) either actionability of the

statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication

of the statement.” Flickinger v. King, 385 So. 3d 504, 512 (Ala. 2023) (citations omitted).

1. Defamation claim against Ruffin

Plaintiff contends that Ruffin defamed her by making statements regarding her

management of a Title IX claim against an assistant football coach:

Defendant Reginald Ruffin defamed Plaintiff by publishing with malice

communications, as facts, to third parties that are false and defamatory regarding

Plaintiff’s management of a Title IX claim in her professional capacity as the Title

IX Coordinator causing harm to her professional reputation. Defendant Ruffin

communicated to several parties that Ms. Maxwell, a duly licensed attorney

engaged in the wrongful execution of her duties and made untrue statements about

[her], casting Ms. Maxwell as a liar. For an attorney who relies on her reputation,

an accusation of dishonesty and the failure to properly follow policy would be an

act of moral turpitude.

(See Doc. 25 at p. 33, ¶ 74). The allegations against Ruffin arise out of the August 21, 2022 email

that Ruffin sent jointly to Plaintiff, General Counsel James, and President Morris. (See Doc. 68 at

p. 35 & Doc. 63 at p. 6). In its entirety, the email provided as follows: