Archangel v. City of Houston

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT August 29, 2025

Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

Jeffery Archangel §

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § Civil Action 4:24-cv-03436

§

City of Houston, Texas; §

David J. Crowder; and §

Alexander S. Vinogradov, §

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

This case has been referred to the undersigned magistrate

judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Pending before the court

are Defendant City of Houston’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 25,

and Defendants David J. Crowder and Alexander S. Vinogradov’s

Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 26. The undersigned recommends that

both motions be GRANTED.

1. Background

Plaintiff Jeffrey Archangel is an aspiring rapper who alleges

that his promising career was derailed when Houston Police

Department detectives, David J. Crowder (Crowder) and

Alexander S. Vinogradov (Vinogradov), falsely arrested him for

robbery and murder. Archangel alleges that Vinogradov and

Crowder presented false information in probable cause affidavits

to secure his arrest for the crimes. The following facts come from

Archangel’s First Amended Complaint and the exhibits attached

thereto.

On February 22, 2017, a robber shot and killed store clerk

Javier Flores at a Subway restaurant in Houston, Texas. ECF

No. 18 at 4. Archangel alleges that Detectives Crowder and

Vinogradov responded to the scene; conducted an interview of

Flores’ mother, Hilda Vasquez; and wrote the original offense

report documenting the incident. Id. In the interview, Vasquez

informed Vinogradov that there were two robbers involved. Id. The

robber who shot her son was somewhere between 5’ 06”to 5’ 08” in

height and was around age “18s, 19s, 20.” ECF No. 18-1 at 103–

104. The second robber was shorter and younger than the shooter,

around 5’ 04” in height and 14 or 15 years old. Id. at 104. Vasquez

informed Vinogradov that she was holding a spray bottle when the

robbers entered the restaurant, but she could not recall if she

sprayed the robbers or not. Id. at 100–101.

Archangel alleges that Vinogradov entered a “wholly

inaccurate summary” of Vasquez’s description of the two suspects

in his March 11, 2017 supplement to the original offense report.

ECF No. 18 at 5. Vinogradov stated in the supplement that the

shooter was no older than 25 years of age. ECF No. 18 at 5.

Vinogradov also stated that the second, younger robber was no

more than 5’ 08” in height even though Vasquez stated that the

second robber was approximately 5’ 04”. Id. Vinogradov referenced

Vasquez’s interview in his supplement and attached it. ECF

No. 18-1 at 36–37.

Also on February 22, 2017, shortly after the Flores murder,

the suspects committed another robbery at a nearby Subway on

San Jacinto Street. ECF No. 18 at 6; ECF No. 18-1 at 114–16. The

responding officer, Officer Manzano, interviewed store clerk

Darrion Dent, who was working at the Subway when the two

suspects robbed him at gunpoint. ECF No. 18 at 6. Dent described

the robbers as juveniles aged 16 to 17. Id. Dent described one

suspect as around 4’ 11” in height. Dent described the other

suspect as around 5’ 05” or 5’ 06” in height. Id.

On March 24, 2017, Vinogradov and Crowder reviewed

Crime Stoppers tips on the Flores murder case. ECF No. 18 at 8.

An anonymous tip stated that the shooter in the Flores murder

case was named Derrick Welch Jr. Id. The tip also identified the

second robber by his nickname of “Little Joe.” Id. According to

Archangel, Welch died in February 2018 and was only 68 inches

tall and weighed 152 pounds. Id. Archangel also alleges that “Little

Joe” was likely Welch’s friend, Joe Nathan Vann, who was 5’ 06”

and weighed 120 pounds in 2018 when Vann was arrested on a

separate felony offense. Archangel alleges that, in contrast, he was

25 years old at the time of the offenses and was much taller and

heavier than the two suspects. Id.

Vinogradov and Crowder investigated the tip and

determined that Welch had been dating a woman named Eryka

Valentine—Archangel’s sister. ECF No. 18 at 9. On March 24,

2017, after determining where Valentine resided, Vinogradov

ordered a patrol officer to drive to Valentine’s apartment complex

to look for the Mazda Protégé car used in the February 2017

offenses. Id. The vehicle was located at the residence, and the

apartment manager informed the officer that the vehicle belonged

to the residents in Valentine’s apartment. Id. Crowder,

Vinogradov, and other HPD officers entered the apartment in

which Valentine stayed and encountered Welch. Id. The officers

found a handgun sitting on a table in the apartment’s living room.

Id. Subsequent testing linked the handgun to the ballistics

evidence recovered at the Flores murder scene. Id. at 10. The

officers also found a Texas identification card belonging to

Archangel on a blow-up mattress next to the living room table. Id.

During an interview with HPD officers, Welch denied ownership

of the handgun and stated that the composite sketch of the shooter

at the Flores murder scene looked like Archangel, though he was

not entirely sure. Id. at 9–10.

Vinogradov and Crowder prepared a photospread for Dent,

the store clerk at the San Jacinto Subway, to view and identify the

persons involved in the offenses. Archangel alleges that

Vinogradov and Crowder violated several identification

procedures. Archangel alleges that, when preparing a photospread

for Dent to review, Vinogradov and Crowder relied on a six-year-

old picture of Archangel, when his physical appearance and age

were more consistent with Vasquez’s and Dent’s descriptions of the

suspects. ECF No. 19 at 11. Archangel alleges that relying on an

old photograph of Archangel was contrary to HPD policies which

require the use of a “reasonably contemporary” photograph in a

photospread. Id. at 10–11. Archangel alleges that a recent

photograph of him could have been obtained online. Id. at 11.

Archangel also alleges that the detectives could have included him

in a live or video lineup that witnesses could view. Id. Archangel

maintains that his appearance from 2017 drastically differs from

his appearance in 2011 which was captured in the identification

card that Vinogradov and Crowder relied on for the photospread.

Id. at 11–12.

On March 29, 2017, Vinogradov and Crowder showed Dent

the photospread. Id. at 12. Archangel alleges that because

Vinogradov and Crowder did not videotape or record Dent’s

viewing of the photospread, they violated HPD policies requiring

the videotaping or recording of this procedure. Id. Archangel also

alleges that because Vinogradov and Crowder presented the

photospread to Dent, they violated HPD policies requiring that the

photospread procedure be conducted in a blind manner, i.e.,

conducted by someone not currently investigating the underlying

offense or knowledgeable about the suspects. Id.

Vinogradov’s report states that Dent made a positive

identification of Archangel from the photospread and reported that

Dent was “100% sure” that he had identified the correct person.

ECF No. 18-1 at 90. Dent described the shooter as having a large

scar under his left eye at the time of the robbery. Id. Dent also

pointed out that there was no scar visible in the photograph of

Archangel in the photospread. Id. Vinogradov’s report goes on to

state that, at the time that Dent described the scar, neither

Vinogradov nor Crowder knew that Archangel had a scar under

his eye. Id. Archangel’s 2017 booking photographs show a scar

under his eye. ECF No. 18 at 12. That is, Archangel had a scar

under his eye matching Dent’s description, and Dent identified

Archangel as “the guy that forced me to give him the money.” ECF

No. 18-1 at 90.

Archangel alleges that Vinogradov misrepresented the

results of Dent’s viewing of the photospread. ECF No. 18 at 13.

Archangel alleges that Dent never made a positive identification

of him from the photospread and further alleges that this alleged

discrepancy was not disclosed to Archangel until 2022, when he

received notes from Harris County prosecutors’ March and

September 2022 interviews with Dent. Id. According to prosecutor

notes that were released to Archangel in September 2022, Dent

was unable to identify any of the suspects when prosecutors asked

him to in March and September 2022. Id. Dent said that he

“doesn’t remember what [the robber] looked like,” and that he

“picked someone at random.” ECF No. 18-1 at 154. Dent later

clarified that it was “an over-exaggeration” to claim that he picked

someone at random. Id. at 155. The notes further reflect that Dent

vaguely recalled telling Vinogradov and Crowder about a scar that

the shooter had. Id. at 154. Dent said he doesn’t remember what

led him to pick Archangel that day and that it has “been years.”

Id. at 155. The notes do not indicate that Dent did not identify

Archangel during the 2017 photospread. Dent confirmed that he

did choose Archangel from the photospread in 2017. Id.

On April 5, 2017, the Harris County District Attorney’s

Office accepted aggravated robbery charges against Archangel

based on Vinogradov’s representations about probable cause. ECF

No. 18 at 14. Archangel accuses Vinogradov of misrepresenting in

his affidavit critical facts regarding probable cause, most notably

by stating that the photospread procedure was conducted in a

blinded manner and that Dent positively identified Archangel. Id.;

see also ECF No. 18-1 at 4. On April 8, 2017, police detained and

interviewed Archangel. ECF No. 18 at 14. Archangel alleges that

he denied involvement in both offenses and stated that Welch and

another unknown person committed the offenses. Id. Archangel

also alleges that he denied that the handgun found at the

apartment belonged to him. Archangel was arrested and booked

into the Harris County Jail. Id.

On May 4, 2017, the Harris County District Attorney’s Office

accepted capital murder charges against Archangel based on

Crowder’s probable cause statement. ECF No. 18 at 15; ECF

No. 18-1 at 7. Archangel alleges that Crowder’s probable cause

affidavit was “riddled with inaccuracies and omissions tailored to

create probable cause.” ECF No. 18 at 15. For example, Archangel

states that rather than including Vasquez’s full description of the

suspects, Crowder instead merely wrote that “Vasquez described

the two suspects as black males wearing hoodies and that one of

the suspects wore a mask.” Id. at 15 (citing ECF No. 18-1 at 7).

Archangel also alleges that Crowder falsely stated that Dent

identified Archangel as one of the suspects. Id. (citing ECF No.

18-1 at 7).

Crowder included additional information in his probable

cause affidavit. Crowder noted that he observed the suspects on

video and saw them park the Mazda Protégé across the street

before the robbery. ECF No. 18-1 at 7. Crowder noted that the

Mazda Protégé was parked at the apartment complex where

Valentine—Welch’s then-girlfriend and Archangel’s sister—lived.

Id. at 8. Crowder described finding the handgun used at the

murder scene in the apartment. Id. Crowder also noted that Welch

informed him that Archangel had purchased the gun and

threatened to kill Welch if Welch talked to police. Id.

On May 5, 2017, Archangel surrendered himself to law

enforcement. ECF No. 18 at 15. Archangel alleges that he

continued to deny involvement in the offenses. Id. at 15. Archangel

alleges that he informed Vinogradov and Crowder that on April 9,

2017—the day after Archangel was initially detained and

interviewed by HPD officers—Archangel’s friend, Kendell

Pitchford, recorded Welch confessing that he, rather than

Archangel, was the shooter in the Flores murder case. Id. at 16;

ECF No. 18-1 at 92. Vinogradov and Crowder then requested that

Pitchford come to the police station so that they could review the

recording on his phone. Id. Pitchford met with the detectives and

provided them a copy of the April 2017 recorded confession. Id.

Welch was recorded saying to Pitchford that Archangel had

nothing to do with the offenses. Id; see also ECF No. 18-1 at 182.

Archangel alleges that Vinogradov provided a false statement in

his offense report, which stated that “at no time in the confession

did Kendall [sic] speak to Derrick[.]” ECF No. 18 at 17; ECF No.

18-1 at 92.

Archangel alleges that Welch admitted to Vinogradov and

Crowder that he was the person speaking on the recording. ECF

No. 18-1 at 17. He claimed, however, that Archangel threatened

him into making the recording. Id. Archangel alleges that

Vinogradov and Crowder acknowledged that the statements made

by Welch contained specifics about what happened at the Flores

murder crime scene, and contained information that “only

somebody [who] was there would know.” Id. (citing Exhibit N).

Archangel finally alleges that the City of Houston injured

him because of its failure to timely release evidence, including

Brady1 material. ECF No. 18 at 18. For example, Archangel alleges

that the offense report “reflects a pattern of late supplementation”

by Vinogradov regarding when he added important information

about evidence and investigative steps taken. Id. Archangel

alleges that the Detectives did not update the relevant offense

report with relevant information for several months. Id. Archangel

also alleges that Vinogradov never updated the offense report with

the fact that Welch’s mother was an HPD informant. Id.

On September 16, 2022, five years after being initially

arrested and detained, the Harris County District Attorney’s

Office dismissed the charges against Archangel. ECF No. 18-1

at 11. Archangel alleges that the Harris County District Attorney’s

Office concealed the “true basis for dismissal” and instead stated

that the case was dismissed because of a missing witness. ECF

No. 18 at 19.

On September 13, 2024, Archangel sued the City of Houston

and detectives Vinogradov and Crowder. ECF No. 1. Archangel

amended his complaint on November 25, 2024. ECF No. 18. He

asserts a Fourth Amendment claim against both detectives. Id. He

also asserts two Monell2 claims against the City of Houston: a

policy, practice, and custom claim and a supervisory liability claim.

Id. All defendants filed motions to dismiss Archangel’s claims

against them. ECF Nos. 25, 26.

2. Legal Standard

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes the court to dismiss a

complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Generally, the court is

1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

2 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

constrained to the “four corners of the complaint” to determine

whether the plaintiff has stated a claim. Morgan v. Swanson, 659

F.3d 359, 401 (5th Cir. 2011); see also Loofbourrow v. Comm’r, 208

F. Supp. 2d 698, 708 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (“[T]he court may not look

beyond the four corners of plaintiff’s pleadings.”).

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint that does not allege

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”

should be dismissed. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007). On the other hand, “[r]egardless of how well-pleaded the

factual allegations may be, they must demonstrate that the party

is entitled to relief under a valid theory.” Langen v. Sanchez Oil &

Gas Corp., No. CV 4:18-2840, 2019 WL 1674348, at *3 (S.D. Tex.

Apr. 17, 2019). While a complaint does not require detailed factual

allegations, a plaintiff must provide more than labels and

conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “A plaintiff need only

plausibly allege facts going to the ultimate elements of the claim

to survive a motion to dismiss.” Cicalese v. Univ. of Tex. Med.

Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 768 (5th Cir. 2019). “Factual allegations

must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level

. . . on the assumption that all allegations in the complaint are true

(even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[A] well

pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that

actual proof of those facts is improbable[.]” Id. at 556.

“The court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing

them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” and “drawing all

reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” In re Katrina Canal

Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205–06 (5th Cir. 2007). Only

statements of fact are to be taken as true. “Threadbare recitals of

the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009). Conclusory allegations are “disentitled . . . to the

presumption of truth.” Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 681. Thus, the court, in

reviewing the plaintiff’s complaint, may neither “accept conclusory

allegations” nor “strain to find inferences favorable to the

plaintiffs.” Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols., Inc., 365

F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2004).

3. Analysis

A. Statute of Limitations

Defendants argue that the statute of limitations bars

Archangel’s claims against them. In Texas, the statute of

limitations for a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is two years. Winfrey

v. Rogers, 901 F.3d 483, 492 (5th Cir. 2018). “[F]ederal courts look

to state’s statute of limitations for personal-injury torts to decide

when § 1983 claims toll.” Id. But the accrual date of a § 1983 cause

of action is a question of federal law. Id.

When Archangel’s 1983 claim accrued “depends on which

common-law tort action is analogous to his claim, false arrest . . .

or malicious prosecution.” Brown v. City of Houston, 297 F.

Supp. 3d 748, 760 (S.D. Tex. 2017). Under § 1983, the statute of

limitations for a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim begins to

run at the time the claimant becomes detained. Wallace v. Kato,

549 U.S. 384, 397 (2007). But where a plaintiff alleges that he was

(1) “arrested pursuant to a warrant, (2) the warrant issued through

the normal legal process, and (3) the warrant application

contained ‘numerous material omissions and misstatements[,]’”

the claim is best analogized to common law malicious prosecution,

which accrues when criminal proceedings end in plaintiff’s favor.

Fusilier v. Zaunbrecher, 806 F. App’x 280, 282–283 (5th Cir. 2020)

(citing Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389–90).

In April 2017, Archangel was arrested and booked into the

Harris County Jail. ECF No. 18 at 14. The Harris County District

Attorney’s Office dismissed the charges against Archangel on

September 16, 2022. Id. at 3. Archangel filed this suit September

13, 2024. ECF No. 1.

Archangel alleges causes of action for “Unlawful Search and

Seizure – No Probable Cause.” ECF No. 18 at 20–21. He also

alleges that he was arrested pursuant to a warrant, which was

issued through normal legal process, but that the warrant

application included numerous misrepresentations and omissions.

Id. Thus, Archangel’s claim is best analogized to a malicious

prosecution claim for the purpose of determining when Archangel’s

claim accrued.

Accordingly, Archangel’s claim accrued when the criminal

proceedings ended in his favor, on September 16, 2022. Archangel

timely brought his claims less than two years later, on September

13, 2024. His claims are not time barred.

B. Claims against Detectives Vinogradov and Crowder

Section 1983 provides redress for those who have been

injured or deprived of their rights under color of state law. 42

U.S.C. § 1983; Moody v. Farrell, 868 F.3d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 2017).

Archangel alleges that the detectives violated his Fourth

Amendment right to be free from arrest without probable cause.

ECF No. 18 at 20–23. “A false arrest occurs, and an individual’s

Fourth Amendment rights are violated, when an officer conducts

an arrest without probable cause.” Scott v. City of Mandeville, 69

F.4th 249, 255 (5th Cir. 2023).

The detectives argue that Archangel’s claims against them

should be dismissed based on qualified immunity. ECF No. 28.

State officials are entitled to qualified immunity unless (1) the

evidence demonstrates that the official’s conduct violated a

statutory or constitutional right and (2) that right was “clearly

established” at the time of the violation. McVae v. Perez, 120 F.4th

487, 492 (5th Cir. 2024). Courts “can analyze the prongs in either

order or resolve the case on a single prong.” Perry v. Mendoza, 83

F.4th 313, 317 (5th Cir. 2023).

At the motion to dismiss stage, “a plaintiff seeking to

overcome qualified immunity must plead specific facts that both

allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the harm he has alleged and that defeat a

qualified immunity defense with equal specificity.” Arnold v.

Williams, 979 F.3d 262, 267 (5th Cir. 2020). Thus, the court must

consider whether Archangel pleaded specific facts allowing the

court to draw the reasonable inference that Vinogradov and

Crowder violated Archangel’s Fourth Amendment right to be free

from arrest without probable cause.

In the false arrest context, “[a] plaintiff must clear a

significant hurdle to defeat qualified immunity.” Brown v. Lyford,

243 F.3d 185, 190 (5th Cir. 2001). “Probable cause exists ‘when the

totality of the facts and circumstances within a police officer’s

knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient for a reasonable

person to conclude that the suspect had committed or was

committing an offense.’” Thompson v. Hammond City, No. 20-

30056, 2023 WL 155412, at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 11, 2023) (quoting

Haggerty v. Tex. S. Univ., 391 F.3d 653, 655 (5th Cir. 2004)).

Analyzing probable cause requires the court to consider whether,

under the totality of the circumstances, there is a “fair probability”

that a crime occurred. United States v. Garcia, 179 F.3d 265, 269

(5th Cir. 1999). A “fair probability” does not mean that a

reasonable official would have thought it more likely than not that

the defendant committed a felony. Id. A fair probability must be

more than a bare suspicion, but less than a preponderance of the

evidence. Id.

When an arrest is made pursuant to a properly issued

warrant, the arrest is not a false arrest. Johnson v. Norcross, 565

F. App’x 287, 289 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Smith v. Gonzalez, 670

F.2d 522, 526 (5th Cir. 1982)). But the intentional or reckless

omission of material facts from a warrant application violates the

Fourth Amendment if the omission was “clearly critical” to a

finding of probable cause. Porter v. Lear, 751 F. App’x 422, 429 (5th

Cir. 2018).

“An officer is due qualified immunity, ‘even if he did not

have probable cause to arrest a suspect,’ so long as ‘a reasonable

person in his position would have believed that his conduct

conformed to the constitutional standard in light of the

information available to him and the clearly established law.’”

Perry, 83 F.4th at 317; Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181,

206 (5th Cir. 2009). “Thus, plaintiffs must allege facts permitting

an inference that defendants lacked arguable (that is, reasonable

but mistaken) probable cause for the arrests.” Club Retro, 568 F.3d

at 207.

With these principles in mind, the court finds that Archangel

has not met his burden. Archangel argues that Vinogradov and

Crowder’s probable cause affidavits were demonstrably and

materially false because “(1) the photo spread was not

administered in a blinded manner, (2) Darrion Dent did not

positively identify Jeffery Archangel as one of the robbers, and (3)

aside from both robbery suspects being African American, it was

impossible to say whether Jeffery Archangel had similar facial

features to the suspects depicted in the video.” ECF No. 28 at 5.

Archangel also argues that Crowder’s affidavit omitted Dent and

Vasquez’s descriptions of the robbers’ heights, age, build, and

tattoos. Id. Archangel alleges that there was no probable cause,

and that no warrant would have been issued but for the detectives’

misrepresentations. ECF No. 18 at 20–23.

Defendant detectives argue that a “mistake about a

witness’s description does not constitute an intentional material

misrepresentation in the warrant application[,]” and that

“Plaintiff had no constitutional right for detectives to transcribe

every word into a report or base their conclusions on a single

witness’s statement rather than their experience and their

investigation.” ECF No. 26 at 10–11. The court agrees.

The court looks first to the facts and circumstances within

the detectives’ knowledge at the time of the arrest to determine

whether a reasonable officer could conclude that there was a fair

probability that Archangel committed the offense. See Thompson,

2023 WL 155412, at *3.

Although Vasquez’s description did not completely line up

with Archangel’s height and age, Vinogradov and Crowder were

able to view the perpetrators and judge their ages on surveillance

footage from the second Subway robbery. ECF No. 18-1 at 86, 124.

The detectives also saw a composite sketch prepared by a sketch

artist. Archangel’s co-defendant, Welch, implicated Archangel and

stated that Archangel looked like the person in the composite

sketch. Id. at 89–91. The Mazda Protégé used at the scene of the

crimes was located at the apartment complex where Archangel

resided. Id. at 86–89. The detectives found the murder weapon and

Archangel’s identification card inside the apartment in which

Archangel resided. Id. As shown in the booking photographs taken

in 2017, Archangel also had a scar under his eye similar to the one

Dent described on the shooter. Id. at 90.

The court also notes that, while Vinogradov’s affidavit does

state that the photospread was conducted in a blinded manner,

Crowder’s later affidavit does not. ECF No. 18-1 at 8. It states that

Crowder himself showed the photo array to Dent. Id.

Archangel’s allegation that “Dent never made a positive

identification of Jeffery Archangel from the photospread” is

unsupported by specific facts. Archangel’s allegations, and the

documents that he attaches to his complaint, show that Dent

positively identified Archangel in the photospread in March 2017.

Dent described a scar on the perpetrator’s face even though there

was no scar in the photo in the lineup. ECF No. 18-1 at 89–90. The

detectives did not know that Archangel had a scar under his eye at

the time that Dent described the scar to them and identified

Archangel in the photospread. Id. at 90. Then, in 2022, five years

after the robbery, Dent stated that in 2017 he picked someone at

random from the photospread and he never saw the robber’s face.

Id. at 154. Dent remembered telling the detectives that the

perpetrator had a scar. Id. A week later, Dent clarified that he

chose the closest person to the robber in the photospread and that

he did not remember what led him to pick that person when

initially shown the photospread. Id. at 155. Dent’s 2022 interviews

at most establish that he could not recall (or was reluctant to say),

in 2022, why he identified Archangel. This says nothing about

whether Dent, in 2017, positively identified Archangel as the

shooter. In fact, Dent affirmed in 2022 that he did identify

Archangel from the photospread in 2017.

The recorded statement in which Welch confessed to being

the shooter does not change the analysis. The documents attached

to Archangel’s motion show that on May 5, 2017, Archangel gave

the detectives a voice recording wherein Welch confessed that he

was the shooter. ECF No. 18-1 at 92. Vinogradov’s report states

“Detective Crowder and I found it difficult to believe that [Welch]

would ‘confess’ to an individual who he did not know.” Id. The

detectives made judgments based on all the circumstances and

apparently did not believe that the confession was genuine. These

facts do not indicate that the detectives’ judgment was

unreasonable or that a constitutional violation occurred.

Archangel has not alleged facts permitting an inference that

defendants lacked arguable (that is, reasonable even if mistaken)

probable cause for the arrest. The detectives’ affidavits were not a

verbatim transcript of the witness statements. They were made

with an understanding of all the facts. Based on the allegations

and the facts and circumstances within the detectives’ knowledge

at the time of the arrest, the court finds that a reasonable detective

could conclude that there was a fair probability that Archangel

committed the offense. Thus, there was probable cause to support

Archangel’s arrest, and there was no Fourth Amendment

violation.

Archangel’s remaining arguments are also without merit.

Archangel’s argument regarding “a wholly inaccurate summary of

Vasquez’s descriptions” in offense reports, ECF No. 18 at 4, is

unpersuasive. An offense report is not a sworn probable cause

affidavit. Archangel has not pleaded specific facts showing that

these misrepresentations in offense reports were used to determine

whether there was probable cause for his arrest or that the reports

were material to a finding of probable cause. See Porter, 751 F.

App’x at 430. In any event, it is not clear that an inaccurate height

and age description in the detectives’ interview summaries

violated Archangel’s rights. Facts outside the height and weight

descriptions pointed to Archangel as the perpetrator.

Further with respect to the offense reports, independent

intermediaries also break the chain of causation. If facts

supporting an arrest are placed before an independent

intermediary such as a magistrate or grand jury, the

intermediary’s decision breaks the chain of causation and

insulates the initiating party. Buehler v. City of Austin/Austin

Police Dep’t, 824 F.3d 548, 554 (5th Cir. 2016). This is so even if

the initiating officer acts with malice. Id. The detectives’ affidavits

here are a fair summary of the facts that they had by then

uncovered. The deviations between the witness statements, the

offense reports, and the final affidavits were not critical to

probable cause and do not undermine the other facts that did point

to probable cause.

Archangel has also not plausibly alleged that the detectives’

failure to fully comply with internal departmental policies was

material to the finding of probable cause or violated Archangel’s

constitutional rights. Even if mistakes were made, there is no

evidence that any mistake led to a constitutional violation. See,

e.g., Vidal v. Sanchez, No. 19-CV-90, 2020 WL 5217410, at *3 (S.D.

Tex. Aug. 5, 2020) (“A negligent police investigation does not

violate [plaintiff’s] constitutional rights, even if it leads to his

arrest.”) (citing Herrera v. Millsap, 862 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1989)),

R. & R. adopted, 2020 WL 5210869 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2020).

Accordingly, as the court stated above, Archangel has not

alleged facts permitting an inference that defendants lacked

arguable probable cause. Thus, there was no Fourth Amendment

violation, and the detectives are entitled to qualified immunity.

Archangel’s false arrest claims against Vinogradov and Crowder

should be DISMISSED.

To the extent that Archangel asserts claims against

Vinogradov and Crowder for failing turn over exculpatory

information, those claims should also be dismissed. ECF No. 18

at 20–23. Archangel argues that he has asserted a valid 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 Brady claim against the detectives. However, “Brady ‘is not

a pretrial remedy.’” Phillips v. Whittington, 497 F. Supp. 3d 122,

159 (W.D. La. 2020) (quoting United States v. Garrett, 238

F.3d 293, 303 (5th Cir. 2000)). A “Brady violation becomes a

concern for courts only after trial, when courts are able to

determine whether a nondisclosure deprived a defendant of a fair

trial.” Garrett, 238 F.3d at 303–304.

There was no trial here. ECF No. 18-1 at 11. The case against

Archangel was dismissed. Id. Archangel has cited no case that

establishes that Brady extends to pretrial failures or delays in

turning over exculpatory evidence. ECF No. 28. As such,

Vinogradov and Crowder did not violate any clearly established

constitutional right in their alleged failure to timely turn over

alleged exculpatory evidence in the absence of any trial. As such,

Archangel’s Brady claims should be DISMISSED.

C. Claims Against the City of Houston

Archangel asserts two municipal liability claims against the

City of Houston under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The first is a policy,

practice, or custom claim based on HPD’s alleged history of

deficient investigative practices and failure to fulfill Brady

obligations. ECF No. 18 at 23–27. The second is a supervisory

liability claim based on the City of Houston’s failure to adequately

train and supervise Vinogradov, Crowder, and other City of

Houston employees. Id. at 27.

To prevail on a Monell claim, a plaintiff must establish (1)

an official policy or custom; (2) the policymaker of that policy or

custom; and (3) a constitutional violation that the policy or custom

was the “moving force” behind. Moore v. LaSalle Mgmt. Co., L.L.C.,

41 F.4th 493, 509 (5th Cir. 2022). For Archangel to prevail on his

Monell claims, he must show that he suffered a constitutional

violation. Id. The court has already found that Archangel did not

allege facts supporting any constitutional violation. The

undisputed facts in the probable cause affidavits supported

probable cause. Accordingly, the court recommends that

Archangel’s claims against the City of Houston be DISMISSED.

4. Conclusion

The court recommends that Defendant City of Houston’s

Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 25, and Defendants David J. Crowder

and Alexander S. Vinogradov’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 26, be

GRANTED and Archangel’s claims be DISMISSED.

The parties have fourteen days from service of this

Memorandum and Recommendation to file written objections.

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. Responses to

objections, if any, are due seven days thereafter. Failure to timely

file objections will preclude appellate review of factual findings or

legal conclusions, except for plain error. See Thomas v. Arn, 474

U.S. 140, 147-49 (1985); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276—

77 (5th Cir. 1988).

Signed at Houston, Texas on August 29, 2025.

Peter Bray

United States Magistrate Judge

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