The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
FELICIA BROCK, et al., Case No. 1:25-cv-685
Plaintiffs,
Cole, J.
vs. Bowman, M.J.
HAMILTON COUNTY JFS CHILDREN
SERVICES, et. al.
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiffs Felicia Brock brings this pro se action on her behalf and purportedly on
behalf of her purported minor children against the Hamilton County JFS Children
Services, Allison Beresford, Opal Anderson, Evan Handle and Alexandria Pattsfall. By
separate Order issued this date, plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma
pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This matter is before the Court for a sua sponte
review of plaintiff’s complaint to determine whether the complaint, or any portion of it,
should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B).
In enacting the original in forma pauperis statute, Congress recognized that a
“litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying
litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive
lawsuits.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To prevent such abusive litigation, Congress has authorized
federal courts to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if they are satisfied that the action
is frivolous or malicious. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint may be
dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable
basis in fact or law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328-29 (1989); see also Lawler v.
Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal basis
when the defendant is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation of a legal
interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable
factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or
“wholly incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32; Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The Court need
not accept as true factual allegations that are fantastic or delusional in reviewing a
complaint for frivolousness. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328).
Congress also has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii). A
complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the same
token, however, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also
Hill, 630 F.3d at 470-71 (“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs
dismissals for failure to state a claim” under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept
all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual
allegations,” it must provide “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-
me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading
that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
“naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557. The complaint
must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which
it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants removed her children from her custody in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff’s complaint claims, inter alia, that
Defendants “stated false allegations in court” and allowed interference with child custody.
(Doc. 1 at 3). Despite these references Plaintiff did not cite to any such court action.
Notably, however, this Court has authority to “take judicial notice of proceedings in other
courts of record” on screening of plaintiff's complaint. See Rodic v. Thistledown Racing
Club, Inc., 615 F.2d 736, 738 (6th Cir.1980) (quoting Granader v. Public Bank, 417 F.2d
75, 82–83 (6th Cir.1969)); Saint Torrance v. Firstar, 529 F.Supp.2d 836, 838 n. 1
(S.D.Ohio 2007); see also Lynch v. Leis, 382 F.3d 642, 648 n. 5 (6th Cir.2004) (citing
Lyons v. Stovall, 188 F.3d 327, 332 n. 3 (6th Cir.1999)) (involving judicial notice of on-
line court records).
A search of on-line court records from Hamilton County, Ohio reveal a prior action
filed by Plaintiff against the same defendants in the instant action, seeking to reverse a
ruling of the Juvenile Division of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas and return
her children to her. See Brock v. Patton, Case No. A 2303760. Defendants moved to
dismiss the action based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim
for relief upon which relief may be granted. Id. Defendants also asserted they are entitled
to qualified immunity. That Court granted Defendants motion and dismissed the action on
December 8, 2023. Id.
The undersigned concludes that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's
complaint. Under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, which arose from the Supreme Court's
decisions in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983),
and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), the lower federal courts are
precluded “from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by ‘state-court losers'
challenging ‘state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced.’” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460, 126 S.Ct. 1198, 163 L.Ed.2d 1059
(2006) (per curiam) (quoting Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudia Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.
280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005)). The doctrine is premised on the “the
notion that appellate review of state court decisions and the validity of state judicial
proceedings is limited to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, and thus that federal
district courts lack jurisdiction to review such matters.” See In re Cook, 551 F.3d 542, 548
(6th Cir.2009) (and cases cited therein).
In this case, it is clear from the face of the complaint that Rooker–Feldman applies
to bar this Court from exercising jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims challenging the rulings
of the state court. See Lee v. Johnson-Wharton, No. 1:14cv868, 2014 WL 7015178, at *4
(S.D. Ohio Dec. 11, 2014) (Dlott, J.; Litkovitz, M.J.) (relying on Stephens and Sefa v.
Kentucky, 510 Fed.Appx. 435, 437-38 (6th Cir. 2013), in holding that the district court
lacked jurisdiction to consider claims couched in terms of a civil rights action, which
essentially amounted to a collateral attack of a state-court judgment terminating the
plaintiff’s parental rights). As such, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
Plaintiff's claims because they fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the state courts.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Accordingly, for these reasons, it is therefore RECOMMENDED this action be
DISMISSED with PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim for relief. It is further
RECOMMENDED that the Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) that for the
foregoing reasons an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation
would not be taken in good faith and therefore deny Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma
pauperis.
s/ Stephanie K. Bowman
Stephanie K. Bowman
United States Chief Magistrate Judge
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
FELICIA BROCK, et al., Case No. 1:25-cv-685
Plaintiffs,
Cole, J.
vs. Bowman, M.J.
HAMILTON COUNTY JFS CHILDREN
SERVICES, et. al.
Defendants.
NOTICE
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after
being served with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on
timely motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the
portion(s) of the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in
support of the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within
FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make
objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).