Opinion

Solt v. CSA America Testing & Certification LLC

Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
Filed: Sep 24, 2025
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 39.5%

“paid overtime or comp time 22 for work in excess of forty hours per week cannot be considered as a factor in determining whether 23 an employee is ‘exempt.’”

How later courts described this case

“paid overtime or comp time 22 for work in excess of forty hours per week cannot be considered as a factor in determining whether 23 an employee is ‘exempt.’”
existence of standard procedures and guidelines does not mean employee's 26 responsibilities do not require exercise of independent discretion
that employee 22 must follow “a highly regimented set of rules” does not prevent employee from exercising 23 discretion and independent judgment

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

9 DENA SOLT, an individual, Case No. 2:24-cv-00112-RSM

Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

11 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

13 CSA AMERICA TESTING &

CERTIFICATION LLC, d/b/a CSA GROUP,

14 a foreign limited liability company, et al.,

Defendant.

17 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant CSA America Testing & Certification

(“CSA”)’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. #71. Plaintiff Dena Solt has filed an opposition

brief. Dkt. #85. Neither party has requested oral argument. For the reasons below, the Court

GRANTS CSA’s Motion.

22 Plaintiff Solt worked for Defendant CSA from 2019 until her termination in April of

23 2023. She alleges wage claims for overtime and unpaid meal periods and rest breaks, breach of

contract, promissory estoppel, a hostile work environment, sex and age discrimination in

violation of RCW 49.60.180, and retaliation. See Dkt. #29.

27 Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine

28 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). Material facts are

2 those which might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at

3 248. In ruling on summary judgment, a court does not weigh evidence to determine the truth of

the matter, but “only determine[s] whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Crane v. Conoco,

Inc., 41 F.3d 547, 549 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. O’Melveny & Meyers,

969 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1992)).

8 On a motion for summary judgment, the court views the evidence and draws all

9 reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 255; Sullivan v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 365 F.3d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 2004). However, the

nonmoving party must make a “sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with

13 respect to which she has the burden of proof” to survive summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v.

14 Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of

the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could

reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251.

The Court will address each claim below.

19 A. Overtime Claim and Administrative Exemption

20 The Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) deals with overtime and minimum wage

requirements for employees. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219. Washington’s Minimum Wage

Requirements and Labor Standards, formerly known as the Minimum Wage Act (“MWA”), is

based upon the FLSA, and federal authority under the FLSA often provides helpful guidance.

25 Drinkwitz v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 140 Wn.2d 291, 298, 996 P.2d 582, 586 (2000). “The

26 FLSA requires employers to pay overtime to covered employees who work more than 40 hours

in a week.” Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 584 U.S. 79, 81 (2018) (citing 29 U.S.C. §

207(a)). However, the FLSA exempts from overtime pay “any employee employed in a bona fide

2 executive, administrative, or professional capacity.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).

3 An employee qualifying for the administrative exemption must (1) be compensated not

less than $455 per week; (2) perform as her primary duty “office or non-manual work related to

the management or general business operations of the employer or the employer's customers;”

and (3) have as her primary duty “the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with

8 respect to matters of significance.” McKeen-Chaplin v. Provident Sav. Bank, FSB, 862 F.3d 847,

9 850-51 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)). “These three conditions are explicit

prerequisites to exemption, not merely suggested guidelines.” Id. at 851. The defendant bears

the burden of proving the exemption applies. Id. The “question of how an employee spends his

13 or her workday is one of fact, while the question of whether his or her activities exclude him or

14 her from the overtime-pay requirement is one of law.” Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,

635 F.3d 383, 391 (9th Cir. 2011).

CSA paid Solt an annual salary of $135,000 as a Certifier III, which increased to $141,075

upon her promotion to Certification Specialist in January 2021. Dkt. #79 (“KC Fletcher Decl.”),

19 ¶ 3; Dkt. #115 at 2. Solt was paid on a biweekly basis. Dkt. #82, Ex. 2, (“Solt Dep.”) at 245:12-

20 17. The amount of compensation received by Plaintiff at all relevant times exceeded the $455

per week threshold, thus satisfying the first prong.

The parties dispute whether Solt’s primary duties were directly related to the management

or general business operations of CSA or its customers. To meet this requirement, the employee

25 “must perform work directly related to assisting with the running or servicing of the business, as

26 distinguished, for example, from working on a manufacturing production line or selling a product

in a retail or service establishment.” 29 C.F.R. 541.201(a). “Work directly related to management

or general business operations includes, but is not limited to, work in functional areas such as tax;

2 finance; accounting; budgeting; auditing; insurance; quality control; purchasing; procurement;

3 advertising; marketing; research; safety and health; personnel management; human resources;

employee benefits; labor relations; public relations, government relations; computer network,

internet and database administration; legal and regulatory compliance; and similar activities.” 29

C.F.R. 541.201(b).

8 CSA cites to the job description for Certifier III, which states the primary function of the

9 role is to “provid[e] certification services,” which requires the “interpretation of standards,

processes and procedures, as well as providing technical guidance; analysis; product testing

information; compliance and maintenance recommendations; technical reviews and independent

13 checks.” Dkt. #79-1 at 2. The Certification Specialist job description expands on these duties by

14 adding that the employee will “make[] technical decisions based on a high degree of knowledge,

training and professional experience to maintain the integrity of CSA’s global certification

programs.” Dkt. #79-2 at 2. CSA then lists Solt’s responsibilities described by her supervisor.

See Dkt. #71 at 10-11. According to her supervisor, Solt:

19 • Interviewed candidates and provided feedback based on interviews. Dkt. #73-1, (“KC

20 Fletcher Dep.”), 218:14-16.

• Contributed to the development and “continuous improvement of [CSA’s] service.” Id.

at 219:16-19.

24 • Drafted quality documents and suggested policy changes. Id. at 220:1-11.

25 • Evaluated product functionality to determine any modifications needed for the project

specific tracking sheet. Id. at 222:2-19.

• As the senior member of the ELD (“Electronic Logging Device”) program, influenced its

2 operations. Id. at 223:16-20.

3 • Designed and modified testing procedures for efficiency. Id. at 224:1-3, 225:11-18. Her

recommendations were provided to the PTL for publishing. Id. at 225:22-226:2.

• Created systems for storing project data, such as screen snaps, reports, and other items

7 generated by the ELD. Id. at 229:8-11.

8 • Was able to modify or deviate from testing procedures with PTL approval. Id. at 232:11-

17.

• Informed customers of non-compliance issues. Id. at 231:21-232:4.

12 • Coordinated with internal teams, including CSA's Technical Management Team,

13 salespeople, and the commercial unit, to ensure departments were aligned; outside

regulators to determine expectations; and customers regarding projects. KC Fletcher

Decl. at ¶¶ 15-16.

• Was qualified to, and did make, final decisions on whether a product should be certified

18 or not. Id. at ¶17.

19 • Independently identified issues and developed solutions before consulting her supervisor

with proposed solutions. Id. at ¶20.

Solt does not dispute that she performed office work, but she argues that her work was not

23 directly related to the management policies or general business operations of CSA or CSA’s

24 customers. Dkt. #86, (“Solt Decl. II”), ¶29. Solt contends that her “primary” duty was solely to

“take test results received from ELD testers and indicate whether that test result passed or failed

Transport Canada’s mandatory thresholds.” Dkt. #85 at 13.

The following facts are undisputed. Solt performed certification services of ELDs, which

2 required her to review ELD test results and compare the results to regulatory standards to

3 determine whether the device complied. Dkt. #85 at 3. Solt conducted three interviews of job

candidates for CSA and provided her feedback of said candidates. Solt Decl. II at ¶ 22. Solt

informed customers whether an ELD passed certification. Dkt. #72, (“Solt Decl.”), ¶ 24. Solt

advised management on issues within the ELD program concerning testing and certification

8 process. Solt Decl. II at ¶¶ 25, 28-29. Solt made recommendations to the PTL. Solt Dep. at

9 305:25-306:2. Solt conducted technical reviews to ensure that CSA quality procedures were

followed. Solt Decl. II at ¶ 23. Solt assisted in developing a spreadsheet to make ELD testing

easier. Dkt. #85 at 14; KC Fletcher Dep. at 105:20-106:5. Finally, Solt participated in the process

13 for CSA to become accredited to certify ELDs, which included being interviewed by the

14 Standards Council of Canada, sitting in on discussions on developing the ELD testing and

certification program, and providing input and recommendations on the development of the

program. Solt Decl. at ¶ 18.

Solt acknowledges that she performed some administrative duties, however, she argues

19 that those duties were “fringe or infrequent tasks” and were not her “primary responsibility.” Dkt.

20 #118 at 2. Solt seems to interpret the language “primary duty” to exclusively mean one specific

task that an employee performs the majority of their time. See Dkt. #85. at 14–15 (“Solt spent

the overwhelming majority – at least 70% – of her time assigning pass/fail designations to ELD

test results, while other tasks directly related to the business operations of CSA were few and far

25 between.”); (“Solt’s primary duty was only to assign a pass/fail designation to test results received

26 from ELD testers”). The regulations do not define “primary duty” so narrowly. WAC 296-128-

505(1)(b) reads:

“The amount of time spent performing exempt work can be a useful guide in

determining whether exempt work is the primary duty of an employee.

2 Employees who spend more than fifty percent of their time performing

exempt work will generally satisfy the primary duty requirement. Employees

3 who do not spend more than fifty percent of their time performing exempt

duties may meet the primary duty requirement if the other factors support

such a conclusion.”

An administrative employee's “primary duty” does not consist of one specific task but

rather the performance of “exempt work” or “exempt duties.” Therefore, Solt’s attempt of

8 rejecting administrative duties as part of her primary duty simply because she spends the majority

9 of her time interpreting ELD test results is not dispositive.

Solt asserts that because she performed certification services that CSA offered to its

customers, her primary duty concerned “production” and not “administrative” tasks. Dkt. #70 at

13 13. The Court finds this argument unpersuasive.

14 The administrative/production dichotomy distinguishes between work related to the goods

and services which constitute the business marketplace offerings and work that contributes to

“running the business itself.” Mckeen-Chaplin v. Provident Sav. Bank, FSB, 862 F.3d 847, 851

(9th Cir. 2017). Solt cites to Bothell to support this proposition, however, Bothell demonstrates

19 that this dichotomy is not generally applicable and is worth employing “only to the extent it

20 clarifies the analysis.” Bothell v. Phase Metrics, Inc., 299 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002). Most

importantly, although Bothell discusses the dichotomy, the Ninth Circuit ultimately did not use it

in deciding whether Bothell was exempt. The Ninth Circuit rejected the district court’s

misapplication of the dichotomy and instead considered the nature of Bothell's employment

25 duties. Id. at 1127. Notably, the Bothell decision states “[i]ndeed, some cases analyze the primary

26 duty test without referencing the dichotomy at all” and that this is appropriate because “the

dichotomy is but one analytical tool, to be used only to the extent it clarifies the analysis.” Id.

Further, “[o]nly when work falls ‘squarely on the “production” side of the line,’ has the dichotomy

2 been determinative.” Id. at 1127.

3 The Court finds that Solt’s primary duty – providing certification services – was “directly

related to the management or business operations of the employer or the employer’s customers.”

WAC 296-128-520(1)(a) (emphasis added). CSA’s customers were not in the business of

providing certifications services. Instead, they sold products that required certification in order

8 to reach the market. KC Fletcher Decl. at ¶¶4-5. Employees do not fall outside the administrative

9 exemption simply because they provide the service their company is hired to provide.

Heffelfinger v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 580 F. Supp. 2d 933, 956 (C.D. Cal. 2008), aff’d in part,

rev’d in part, 492 F. App'x 710 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Webster v. Public School Employees of

13 Washington, Inc., 247 F.3d 910, 916 (2001) (noting that a “sensible application of the

14 administrative work/production dichotomy” supported a finding that a labor union field

representative, who assisted bargaining units that were his employer’s clients negotiate collective

bargaining agreements, was engaged in administrative work because “the purpose of the

dichotomy is to clarify the meaning of ‘work directly related to the management policies or

19 general business operations,’ not to frustrate the purpose and spirit of the entire exemption”).

20 Accordingly, the Court finds her position does not fall squarely on the production side of the line.

Solt cites to only one case to support the assertion that her role was not directly related to

the management or general business operations of CSA or its customers. Solt claims her primary

duty was similar to Bothell’s, where his role entailed installation, troubleshooting, and

25 maintaining equipment. Dkt. #70 at 13 (“Solt spent her time much like Bothell did. . .”); Bothell,

26 299 F.3d at 1128. However, these primary duties are easily distinguishable from Solt’s as based

on her own testimony. Solt was not a repairman, nor did she perform manual work.

Next, throughout her brief, Solt repeatedly asserts that a specific duty is not “directly

2 related to management or general business operations” and cites to 29 CFR §541.201(b) to

3 support that assertion. This regulation provides a list of duties that are “directly related to

management or general business operations,” however, it is not exhaustive as made evident by

the language “but is not limited to” and “similar activities.” Id. Moreover, the regulation does

list similar duties that Solt performed such as auditing, quality control, and regulatory compliance.

8 29 CFR §541.201(b). Accordingly, Solt’s attempt to reject the characterization of duties simply

9 because they are not explicitly listed within 29 CFR §541.201(b) is unpersuasive.

Next, CSA must show that there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Solt’s primary

duty “includes the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of

13 significance.” WAC 296-128-520(1)(b). Exercising discretion and independent judgment

14 “involv[es] the comparison and the evaluation of possible courses of conduct, and acting or

making a decision after the various possibilities have been considered.” WAC 296-128-

520(3)(b). This implies that the employee has the authority to make an independent choice, free

from immediate direction or supervision. Id. However, employees can exercise discretion and

19 independent judgment even if their decisions or recommendations are reviewed at a higher level.

20 Id. The decisions made as a result of the exercise of discretion and independent judgment may

consist of recommendations for action rather than the actual taking of action. 29 C.F.R.

§541.202(c). The fact that an employee’s decision may be subject to review and that, upon

occasion, the decisions are revised or reversed after review does not mean that the employee is

25 not exercising discretion and independent judgment. Id. Exemptions are not available for

26 employees who simply apply “well-established techniques, procedures or specific standards

described in manuals or other sources.” WAC 296-128-520(3)(b). Lastly, the exercise of

discretion and independent judgment does not include clerical or secretarial work, recording or

2 tabulating data, or performing other mechanical, repetitive, recurrent or routine work. Id.

3 CSA argues that, as a matter of law, Solt’s primary duties included the exercise of

discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. CSA argues that

Solt qualifies as an administrative employee, based on similarities between Solt’s primary duties

and those of Williams-Bell, where the Northern District Court of Illinois upheld the exempt status.

8 Williams-Bell v. Brit. Standards Inst., Inc., 532 F. Supp. 3d 640 (N.D. Ill. 2021).

9 In Williams-Bell, the plaintiff conducted certification audits for her employer’s clients. To

perform these audits, Williams-Bell was obligated to follow the structures and procedures within

the employer’s manual. 532 F. Supp. 3d at 644. Because of this, Williams-Bell argued that she

13 did not exercise discretion and independent judgment because she did nothing more than “follow

14 [her employer’s] strict, step-by-step policies from start to finish.” Id. at 649. However, the district

court stated that obligation to follow a framework in an employer’s manual did not preclude one

from such discretion and judgment. Id. at 650. The court held that the factual record showed

Williams-Bell was able to exercise discretion and independent judgment before, during, and after

19 her audits while still adhering to the guidelines in the employer’s manual. Id.

20 Similar proclamations have been made in the Seventh and Fifth circuit courts. See

Kennedy v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 410 F.3d 365, 374-75 (7th Cir. 2005) (that employee

must follow “a highly regimented set of rules” does not prevent employee from exercising

discretion and independent judgment); Owsley v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 187 F.3d 521,

25 526 (5th Cir. 1999) (existence of standard procedures and guidelines does not mean employee's

26 responsibilities do not require exercise of independent discretion).

According to Solt, her primary duty – interpreting ELD test results and comparing them

2 to the standards of Transport Canada’s standards – was simply her applying established

3 techniques and procedures. Solt claims that she could not modify or deviate from these standards

without approval from the PTL. Dkt. #85 at 14. Evidence in the record appears to conflict with

this assertion. Solt states that at times she and the other certifiers would be inconsistent with how

they would handle certain challenges. See Solt Dep. at 308:11-16. (“Hey, here's a challenge.

8 Would this work? How about we do this? … ‘Hey, you know, this is how John’s been doing it,

9 this is how Allen’s been doing it. This is how Dena’s been doing it.’” and “The three of us would

talk. ‘Hey, ... what do we do here so it’s consistent?’”).

Next, Solt claims that interpreting whether a test result passed or failed was mainly

13 quantitative, such as whether a test result indicated that a warning icon appeared on the dashboard.

14 Dkt. #85 at 13. Because the decisions were largely binary – the light appeared/did not appear –

she claims she was not exercising discretion. However, the next portion of that deposition states

“there were a handful that required some amount of qualitative evaluation.” KC Fletcher Dep. at

78:24-79:1. Further, when questioned on whether she made recommendations and suggestions,

19 Solt responded, “All of us would ask questions and/or make a suggestion or whatever . . .

20 Sometimes . . . all three of us together [would say] ‘Hey, we're experiencing this problem,’

because there were a lot of challenges with this stuff.” Solt Dep. at 340:16-22.

Next, Solt claims her recommendations and feedback to management were routinely

ignored. For example, Solt interviewed potential candidates for ELD positions and provided

25 recommendations, however she claims her recommendations were not followed. Dkt. #85 at 13.

26 Solt suggested improvements to the certification process, but she was told “not to fix” the issue.

KC Fletcher Dep. at 219:16-20.

Viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to

2 the non-moving party, the Court finds that no genuine dispute of material fact precludes a

3 determination as a matter of law that Solt’s primary duty included the exercise of discretion and

independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. This is based on Solt’s own

deposition testimony characterizing her job. Given all of the above, the administrative exemption

applies and the Court grants CSA’s motion for summary judgment on this claim.

8 B. Related Wage Claims

9 Because the Court concludes that Solt is subject to the administrative exemption, her

related wage claims fail. CSA was not obligated to pay for meal periods, rest breaks, or travel

time. See WAC § 296-126-002; Dkt. #71 at 13–14.

13 C. Paid Leave

14 Solt alleges that “Defendants CSA America Testing and CSA Group were obligated to

track and report accrual and usage of paid leave and did not accurately do so” and that she

“worked and was deducted for paid leave for the same time.” Dkt. #29 at 19. CSA characterizes

Solt’s deposition testimony as stating that she was obligated to finish assignments by deadlines

19 and chose to work from home on days that she had taken paid leave. See Dkt. #71 at 14–15. In

20 response, Solt argues that she was terminated in part for complaining about paid leave practices,

but this is more properly dealt with in the retaliation section below. Dkt. #85 at 16–17. She

argues that CSA failed to track and report her paid leave but does not provide specifics. Id. The

Court finds that this claim is properly dismissed on summary judgment.

25 D. Actionable Deductions

26 CSA states that on March 15, 2024, CSA offered to reimburse Solt the $83.36 that was

improperly deducted from a health savings account. Dkt. #116, Ex. D at 2-3. This $83.36 was

identified in initial disclosures as the amount at issue. See Dkt. #116-3 at 8. CSA states that Solt

2 has never responded to the offer, which still stands ,and that the claim is not actionable. Plaintiff

3 asserts that this offer does not cure the conduct and that summary judgment is improper. Dkt.

#85 at 17.

Plaintiff’s opposition fails to adequately articulate a remaining dispute. If one does exist,

it is over less than a hundred dollars. The Court assumes that CSA will honor its offer to

8 reimburse this amount. Accordingly, this claim will be dismissed as moot.

9 E. Breach of Contract

The Amended Complaint alleges that CSA “made enforceable promises to Ms. Solt that

they did not perform, including pay, overtime pay, training, reimbursement for travel expenses,

13 and promises of compensatory paid leave instead of overtime pay.” Dkt. #29 at 20. CSA argues

14 that this claim is “nebulous,” that she was properly classified as exempt, and that it paid her

properly for overtime and other expenses according to its own policies. Dkt. #71 at 15–16.

Under Washington law, an employer can pay overtime to exempt employees without

waiving their exemption status. RCW § 49.46.130(2)(a) (“The payment of compensation or

19 provision of compensatory time off in addition to a salary shall not be a factor in determining

20 whether a person is exempted under RCW 49.46.010(3)(c)”); see also Drinkwitz v. Alliant

Techsystems, Inc., 140 Wn.2d 291, 303, 996 P.2d 582, 588 (2000) (“paid overtime or comp time

for work in excess of forty hours per week cannot be considered as a factor in determining whether

an employee is ‘exempt.’”).

25 In her opposition brief, Solt argues in a few terse sentences, without citation to the record,

26 that she failed to get paid for agreed-upon overtime. Dkt. #85 at 17 (“In April 2023, CSA

promised Solt that she would receive time and a half pay hours worked during a period of

increased business demand. Solt worked those hours. CSA did not pay her.”). Earlier in the

2 opposition brief, Solt contends that she did not receive promised overtime pay in December 2022

3 and April 2023, with citations to specific emails. Id. at 8–9. She does not respond to CSA’s

arguments about the difference between her manager planning to offer overtime versus her

personally being approved for overtime. See Dkt. #71 at 16. CSA points out in its Reply that

Solt’s initial disclosures show she did receive at least some overtime pay in December 2022 and

8 April 2023. Dkt. # 115 at 10 (citing Dkt. #116-3).

9 Solt contends that she did not get paid an estimated $1,500 in travel expenses despite

CSA’s policies allowing for reimbursement. Dkt. #85 at 17–18. She also says she was instructed

not to submit those claims. CSA argues that it was not bound by its own policies to approve every

13 travel expense, that the record shows these expenses were not approved, and that in any event

14 Solt submits no receipts to prove these expenses. See Dkt. #115 at 10.

Finally, Solt maintains in her opposition that:

Solt was promised support to attain her Certified Information

17 System Security Professional (CISSP) license as well as continuing

education to maintain her cybersecurity certificate, yet CSA failed

to fulfill this obligation. Solt Decl. at ¶ 40. CSA made this promise

19 to Solt on her hiring, an attractive promise to Solt as she sought to

maintain and improve her cybersecurity credentialing. Id. at ¶ 38.

Dkt. #85 at 18. On reply, CSA argues:

22 Solt again does not identify any document where the promise of

“supporting” her pursuit of her Certified Information System

23 Security Professional (CISSP) license was offered. Only by

scouring her declaration will the Court find that Solt maintains an

“oral promise” was made on an unspecified date during the

25 recruiting process. Solt Dec. ¶ 38. Additionally, her reference to her

Development Dialogue does not make her claim actionable. In the

26 Dialogue, she describes obtaining the licensure as her “goal,” and

27 that it is “important to me” to receive the certification. Id. at Ex. 7.

Nowhere does she cite to any document where such a promise was

28 made and, in fact, she concedes that approval of the support was a

decision within management’s discretion. Id. (“Assuming it is

supported by management…”). Indeed, because the alleged promise

2 was oral, her claim would be time-barred, as it was made “during

the recruitment process” in 2019, more than three years before she

3 filed her Complaint. See RCW 4.16.080(3) (three-year statute of

limitations for non-written contracts).

5 Dkt. #115 at 11.

6 The Court has thoroughly reviewed the briefing and the cited exhibits for this contract

claim and agrees with CSA that there are no genuine disputes of material fact here and that

Plaintiff Solt has failed to set forth a valid claim. Her initial disclosures show she received

10 overtime pay in December 2022 and April 2023, and she does not make a sufficient showing of

11 breach as to specific terms of a contract related to overtime. She fails to make a sufficient showing

that she incurred travel expenses that CSA agreed to reimburse. She fails to make a sufficient

showing of an actionable claim for “support” for CISSP training. Without such, the Court is left

with the impression that CSA’s actions disappointed Solt but did not breach any contract between

16 the parties. This claim is properly dismissed on summary judgment.

17 F. Promissory Estoppel

The Amended Complaint alleges that CSA “made specific promises to Ms. Solt that they

did not perform, including overtime pay, training, reimbursement for travel expenses, and

promises of compensatory paid leave instead of overtime pay.” Dkt. #29 at 20.

22 A promissory estoppel claim requires three elements: 1) that statements amounted to

23 “promises of specific treatment in specific situations”; 2) that Plaintiff “justifiably relied on any

of these promises”; and 3) that those promises were breached. Bulman v. Safeway, Inc., 144

Wn.2d 335, 27 P.3d 1172, 1174-75 (2001).

27 CSA argues Solt fails the first two elements. CSA asserts that the overtime policy clearly

28 states that all overtime must be approved by a supervisor and that it was not guaranteed. Dkt. #71

at 17 (citing Dkt. #81-3). Likewise, CSA says the travel policy is clear that not all travel expenses

2 may be reimbursed. Id. citing Dkt. #81-4. CSA maintains that Solt cannot point to any overtime

3 premium or travel reimbursement that was not paid when it was properly submitted and approved,

and that she has provided no evidence or examples of training that was promised, that she relied

upon promises of such training, and that such training was not provided.

In response, Solt claims she can point to specific instances where CSA failed to honor its

8 promises to Solt’s detriment, but she fails to cite to evidence in her argument section, requiring

9 the Court to piece together facts stated earlier in briefing. As with the previous claim of breach

of contract, ultimately Solt fails to connect the dots to specific instances of promised overtime,

work performed, and a failure to uphold that promise considering that she did receive at least

13 some overtime pay in December 2022 and April 2023.

14 The Court finds that Solt has failed to identify sufficient evidence to preclude this claim

from summary judgment.

G. Hostile Work Environment

A hostile work environment claim under the Washington Law Against Discrimination

19 (“WLAD”) is largely the same as under Title VII. Diemert v. City of Seattle, 689 F. Supp. 3d

20 956, 962 (W.D. Wash. 2023); Arthur v. Whitman Cnty., 24 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1033 (E.D. Wash.

2014). To succeed on a Title VII hostile work environment claim based on sex, a plaintiff must

prove the employee was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, that the

conduct was unwelcome, and that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the

25 terms and conditions of her employment and create an abusive work environment. Fried v. Wynn

26 Las Vegas, LLC, 18 F.4th 643, 647 (9th Cir. 2021). “[I]t is well established that an employer can

create a hostile work environment by failing to take immediate and corrective action in response

to a coworker’s or third party's sexual harassment or racial discrimination the employer knew or

2 should have known about.” Id. To determine whether an environment is sufficiently hostile or

3 abusive to violate Tile VII, we consider “all the circumstances, including the frequency of the

discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere

offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work

performance.” Id. at 648 (citing Christian v. Umpqua Bank, 984 F.3d 801, 809 (9th Cir. 2020)).

8 “Not every insult or harassing comment will constitute a hostile work environment.” Ray v.

9 Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000). The standard for judging hostility is meant to

“ensure that Title VII does not become a ‘general civility code.’” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,

524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 141 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1998) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner

13 Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80, 118 S. Ct. 998, 140 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1998)). The Supreme

14 Court has explained that, properly applied, this standard “will filter out complaints attacking the

ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-

related jokes, and occasional teasing.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A hostile work

environment “must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person

19 would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so.” Id. at 787.

20 Solt’s opposition brief points to the following facts:

After joining CSA, Solt’s cybersecurity manager’s manager, Laura

22 Elan, exposed herself to Solt. Rocke Decl., Ex. 7; Solt Dep. at 92:17-

19. Following this incident, Elan called Solt a “prude” during calls

23 with others and in-person. . . Solt Decl. at ¶ 3-4. Elan also referenced

“not wearing tights or nylons or . . . pantyhose” to Solt in the

presence of others, suggesting that she and Solt go to buy a pair for

25 Elan. Solt Dep. at 98:11-16. Solt repeatedly told Elan that the

comments made her uncomfortable, but Elan continued. Solt Dep.

26 at 101:7-12. Sometimes the harassment occurred several times a

27 week, but other weeks Solt was not harassed. Solt Dep. at 105:20-

24. CSA understood that Elan’s conduct constituted harassment,

substantiating “certain of Plaintiff’s allegations.”. See Rocke Decl.,

Ex. 1.

Dkt. #85 at 6. Solt complained to her manager and Elan’s employment was terminated in 2020.

Solt Dec. at ¶ 7. She was not sexually harassed after Elan’s termination. Solt Dep. at 123:3-6.

5 Solt also states that another employee told her that he would need to speak with the technology

6 “guys” because they “actually know about this stuff,” and that she was reassigned on multiple

occasions to different projects. Dkt. #85 at 6 (citing Solt Decl. at ¶ 8). Further facts are not

referenced in argument.

10 The allegations of harassment in the record do not rise to the level of severe or pervasive

11 conduct sufficient to alter the terms and conditions of her employment. Furthermore, CSA

eventually dealt with the situation by terminating the alleged harasser in 2020. The Court agrees

with CSA that even if she had an actionable claim for a hostile work environment, it is time-

barred. This claim is properly dismissed on summary judgment.

16 H. Unlawful Discrimination

17 The Amended Complaint fails to discuss this claim beyond mere labels and conclusions.

See Dkt. #29 at 22 (“CSA America Testing discriminated against Ms. Solt based on sex and age

in violation of RCW 49.60.180. Ms. Solt was given different work because of her sex.”). She

pleads that, “[i]n December 2022, Solt’s manager told her she could return home from the Dallas

22 lab because he had found ‘two younger and smarter’ guys and he was flying them in to work on

23 the ELD projects.” Id. at 12. In briefing, Solt points to the “younger and smarter” comment,

being reassigned multiple times, and “discriminatory comments from a [coworker/supervisor]

when he, for example, told Solt that he would need to speak with the technology ‘guys’ because

27 they ‘actually know about this stuff.’” Dkt. #85 at 21. Solt argues that these events resulted in

“adverse opportunities for work and ultimately informing her termination as a ‘poor cultural fit.’”

2 Id.

3 On Reply, CSA states:

Solt’s only example of age discrimination is that she was “replaced”

5 in Texas by two “younger and smarter” men. Opp. p. 21. In addition

to providing no evidence that anyone made that statement, she

6 ignores the undisputed evidence that she was: 1) offered the chance

to go home from Dallas for the holidays; because 2) her supervisor

had located two graduate interns to take over and relieve her team;

8 and 3) she suffered no adverse action for volunteering to go home.

Fletcher Dec. ¶¶ 24-27.

10 Likewise, her singular incident of alleged sex discrimination is an

innocuous comment from her PTL that he would need to speak to

11 the technology “guys” because they “actually know about this

stuff.” Opp. p. 21. To call this a stray remark would be straining the

concept. “Guys” is a frequently used and often genderless term used

13 to denote a group of persons, plural. Guys, Merriam-Webster.com.

2025. https://www.merriam-webster.com (17 Feb. 2025).

14 Moreover, Solt has cited no evidence that the technology members

were not more knowledgeable about the issue (which is not dated or

even described) than her. She cites no record evidence of

16 opportunities denied, and her assertion that “these actions did not

occur” for her younger, male coworkers is speculation.

Dkt. #115 at 13–14.

19 As for Solt’s eventual termination, this occurred in February of 2023. KC Fletcher Dep.

20 62:8-13.

Under the WLAD, an employer may not “discharge or bar any person from employment

because of age [or] sex” or “discriminate against any person in compensation or in other terms or

conditions of employment because of age [or] sex.” RCW 49.60.180(2), (3). In analyzing claims

25 under the WLAD, Washington courts look to federal courts for interpretation and use the

26 McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis used to assess Title VII claims. See Duplessis v.

Golden State Foods, No. C06-5631RJB, at *3, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27851 (W.D. Wash. Apr.

16, 2007) (citing Hill v. BCTI Income Fund-I, 144 Wn.2d 172, 23 P.3d 440, 445-46 (2001)). The

2 McDonnell Douglas analysis has three components. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

3 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973). First, the plaintiff must present a

prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 802. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in presenting a

prima facie case, there is rebuttable presumption of discrimination and the burden of production

shifts to the employer to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse

8 employment action. Robinson v. Pierce Cty., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1326 (W.D. Wash. 2008)

9 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). And third, if the employer presents a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show

that the employer’s reason is merely pretext for unlawful discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas,

13 411 U.S. at 804.

14 An employer is entitled to summary judgment if the plaintiff cannot present sufficient

evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that the employer’s stated reasons are

pretextual. Robinson, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1326. “Summary judgment to an employer is seldom

appropriate in the WLAD cases because of the difficulty of proving a discriminatory motivation.”

19 Scrivener v. Clark Coll., 181 Wn.2d 439, 334 P.3d 541, 545 (2014). “To overcome summary

20 judgment, a plaintiff only needs to show that a reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff's

protected trait was a substantial factor motivating the employer’s adverse actions.” Id.

Washington courts describe a plaintiff's burden at this stage as one of “production, not

persuasion,” which may be proved through direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. But where “the

25 plaintiff has produced no evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that an employer’s

26 decision was motivated by an intent to discriminate, summary judgment is entirely proper.”

Kuyper v. State, 79 Wn. App. 732, 904 P.2d 793, 797 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).

Under the above standards, the Court finds that Plaintiff Solt has failed to make a prima

2 facie case of discrimination based on age or sex. Her evidence of being replaced for a work

3 activity and the stray remarks above do not causally relate to an adverse employment action.

Assuming Plaintiff could put together a prima facie case, the Court finds that she has failed to

present sufficient evidence that CSA’s stated reasons for termination or other adverse

employment actions were pretextual. This claim will be dismissed on summary judgment.

8 I. Retaliation

9 For Plaintiff to prevail on a claim of retaliation under the WLAD, she must show that 1)

she was engaged in a protected activity; 2) that she suffered an adverse employment action; and

3) that there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the employment action.

13 Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 965 (9th Cir. 2004); Lodis v. Corbis Holdings,

14 Inc., 292 P.3d 779, 786 (Wn. App. 2013). Under the WLAD, Plaintiff needs to show that her

protected activity was a “substantial factor” in the employer’s decision to take the adverse

employment action. Allison v. Housing Auth. of City of Seattle, 821 P.2d 34, 42-43 (1991).

Solt claims she was fired in retaliation for engaging in protected activity. She points to

19 the 2020 complaint she made about her coworker Elan and argues that “[c]ausation may be

20 inferred based on temporal proximity alone in the context of a retaliation claims.” Dkt. #85 at 22

(citing Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1244 (9th Cir. 2000)). CSA argues she was terminated

because CSA was in a “retraction phase,” because of “behavior issues and failure to provide

timelines for projects,” and because her salary “was higher than her peers or supervisor’s.” Dkt.

25 #71 at 7 (citing, e.g., KC Fletcher Dep. 62:8-13 and at 47:20-23.).

26 The Court agrees with CSA that the three years that passed between the 2020 complaint

about Elan and Solt’s February 2023 termination is too long a period to infer causation based on

temporal proximity. See Dkt. #71 at 23. Furthermore, during these three years Solt may have

2 received a negative performance review, but she was also promoted and given a raise. KC

3 Fletcher Dec. at ¶ 3; KC Fletcher Dep. at 181:6-9. CSA has put forth other reasons for her

termination as stated above. Ultimately, to survive summary judgment Solt needs to make a

sufficient showing that her protected activity was a “substantial factor” in the employer’s

decision, and she fails to do so. This claim will be dismissed.

8 Having reviewed the relevant pleadings, the declarations and exhibits attached thereto,

9 and the remainder of the record, the Court hereby finds and ORDERS that Defendant’s Motion

for Summary Judgment, Dkt. #71, is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Dkt. #70, is DENIED given the above rulings.

13 All other pending Motions are STRICKEN as MOOT. This case is CLOSED.

14 DATED this 24th day of September, 2025.

15 A

17 RICARDO S. MARTINEZ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.