Doe v. The University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT August 27, 2025

Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

Jane Doe et al., §

Plaintiffs, §

§

v. § Civil Action H-21-1574

§

The University of Texas §

Health Science Center §

at Houston, et al., §

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

This case has been referred to the undersigned magistrate

judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). ECF No. 72. Pending

before the court are Defendant McKesson Corp.’s (McKesson)

Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 56; Defendant UT Physicians’ (UTP)

Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 58; and Defendant Change Health

Care Corporation a/k/a Change Healthcare Engagement Solutions,

Inc.’s (Change) Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 59. The court

recommends that Defendant McKesson’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF

No. 56, be GRANTED; Defendant UTP’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF

No. 58, be DENIED without prejudice pending jurisdictional

discovery; and Defendant Change’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF

No. 59, be GRANTED.

1. Background

The False Claims Act (FCA) imposes civil liability on any

person who “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false

or fraudulent claim for payment or approval” to the Government.

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1). A private person, the relator, may bring a

qui tam civil action “for the person and for the United States

Government” against the alleged false claimant, “in the name of

the Government.” Id. § 3730(b).

In this case, Relator alleges that Defendants UTP,

McKesson, and Change each violated the FCA and the Texas

Health Care Program Fraud Prevention Act1 (THFPA, Tex. Hum.

Res. Code §§ 36.00, et seq.). Third Am. Compl., ECF No. 39 at ¶ 1.

Relator is a former employee of UTP, and she alleges that

Defendants “engaged in schemes of knowingly submitting

fraudulent and false claims to and for payment from federally-

funded Medicare, Medicaid, TRICARE, the Veterans

Administration, and other federally-funded health care programs

. . . and state-operated Medicaid programs[.]” Id. at ¶¶ 22, 33.

Relator filed her Original Complaint against the University

of Texas Health Science Center at Houston (UTHSCH) on May 7,

2021. ECF No. 1. The operative pleading now in the case is

Relator’s Third Amended Complaint. ECF No. 39. Relator sought

leave to file her Third Amended Complaint on May 24, 2024, and

the Third Amended Complaint was filed on the docket on June 4,

2024.2 The Third Amended Complaint removed UTHSCH as a

defendant and added UTP, McKesson, and Change. See id. Each

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. ECF Nos. 56, 58, 59. In

response to Defendants’ motions to dismiss, the State of Texas filed

a Statement of Interest. ECF No. 66.

The court provides additional facts as needed in its analysis

below.

1 “The Legislature recently amended the Texas Medicaid Fraud Prevention Act and changed

its name to the Texas Health Care Program Fraud Prevention Act.” Malouf v. State ex rels.

Ellis, 694 S.W.3d 712, 716 n.1 (Tex. 2024).

2 The Third Amended Complaint was again filed on the docket on August 12, 2024. ECF

No. 39. As the most recently filed complaint, this is the filing that the court uses in this

Memorandum and Recommendation.

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2. Motion to Dismiss Legal Standards

Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes the court to dismiss a complaint for

“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Generally, the court is constrained to the “four

corners of the complaint” to determine whether the plaintiff has

stated a claim. Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 401 (5th Cir.

2011); see also Loofbourrow v. Comm’r, 208 F. Supp. 2d 698, 708

(S.D. Tex. 2002) (“[T]he court may not look beyond the four corners

of the plaintiff’s pleadings.”).

“The court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing

them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” and “drawing all

reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” In re Katrina Canal

Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205–06 (5th Cir. 2007). The pleading

rules “do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect

statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.”

Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014); see Skinner

v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (“[A] complaint need not pin

plaintiff’s claim for relief to a precise legal theory.”).

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the

plaintiff must also plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The

plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but

it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

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unlawfully.” Id. Ultimately, the “[f]actual allegations [in the

complaint] must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citation

omitted).

Conclusory allegations “disentitle[] them to the presumption

of truth.” Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 681. It follows that the court, in

reviewing the plaintiff’s complaint, may neither “accept conclusory

allegations” nor “strain to find inferences favorable to the

plaintiffs.” Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols., Inc., 365

F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2004).

The court also may dismiss a complaint “under Rule 12(b)(6)

where it is evident from the plaintiff’s pleadings that the action is

barred [by limitations] and the pleadings fail to raise some basis

for tolling or the like.” Salas v. City of Galena Park, Nos. 21-20170,

21-20333, 2022 WL 1487024, at *8 (5th Cir. May 11, 2022) (quoting

Jones v. Alcoa, Inc., 339 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 2003)).

3. Analysis

A. McKesson

McKesson argues that the FCA’s statute of limitations bars

Relator’s claims against it. ECF No. 56 at 8. The FCA’s statute of

limitations provides that:

A civil action under section 3730 may not be brought--

(1) more than 6 years after the date on which the

violation of section 3729 is committed, or

(2) more than 3 years after the date when facts

material to the right of action are known or

reasonably should have been known by the

official of the United States charged with

responsibility to act in the circumstances, but in

no event more than 10 years after the date on

which the violation is committed,

whichever occurs last.

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31 U.S.C. § 3731(b). The Supreme Court has clarified that the FCA

“contains two limitations periods that apply to a ‘civil action under

section 3730[.]’” Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. United States ex rel.

Hunt, 587 U.S. 262, 264 (2019).

As to the first, six-year statute of limitations period, Relator

does not allege that McKesson was involved in any allegedly

fraudulent conduct after March 2017. See ECF No. 39 at ¶¶ 5–10,

95–99, 108–10, 177–78, 188, 204. Thus, to survive the first statute

of limitations, Relator must have filed suit by March 2023.

McKesson argues that Relator’s claims are barred by the first, six-

year, statute of limitations because the claims against it were filed

in June 2024. ECF No. 56 at 8–9.

Relator argues that “each fraudulent scheme alleged in the

TAC occurred, in substantial part, within the six-year window

immediately preceding the filing of the TAC.” ECF No. 65 at 5. But

Relator fails to allege that McKesson took any fraudulent actions

or participated in any fraudulent scheme in the six years before

McKesson was added as a party to the suit.

The court agrees with McKesson. Relator does not allege

that McKesson committed any fraudulent acts after March 2017.

Thus, because Relator did not bring any claims against McKesson

until May 24, 2024, when she filed her motion for leave to file the

Third Amended Complaint, Relator’s claims against McKesson are

barred under the six-year statute of limitations. See ECF No. 28

(Relator’s motion to file an amended complaint “against new and

additional Defendants”).

The FCA states that whichever of its two limitations periods

provides the later date serves as the limitations period. Cochise

Consultancy, 587 U.S. at 264. The court thus turns to whether the

claims against McKesson are barred under the FCA’s second

statute of limitations period.

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“The second [limitations] period requires that the action be

brought within 3 years after the United States official charged

with the responsibility to act knew or should have known the

relevant facts, but not more than 10 years after the violation.”

Cochise Consultancy, 587 U.S. at 264. Courts have found that

“facts material to” the claims were known to the Government when

a qui tam suit was initially filed. United States ex rel. Wood v.

Allergan, Inc., No. 19-CV-4029, 2020 WL 3073293, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.

June 10, 2020) (dismissing a suit as untimely where Relator had

filed two prior actions alleging the same claims he alleged in a

third action); United States ex rel. Schroeder v. Medtronic, Inc., No.

17-2060, 2023 WL 5152513, at *5–6 (D. Kan. Aug. 10, 2023)

(“Because relator did not file the claims against WRG within three

years after the 2017 disclosure, relator may not take advantage of

Section 3731(b)’s 10-year statute of repose.”).

Relator argues that (1) the Government “couldn’t have

known the relevant facts until, at a minimum, August 25, 2022,

when the DOJ declined to intervene with respect to the original,

amended and second amended complaints[,]” and (2) a ten-year

statute of limitations applies and “cannot be ignored.” ECF No. 65

at 5. The court disagrees.

Relator’s Original Complaint, which was filed on May 7,

2021, states that a copy of Relator’s complaint and all material

evidence was provided to the Attorney General of the United

States, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of

Texas, and the Attorney General for the State of Texas. ECF No. 1

at 1–2. Relator does not argue that the Third Amended Complaint

alleges facts materially different from those in her prior

complaints. Thus, the second limitations period began running on

May 7, 2021, and Relator had until May 7, 2024 to bring FCA

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claims against McKesson. As the court stated above, Relator did

not bring any claims against McKesson until May 24, 2024.

Relator’s argument that a ten-year statute of limitations

applies misstates the law. Ten years is the latest deadline to file

suit, even when the government does not have actual or

constructive knowledge of the violation. See Cochise Consultancy,

587 U.S. at 264 (requiring that the action be brought within three

years after the Government knew or should have known the

relevant facts, but not more than 10 years after the violation).

Relator’s claims against McKesson are barred by the FCA’s statute

of limitations.

As to Relator’s claims under the THFPA, the THFPA states

that:

A person proceeding under this subsection may

recover for an unlawful act for a period of up to six

years before the date the lawsuit was filed, or for a

period beginning when the unlawful act occurred until

up to three years from the date the state knows or

reasonably should have known facts material to the

unlawful act, whichever of these two periods is longer,

regardless of whether the unlawful act occurred more

than six years before the date the lawsuit was filed.

Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, in no event

shall a person proceeding under this subsection

recover for an unlawful act that occurred more than 10

years before the date the lawsuit was filed.

Tex. Hum. Res. Code § 36.104(b). The court has not found, and the

parties have not provided, any Texas state court cases interpreting

this provision of the THFPA. In the absence of other guidance, the

court interprets the statute’s plain text, which appears to track the

federal limitations period. For the reasons stated with respect to

the federal statute, Relator’s claim against McKesson under the

Texas FCA is also untimely.

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The court recommends that McKesson’s motion be

GRANTED. See Salas, 2022 WL 1487024, at *8 (stating that the

court may grant a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) where it

is evident from the plaintiff’s pleadings that the claim is barred by

the statute of limitations). Relator’s claims against McKesson

should be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim.

B. UT Physicians

UTP argues that Relator’s claims against it should be

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to

state a claim under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). ECF No. 58 at 1.

The court first considers whether UTP is an arm of the state to

determine whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction over

the claims against UTP.

Absent consent to suit, waiver of immunity by the State, or

congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity, the Eleventh

Amendment bars an individual from suing a state in federal court.

Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr., 307 F.3d 318, 326 (5th Cir.

2002) (citing U.S. Const. Amend. XI). Because Eleventh

Amendment sovereign immunity deprives the court of

jurisdiction, barred claims can be dismissed only under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and without prejudice. Warnock

v. Pecos Cnty., 88 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996). The court must

resolve whether it has subject matter jurisdiction prior to

addressing the merits of any claims. Doe v. United States, 853

F.3d 792, 798 (5th Cir. 2017), as revised (Apr. 12, 2017).

The FCA does not permit a cause of action against a State or

state agency. See Vermont Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel.

Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 787 (2000). In deciding whether an entity is

an “arm of the state” such that it cannot be liable under the FCA,

the court uses a six-factor test. U.S. ex rel. King v. Univ. of Tex.

Health Sci. Ctr.-Houston, 544 F. App’x 490, 495 (5th Cir. 2013)

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(citing Clark v. Tarrant Cnty., 798 F.2d 736, 744–45 (5th Cir.

1986)). The court considers:

(1) whether the state statutes and caselaw

characterize the agency as an arm of the state; (2) the

source of funds for the entity; (3) the degree of local

autonomy the entity enjoys; (4) whether the entity is

concerned primarily with local, as opposed to

statewide problems; (5) whether the entity has

authority to sue and be sued in its own name; and (6)

whether the entity has the right to hold and use

property.

Id.

To determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction, the

court may consider “(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint

supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3)

the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s

resolution of disputed facts.” United States ex rel Johnson v.

Raytheon Co., 93 F.4th 776, 783 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145

S. Ct. 356 (2024).

UTP argues that UTHealth is a protected arm of the state,

and that as “the faculty group practice of UTHealth[,]” UTP is also

immune from liability under the FCA. ECF No. 58 at 7–8.

As to the first factor, a Texas court of appeals has held that

“[j]urisdictional facts do not conclusively establish that UTP is a

governmental unit entitled to immunity[.]” Lenoir v. U.T.

Physicians, 491 S.W.3d 68, 77 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2016, pet. denied). The court explained that

UTP is affiliated with the University of Texas System.

The UT System includes the University of Texas

Health Science Center at Houston (UTHSCH), which

has immunity from suit. The UT Board of Regents

authorized UTHSCH to establish a subsidiary entity,

UTP. UTP operates a medical clinic at which

UTHSCH teaching physicians provide medical care to

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patients and medical instruction to physicians in the

UTHSCH residency programs.

Id. In Lenoir, the court considered whether UTP qualified as a

governmental unit under the Texas Tort Claims Act, which

required considering whether UTP had a legislative or

constitutional source of authority. Id. That question corresponds

to the first of the six factors. The court found that “UTP does not

qualify as a ‘governmental unit’ . . . because it received its power

and authority from UTHSCH, as authorized by the UT Board, and

not from a legislative or constitutional source.” Id. at 79, 81 (“mere

status as a wholly-owned subsidiary . . . does not shield UTP with

another entity’s immunity from suit”).

UTP does not cite, and the court has not found, any Texas

caselaw finding that UTP is a government entity or an arm of the

state. UTP also does not cite, and the court has not found, any

Texas statutes stating that UTP is a government entity. The Texas

Education Code states that UTHSCH is a part of the University of

Texas System and that the University of Texas System is

composed of “such other institutions and entities as from time to

time may be assigned by specific legislative act to the governance,

control, jurisdiction, or management of The University of Texas

System.” Tex. Educ. Code § 65.02(a)(9), (b). UTP has not shown

that any legislative act has included UTP as a component of the

University of Texas System. The first factor weighs against finding

that UTP is an arm of the state.

The second factor, the source of funds for the entity, is the

most significant factor in assessing an entity’s status. U.S. ex rel.

King, 544 F. App’x at 496. UTP argues that its funding comes from

the State and that “the only potential source of funds for payment

of any judgment in this case would be funds belonging to

UTHealth, and ultimately, the State[.]” ECF No. 58 at 8. The

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evidence that UTP provides to support this assertion merely states

that if UTP is dissolved, all of its assets will be transferred to

UTHSCH. ECF No. 58-1 at 5, 9 (updating the entity’s name to U.T.

Physicians). It is not clear to the court that UTP is funded by the

state. As it stands, the court cannot make a determination as to

the second factor.

As to the third factor, UTP argues that it has little

autonomy, that UTHealth appoints UTP’s Board of Directors, and

that UTP only operates as directed by UTHealth. ECF No. 58 at 9.

UTP refers the court to UTP’s Articles of Incorporation to support

these arguments. Even if this factor weighed in favor of UTP being

an arm of the state, the court could still not make a determination

about UTP’s ultimate status because the court is unable to make a

determination about the final three factors. As to the fourth factor,

UTP argues that it provides statewide services, but it does not

provide any evidence to support this assertion. ECF No. 58 at 9.

As to the fifth factor, UTP merely states that this factor has little

weight. As to the sixth factor, UTP states that “UTP, as a ledger

line in UTHealth’s financial statements, holds property on behalf

of the Board of Regents[.]” Id. UTP does not provide evidence

supporting this statement.

Relator argues that, at best, the court should “allow

discovery on this point.” ECF No. 63 at 8. The court agrees. When

the Government is sued, subject matter jurisdiction is at issue, and

the court must resolve whether it has subject matter jurisdiction

prior to addressing the merits of any claims. Doe, 853 F.3d at 798.

If subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, the court must dismiss the

claims without reaching the merits. Id. Because there are

insufficient facts before the court about UTP’s status as an arm of

the state, the court is unable to determine whether it has subject

matter jurisdiction over Relator’s claims against UTP.

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The court recommends that UTP’s motion to dismiss be

DENIED without prejudice to raising the same arguments in a

later motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) after the parties

engage in jurisdictional discovery as to UTP’s status. In re MPF

Holdings US LLC, 701 F.3d 449, 457 (5th Cir. 2012) (“while a court

should determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction at the

earliest possible stage in the proceedings, some jurisdictional

discovery may be warranted if the issue of subject matter

jurisdiction turns on a disputed fact”). The court will enter a

schedule as to jurisdictional discovery in a separate order.

C. Change Healthcare

As to Change, Relator has sued the wrong entity. Relator

alleges that Change (Change Healthcare, Corp., a/k/a Change

Healthcare Engagement Solutions, Inc.) contracted with UTP to

provide revenue cycle management services. ECF No. 39 at ¶¶ 3,

6–7, 19–22, 178. Change argues that, as a threshold matter, “the

Change Healthcare Entities did not contract with UT Physicians

or perform the relevant services at issue in Relator’s Complaint.”

ECF No. 59 at 8. Change attaches to its motion to dismiss the

Physician Billing Service Agreement (the Agreement) with UTP

and argues that the Agreement demonstrates that it is the wrong

party to this suit. See ECF No. 59-1. There is no dispute that the

agreement is valid and binding on the parties to it. The court first

must determine whether it may consider the Agreement at this

stage in the proceedings.

To determine whether a claim survives a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss, the court’s inquiry is usually limited to “(1) the

facts set forth in the complaint, (2) documents attached to the

complaint, and (3) matters of which judicial notice may be taken

under Federal Rule of Evidence 201.” De Leon v. Munoz, No. 24-

40215, 2025 WL 957500, at *7 (5th Cir. Mar. 31, 2025). Documents

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that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss are considered

part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the complaint and if

they are central to plaintiff’s claim. Collins v. Morgan Stanley

Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498–99 (5th Cir. 2000); De Leon, 2025

WL 957500, at *7.

Courts have held that documents are central to a plaintiff’s

claims when they are necessary to establish an element of one of

the plaintiff’s claims. Johnson v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 999 F.

Supp. 2d 919 (N.D. Tex. 2014); Piper Jaffray & Co. v. Omni

Surgical, LLC, No. 14-CV-814, 2015 WL 3687946, at * (W.D. Tex.

June 12, 2015), R. & R. adopted, No. 14-CV-814, 2015 WL

13649107 (W.D. Tex. July 8, 2015); St. v. Maverick Tube Corp., No.

15-CV-02736, 2016 WL 8711338, at *3 (S.D. Tex. June 17, 2016),

R. & R. adopted, No. 15-CV-2736, 2016 WL 3948106 (S.D. Tex.

July 19, 2016).

The court finds that the Agreement between UTP and

Change is central to Relator’s claims because it is necessary to

establish that Change was involved in the alleged fraudulent

course of conduct.3 Relator alleges that “[f]or more than twenty

years UT Physicians has contracted with Defendants McKesson

and/or Change Healthcare to provide revenue cycle management

services on behalf of UT Physicians.” ECF No. 39 at ¶ 3. Relator

does not allege that Change’s involvement in the fraud scheme was

independent of the contract. Relator does not explain how Change

was plausibly involved in the fraud other than by virtue of its role

under the contract. Relator does not allege or argue that Change

could be responsible for the actions of the actual party to the

3 A violation of the FCA occurs when (1) “there was a false statement or fraudulent course of

conduct; (2) made or carried out with the requisite scienter; (3) that was material; and (4)

that caused the government to pay out money or to forfeit moneys due (i.e., that involved a

claim).” United States v. Bollinger Shipyards, Inc., 775 F.3d 255, 259 (5th Cir. 2014).

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contract. Thus, the only way Change can be liable is if it is a party

to the contract. The contract is therefore central to Relator’s claims

and referred to in the complaint. Accordingly, the Agreement and

its relevant amendments are considered part of the pleadings, and

the court will consider them here.

The Agreement is between UTP and Change Healthcare

Technology Enabled Services, LLC (CHTES). ECF No. 59-3 at 1;

ECF No. 59-1. Relator’s claims are against Change Healthcare,

Corp., a/k/a Change Healthcare Engagement Solutions, Inc. ECF

No. 39 at 1. It is undisputed that these are two distinct corporate

entities.

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the conduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Relator has not met her

burden. She has named an entity that is not a party to the contract

and has not pleaded any theory of liability, such as alter ego, that

would allow the court to hold non-contracting parties liable. Cf. In

re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 538 F. Supp. 2d

367, 391 (D. Mass. 2008) (dismissing FCA claims against a parent

company where “[e]ach wrongful act alleged by the Relator

implicates only [the subsidiary], not . . . the corporate parent”);

compare U.S. ex rel. Dekort v. Integrated Coast Guard Sys., 705 F.

Supp. 2d 519, 545–547 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (denying a motion to

dismiss an FCA claim where Relator’s complaint included

allegations supporting that the parties were alter egos). Relator

has brought her claims against the wrong entity. Thus, the court

recommends that Change’s motion, ECF No. 59, be GRANTED

and Relator’s claims against Change be dismissed with prejudice

for failure to state a claim.

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4. Conclusion

The court recommends that Defendant McKesson’s Motion

to Dismiss, ECF No. 56, be GRANTED; Defendant UTP’s Motion

to Dismiss, ECF No. 58, be DENIED without prejudice pending

jurisdictional discovery; and Defendant Change’s Motion to

Dismiss, ECF No. 59, be GRANTED.

The parties have fourteen days from service of this

Memorandum and Recommendation to file written objections. 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. Responses to objections, if

any, are due seven days thereafter. Failure to timely file objections

will preclude appellate review of factual findings or legal

conclusions, except for plain error. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.

140, 147—49 (1985); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276-77 (5th

Cir. 1988).

Signed at Houston, Texas on August _27 , 2025.

Peter Bray 7

United States Magistrate Judge

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