“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.”
How later courts described this case
- “[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.”
- holding that claims against Miami University and its employees in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment
- holding a plaintiff’s complaint against the Medical College of Ohio at Toledo and the president and dean of the institution in their official capacities was barred
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
Talisha J. Foster, Case No. 3:25-cv-23
Plaintiff,
v. MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
David Sohn, et al.,
Defendants.
I. BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff Talisha J. Foster, a Michigan resident, has filed a complaint in this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State of Ohio, the University of Toledo Medical Center
(“UTMC”), and Orthopedic Doctor David Sohn, an employee of UTMC. (Doc. No. 1 at 1).
In her complaint, she alleges constitutional violations and state-law claims “arising from
defendants’ [alleged] gross negligence, medical malpractice, deliberate indifference, intentional
misconduct, and spoliation of evidence” in connection with a knee surgery she received, and that
was performed by Dr. Sohn, at UTMC. (Id. at 8). She seeks compensatory and punitive damages
as well as other relief.
Plaintiff originally filed her complaint in the United States District Court for Eastern District
of Michigan, which transferred the action here pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). (See Doc. No. 7).
After the action was transferred, Plaintiff filed motions to proceed in forma pauperis, (Doc. No. 10),
for appointment of counsel, (Doc. No. 11), and for a ruling on her motions. (Doc. No. 12). She
then filed a motion to supplement her motion to proceed in forma pauperis, (Doc. No. 13), and a
motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. (Doc. No. 14).
Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted and her motion to supplement is
denied as moot. For the following reasons, I deny her motion for leave and dismiss her complaint.
II. DISCUSSION
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and have a duty to examine their jurisdiction
in every case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). I do not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s suit. The
Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution operates as a bar to federal-court
jurisdiction when a private citizen sues a state or its instrumentalities in federal court, unless the state
has given its express consent to suit. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. 139
(1993); Pennhurst St. Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1983). The State of Ohio has not
waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court. Johns v. Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 753 F.2d 524
(6th Cir. 1985).
The Eleventh Amendment bars all suits, whether for injunctive, declaratory, or monetary
relief, against the state and its departments and instrumentalities, as well as suits which essentially
seek money damages from the state. McCormick v. Miami Univ., 693 F.3d 654, 661 (6th Cir. 2012);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). Claims against state employees in their official
capacities are in effect claims for money damages against the state and are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official
in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s
office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.”) (internal citations omitted).
And where, as here, a plaintiff does not clearly specify that a state official is sued in his individual
capacity, the court assumes the official is being sued in his official capacity only. Wells v. Brown, 891
F.2d 591, 592-94 (6th Cir. 1989).
Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment bars federal-court jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims
against the State of Ohio, UTMC, and Dr. Sohn. See, e.g., McCormick, 693 F.3d at 661 (holding that
claims against Miami University and its employees in their official capacities are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment); Hall v. Med. Coll. of Ohio at Toledo, 742 F.2d 299, 307 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding
a plaintiff’s complaint against the Medical College of Ohio at Toledo and the president and dean of
the institution in their official capacities was barred).
Furthermore, it would be futile to allow Plaintiff to amend her complaint to specify whether
she sues Dr. Sohn in his individual capacity. Ohio Revised Code § 9.86 confers immunity on Ohio
state officers and employees and provides that “no officer or employee shall be liable in any civil
action that arises under the law of this state for damage or injury caused in the performance of his
duties, unless the officer’s or employee’s actions were manifestly outside the scope of his
employment or official responsibilities, or unless the officer or employee acted with malicious
purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.” And only the Ohio Court of Claims has
the authority to make that determination. See McCormick, 693 F.3d at 664–65.
As it is clear from Plaintiff’s pleading that the Ohio Court of Claims has not determined that
Dr. Sohn is not entitled to immunity,1 I lack subject-matter jurisdiction over any state-law claims
Plaintiff may assert against Dr. Sohn in his individual capacity. Id. at 665 (holding that district court
lacked jurisdiction to hear state claims against individual state defendants where there was no
evidence that the Ohio Court of Claims determined the defendants were not entitled to immunity).
Plaintiff also could not amend her complaint to allege a plausible federal constitutional claim
against Dr. Sohn. It is well-established that medical negligence or malpractice, which is the most
1 Plaintiff represents in her pleading that she voluntarily withdrew an action she filed in the Ohio
Court of Claims in connection with Dr. Sohn’s conduct after her attorney withdrew from
representing her in the Ohio Court of Claims. (See Doc. No. 1 at 21.)
Plaintiff’s complaint suggests, are state-law tort claims insufficient to state a plausible constitutional
claim for relief under § 1983. See Bolden v. Univ. Hosp. Cleveland, Case No. 1:22-cv-380, 2022 WL
1987348, at *1 (N.D. Ohio June 6, 2022) (dismissing pro se action against medical providers for
“discrimination, negligence, infringement, and/or malpractice of his Civil Rights”).
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint fails for the same reasons.
While she seeks to add other medical providers as defendants and offers the conclusory allegation
that they acted “outside their duties as public employees,” (Doc. No. 14-1 at 1), the Ohio Court of
Claims has not made that determination, and I am not permitted to do so. Therefore, I deny her
motion for leave. (Doc. No. 14).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, I grant Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, (Doc.
No. 10), and deny her motion to supplement, (Doc. No. 13), as moot. I deny her motion for leave
to file a second amended complaint, (Doc. No. 14), and deny her motion for a ruling, (Doc. No. 12),
as moot. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed for failure to allege a plausible claim over which I may
exercise subject-matter jurisdiction.
I further certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal from this decision could
not be taken in good faith.
So Ordered.
s/ Jeffrey J. Helmick
United States District Judge