Ray v. Hamm

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

MELVIN RAY,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 4:24-cv-977-CLM

JOHN HAMM, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Inmate Melvin Ray sues 14 employees of the Alabama Department

of Corrections (“DOC”): Commissioner John Hamm; Classification

Director Angie Baggett: Wardens Phillip Mitchell, Christopher Webster,

and Darrel Fox; Correctional Lieutenants Monika Gadson, Roderick

Gadson, Derrick Dent, and Brandon Burns; Correctional Sergeants Keller

Speaks, Antonia Barnes, and JaJuan Howard; and Correctional Officers

Randall Billingsley and Cholleé Jackson. Defendants ask the court to

dismiss all counts. For the reasons explained below, the court GRANTS

IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion (doc. 22).

BACKGROUND

Because Ray is defending against a motion to dismiss, the court

takes his pleaded facts as true. Crowder v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 963 F.3d

1197, 1202 (11th Cir. 2020)

A. Advocacy

Ray is in state custody. Ray describes himself as a nonviolent

advocate for inmates’ rights. Ray and fellow inmate Robert Council co-

founded the Free Alabama Movement (“FAM”), an organization dedicated

to protesting civil and human rights violations committed by or within

DOC. Ray claims his participation in FAM makes him a target for

inhumane and cruel treatment by DOC employees.

1

Until his recent transfer to Limestone, Ray was housed at St. Clair

Correctional Facility in Springville, Alabama. Beginning in February

2024, the Tennessee Student Solidarity Network (“TSSN”), an activist

group focusing on the civil rights of prisoners, started regularly protesting

outside of St. Clair in support of FAM and Ray.

B. Restrictive Housing

Ray claims that several Defendant abused him in retaliation for the

TSSN protests. Ray provides these examples.

• March 30, 2024

TSSN protested an Alabama prison construction site in mid-March

2024. A week later, Billingsley and Russell approached Ray as he was

praying in the “Spiritual Grounds” area outside of his H-Dorm cell in St.

Clair. Billingsley and Russell searched Ray and his immediate

surrounding area. Finding no contraband on his person, they detained

Ray while Monika Gadson, Speaks, and Barnes searched his living area.

According to Ray, Gadson, Speaks, and Barnes broke his

headphones, desecrated his religious items, and destroyed his property.

The search of Ray’s cell led to the discovery of a cell phone, which led to a

strip-search of Ray by Billingsley and Barnes. Ray claims Billingsley

planted the phone in his cell. Russell and Speaks subsequently detained

a handcuffed Ray in a restricted housing unit (“the RHU cage”) for nearly

five hours.

Ray claims that “[p]lacement in the RHU cage [] restricts a

prisoner’s movement even more so than solitary confinement and deprives

a prisoner of any privacy and or ability to use his personal property and

is typically used to punish prisoners.” (Id., ¶ 52). The housing unit had no

bathroom or running water. After Ray was cleared to leave the RHU cage,

Seals advised him against filing a grievance.

• April 1, 2024

Two days later, Roderick Gadson and Howard told Ray about an

2

ongoing DOC Law Enforcement Services Divisions (“LESD”) investigation

on Ray that resulted in “lock-up orders.” In response to Ray asking why

LESD was investigating him, R. Gadson responded “I don’t know . . . Just

cuff up.” (Doc. 21, ¶42). R. Gadson and Howard placed Ray in the RHU

cage for several hours before moving him to solitary confinement. Ray

remained in solitary confinement from April 1, 2024 until April 28, 2024.

Ray describes his solitary confinement cell as filthy and lacking

running water and lighting. While in solitary, Ray was only permitted one

shower per week and was denied access to basic cleaning supplies,

exercise, and his pre-approved vegetarian meals. According to Ray, he

carried out his solitary confinement in a racially segregated housing unit.

On April 17, 2024, Ray’s attorneys sent a cease-and-desist letter to St.

Clair citing DOC’s own 72-hour limit on holding prisoners in solitary

confinement without pending disciplinary charges. The letter, addressed

to St. Clair’s Wardens, also pointed out that inmates caught with

contraband are not usually subject to solitary confinement. Ray doesn’t

include the date St. Clair received the letter.

• April 13, 2024, April 20, 2024, and May 2–3, 2024

While Ray was in solitary confinement on April 13, 2024, TSSN held

another protest at St. Clair. Dent, Fester, Allan, and Russell moved Ray

from solitary to the RHU cage when the protest started where he

remained handcuffed until the protest ended. The same thing happened

on April 20, 2024: solitary confinement, TSSN protest starts, RHU cage,

TSSN protest ends, back to solitary confinement.

Ray experienced similar treatment on May 2, 2024 and May 3, 2024.

On May 2, 2024, Monika Gadson and Webster took Ray from his cell and

seated him in a chair in “the breezeway” during a TSSN protest. And on

May 3, 2024, Burns strip-searched Ray during a TSSN protest. “Several

officers” then took and destroyed Ray’s (non-contraband) property. (Id.,

¶59).

3

C. Disciplinary Hearing

Ray received a disciplinary citation on April 3, 2024, for possessing

the cellphone Billingsley found in Ray’s cell. As evidence of possession,

several St. Clair officers claimed Ray was alone in the location Billingsley

found the phone, allegedly proving the phone must have belonged to Ray.

In response, Ray listed three people (Leon Bond, Ricky Rankin, and

Edmond Brown) that were praying with him in the Spiritual Grounds on

April 30, 2024. Ray claims that Monika Gadson and Jackson threatened

his named witnesses to steer clear of Ray’s disciplinary proceedings.

Ray’s disciplinary hearing was held on April 17, 2024, with Jackson

serving as the disciplinary hearing officer. At the hearing, Jackson

allegedly stated that Ray’s witnesses couldn’t be called because “Ray had

failed to provide the complete first and last name of each witness and

therefore correctional officers could not locate the three witnesses.” (Id., ¶

65). Ray, of course, disputes Jackson’s characterization and asserts he was

denied the opportunity to present any witnesses or question any officer

who testified against him. Ray also claims Monika Gadson lied during the

hearing and that Jackson found him guilty of contraband possession as

pretext for his continued housing in solitary confinement.

D. Transfer

Ray was transferred without request from St. Clair to Limestone on

May 30, 2024. According to Ray, he was transferred to quell the weekly

TSSN protests at St. Clair. At the same time Ray moved from St. Clair to

Limestone, ADOC transferred FAM co-founder Robert Council from

Limestone to St. Clair. Though Ray and Council have been friends for

years, ADOC insists on labeling them “enemies,” thus prohibiting the two

men from being housed in the same facility.

4

E. Lawsuit

In his complaint, Ray pleads these nine claims:

Requested

Count Who What Why

Relief

In their official capacities,

Injunction

Hamm and Baggett retaliated

ordering transfer

First against Ray’s speech by

Hamm, back to St. Clair

I Amendment transferring him to Limestone

Baggett and removal of

Retaliation and designating him as an

enemy

enemy of Robert Council.

designation

Mitchell violated Ray’s First

Amendment rights by, in his

Injunctive relief to

official capacity, subjecting Ray

First prevent continued

to a pattern or practice of abuse

II Mitchell Amendment retaliation upon

(e.g., solitary confinement,

Retaliation transfer back to

placement in the cage,

St. Clair

unwarranted searches, and so

on).

Injunctive relief

Mitchell, in his official capacity,

against use of the

Eighth violated the Eighth Amendment

RHU cage as

III Mitchell Amendment by unjustly punishing Ray

punishment when

Violation through handcuffing and

Ray returns to St.

placing him in the RHU cage.

Clair

Mitchell, in his official capacity, Injunctive relief

violated Ray’s Due Process against use of the

Fourteenth

rights by (unjustly and without RHU cage as

IV Mitchell Amendment,

process) holding him in the RHU punishment when

Violation

cage to offend Ray’s bodily Ray returns to St.

autonomy. Clair

Webster,

Ray experienced retaliation for

Fox,

his support of FAM and the

Mitchell,

TSSN protest from Defendants

M. Gadson,

in their individual capacities by

Dent,

First (1) placement in RHU cage, (2)

Burns,

V Amendment harassing searches and property Damages

Speaks,

Retaliation destruction, (3) solitary

Barnes,

confinement without due

R. Gadson,

process, and (4) unsanitary

Howard,

conditions within solitary

Billingsley,

confinement.

Jackson

5

Webster,

Fox,

Defendants in their individual

Mitchell,

capacities violated the Eighth

M. Gadson, Eighth

Amendment by unjustly

VI Dent, Amendment Damages

punishing Ray through

Speaks, Violation

handcuffing and placing him in

Barnes,

the RHU cage.

R. Gadson,

Howard

Without a meaningful

opportunity to contest

Billingsley, Fourteenth

detainment, Defendants kept

VII M. Gadson, Amendment, Damages

Ray in solitary confinement and

Jackson Violation

lied during his disciplinary

hearing.

Webster,

Fox,

Mitchell,

Defendants violated Alabama

M. Gadson,

law through the extreme and

VIII Dent, IIED Damages

outrageous repeated use of the

Speaks,

RHU cage.

Barnes,

R. Gadson,

Howard

M. Gadson,

Speak, Defendants violated Alabama

IX Barnes, Conversion law by maliciously destroying Damages

Dent, Ray’s property.

Burns

Defendants ask the court to dismiss all claims.

STANDARD

Because this is a Rule 12 motion, the court accepts the allegations

in Ray’s complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable

to Ray. Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc., 697 F.3d 1267, 1275 (11th Cir. 2012).

The ultimate question is whether all of Ray’s allegations, when accepted

as true, “plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). If the facts as pleaded could entitle Ray to

relief, then the court must deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss. If,

however, the court accepts all of Ray’s pleaded facts as true, and Ray still

would not be entitled to relief, then the court must grant the motion.

6

DISCUSSION

Before it can reach the merits, the court must deal with two

ancillary issues: fictitious party pleading and Ray’s requested relief. The

first is easily dispatched: Fictitious party practice is generally not allowed

in federal court, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a); Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d

734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010), so the court dismisses all claims against the two

fictitious Defendants, “LESD Agent John Doe 1” and “Desk Clerk Jane

Doe 2.” (Doc. 21, pp. 1, 20, 24, 29). The relief-related issues, however,

warrant their own discussion section.

A.

Relief-related Issues

1. Needs-Narrowness-Intrusiveness Test (Counts I-IV)

In his prayer for relief, Ray asks the court to:

• Order Defendants to transfer him back to St. Clair;

• Order Defendants not to designate Ray and Council as

enemies;

• Order Defendants not place Ray in solitary confinement

when protestors are outside his facility;

• Order Defendants not to search Ray’s body or possessions

when protestors are outside his facility;

• Order Defendants not to desecrate Ray’s religious

materials when protestors are outside his facility; and,

• Order Defendants not to file disciplinary charges against

Ray without due process when protestors are outside his

facility.

(Doc. 21, p. 35). Defendants argue that the court must dismiss Counts I-

IV because these requests violate the needs-narrowness-intrusiveness

test of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. (Doc. 23, p. 10).

7

While Defendants may ultimately be right about the PLRA, the

court cannot dismiss Counts I-IV on this ground (at least not yet). Rule 8

doesn’t require Ray to plausibly allege a form of relief; it only requires Ray

to plausibly allege facts that could state a claim for relief. As the Eleventh

Circuit recently explained,

[r]equesting an improper remedy is not fatal to a claim. A

complaint is sufficient if it alleges facts that establish that

the plaintiff is entitled to any relief that the court can grant.

That a plaintiff might misconceive his remedy does not

warrant dismissal of the complaint unless he is entitled to

no relief under any state of facts. . . . Although these

precedents pre-date Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, that

decision did not disturb the rule that requesting an improper

remedy is not fatal to a claim. Twombly replaced the “no set

of facts” standard with the requirement that complaints

must state “plausible” claims. But Twombly did not change

the rule that a district court must consider whether a

complaint that seeks an improper remedy might warrant

another form of relief.

A.W. by and Through J.W. v. Coweta County Sch. District, 110 F.4th 1309,

1315 (11th Cir. 2024) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Here,

Ray requests damages in addition to injunctive relief, (doc. 21, p. 35–36),

and there will be plenty of time for remedy arguments if this case

proceeds. So for now, the court does not find that the needs-narrowness-

intrusiveness test warrants dismissal of any count.

2. Injunctive Relief Claims Against Mitchell (Counts II-IV)

Ray’s requested relief, however, does warrant dismissal of his

claims against Mitchell (i.e., Counts II-IV). In each of these counts, Ray

sues Mitchell only in his official capacity as St. Clair’s warden. See (doc.

21, ¶¶ 89, 104, 109).

8

In Count I, Ray alleges that he was wrongly moved from St. Clair

to Limestone and asks the court to order he be sent back to St. Clair.

Counts II-IV assume Ray’s success on Count I, meaning that Ray’s claims

depend on him being sent back to St. Clair. Specifically, Ray asks the court

to order Mitchell, in his official capacity as St. Clair’s warden, to ensure

that Ray doesn’t suffer further retaliation after his return to St. Clair.

(Doc. 21, p. 16–20).

Defendants argue Counts II–IV are moot because Ray is not housed

at St. Clair. (Doc. 23, p. 13–14). The court agrees. As pleaded, Ray is not

an inmate at St. Clair and there’s no imminent plan for him to return to

St. Clair absent a court order. Even if Ray does return to St. Clair, there

is no guarantee Mitchell will still be warden or that retaliation is a

continued risk. Accordingly, Counts II–IV do not present a live

controversy over which the court has jurisdiction. See Soliman v. U.S. ex

rel. INS., 296 F.3d 1237, 1242 (11th Cir. 2002). And for the same reasons,

the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to mootness

doesn’t apply. Id. (“[T]he exception can be invoked only when [] there [is]

a reasonable expectation or a demonstrated probability that

the same controversy will recur involving the same complaining party

. . .”). The court will therefore dismiss Counts II–IV for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction.

B.

Federal claims

That leaves the court with Counts I and V-IX. The court starts with

Ray’s federal claims to determine whether Ray pleads any claims that

invoke the court’s original jurisdiction. And within those claims, the court

starts with Ray’s claim that seeks prospective injunctive relief because

qualified immunity does not apply.

Count I: First Amendment Retaliation (injunctive relief)

1. Allegation: In his first count, Ray pleads that certain Defendants

transferred him from St. Clair to Limestone in retaliation for Ray

9

exercising his First Amendment rights. Among other things, Ray alleges

that he and Council co-founded FAM to challenge inmates’ conditions of

confinement. To chill their speech, Ray alleges that Defendants wrongly

tagged him and Council as “enemies” so that they would have to be housed

in different facilities, thus requiring Ray be transferred out of St. Clair

when Council transferred in on the same day. As relief, Ray asks the court

order Hamm and Baggett remove the “enemy” label and transfer Ray back

to St. Clair.

2. Analysis: The court finds that Ray sufficiently pleads a retaliation

claim. “To state a §1983 First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff

generally must show: (1) []he engaged in constitutionally protected

speech, []; (2) the defendant’s retaliatory conduct adversely affected that

protected speech and right to petition; and (3) a causal connection exists

between the defendant's retaliatory conduct and the adverse effect on the

plaintiff's speech and right to petition.” DeMartini v. Town of Gulf Strean,

942 F.3d 1277, 1289 (11th Cir. 2019). If he proves his alleged facts, Ray

could show that (a) he and Council engaged in constitutionally protected

speech and association (b) Defendants’ acts that separated the two men

would likely deter others from exercising their First Amendment rights,

and (c) Defendants took those actions because Ray was exercising his

rights. See Turner v. Williams, 65 F.4th 564, 580 (11th Cir. 2023) (“A

plaintiff suffers adverse action if the defendant’s allegedly retaliatory

conduct would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from the exercise

of First Amendment rights.”). So the court denies Defendants’ motion to

dismiss Count I.

Count V: First Amendment Retaliation (money damages)

In Count V, Ray alleges multiple acts of retaliation on different days

involving different defendants. So the court breaks down the allegations

by event type and date to determine whether any result in a viable claim.

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1. Holding Cage allegations

1. Sufficiently pleaded: According to Ray, St. Clair’s restricted

housing unit (RHU) walk yard has a holding cell that Ray describes as a

“small, metal, confined cage with no running water or bathroom.” (Doc.

21, ¶ 39). Ray alleges that some combination of Defendants placed him in

an RHU cage or otherwise mistreated him during and/or in retaliation for

TSSN protests outside St. Clair on these dates:

• March 30, 2024: Ray alleges that when TSSN

protestors arrived at about 12:15pm, five Defendants

(Monika Gadson, Speaks, Barnes, Billingsley, and

Russell) locked him in an RHU cage for five hours.

These defendants released Ray from the cage as soon

as the protest ended.

• April 13, 2024: Ray alleges that when TSSN protestors

arrived at about 12:15pm, four Defendants (Dent,

Hester, Allen, and Russell) took him from his cell and

locked him in an RHU cage for three hours. These

defendants released Ray from the cage as soon as the

protest ended.

• April 20, 2024: Ray alleges that when TSSN protestors

arrived at about 12:00pm, multiple unnamed officers

took him from his cell and locked him in an RHU cage

for one hour. These defendants released Ray from the

cage as soon as the protest ended.

• May 3, 2024: Ray alleges that immediately after a

TSSN protest ended, 8 to 10 officers removed him from

his cell, destroyed his property, and strip searched

him. Ray does not allege he was put in an RHU cage.

The court finds that Ray sufficiently pleads a retaliation claim for each of

these incidents.

11

Assuming Ray’s facts are true, and reading them in a light most

favorable to Ray, Ray could show that (a) Ray and TSSN were associated

for protected expressive purposes, (b) Defendants’ use of the RHU cage

and/or destruction of property would dissuade others from associating to

express similar ideas or grievances, and (c) Defendants took these acts

because of Ray’s association with TSSN and TSSN’s expression of ideas

and grievances. Whether Ray can ultimately prove facts that satisfy these

elements is a question for another day. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,

486 U.S. 609, 622-23 (1984) (“According protection to collective effort on

behalf of shared goals is especially important in preserving political and

cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression from suppression

by the majority. Consequently, we have long understood as implicit in the

right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a

corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety

of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends. . . .

The right to associate for expressive purposes is not, however, absolute.

Infringements on that right may be justified by regulations adopted to

serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas,

that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of

associational freedoms.”) (citations omitted).

2. Deficient pleading: Some of Ray’s other fact allegations, however,

do not lead to viable claims. The court finds that Ray’s allegation that

Roderick Gadson and Howard placed him in an RHU cage on April 1, 2024

(¶ 55) does not—by itself—plead a viable claim because Ray fails to plead

any facts linking that placement to TSSN or any other protected activity.

The court also finds that Ray’s allegation that Monika Gadson and

Webster moved him to a chair in the breezeway on May 2, 2024 (¶ 58) does

not plead a viable claim because the threat of being moved from a cell to

a breezeway chair would not dissuade others from engaging in protected

activity.

3. Qualified immunity: Because Ray seeks money damages, finding

that Ray pleaded a viable claim(s) does not end the analysis. Qualified

immunity protects government officials from being sued in their

12

individual capacities so long as “their conduct ‘does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.’” Vineyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir.

2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “Once the

defendant establishes that he was acting within his discretionary

authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified

immunity is not appropriate. [] To overcome a qualified immunity defense,

the plaintiff must make two showings. First, the plaintiff must establish

that the defendant violated a constitutional right. Second, the plaintiff

must show that the violation was clearly established.” Foulke v. Weller,

2024 WL 2761778, at *5 (May 29, 2024, 11th Cir.).

Each act Ray complains about (e.g., placement in an RHU cage, cell

searches) falls within Defendants’ discretionary authority as prison

officials. So Ray has the burden to plead facts that would show (1) a

constitutional violation and (2) the violative act violated Ray’s clearly

established rights. The court has found that Ray pleads facts that would

show a constitutional violation. The court now finds that when

Defendants allegedly began retaliating against Ray in March 2024, it was

clearly established that prison officials cannot retaliate against an inmate

because that inmate, or a person or group with whom the inmate is

associated for expressive purposes, complained about prison conditions.

“The First Amendment forbids prison officials from retaliating

against prisoners for exercising the right of free speech.” Farrow v. W.,

320 F.3d 1235, 1248 (11th Cir. 2003). Freedom of association is similarly

protected under the First Amendment. Roberts, 467 U.S. at 618 (“The

Court has recognized a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in

those activities protected by the First Amendment—speech, assembly,

petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.”). “It is

an established principle of constitutional law that an inmate is considered

to be exercising his First Amendment right of freedom of speech when

he complains to the prison’s administrators about the conditions of

his confinement. It is also established that an inmate may maintain a

cause of action against prison administrators who retaliate against him

for making such complaints.” Smith, 532 F.3d at 1276.

13

If Ray can prove that prison officials locked him in a cage for hours

and/or destroyed his personal belongings because a political action group

was outside chanting protests against prison conditions and in favor of

Ray personally, see (doc. 21, ¶¶ 26-29), then Ray could show that

Defendants violated a clearly established right. The court recognizes that

“freedom of association is among the rights least compatible with

incarceration.” See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003). But

accepting Ray’s pleaded facts as true, Defendants’ actions bear no

“rational relation to legitimate penological interests.” See id. at 132.

Defendants instead took adverse action against Ray solely because a

group he was associated with was protesting prison conditions just outside

St. Clair’s walls. So the court denies qualified immunity to Monika

Gadson, Speaks, Barnes, Billingsley, Dent, Hester, Allen, and Russell at

this time.

4. Supervisory Liability: Finally, the court must decide whether

Ray pleads facts that would attach supervisory liability to Wardens

Webster and Fox. “Supervisor liability under §1983 occurs either when

the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional

violation or when there is a causal connection between actions of the

supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation. The causal

connection can be established when a history of widespread abuse puts

the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged

deprivation, and he fails to do so.” Braddy v. Florida Dept. of Labor and

Employment Sec., 133 F.3d 797, 802 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Brown v.

Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990)).

The court finds that Ray has not plausibly alleged facts that show

Fox personally participated in a constitutional violation or sanctioned the

allegedly unlawful acts of his subordinates. Nor has Ray articulated the

existence of a widespread pattern and history of abuse within St. Clair

that would put Fox on notice. (Doc. 23, p. 24–26). All Ray claims is that

the Fox “must have known” of Ray’s abuse, which is insufficient to meet

the pleading standard. (Doc, 21, ¶124). So Ray has failed to state any

supervisory liability claim against Fox.

14

The court reaches the same result for Webster but for a different

reason. Ray pleads that on May 2, 2024, Webster personally participated

in the moving of Ray from his cell to “sit in a chair in the breezeway for

multiple hours” while TSSN protested outside. (Doc. 21, ¶58). As stated,

the court finds that having Ray sit in a chair rather than in his cell is not

an adverse action because knowledge of this act would not dissuade

another inmate from associating with FAM or TSSN or speaking out

against prison conditions.

2. Searches with property destruction

According to Ray, certain Defendants also performed unreasonable

searches and destroyed his personal property during and/or in retaliation

for TSSN protests outside St. Clair on these dates:

• March 30, 2024: Monika Gadson led a search of Ray’s

personal items that resulted in the desecration of his

religious items, the destruction of his headphones, and

the strewing of his other property on the ground. Speaks

and Barnes also participated.

• April 13, 2024: Dent led a search that resulted in the

desecration of other religious artifacts.

• May 3, 2024: Burns led a strip search that included the

destruction and taking of Ray’s personal goods, religious

items, and state-issued tablet.

As explained, each of these searches occurred during or just after a TSSN

protest. So the court finds that Ray pleads a viable retaliation claim for

these incidents for the same reason the court found Ray’s ‘RHU cage’

claims were viable—i.e., Ray could prove that Defendants took an adverse

action against Ray because of his protected association with TSSN, who

was engaged in protected speech.

The court similarly finds that neither Monika Gadson, Dent, nor

Burns is entitled to qualified immunity for the reasons explained in the

court’s RHU cage analysis. While each Defendant was acting in his or her

15

official capacity, each alleged act (if proved) would violate a constitutional

right that was clearly established at the time.

3. Solitary confinement with harsh conditions

According to Ray, multiple Defendants conspired to place and keep

him in solitary confinement cell C35 from April 1, 2024 through April 28,

2024 in retaliation for the TSSN protests:

• On April 1, an unnamed LESD agent ordered Ray into solitary

confinement;

• Within solitary confinement, Monika Gadson and Howard put

Ray in cell C35 because they knew it was flooded, covered in filth,

and lacked light and running water;

• Billingsley, Gadson, and Jackson fabricated a disciplinary

charge to make sure Ray stayed in solitary confinement, then at

the disciplinary hearing:

o Billingsley lied about finding a contraband cell phone;

o Gadson blocked Ray from calling witnesses; and,

o Jackson, as presiding officer, found Ray liable without

hearing from Ray’s witnesses; and,

• After ensuring Ray’s loss at the hearing, Gadson and Howard

failed to move Ray from cell C35 or provide Ray with cleaning

supplies to make C35 more livable.

(Doc. 21, ¶¶ 139-48). Assuming these facts are true and that Ray can tie

them to the TSSN protests as he claims, the court finds that Ray pleads a

viable retaliation claim for the same reason the court found Ray’s RHU

cage and property destruction claims were viable—i.e., Ray could prove

that Defendants took an adverse action against Ray because of his

16

protected association with TSSN, who was engaged in protected speech.1

The court similarly finds that neither Billingsley, Monika Gadson,

nor Jackson is entitled to qualified immunity for the reasons explained in

the court’s RHU cage analysis. While each Defendant was acting in his or

her official capacity, each alleged act (if proved) would violate a

constitutional right that was clearly established at the time.

—

To sum up Count V, the court finds that Ray sufficiently pleaded a

retaliation claim(s) against Monika Gadson, Allen, Speaks, Barnes,

Burns, Billingsley, Dent, Hester, Jackson, and Russell. The court further

finds that none of these Defendants is entitled to qualified immunity at

this point. The court will dismiss, however, Ray’s retaliation claims

against Roderick Gadson, Fox, Webster, and Howard for failure to state a

claim that can entitle Ray to relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Count VI: Cruel & Unusual Punishment (money damages)

As recounted in Count V part 1, Ray alleges that certain Defendants

put him in an RHU cage from one to five hours during or just after TSSN

protests. In Count VI, Ray alleges that each placement in the RHU cage

amounts to deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

“[A] prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two

requirements are met. First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively,

‘sufficiently serious,’ and . . . [second], the prison official must have a

‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

834 (1994) (internal citations omitted). Recently, the en banc Eleventh

Circuit expounded on this test. See Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251 (11th

Cir. 2024). Under Wade, to prevail on an Eight Amendment deliberate

indifference claim, the inmate must prove three things: (1) “that the

1 At some point, Ray will have to explain certain things, such as, if Ray’s placement in cell C35

was retaliatory punishment for TSSN’s protests, then why did Defendants remove Ray from C35

and place him in an RHU cage during TSSN’s April 13 protest, then return him to C35 when

TSSN left? But for now, Ray is allowed to plead alternative theories of adverse action.

17

official was subjectively aware that the inmate was at risk of serious

harm, (2) “the official disregarded that risk,” and (3) “the official acted

with more than some requisite level of negligence.” Id. at 1255. Wade dealt

with the third factor and resulted in a decision that the requisite level of

culpability is much higher than mere negligence:

a deliberate-indifference plaintiff must prove that the

defendant acted with ‘subjective recklessness as used in the

criminal law,’ and that in order to do so, the plaintiff must

show that the defendant was subjectively aware that his own

conduct put the plaintiff at substantial risk of serious

harm—with the caveat that, in any event, a defendant who

“respond[s] reasonably’ to a risk, even a known risk, ‘cannot

be found liable’ under the Eighth Amendment[.]

Id. (citations omitted).

Ray fails to plead any facts that would show he was at risk of serious

harm while inside the RHU cage, much less any facts that would prove

any Defendant knew that such a risk existed and acted with a subjective,

criminal-level recklessness when putting Ray in the RHU cage any way.

So Ray fails to state a claim that could entitle him to relief on Count VI.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Further, because Ray fails to plead that any

official violated his Eighth Amendment rights, Ray necessarily fails to

plead supervisory liability against any Defendant. See Mann v. Taser

Intern., Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1309 (11th Cir. 2009). So the court will

dismiss Count VI without prejudice.

Count VII: Procedural Due Process (money damages)

As recounted in Count V part 3, Ray alleges that Billingsley,

Jackson, Monika Gadson, and an unnamed LESD agent conspired to place

and keep Ray in an unsanitary solitary confinement cell (C35) for nearly

a month. In Count VII, Ray alleges these acts also violated his procedural

due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

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To ultimately prove this claim, Ray must prove three things: “(1) a

deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2)

state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.” Grayden v.

Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir.2003) (citing Cryder v. Oxendine,

24 F.3d 175, 177 (11th Cir.1994)). “Lawful imprisonment necessarily

makes unavailable many rights and privileges of the ordinary citizen . . .

[But prisoners] may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without

due process of law.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974).

That said, the Fourteenth Amendment does not create property

interests. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Property

interests are instead “defined by existing rules or understandings that

stem from an independent source such as state law.” Id. The Supreme

Court held that “[s]tates may under certain circumstances

create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause.

But these interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint

which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as

to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force,

nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515

U.S. 472, 484–85 (1995). With that backdrop, the court assesses Ray’s two

theories of Fourteenth Amendment liability.

1. Solitary Confinement

Ray first complains about placement in a solitary confinement cell,

rather than general population. But Ray points to no Alabama statute,

ADOC policy, or precedent that creates a right to be housed in general

population. That said, the Supreme Court forged a second path for

inmates to find liberty interests in Sandin. “After Sandin, it is clear that

the touchstone of the inquiry into the existence of a protected, state-

created liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of confinement

is not the language of regulations regarding those conditions but the

nature of those conditions themselves in relation to the ordinary incidents

of prison life.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005). Ray could

thus plausibly state a liberty interest by showing that his time in cell C35

presented an “atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might

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conceivably create a liberty interest.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486.

In creating this “atypical deprivation” path, however, the Sandin

Court refused to find a state-created liberty interest against segregated

housing because the

record show[ed] that, at the time of Conner’s punishment,

disciplinary segregation, with insignificant exceptions,

mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in

administrative segregation and protective custody. . . . Thus,

Conner’s confinement did not exceed similar, but totally

discretionary, confinement in either duration or degree of

restriction. Indeed, the conditions at Halawa involve

significant amounts of ‘lockdown time’ even for inmates in

the general population. Based on a comparison between

inmates inside and outside disciplinary segregation, the

State’s actions in placing him there for 30 days did not work

a major disruption in his environment. Nor does Conner’s

situation present a case where the State’s action will

inevitably affect the duration of his sentence.”

Id. 486–87.

Ray’s pleaded facts largely mirror the facts the Sandin Court

rejected. While Ray alleges the C35 cell presented difficult (if not

abhorrent) conditions, he does not allege facts showing such conditions

were atypical, abnormal, or severe compared to the housing conditions of

general population or other solitary cells. Ray also doesn’t allege that the

reasons, frequency, or duration for which he stayed in the solitary

confinement unit were atypical of St. Clair’s normal practice. Nor does

Ray allege that his tenure in solitary confinement was for an indefinite

duration, impacted the length of his sentence, or affected any chance of

early release. And Ray pleads facts that would show other inmates were

housed in the same unit, meaning that his confinement was not wholly

“solitary.” See, e.g. (doc. 21, ¶¶ 46, 56). So the court finds that Ray fails to

plead facts that would establish that Ray had a protected interest in being

kept in general population, rather than the C35 solitary confinement cell.

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See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

2. Disciplinary Hearing

Ray next pleads that the disciplinary hearing that resulted in his

solitary confinement was a sham tainted by false testimony against him

and the preclusion of witnesses for him. While Ray may have pleaded facts

that would establish inadequate process, Ray still fails to plead a

protected liberty interest. According to Ray, the outcome of the

disciplinary hearing was continued time in solitary confinement. (Doc. 21,

¶¶ 69, 166). As explained, Ray has not plausibly alleged a liberty interest

in remaining in general population, rather than solitary confinement. So

even if Ray can prove his hearing was inadequate, he cannot prove that

inadequacy deprived him of a protected interest.

—

To sum up Count VII, Ray fails to plead facts that would establish

the loss of a protected interest. So Ray fails to plead a viable claim against

the participating officers (Monika Gadson, Jackson, and Billingsley) and

necessarily against their supervisors under a supervisory liability theory.

See Mann, 588 F.3d at 1309. So the court will dismiss Count VII without

prejudice.

C.

State-law claims

Because the court finds that Ray has pleaded at least one viable

claim under federal law, the court moves on to Ray’s state-law claims.

Count VIII: Intentional Infliction of Emotion Distress

Ray alleges certain Defendants intentionally caused him emotional

distress each time they put him in the RHU cage. Under Alabama law,

the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress and the tort of

outrage mean the same thing. Ex parte Lumbermen’s Underwriting

Alliance, 662 So. 2d 1133, 1134 (Ala. 1995). To state a claim under either,

Ray must prove a Defendant’s conduct: “(1) was intentional or reckless;

(2) was extreme and outrageous; and (3) caused emotional distress so

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severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.”

Harrelson v. R.J., 882 So. 2d 317, 322 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Thomas v. BSE

Indus. Contractors, Inc., 624 So. 2d 1041, 1043 (Ala. 1993)).

Alabama courts mean it when they say “extreme” and “so severe;”

to state a claim, the alleged conduct must “go beyond all possible bounds

of decency” and must “be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in

a civilized society.” Id. at 322. As a result, the IIED tort is “extremely

limited,” and the Alabama Supreme Court has “recognized it in regard to

only three kinds of conduct: (1) wrongful conduct in the family-burial

context; (2) barbaric methods employed to coerce an insurance settlement;

and (3) egregious sexual harassment.” Potts v. Hayes, 771 So. 2d 462, 465

(Ala. 2000) (internal citations omitted). Although the Alabama Supreme

Court recognized that a viable claim could fall outside these three

categories, id., both that state court and the Eleventh Circuit have been

extremely reluctant to extend the tort to other categories of conduct. See,

e.g., Stancombe v. New Process Steel LP, 652 F. App’x 729, 739 (11th Cir.

2016); McIsaac v. WZEW-FM Corp., 495 So. 2d 649, 651 (Ala. 1986).

Ray’s confinement in an RHU cage does not fall into any one of the

three recognized IIED categories. For federalism reasons, this court will

not create a fourth category here. Federalism aside, the court further finds

that Ray’s placement in an RHU cell is not so extreme or severe as to “go

beyond all possible bounds of decency,” nor would it “be regarded as

atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.” Harrelson, 882 So.

2d at 322. So the court will dismiss Count VIII without prejudice.

Count IX: Conversion

Finally, Ray claims conversion against Monika Gadson, Speaks,

Barnes, Dent, and Burns. According to Ray, these Defendants violated

Section 6-5-260 of the Alabama Code when they unlawfully destroyed his

property during body and cell searches. (Id.). That statute provides:

The owner of personalty is entitled to possession thereof.

Any unlawful deprivation of or interference with such

possession is a tort for which an action lies.

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Ala. Code § 6-5-260.

1. Sufficient pleading: “To prove conversion, [Ray] must present

evidence of a wrongful taking or a wrongful detention or interference, or

an illegal assumption of ownership, or an illegal use or misuse.” Ex parte

Anderson, 867 So.2d 1125, 1129 (Ala. 2003) (internal quotation omitted).

Showing “either title or possession is sufficient [for Ray to] maintain

a conversion action.” Id. According to Ray, he can prove conversion on

these dates:

• On March 30, 2024, M. Gadson, Speaks, and Barnes

searched Ray’s cell, “desecrated Plaintiff Ray’s sacred

religious items, broke his headphones, and otherwise

threw his property all over the ground,” (doc. 21, ¶194),

• On April 13, 2024, Dent searched Ray’s “person and

property and desecrated his religious items,” (id., ¶197),

and

• On May 3, 2024, Burns “destroyed or threw Plaintiff

Ray’s property and religious items all over the floor. Lt.

Burns removed several items from Plaintiff Ray’s

property, including a state-issued “J Pay tablet,” without

returning Plaintiff Ray’s property.” (id., ¶198).

Assuming these facts are true, Ray has sufficiently pleaded conversion of

property on all three dates because, regardless of ownership, Ray has

pleaded that the headphones, tablet, and religious items were all within

his possession when Defendants destroyed or took them.

2. State-agent immunity: That said, Alabama state officials sued in

their personal capacities for actions taken on behalf of the state are

immune against claims for actions done when exercising judgement in the

administration of a department or agency. See Ala. Code § 36-1-12; Ex

parte Butts, 775 So.2d 173 (Ala. 2000). But immunity will not protect state

officials that either (a) violate the United States Constitution or (b) act

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“willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, [or] in bad faith.” See Ala. Code § 36-

1-12(d). Ray has pleaded facts that could establish one or both of these

exceptions. As explained, Ray pleads facts that would establish that the

searches occurred as part of an unconstitutional retaliation against Ray’s

first amendment rights. Further, citing the second exception, Ray pleads

that each Defendant acted “willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, or in bad

faith.” (Doc. 21, § 199). So the court cannot grant Defendants state-agent

immunity at the pleading stage. The court will therefore deny Defendants’

motion to dismiss Count IX.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to

dismiss the following claims, without prejudice:

e Count II;

e Count III;

e Count IV;

e Count V, limited to claims against Roderick Gadson, Fox,

Webster, and Howard;

e Count VI;

e Count VII; and,

e Count VIII against Webster, Fox, Mitchell, M. and R.

Gadson, Dent, Speaks, Barnes, and Howard.

The court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts I, V (against all

Defendants not named above), and IX.

The court gives Ray one chance to amend his complaint if he wishes.

Ray must file his amended complaint by October 17, 2025.

DONE and ORDERED on September 26, 2025.

7 Pil,

Ee 7

COREY L. MAZE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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