Wieland v. Arlington Community Schools Board of Education

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

CYNTHIA WIELAND,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 2:24-cv-02128-SHM-atc

ARLINGTON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS

BOARD OF EDUCATION,

Defendant.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL

Plaintiff Cynthia Wieland, a former tenured teacher at

Arlington High School (“AHS”), was involuntarily discharged by

Defendant Arlington Community Schools Board of Education. On

February 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed this action alleging that

Defendant (1) terminated her employment in retaliation for her

complaints about AHS’s discrimination against her transgender son,

in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972

(“Title IX”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681, et seq.; and (2) revoked her

tenure in violation of the Tennessee Tenure Act, Tenn. Code Ann.

§§ 49-5-501, et seq. (ECF No. 1.)

Before the Court is Defendant’s November 22, 2024 Motion for

Partial Dismissal (“the Motion”), seeking to dismiss Plaintiff’s

Title IX claim. (ECF Nos. 12, 13.) For the reasons stated below,

the Motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s complaint.

(ECF No. 1.) For purposes of deciding the Motion, the Court

accepts all factual allegations in the complaint as true. See

Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 377 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Mertik

v. Blalock, 983 F.2d 1353, 1356 (6th Cir. 1993).

Plaintiff began her employment as a theater teacher at AHS in

August 2018. (ECF No. ¶ 8.) She attained tenure in August 2020

and continued teaching theater until her involuntary discharge on

January 31, 2024. (Id.) During her tenure, Plaintiff received

multiple teaching awards, including recognition as an “Inspiring

Educator” and “Teacher of the Year.” (Id., Ex. 6.)

Plaintiff is the mother of Max Wieland, a student at AHS.

(Id. at ¶ 10.) Max was born on July 7, 2006, as Mary Elizabeth

Wieland. (Id.) During the eighth grade, Max came out as a

transgender male and informed Plaintiff of his intent to live as

a boy. (Id.) Since then, Max has ceased using the name Mary,

which he identifies as his “dead name.” (Id. at ¶ 11.)

On April 6, 2023, Plaintiff emailed AHS principal Shannon

Abraham to report incidents of alleged sex discrimination against

Max and to request corrective action. (Id.) In her email,

Plaintiff said that Max had been denied access to the male restroom

and was repeatedly addressed as “Mary” by teachers during class

attendance, despite his insistence on being called Max. (Id.)

Plaintiff said that AHS officials had informed her that Max would

be referred to as “Mary” when called to receive his diploma at

graduation, based on the name on his birth certificate. (Id.)

Plaintiff urged the principal to instruct AHS officials to cease

using Max’s birth name in class and at graduation, explaining that

its continued use had caused him severe emotional distress and

physical illness. (Id.)

The principal denied Plaintiff’s request. On April 9, 2023,

Plaintiff filed a Title IX complaint with the U.S. Department of

Education’s Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”), alleging that

Defendant had engaged in sex discrimination against Plaintiff’s

son, Max. (Id. at ¶ 12, Ex. 1.) On May 16, 2023, the OCR

acknowledged receipt of the complaint and initiated an

investigation into Defendant, providing notice to Defendant’s

statutory agent, Superintendent Jeffery Mayo. (Id., Ex. 2.)

On August 24, 2023, AHS officials displayed five large posters

honoring students who had achieved high scores on the American

College Test (“ACT”). (Id. at ¶¶ 13-14.) Max was among the

students recognized, but the posters identified him by his birth

name, “Mary.” (Id. at ¶ 14.) On discovering the posters,

Plaintiff again contacted the principal to complain. (Id.) In

response, the principal gave Plaintiff two options: either the

posters would remain unchanged with Max identified as “Mary,” or

Max’s name would be removed entirely. (Id. at ¶ 16.) The principal

explained that the decision was based on the school’s naming

policy, which provided that a student’s “preferred name could not

be used on student records.” (Id.)

The next day, Plaintiff emailed the principal to object to

the decision, copying Superintendent Mayo. (Id. at ¶ 17.) In her

email, Plaintiff argued that the ACT recognition posters were not

“student records” and asked that the posters be revised to reflect

Max’s preferred name. (Id., Ex. 3.) She described the posters as

“an assault for my child” and alleged that they were “placed

intentionally so they would be visible.” (Id.)

Later that day, Superintendent Mayo responded:

Your child took the ACT under the legal name Mary Wieland

and that name is also the legal name reflected currently

in the ACS/AHS school records. The scoring report used

by AHS to ascertain the names of students for … [the]

poster … was generated from the ACT database … based on

the legal names of students at the time they took the

ACT and who are currently enrolled at AHS. ACT did not

provide accessibility to AHS for a score report with the

name Max Wieland on it, nor is there a student enrolled

at AHS with that legal name[.] [T]herefore, that name

cannot be used on the poster[.]” (Id.)

On August 26, 2023, Plaintiff responded to the

Superintendent. (Id. at ¶ 20.) In her response, Plaintiff

asserted that the school applied its naming policy inconsistently.

She pointed out that the school’s athletics website listed student

athletes by their preferred names, rather than their birth names.

(Id. at ¶ 21.) She also noted the Max had been recognized under

his preferred name for similar academic honors. (Id.) Based on

those examples, Plaintiff argued that the school was “targeting

[her] transgender child.” (Id.) She asked that the school use

students’ birth names consistently in all public materials or

permit Max’s preferred name to appear on the ACT recognition

posters. Plaintiff requested a response by August 28, 2023, at

6:45 a.m. (Id.)

On August 29, 2023, Superintendent Mayo replied. (Id. at ¶

22.) In his reply, he expressed dissatisfaction with the “tone

and disrespect” of Plaintiff’s prior email, saying that in his

“entire 36-year career in education,” he had “never been spoken to

this way by a parent, much less a parent who is also an employee

of the district.” (Id.) He characterized Plaintiff’s email as a

personal attack on his logic and character. (Id.) Superintendent

Mayo admonished Plaintiff for failing to comply with the district’s

employee code of ethics, and said he would disregard any future

correspondence if it were similarly disrespectful. (Id.)

Later the same day, Plaintiff suffered a physical injury at

work. (Id. at ¶ 23.) While supervising a class, she fell from a

rolling desk chair, struck her head on a bookshelf, and landed on

a shoulder that had recently undergone surgery. (Id., Ex. 6.)

She sustained a concussion and re-injured her shoulder. (Id.)

After she had fallen, some students allegedly laughed at her.

(Id.) In response, Plaintiff said: “It’s not funny, asshole.”

(Id. at ¶ 24.) At least seven students in the classroom

corroborated in written statements that Plaintiff had used the

expletive in reaction to the students’ laughter. (Id.) Plaintiff

remained on sick leave until September 5, 2023. (Id. at ¶ 25.)

While on leave, the AHS Chief of Human Resources emailed Plaintiff,

directing her to report to the Central Office on her return. (Id.

at ¶ 26.)

On September 5, 2023, Plaintiff met with the Chief of Human

Resources, who informed her that she was suspended from her

position because Superintendent Mayo had filed charges with the

school district’s Board of Education (the “Board”). (Id. at ¶

27.) The charges – “unprofessional conduct and insubordination”

– arose from the August 29, 2023 incident in which Plaintiff

allegedly called students “assholes” in class. (Id.) Plaintiff

was also informed that Superintendent Mayo had sent notices of the

charges to the Tennessee State Board of Education’s Office of

Educator Licensure and requested the suspension of Plaintiff’s

teaching license. (Id.)

On September 14, 2023, the Board convened and decided that,

if the charges were proven, they would be sufficient to warrant

Plaintiff’s termination. (Id. at ¶ 28.) Superintendent Mayo sent

Plaintiff notice of the Board’s decision the following day. (Id.)

Plaintiff subsequently requested a hearing. (Id. at ¶ 29.)

Pursuant to the Tennessee Tenure Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-512,

the Board appointed R. Dale Thomas, a member of the Tennessee

Council of School Board Attorneys, to serve as hearing officer.

(Id.)

On December 22, 2023, the hearing officer issued a decision

recommending Plaintiff’s termination. (Id. at ¶ 31.) He found

that, although Plaintiff’s single, isolated use of profanity did

not amount to insubordination, it constituted “unprofessional

conduct” capable of inflicting “mental or emotional harm to

students,” which demonstrated her “unfitness to teach.” (Id., Ex.

6.) Plaintiff appealed the decision. (Id. at ¶ 32.) On January

31, 2024, the Board adopted the hearing officer’s recommendation

and formally terminated Plaintiff’s employment. (Id. at ¶ 33.)

B. Procedural Posture

On February 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed this action. She

alleges that she was terminated in retaliation for opposing the

school’s discriminatory treatment of her son, in violation of Title

IX. (Id. at ¶¶ 34-37.) She also alleges that the Board’s decision

to revoke her tenure was “arbitrary and capricious,” in violation

of her rights under the Tennessee Tenure Act. (Id. at ¶¶ 38-43.)

On April 9, 2024, Defendant filed an answer denying

Plaintiff’s allegations and denying that Superintendent Mayo acted

with retaliatory intent. (ECF No. 11.) On November 22, 2024,

Defendant filed the instant Motion, seeking dismissal of

Plaintiff’s Title IX claim. (ECF No. 12.) Defendant argues that,

even assuming all allegations are true, Plaintiff’s Title IX claim

fails as a matter of law because Title IX only prohibits

discrimination “on the basis of sex,” not “sexual orientation and

gender identity.” (ECF No. 13.)

On January 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition.

(ECF No. 17.) Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s interpretation of

Title IX is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in

Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., which held that discrimination based on

“homosexuality or transgender status” constitutes discrimination

“because of sex.” 590 U.S. 644, 665 (2020). Although Bostock

arose under Title VII, Plaintiff argues that the Sixth Circuit

generally applies Title VII principles in the Title IX context.

(ECF No. 17.)

On January 31, 2025, Defendant filed a reply, asserting that

Bostock is inapplicable because Title VII and Title IX employ

materially different statutory language. (ECF No. 18.) Therefore,

Defendant argues, the reasoning in Bostock does not control the

interpretation of Title IX. (Id.)

The Motion is now fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.

II. JURISDICTION

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1331 because Plaintiff asserts claims under Title IX. The Court

exercises supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Tennessee

Tenure Act claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, because her state

law claims and her federal claims share a “common nucleus of

operative facts.” Packard v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Columbus Inc.,

423 Fed. Appx. 580, 583 (6th Cir. 2011); see also Royal Canin

U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 27 (2025).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),

courts must “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff [and] accept all factual allegations as true.” Payne

v. Secretary of Treasury, 73 Fed. Appx. 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003);

see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d

523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007). Courts “need not accept as true legal

conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.” Commercial Money

Center, Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 336 (6th

Cir. 2007); see also JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510

F.3d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 2007). Courts may consider “matters of

public record, orders, items appearing in the record, and exhibits

attached to the complaint,” as well as “documents that a defendant

attaches to a motion to dismiss … if referred to in the complaint

and … central [to the] claim.” Amini v. Oberlin College, 259 F.3d

493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001).

To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain

sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim

is plausible when the alleged facts “allow the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although the

complaint is not required to include “detailed factual

allegations,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007), it must assert “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-

unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A

complaint may be dismissed only if “it is clear that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts consistent with the allegations that

would entitle him to relief.” Flanory v. Bonn, 604 F.3d 249, 252-

53 (6th Cir. 2010).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Title IX Retaliation Standard

Title IX prohibits sex discrimination by recipients of

federal education funding. See State of Tenn. v. Dept. of Educ.,

104 F.4th 577, 584 (6th Cir. 2024); see also Gebser v. Lago Vista

Independent Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 280 (1998). The statute

provides:

No person in the United States shall, on the basis of

sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the

benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any

education program or activity receiving Federal

financial assistance.

20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (emphasis added).

Title IX also forbids retaliation against individuals who

oppose sex discrimination. In Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ.,

the Supreme Court held that retaliation against a person who

complains about sex discrimination is itself a form of intentional

sex discrimination prohibited by Title IX. 544 U.S. 167, 173-74

(2005). Because retaliation is a form of disparate treatment,

courts generally analyze Title IX retaliation claims under the

framework used for retaliation claims brought under Title VII.

See Goldblum v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 62 F.4th 244, 251 (6th Cir.

2023); see also Nelson v. Christian Bros. Univ., 226 Fed. Appx.

448, 454 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[C]ourts have looked to Title VII … as

an analog for the legal standards in both Title IX discrimination

and retaliation claims.”).

A Title IX retaliation claim may be proven by direct or

circumstantial evidence. See Doe v. Belmont Univ., 367 F.Supp.3d

732, 756 (M.D. Tenn. 2019). Where, as here, a plaintiff relies on

circumstantial evidence, courts apply the burden-shifting

framework set forth in McDonnel Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792 (1973). To recover under that framework, the plaintiff must

first establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing:

(1) she engaged in “protected activity”;

(2) the defendant “knew of the protected activity”;

(3) she suffered an “adverse school-related action”; and

(4) a “causal connection exists” between the protected

activity and the adverse action.

Doe v. Univ. of Ky., 111 F.4th 705, 716 (6th Cir. 2024) (citing

Bose v. Bea, 947 F.3d 983, 988 (6th Cir. 2020)); see also Gordon

v. Traverse City Area Pub. Schs., 686 Fed. Appx. 315, 320 (6th

Cir. 2017).

The burden of establishing a prima facie case is “easily met.”

Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2000).

Once a plaintiff satisfies that burden, the burden shifts to the

defendant to articulate a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for its action.” Gordon, 686 Fed. Appx. at 320. If the defendant

does, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that

the proffered reason is pretextual. See id.

At the pleading stage, analogous Title VII cases establish

that a Title IX plaintiff is not required to establish conclusively

each element of retaliation to survive a motion to dismiss. See

Bar v. Kalitta Charters II, LLC, No. 21-1739, 2022 WL 3042844, at

*3 (6th Cir. Aug. 2, 2022). A plaintiff need not plead a prima

facie case. Rather, the complaint need only “allege sufficient

‘factual content’ from which a court, informed by its ‘judicial

experience and common sense,’ could ‘draw the reasonable

inference’ that” the defendant violated Title IX. Keys v. Humana,

Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 610 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678-79) (applying the standard to a Title VII claim). The

Supreme Court has said that the McDonnell Douglas framework is “an

evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement,” and that “the

ordinary rules for assessing the sufficiency of a complaint apply.”

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510-11 (2002). To

withstand dismissal, Plaintiff need only plead sufficient facts

which, accepted as true, permit a factfinder to reasonably infer

that each element of Plaintiff’s Title IX retaliation claim is

met. See Primm v. Dept. of Hum. Servs., No. 16-6837, 2017 WL

10646487, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 17, 2017); see also Serrano v.

Cintas Corp., 699 F.3d 884, 897 (6th Cir. 2012).

B. Protected Activity

For purposes of the Motion, the parties do not dispute the

second, third, and fourth elements of Plaintiff’s Title IX

retaliation claim.1 The complaint adequately pleads that Defendant

knew of Plaintiff’s objections; that her termination was an adverse

school-related action; and that there is a causal connection

between her objections and her termination. The only contested

issue is whether Plaintiff’s conduct – objecting to the school’s

refusal to use her son Max’s preferred name consistent with his

1 Defendant’s Motion for Partial Dismissal does not address all four

elements of Plaintiff’s Title IX retaliation claim. (ECF No. 13.) The

Motion focuses solely on the “protected activity” element, asserting

that Plaintiff “fail[ed] to show entitlement to relief” because she “did

not complain about conduct prohibited by Title IX.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s

Response addresses all four elements of a Title IX retaliation claim and

argues that her allegations adequately support each element. (ECF No.

17.) Defendant’s Reply continues to address only the “protected

activity” element. (ECF No. 18.) Because Defendant has not responded

to Plaintiff’s arguments about the second, third, and fourth elements,

the Court deems those elements undisputed. See Doe v. Bredesen, 507

F.3d 998, 1007-08 (6th Cir. 2007); see also ARJN #3 v. Cooper, 517

F.Supp.3d 732, 750 (M.D. Tenn. 2021)(“Where a party fails to respond to

an argument in a motion to dismiss, the Court assumes he concedes this

point and abandons the claim.”).

gender identity – qualifies as a “protected activity” under Title

IX.

Although the statute does not define “protected activity,”

courts have interpreted the term to encompass efforts to oppose,

complain about, or otherwise challenge acts or policies that

discriminate “on the basis of sex.” See Belmont Univ., 367

F.Supp.3d at 757 (citing Jackson, 544 U.S. at 183); see also Doe

v. Univ. of Tenn., 186 F.Supp.3d 788, 809 (M.D. Tenn. 2016). To

qualify as “protected activity,” the challenged conduct must

involve “intentional sex discrimination.” Goldblum, 62 F.4th at

253. Vague or generalized allegations of unfair treatment are

insufficient. See id. (citing Yazdian v. ConMed Endoscopic Techs.,

Inc., 793 F.3d 634, 645 (6th Cir. 2015).

A plaintiff alleging Title IX retaliation need not be the

direct target of the underlying discrimination. See Jackson, 544

U.S. at 179. A person engages in a “protected activity” so long

as she complains about conduct that constitutes sex

discrimination, even if that discrimination is directed at someone

else. See id.; see also Lipian v. Univ. of Mich., 453 F.Supp.3d

937, 966 (E.D. Mich. 2020). “Where the complainant speaks out

about sex discrimination, … [t]he complainant is [her]self a victim

of discriminatory retaliation, regardless of whether [she] was the

subject of the original complaint.” Jackson, 544 U.S. at 179.

To demonstrate that her objections constitute “protected

activity” under Title IX, Plaintiff must plausibly show that (1)

Defendant engaged in “intentional” discrimination, and (2) that

discrimination was “on the basis of sex.” See Goldblum, 62 F.4th

at 253; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).

1. Intentional Discrimination

Two forms of intent are often conflated in Title IX cases:

discriminatory intent and retaliatory intent. Discriminatory

intent refers to a defendant’s motive for treating a person

differently on the basis of sex. Retaliatory intent refers to a

defendant’s motive for taking adverse action against a plaintiff

for opposing that discrimination. See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171.

To plausibly state a Title IX retaliation claim, a plaintiff

need not show that the defendant acted with retaliatory intent

against her personally. See id. at 179. Rather, it is sufficient

to demonstrate that the defendant intentionally discriminated

against another individual – here, Plaintiff’s son, Max – and that

the plaintiff suffered an adverse action for opposing that

discriminatory conduct. See id.; see also Allen v. Escanaba Area

Pub. Schs., No. 2:23-cv-200, 2025 WL 1328799, at *13 (W.D. Mich.

May 6, 2025) (holding that a mother alleging Title IX retaliation

for protesting a school’s disparate treatment of her child must

plausibly show that the school acted with discriminatory intent

against the child).

Discriminatory intent may be established in two ways: by

demonstrating either “discriminatory animus” or “deliberate

indifference.” See Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 206

F.3d 685, 693 (6th Cir. 2000). Discriminatory animus may be

inferred when the factual allegations permit a reasonable

factfinder to conclude that “discrimination was at least a

motivating factor” in the defendant’s conduct. Clemons ex rel.

T.W. v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 818 Fed. Appx. 453, 464 (6th

Cir. 2020) (quoting Gohl v. Livonia Pub. Sch., 836 F.3d 672, 683

(6th Cir. 2016)); cf. Voltz v. Erie Cnty., 617 Fed. Appx. 417, 425

(6th Cir. 2015) (“Discriminatory animus … requires a showing of

prejudice, spite, or ill will.”). Alternatively, where an

educational institution has a duty to prevent discriminatory harm,

“deliberate indifference to known acts” of discrimination may

suffice to show discriminatory intent. Davis ex rel. LaShonda D.

v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 643 (1999). If the

institution is aware of sex discrimination and fails to act, or

responds in a manner that is “clearly unreasonable in light of the

known circumstances,” its inaction may be deemed intentional

discrimination. Vance v. Spencer Cnty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d

253, 260 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Davis, 526 U.S. at 648).

A Title IX plaintiff need not present direct evidence to

establish discriminatory intent. At the pleading stage, it is

sufficient if the complaint “pleads specific facts that support a

minimal plausible inference” of intent to discriminate “on the

basis of sex.” Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 588-89 (6th Cir.

2018) (quoting Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir.

2016)).

Here, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support a

plausible inference that Defendant intentionally discriminated

against Max by refusing to acknowledge his preferred name – a core

aspect of his gender identity. Despite Plaintiff’s repeated

objections, the school continued to display Max’s birth name on

the ACT recognition posters and at graduation, conduct that

allegedly caused Max severe mental and emotional harm. (ECF No.

1, at ¶ 11.) In Vance, the Sixth Circuit held that a school acts

with “deliberate indifference” when it “has actual knowledge that

its efforts to remediate [discrimination] are ineffective, and it

continues to use those same methods to no avail[.]” Vance, 231

F.3d at 261; see also Stiles ex rel. D.S. v. Grainger Cnty., Tenn.,

819 F.3d 834, 849 (6th Cir. 2016). Plaintiff has pled that

Defendant knew that Max was suffering harm as a result of the

continued display of his birth name on public-facing academic

materials, but took no corrective action. (ECF No. 1.) Those

facts support a plausible inference that Defendant acted with

deliberate indifference.

Plaintiff has also sufficiently alleged that Defendant

applied its naming policy inconsistently against Max. Other

students, particularly student athletes, were permitted to use

their preferred names on the school’s website, despite the school’s

stated policy of displaying only legal names on public materials

and student records. (ECF No. 1, at ¶ 21.) Max was denied the

same treatment.

Superintendent Mayo justified the use of Max’s birth name on

the ACT recognition posters by saying that it was the name Max

used to take the test, which appeared in the ACT database. (Id.,

Ex. 3.) However, he failed to address Plaintiff’s argument that

the school had previously allowed other students to use names other

than their legal names in similar academic settings. (Id. at ¶

21.) At this early juncture, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient

facts to support a plausible inference that Defendant acted with

discriminatory intent.

Defendant’s argument that Superintendent Mayo did not

intentionally retaliate against Plaintiff for advocating for her

child is unavailing. As the Supreme Court made clear in Jackson,

a plaintiff need not show that the defendant acted with retaliatory

intent towards her. See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 179. Rather, it is

sufficient to show that the defendant intentionally discriminated

against the person for whom she advocated, and that she suffered

adverse consequences for her advocacy. See id. Plaintiff has

satisfied that burden.

2. On the Basis of Sex

The remaining question is whether the alleged discrimination

against Max – based on his gender identity – constitutes

discrimination “on the basis of sex” under Title IX. That turns

on whether Bostock, which held that Title VII’s prohibition of

discrimination “because of sex” encompasses gender identity and

sexual orientation, applies with equal force in the Title IX

context. It does.

In Bostock, the Supreme Court held that Title VII, which

forbids employment discrimination “because of sex,” bars an

employer from firing someone for simply being homosexual or

transgender. 590 U.S. 644 (2020). Writing for the majority,

Justice Gorsuch explained that Title VII’s “because of sex”

language incorporates a “but-for” causation standard: if an

individual’s sex is a “but-for” cause of the adverse action, the

statute is violated. See id. at 656. Applying that principle,

the Court reasoned that discriminating against a homosexual or

transgender person necessarily entails disparate treatment

“because of sex,” because the employer’s decision hinges on “traits

or actions it [would] tolerate” in members of a different sex.

Id. at 660. Because “homosexuality and transgender status are

inextricably bound up with sex,” discriminating on those grounds

treats an individual differently “because of [that person’s] sex.”

Id. at 661. Even accepting that “sex” in 1964 – the year Title

VII was enacted – referred to “biological distinctions between

male and female,” the Court emphasized that the “but-for” standard

applies to discrimination against homosexual and transgender

individuals. Id. at 645. Unexpected applications of a broad

statute do not narrow its ordinary meaning. See id. at 674 (citing

Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of

Legal Texts 101 (2012)) (noting that unexpected applications of

broad statutory language reflect only Congress’s “presumed point

[to] produce general coverage – not to leave room for courts to

recognize ad hoc exceptions.”).

Since Bostock, several circuits have interpreted Title IX’s

prohibition on sex discrimination to include gender identity and

sexual orientation. In Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., the

Fourth Circuit held that a school’s bathroom policy barring a

transgender boy from using the male restroom constituted sex

discrimination in violation of Title IX. 972 F.3d 586, 616 (4th

Cir. 2020). Although Bostock addressed Title VII, the Fourth

Circuit explained that Title VII precedents guide Title IX

analysis, consistent with its past practice and the Supreme Court’s

instruction to read Title IX alongside antidiscrimination statutes

enacted as part of, or later amended into, the Civil Rights Act of

1964. See Grimm, 972 F.3d at 616 (citing Jennings v. Univ. of

N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 695 (4th Cir. 2007)); see also Davis v. Monroe

Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651 (1999); Preston v. Virginia

ex rel. New River Cmty. College, 31 F.3d 203, 206-07 (4th Cir.

1994) (“Title VII, and the judicial interpretation of it, provide

a persuasive body of standards to which [courts] may look in

shaping the contours of a private right of action under Title

IX.”).

The Seventh Circuit has extended Bostock’s reasoning to Title

IX, holding that a policy preventing transgender students from

using bathrooms aligned with their gender identity constituted

unlawful sex discrimination. See A.C. v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist.

of Martinsville, 75 F.4th 760, 769 (7th Cir. 2023). The Ninth and

Tenth Circuits have similarly interpreted Title IX’s prohibition

on sex discrimination to encompass gender identity. See Doe v.

Horne, 115 F.4th 1083, 1107 (9th Cir. 2024); see also Dimas v.

Pecos Independent Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 23-2064, 2024 WL

1881076, at *8 n.9 (10th Cir. Apr. 30, 2024) (“For purposes of

this appeal, we assume that under Title IX, discrimination on the

basis of sexual orientation is sex-based discrimination.”).

The Sixth Circuit has not addressed this issue directly.2 In

Tennessee v. Cardona, the Sixth Circuit expressed skepticism that

Bostock automatically controls in the Title IX context. No. 24-

5588, 2024 WL 3453880, at *3 (6th Cir. Jul. 17, 2024). The Sixth

Circuit, however, resolved that case on agency deference grounds,

rather than by construing the statutory phrase “on the basis of

sex.” See id. at *4. Without reaching the merits, the Sixth

Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of

the Department of Education’s 2021 rule on the ground that the

rule likely exceeded the agency’s rulemaking authority. See id.

at *2. The rule would have expanded Title IX’s coverage to include

“discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes, sex

characteristics, pregnancy or related conditions, sexual

orientation, and gender identity.” Id. at *1 (citing 89 Fed. Reg.

33886).

In dicta, the Sixth Circuit observed:

2 Although the Sixth Circuit has not yet addressed the applicability of

Bostock to Title IX claims, its pre-Bostock precedent directs courts to

look to Title VII jurisprudence when interpreting Title IX. See, e.g.,

Tumminello v. Father Ryan High Sch., Inc., 678 Fed. Appx. 281, 284 (6th

Cir. 2017) (“The boundaries of ‘on the basis of sex’ have been more

extensively analyzed under Title VII jurisprudence, which often is

consulted when interpreting and applying Title IX.”); Fuhr v. Hazel Park

Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 668, 673 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he standards

articulated by Title VII cases are sufficient to establish the applicable

legal framework [in Title IX].”); Nelson, 226 Fed. Appx. at 454

(“Generally, courts have looked to Title VII … as an analog for the legal

standards in both Title IX discrimination and retaliation claims.”).

As to the relationship between Title VII and Title IX,

the statutes use materially different language:

discrimination “because of” sex in Title VII and

discrimination “on the basis of” sex in Title IX. See

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). In

addition, the two statutes serve different goals and

have distinct defenses. For these reasons, it does not

follow that principles announced in the Title VII

context automatically apply in the Title IX context.

Cardona, 2024 WL 3453880, at *3 (citing Meriwether v. Hartop, 992

F.3d 492, 510 n. 4 (6th Cir. 2021)) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Defendant relies on the dicta in Cardona to argue that Bostock

is inapplicable to Title IX because Title IX uses the phrase “on

the basis of sex” rather than “because of sex.” However, Cardona

did not announce a new rule of statutory interpretation. Cardona

held that, at the preliminary injunction stage, the Department of

Education’s 2021 rule – which expanded Title IX’s reach to cover

additional categories unrelated to biological sex – likely

exceeded the agency’s rulemaking authority. Cardona cautioned

against “automatically” importing Title VII principles into Title

IX without analysis. It did not decide whether Title IX’s “on the

basis of sex” language encompasses gender identity. Cardona is

not a decision excluding gender identity from the scope of Title

IX. It is an invitation for courts to engage in reasoned analysis.

In Bostock, the Supreme Court drew no distinction between the

two statutory phrases at issue. The Supreme Court used “on the

basis of sex” and “because of sex” interchangeably. See Bostock,

590 U.S. at 680 (“We can’t deny that today’s holding – that

employers are prohibited from firing employees on the basis of

homosexuality or transgender status – is the elephant [in the

room].”) (emphasis added); see id. at 658 (“[A]n employer who

intentionally treats a person worse because of sex – such as by

firing the person for actions or attributes it would tolerate in

an individual of another sex – discriminates against that person

in violation of Title VII.”) (emphasis added). The Court used “on

the basis of” 49 times in contexts where it could have said

“because of,” suggesting that it perceived no material difference

between the two. Justice Alito’s dissent, which focused on the

original public meaning of “because of sex” at the time Title VII

was enacted, treated “because of,” “on account of,” and “on the

basis of” interchangeably. See id. at 709 (Alito, J., dissenting).

The plain and ordinary meaning of the two phrases confirms

their equivalence. When Title VII was enacted, Congress understood

that “the ordinary meaning of ‘because of’ is ‘by reason of’ or

‘on account of.’” Bostock, 590 U.S. at 644 (quoting Univ. of Tex.

Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 350 (2013)

(citing 1 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 194 (1966);

1 Oxford English Dictionary 746 (1933); The Random House Dictionary

of the English Language 132 (1966)). That term conveys “but-for”

causation, which “[i]n the language of law” means that “causation

is established whenever a particular outcome would not have

happened ‘but for’ the purported cause.” Bostock, 590 U.S. at

656.

The phrase “on the basis of” carried the same meaning when

Title IX was enacted. The American Heritage Dictionary of the

English Language defined “basis” in 1969 as a “foundation upon

which something rests,” and “[t]he chief component of anything.”

The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 60 (1969).

Although idiomatic phrases like “on the basis of” were not listed

as independent entries, the meaning follows from the ordinary

components “on,” “the basis,” and “of.” Because “basis” meant the

foundation of reason, a phrase built on it naturally conveyed a

causal relationship. That meaning persists today: the Merriam-

Webster Dictionary defines “on the basis of” as “according to,”

“because of,” and “based on.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2025).

Under its most natural reading, discrimination “on the basis of

sex” occurs whenever sex is a “but-for” cause of the challenged

action. Any other meaning would contradict ordinary usage and the

Supreme Court’s treatment of the phrases as interchangeable in

Bostock.

Some out-of-circuit authorities have read “on the basis of

sex” differently from “because of sex.” A court in the Southern

District of Mississippi has declined to extend Bostock to Title IX

on the ground that the phrases state different causation standards.

See Tennessee v. Becerra, 739 F.Supp.3d 467, 479 (S.D. Miss. 2024).

A court in the Northern District of Texas has held that Title IX’s

“on the basis of sex” language requires proof that “biological sex

[was] the motivating factor,” but that Title VII’s “because of

sex” language requires only “but-for” causation. Neese v. Becerra,

640 F.Supp.3d 668, 684 (N.D. Tex. 2022) (emphasis added), rev’d on

other grounds, 123 F.4th 751 (5th Cir. 2024).3 A court in the

District of New Hampshire has acknowledged the phrases may imply

different causation thresholds, but has declined to decide whether

“motivating factor” is more or less stringent than “but-for”

causation. See Doe v. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 731 F.Supp.3d

222, 238 (D.N.H. 2024). The question remains open in the Sixth

Circuit.

3 The court in Nesse distinguished between the “motivating factor” test

and “but-for” causation test by suggesting that the latter implies a

“derivative” causal relationship. See Nesse, 640 F.Supp.3d at 684 (“For

an action to occur ‘on the basis of sex,’ biological sex must be the

motivating factor. ‘On the basis of sex’ does not connote a derivative,

‘but-for causation’ analysis like the Supreme Court reasoned ‘because

of sex’ does.”). However, Nesse does not explain what “derivative” means

in the context of Title IX, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock

does not use the term “derivative” at all.

The Court need not resolve the issue here. Even if Title IX

requires a “motivating factor” showing distinct from Title VII’s

“but-for” causation, that difference goes only to the level of

proof. Either way, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges sufficient facts

from which a reasonable factfinder could infer the nexus between

sex and Defendant’s conduct. At the pleading stage, it is enough

to plead “specific facts that support a minimal plausible

inference” of intentional discrimination “on the basis of sex.”

Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 588-89. Plaintiff has satisfied that

burden.

Defendant also cites the decision of a court in the Eastern

District of Tennessee, Tennessee v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., for the

proposition that the “on the basis of sex” language in Title IX

excludes gender identity. 615 F.Supp.3d 807 (E.D. Tenn. 2022).

That case does not control. The court there declined to extend

Bostock to Title IX, noting that the Supreme Court “was careful to

narrow the scope of its holding” and that Bostock “did not sweep

beyond Title VII to other federal or state laws that prohibit sex

discrimination.” Id. at 817 (quoting Bostock, 590 U.S. at 681)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Like Cardona, Tennessee

addressed a challenge to the Department of Education’s 2021 rule.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed on the ground that the

Department likely exceeded its rulemaking authority, without

interpreting the “on the basis of sex” language in Title IX. See

Tennessee v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., 104 F.4th 577 (6th Cir. 2024).

Tennessee does not foreclose the application of Bostock’s

reasoning to Title IX.

The short of it is that a fair reading of “because of sex”

and “on the basis of sex” does not distinguish them. That is

particularly true given that Title VII and Title IX are interpreted

together. It was true in 1964 and 1972, and it is true today.

Defendant contends that Plaintiff must plead “actual

violation” of Title IX. Plaintiff responds that it is sufficient

that she complained based on a “reasonable[,] good faith belief”

that Defendant discriminated “on the basis of sex.” See Yazdian,

793 F.3d at 646. The Court need not resolve that question at this

juncture. Whether the “actual violation” or “reasonable, good

faith belief” standard applies is better addressed after discovery

on a fuller record. Under either standard, Plaintiff has plausibly

alleged conduct that, if true, states a Title IX retaliation claim

sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff has plausibly stated a

claim of Title IX retaliation. Defendant’s Motion for Partial

Dismissal (ECF Nos. 12, 13.) is DENIED.

SO ORDERED this 26th day of September, 2025.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.

SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE