“It long has been understood that a valid seizure of the res is a prerequisite to the initiation of an in rem … proceeding.” (cleaned up)
How later courts described this case
- “It long has been understood that a valid seizure of the res is a prerequisite to the initiation of an in rem … proceeding.” (cleaned up)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued September 20, 2024 Decided September 26, 2025
No. 23-7080
ESTATE OF JEREMY ISADORE LEVIN, ET AL.,
APPELLEES
JAMES OWENS, ET AL.,
APPELLANTS
v.
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
APPELLEES
Consolidated with 23-7082
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:21-cv-00128)
Suzelle M. Smith argued the cause and filed the briefs for
appellants Estate of Jeremy Isadore Levin, et al.
2
Jessica L. Wagner argued the cause for appellants James
Owens, et al. With her on the briefs was Matthew D. McGill.
Jonathan C. Bond entered an appearance.
Brian P. Hudak, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause
for appellee United States of America. With him on the brief
was Matthew M. Graves, U.S. Attorney. Jane M. Lyons,
Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.
Alex C. Lakatos argued the cause for appellee Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. With him on the brief was Jennifer L. Weinberg.
William D. Sinnott entered an appearance.
Christopher D. Man was on the brief for amicus curiae
Crystal Holdings Limited in support of neither party.
Before: KATSAS, WALKER, and GARCIA, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge KATSAS.
KATSAS, Circuit Judge: An instrumentality of the Islamic
Republic of Iran wired nearly $10 million through an American
bank. The United States blocked the funds pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act and then
initiated a civil-forfeiture action against them. Plaintiffs, who
hold judgments against Iran for supporting terrorism, later
sought to attach those same funds in order to execute their
judgments. The district court quashed the attachments on two
independent grounds: First, the funds were immune from
attachment because the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, which
permits execution against certain blocked assets of designated
state sponsors of terrorism, did not apply. Second, the
government’s forfeiture action barred any later in rem
proceeding against the same funds. We disagree on both
points, so we reverse.
3
I
A
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) provides
that foreign states are “immune from the jurisdiction” of United
States courts unless one of its exceptions applies. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1604. One of these is the terrorism exception—courts may
enter damages judgments against foreign states that have been
designated as state sponsors of terrorism for committing or
supporting specified terrorist activities. Id. § 1605A(a)(1); see
Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578 U.S. 212, 216 (2016).
The FSIA also provides the property of foreign states with
immunities from attachment or execution. 28 U.S.C. § 1609.
And it sets forth exceptions to these immunities. Id. § 1610.
B
Congress has authorized the President to regulate property
owned by foreign governments or individuals in the interest of
national security. Section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy
Act (TWEA) authorizes the President to regulate “any property
in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any
interest,” 50 U.S.C. § 4305(b)(1)(B), but it applies only during
wartime, id. § 4305(b)(1). Section 203 of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which contains no
such limitation, is thus more prominent today. It enables the
President to regulate transactions in property owned by “any
foreign country or a national thereof,” id. § 1702(a)(1)(B), in
order to address “any unusual and extraordinary threat … to the
national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United
States, if the President declares a national emergency with
respect to such threat,” id. § 1701(a). The President has
declared a national emergency relating to foreign terrorism
and, pursuant to section 203, has “blocked” the property of
4
persons designated as terrorists or supporters of terrorism. See
Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079, 49,079–80 (Sep.
23, 2001). The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is
charged with implementing this directive. It has provided that
when property of designated persons comes “within the United
States” or “the possession or control of U.S. persons,” it is
“blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported,
withdrawn or otherwise dealt in.” 31 C.F.R. § 594.201(a).
However, OFAC may remove or qualify a block by issuing a
license for specified uses or transactions. See id.
C
Congress has made assets blocked under TWEA or IEEPA
available to victims of state-sponsored terrorism. First, it
amended the FSIA to provide that the holder of a terrorism-
based judgment against a foreign sovereign may attach
property for which transactions are “prohibited or regulated”
under TWEA or IEEPA. 28 U.SC. § 1610(f)(1)(A). But
Congress also authorized the President to waive section 1610(f)
“in the interest of national security.” Id. § 1610(f)(3). And the
President did so almost immediately, finding that attachments
under section 1610(f) would “impede the ability of the
President to conduct foreign policy.” See Determination to
Waive Attachment Provisions Relating to Blocked Property of
Terrorist-List States, 65 Fed. Reg. 66,483 (Oct. 28, 2000).
Congress overrode the waiver by including another
attachment provision in the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of
2002, Pub. L. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (TRIA). See Ministry of
Def. & Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic
of Iran v. Elahi, 556 U.S. 366, 386 (2009). Section 201 of
TRIA states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, … in
every case in which a person has obtained a judgment
5
against a terrorist party on a claim based upon an act
of terrorism, … the blocked assets of that terrorist
party (including the blocked assets of any agency or
instrumentality of that terrorist party) shall be subject
to execution or attachment in aid of execution in order
to satisfy such judgment to the extent of any
compensatory damages for which such terrorist party
has been adjudged liable.
TRIA § 201(a). In sum, a foreign sovereign’s “blocked assets”
are not immune from attachment by the holder of a terrorism-
related judgment. TRIA defines a “blocked asset” as “any asset
seized or frozen by the United States” under TWEA or IEEPA,
id. § 201(d)(2)(A), but it excludes from the definition assets
that are subject to certain licenses or used exclusively for
diplomatic purposes, id. § 201(d)(2)(B). And it defines a
“terrorist party” to include any foreign country designated as a
state sponsor of terrorism. Id. § 201(d)(4). Where it applies,
TRIA thus operates to abrogate the FSIA’s general immunity
from execution and attachment that would otherwise protect
the property of designated state sponsors of terrorism. Iran was
so designated in 1984. See Determination Pursuant to Section
6(i) of the Export Administration Act of 1979—Iran, 49 Fed.
Reg. 2,836 (Jan. 23, 1984).
D
Plaintiffs with terrorism-related judgments against foreign
sovereigns also may seek compensation from the United States
Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund. See 34 U.S.C.
§ 20144(e)(1). Such plaintiffs may apply to the Victims Fund
for compensation. See id. § 20144(c)(3)(A). The Fund then
makes distributions to each eligible applicant on a pro rata basis
up to a statutory cap. Id. § 20144(d)(3)(A)(i)–(ii).
6
Congress initially funded the Victims Fund with an
appropriation. 34 U.S.C. § 20144(e)(5). But the Fund is now
financed primarily by proceeds from enforcement actions
under TWEA and IEEPA—including forfeiture actions against
blocked assets. See id. § 20144(e)(2)(A)(i)–(ii).
II
This appeal involves two groups of plaintiffs holding
terrorism-related judgments against Iran—the Owens and
Levin plaintiffs. The Owens plaintiffs are owed almost a
billion dollars on judgments arising from Al Qaeda’s 1998
bombings of United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
The Levin plaintiffs are owed approximately $15 million on a
judgment arising from the 1984 kidnapping and torture of
Jeremy Levin by the Iran-backed terrorist group Hezbollah.
Both groups seek to attach the same $9.98 million—which
we call the “Funds”—to help execute their judgments. That
money surfaced after Taif Mining Services tried to wire it to
another foreign entity through Wells Fargo in New York. Taif
was prohibited from doing so because it is a front company for
the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps—an instrumentality of
Iran and OFAC-designated sponsor of terrorism. See 31 C.F.R.
§ 594.201(a)(5); Est. of Levin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 45
F.4th 416, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (Levin I). Alerted by OFAC,
Wells Fargo halted the transfer of the Funds and placed the
Funds in a South Dakota account. OFAC then issued an order
memorializing that the Funds were blocked under section 203
of IEEPA, Executive Order 13,224, and 31 C.F.R. § 594.201.
After it blocked the Funds, the government moved to
confiscate them by civil forfeiture. It filed an action against
them in our district court, and the case was assigned to Chief
Judge Boasberg. The government then sought a license from
OFAC “for the purpose of perfecting civil in rem forfeiture of
7
the Blocked Funds pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981.” J.A. 287.
OFAC granted the request, authorizing the government “to
engage in all transactions necessary and ordinarily incident to
effect the forfeiture” of the Funds. Id. at 291. It also authorized
Wells Fargo to relinquish custody of the Funds, but only to the
government, and only if the government “furnish[ed] a valid
forfeiture order.” Id. Until then, OFAC’s license did not
permit Wells Fargo to do anything with the Funds.
While the government was taking steps toward forfeiture,
a Wall Street Journal story brought the Funds to the attention
of both plaintiff groups. See Sun & Tokar, U.S. Charges Two
Iranians Over Oil Tanker Purchase, Seeking $12 Million
Forfeiture, Wall St. J. (May 2, 2020), https://perma.cc/B75B-
KMVT. Invoking TRIA, both groups moved for writs of
attachment in the district court. In the Owens case, Judge Bates
granted writs of attachment and then transferred the matter to
Chief Judge Boasberg for coordination with the government’s
civil-forfeiture action. In the Levin case, Judge Moss
transferred the matter to Chief Judge Boasberg, who granted
the writs but allowed the government to move to quash.
The government moved to quash the Owens and Levin
plaintiffs’ writs, and the district court granted the motion.
Initially, it concluded that Iran lacked any property interest in
the funds held by Wells Fargo. Levin v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 523 F. Supp. 3d 14, 21 (D.D.C. 2021). Reversing, we
held that terrorist victims may attach blocked assets traceable
to a terrorist owner and that the funds were “traceable to Taif
and thus to Iran.” Levin I, 45 F.4th at 423 (cleaned up).
On remand, the district court again granted the motions to
quash. In relevant part, it offered two justifications. First,
sovereign immunity barred the attachments. On this point, the
court concluded that TRIA’s abrogation of immunity did not
8
apply because the Funds did not meet the statutory definition
of “blocked assets.” Est. of Levin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
No. 21-cv-420, 2023 WL 3750577, at *6 (D.D.C. June 1,
2023). Second, the court held that the government’s civil-
forfeiture action independently foreclosed relief because, under
the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, that first-filed case
barred all subsequent actions against the same property. Id. at
*9. In closing, the district court also remarked that Congress’s
decision to create the Victims Fund “cast heavy doubt” that it
meant “to encourage a race to the courthouse by individual
victims seeking to attach foreign funds that glance off the U.S.
financial system.” Id. at *12.
Both groups appealed. Our review is de novo. Bennett v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 618 F.3d 19, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
III
Section 201(a) of TRIA makes the “blocked assets” of a
“terrorist party” available to satisfy terrorism-related
judgments against foreign sovereigns designated as state
sponsors of terrorism. Levin I held that the Funds here are
sufficiently traceable to Iran as a “terrorist party.” 45 F.4th at
423–24. We now hold that the Funds are also “blocked assets.”
A
Section 201(d)(2)(A) of TRIA defines a “blocked asset” as
“any asset seized or frozen by the United States” under TWEA
or IEEPA. The statute then excludes from this definition two
categories of property. The first covers any property that is
“subject to a license … for final payment, transfer, or
disposition by or to a person subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States in connection with a transaction for which the
issuance of such license has been specifically required by
statute other than [IEEPA] or the United Nations Participation
9
Act” (Participation Act). Id. § 201(d)(2)(B)(i). The second
exclusion covers property that is used for diplomatic purposes.
Id. § 201(d)(2)(B)(ii).
The Funds meet all the elements of this statutory
definition. They are “frozen” because the OFAC blocking
order provides that they “may not be transferred, paid,
exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in without prior
authorization from OFAC.” J.A. 271. In other words, the
Funds may do nothing but sit in a bank account. Moreover,
OFAC imposed the freeze pursuant to IEEPA. The license
exception does not apply because the license itself was required
by IEEPA, not by a statute “other than” IEEPA or the
Participation Act. And nobody contends that the exception for
diplomatic property applies.
B
The government responds that the Funds are not a
“blocked asset” because they are not “frozen.” We disagree.
1
The government contends that an asset is frozen only if it
is fully immobilized. And it says that the Funds are not fully
immobilized because OFAC has issued a license authorizing
the government to seek their forfeiture.
This argument likely falters at its major premise. In both
ordinary and legal parlance, an asset is frozen if it is difficult to
convert into cash. See Frozen asset, Webster’s New
International Dictionary 915 (3d ed. 1961) (“an asset that
cannot readily be turned into cash without heavy loss”); Asset,
Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining “frozen
asset” as “[a]n asset that is difficult to convert into cash because
of court order or other legal process”). That suggests an asset
10
is frozen if it is subject to a significant restriction; the restriction
need not be fully immobilizing.
In any event, the Funds are fully immobilized despite the
forfeiture license. The license does just two things. First, it
permits courts to enter orders in forfeiture proceedings
respecting the Funds. See Forfeiture License §§ 1(a), 3(a)–(b),
J.A. 291. Second, it permits Wells Fargo to relinquish custody
of the Funds to the government if the government obtains a
valid forfeiture order. See id. §§ 1(b), 2, J.A. 291. But the
government has not yet obtained a forfeiture order, so for the
time being, all dealing in the Funds is prohibited—they must
remain in a Wells Fargo account. See 31 C.F.R. § 594.502(c)
(a license removes a prohibition “only to the extent specifically
stated by its terms”). In other words, the license does not
unfreeze the Funds.
Arguing even more broadly, the government contends that
any OFAC license authorizing any use unfreezes otherwise
blocked funds. We see no textual support for that
interpretation. For one thing, it runs headlong into the ordinary
and legal meaning of frozen asset, as explained above. And it
is implausible in light of TRIA’s historical context. Congress
enacted section 201 in response to the President’s waiver of 28
U.S.C. § 1610(f). The whole point of section 201 was to
eliminate the President’s discretion to prevent victims of state-
sponsored terrorism from attaching blocked assets. See Elahi,
556 U.S. at 386. If the government were right, then section 201
would not prevent the very mischief that Congress sought to
address—that provision would allow the Executive to thwart
attachment of blocked assets simply by authorizing itself to
initiate forfeiture proceedings.
Structural considerations reinforce this conclusion. The
license exception excludes from the definition of “blocked
11
asset” property that is subject to specific kinds of licenses
required by specific statutory authorities. TRIA
§ 201(d)(2)(B)(i). That exception would be puzzling if the
government were right that other kinds of licenses required by
other statutory authorities could have the same practical effect
by making the relevant asset no longer “frozen” or “blocked.”
In that instance, Congress would have had little reason to
specify which licenses fall within the exception. See Esteras v.
United States, 145 S. Ct. 2031, 2040–41 (2025) (negative-
implication canon). Moreover, the exception would be even
more puzzling if the government were right that any license
operates to un-freeze and un-block assets for TRIA purposes.
In that instance, the license exception—with all of its
qualifications regarding the covered kinds of licenses and
statutory authorities—would be surprisingly reduced to
surplusage. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339
(1979) (canon against surplusage).
To defuse this concern, the government points out that
OFAC has blocking and licensing authority under statutes
besides TWEA and IEEPA, such as the Foreign Narcotics
Kingpin Designation Act, 21 U.S.C. § 1904(b). The
government contends that the license exception can therefore
do meaningful work even if any TWEA or IEEPA license un-
freezes and un-blocks the relevant asset. The government asks
us to imagine an asset simultaneously blocked under IEEPA
and the Kingpin Act. As the government explains, if the
government licensed transactions under its Kingpin Act
authority but not under its IEEPA authority, then TRIA’s
license exception would operate to un-block the asset for TRIA
purposes. And so, the government concludes, the license
exception does meaningful work even under its narrow reading
of “blocked” and “frozen.”
12
This account has several difficulties. To begin with,
TRIA’s text suggests that Congress envisioned OFAC would
license specific transactions rather than remove statutory
blocks one-by-one. Its license exception covers “property”
subject to a license “for final payment, transfer, or disposition”
in connection with a transaction that requires a license. TRIA
§ 201(d)(2)(A). If a license merely removed one of multiple
overlapping statutory blocks on an asset, it would not actually
authorize a transaction finally transferring or disposing of that
property. Moreover, the government offers no explanation for
why Congress would focus on the unblocking of assets in this
piecemeal fashion. And the record before us suggests that
OFAC keys licenses to particular transactions, without regard
for the particular statute or statutes supporting the block. See
Forfeiture License, § 1(a), J.A. 291 (licensing the government
“to engage in [certain] transactions,” without specifically
mentioning IEEPA); see also J.A. 290 (granting the license
“under the authority of one or more” statutes and regulatory
provisions, without specifying which). Furthermore,
regardless of whether the government’s interpretation of
“frozen” would reduce the license exception entirely to
surplusage, or would simply render it implausibly narrow, that
structural consideration cuts against its proposed interpretation.
See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S.
825, 837 (1988). And finally, the government’s account at
most responds to the structural argument that its interpretation
of “frozen” makes the license requirement implausibly narrow.
This does not undercut the frontline textual argument regarding
the plain meaning of frozen asset.
For these reasons, we conclude that a highly restrictive
license like the one at issue here does not make TRIA
inapplicable. The Funds remain “frozen” and thus “blocked.”
And because the relevant license was not required under a
13
statute “other than” IEEPA or the Participation Act, the license
exception does not apply.
2
The government also invokes precedent, primarily three
circuit decisions. With respect, we find the cited authorities
either inapposite or unpersuasive.
First, the government cites Bank of New York v. Rubin, 484
F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2007), where the Second Circuit endorsed the
reasoning in Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 299
F. Supp. 2d 63 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). See 484 F.3d at 150. In
Weinstein, a district court held that the relevant accounts were
not “frozen” under TRIA because the OFAC orders at issue
allowed the assets’ owners to retrieve their funds under certain
conditions. See 299 F. Supp. 2d at 73–74. Weinstein stands for
the obvious proposition that not every IEEPA restriction
freezes an asset. In particular, if OFAC allows the owner of an
asset to withdraw it from the United States, the asset is easily
converted into cash and thus not frozen. See id. at 74;
Webster’s, supra, at 915 (defining “frozen asset”). That point
hardly supports the government’s position that any license
unfreezes an asset, no matter how restrictive.
The second case is United States v. Holy Land Foundation
for Relief & Development, 722 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 2013). Holy
Land involved assets blocked by IEEPA and the criminal-
forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(A), which allows the
government to restrain assets pending criminal-forfeiture
proceedings. See 722 F.3d at 681–82. The government sought
and obtained an OFAC license to allow it to pursue the
forfeiture. Id. at 682. The plaintiffs held terrorism-related
judgments against the owners of the blocked funds, and they
invoked TRIA to attach the assets. Id. The district court issued
a writ of attachment, but the Fifth Circuit reversed. Without
14
textual analysis or citations to precedent, the Fifth Circuit
stated that TRIA does not “reach those funds which the
government has been given authorization to control through
another means” such as the criminal-forfeiture statute. Id. at
685. But an asset may be “frozen” and thus “blocked” under
IEEPA even if some other statute allows particular uses or
transactions for the funds. And although section 853 authorizes
both asset blocks and criminal-forfeiture proceedings against
the blocked assets, it does not displace the IEEPA block. To
do that, the government in Holy Land needed to obtain an
IEEPA license. See id. at 687. Moreover, even after the license
issued, the IEEPA block still prevented all dealing in the funds
unless and until a court entered a final forfeiture order. See id.
(noting that the license allowed the forfeiture process to
proceed “[n]otwithstanding the status of [the] assets as
blocked”). That means the funds were still “frozen” and thus
“blocked” within the meaning of TRIA. And because the
license obtained was not “required by a statute other than”
IEEPA, the license exception did not apply. See TRIA
§ 201(d)(2)(B)(i).
The government’s final case is United States v. All Funds
on Deposit with R.J. O’Brien & Associates, 783 F.3d 607 (7th
Cir. 2015). There, the Seventh Circuit held that plaintiffs could
not use TRIA to attach IEEPA-blocked funds because OFAC
had licensed the government to pursue civil forfeiture against
them. The court relied primarily on TRIA’s license exception.
It reasoned that because the funds at issue were subject to a
civil-forfeiture license, which is “a license for final transfer or
disposition,” the license exception carved them out from
TRIA’s definition of “blocked assets.” Id. at 624. But again,
the license exception by its terms applies only if assets are
subject to a license “required by a statute other than” IEEPA or
the Participation Act. See TRIA § 201(d)(2)(B)(i). As Judge
Manion explained, only IEEPA required the government to
15
seek the license in question, so the license did not unblock the
frozen assets. See R.J. O’Brien, 783 F.3d at 630 (Manion, J.,
dissenting in relevant part).
* * * *
Because the Funds fall within TRIA’s definition of a
“blocked asset,” section 201 of TRIA applies and abrogates
what would otherwise be Iran’s sovereign immunity from
attachment in aid of execution of the plaintiffs’ judgments.
IV
The district court further held that the prior exclusive
jurisdiction doctrine independently bars attachment of the
Funds. That doctrine seeks to prevent multiple in rem
proceedings against the same property at the same time. We
hold that the doctrine does not apply to proceedings, like the
competing forfeiture and attachment matters here, filed in the
same court.
The prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine is an “ancient and
oft-repeated rule” of in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction. 16
C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3631
(3d ed. 2025). It provides that “when a state or federal court of
competent jurisdiction has obtained possession, custody, or
control of particular property, that authority and power over the
property may not be disturbed by any other court.” Id. So
when two in rem actions are filed against the same property in
different courts, only one “court, or its officer” may possess or
control “the property which is the subject of the litigation.”
Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456,
466 (1939). Thus “the jurisdiction of the one court must yield
to that of the other.” Id. In sum, only one court at a time may
exercise jurisdiction over particular property.
16
On that understanding, the prior exclusive jurisdiction
doctrine does not apply here. This case involves three
competing in rem actions filed against the same property—one
civil-forfeiture action and two attachment proceedings under
TRIA. But all three were filed in the same court—the District
Court for the District of Columbia. The cases thus present no
problem of multiple courts simultaneously exercising
jurisdiction over the same property.
The government objects that the prior exclusive
jurisdiction doctrine does more than simply prevent
jurisdictional conflicts between courts. It contends that once a
suit involving particular property is filed, the doctrine bars any
other suit involving the same property. The government thus
seeks to apply the doctrine to competing lawsuits filed before
different judges, even if they all serve on the same court. The
government is mistaken.
A
The prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine is “based upon
necessity.” Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 235
(1922). So it does not apply “where the necessity, actual or
potential, does not exist.” Id. Thus, the scope of the doctrine
turns on what problem it exists to solve.
Here is the problem: A court cannot proceed in a suit
involving particular property without seizing the property. See,
e.g., Republic Nat’l Bank of Mia. v. United States, 506 U.S. 80,
84 (1992) (“It long has been understood that a valid seizure of
the res is a prerequisite to the initiation of an in rem …
proceeding.” (cleaned up)). So one court hearing an in rem
action must seize the property against which it is directed. And
a second court could not hear an in rem action against the same
property without seizing it from the first, which would create
“unseemly conflicts between courts whose jurisdiction
17
embraces the same subject.” Kline, 260 U.S. at 231; see Penn
Gen. Cas. Co. v. Commonwealth of Pa. ex rel. Schnader, 294
U.S. 189, 195 (1935). No such conflicts arise when multiple
suits are filed in the same court. In that instance, the court takes
control of the property by virtue of the first-filed suit. And later
suits merely ask the court to consider further claims against it.
The Supreme Court suggested as much in Hagan v. Lucas,
35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 400 (1836). That case arose after a federal
court directed a marshal to seize property that a sheriff had
levied pursuant to a state court order. Id. at 401. The Supreme
Court deemed the federal seizure order invalid. It reasoned that
the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine prevents a court from
attaching property already seized by a different court. Id. at
403. It explained that “[t]he first levy, whether it were made
under the federal or state authority, withdraws the property
from the reach of the process of the other.” Id. At the same
time, however, the Court also observed that the first levy does
not withdraw the property from the reach of the process of the
same court. Id. For even after a sheriff seizes property
pursuant to a writ of attachment, a judge or sheriff in the same
“jurisdiction” may issue additional writs of attachment or
execution against that property. Id. In other words, the prior
exclusive jurisdiction doctrine does not prevent a single court
from presiding over multiple suits involving the same property.
B
The government argues that the prior exclusive
jurisdiction doctrine exists to prevent not only jurisdictional
conflicts arising when cases are filed, but also inconsistent
judgments when they are adjudicated. The government reasons
that district judges within a single court are not bound by each
other’s rulings, just as district judges on different courts do not
bind one another. So, it concludes, the prior exclusive
18
jurisdiction doctrine must foreclose multiple in rem
proceedings even within the same court.
The government’s view has little to recommend it. For one
thing, we have found no case applying the doctrine in this way;
the cases cited by the government involve actual or potential
conflicts between state and federal courts. See United States v.
Bank of N.Y. & Tr. Co., 296 U.S. 463, 478 (1936); Hammer v.
HHS, 905 F.3d 517, 536 (7th Cir. 2018). Moreover, rules of
claim and issue preclusion prevent conflicting judgments. See
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 30 (1982). And the
concern that there would be unseemly competition between
judges of the same court strikes us as unrealistic. In the main,
local rules will funnel cases involving the same property to the
same district judge. Here, for example, Judge Bates and Judge
Moss invoked D.D.C. Local Rule 40.5 to transfer their
respective TRIA attachment cases to Chief Judge Boasberg,
who was already presiding over the government’s first-filed
forfeiture action. And with all three cases before a single judge,
there is no need to allow only the first-filed case to be
considered.1
1
The government hints at an argument that the civil-forfeiture
statute bars the attachment proceedings here. In relevant part, that
statute provides that property “taken or detained [by civil forfeiture]
shall not be repleviable, but shall be deemed to be in the custody of
the [government], subject only to the orders and decrees of the court
or the official having jurisdiction thereof.” 18 U.S.C. § 981(c). The
government notes that section 981(c) ordinarily bars plaintiffs from
initiating process against property already subject to a civil-forfeiture
proceeding. But the government does not argue that section 981(c)
bars attachments specifically authorized by TRIA. For good reason,
because TRIA’s attachment provision applies “[n]otwithstanding
any other provision of law.” TRIA § 201(a). We have said that this
phrase “clearly requires courts to disregard other statutory provisions
that conflict with the scope of the TRIA.” Greenbaum v. Islamic
19
V
Only one argument remains—that our holding might
disrupt the Victims Fund. As explained above, the Fund is now
financed largely through forfeiture actions pursued by the
United States against the blocked assets of terrorist parties. So,
when a judgment holder invokes TRIA to recover assets that
would otherwise be forfeited, he takes funds that would
otherwise be distributed more broadly and more equitably to
similarly situated holders of terrorism-related judgments.
We appreciate the force of this argument as a policy
matter. Nevertheless, Congress did not expressly modify TRIA
when it created the Victims Fund, and we may not assume that
it did so impliedly. See Am. Forest Res. Council v. United
States, 77 F.4th 787, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (noting the “strong
presumption that repeals by implication are disfavored and that
Congress will specifically address preexisting law when it
wishes to suspend its normal operations in a later statute”
(cleaned up)). Moreover, in creating the Victims Fund,
Congress expressly provided that plaintiffs whose judgments
are not fully satisfied by distributions from the Fund retain the
right to satisfy their judgments through other mechanisms—
which presumably would include TRIA collection actions. See
34 U.S.C. § 20144(d)(5)(B). In sum, any anomaly in the
interaction between the Victims Fund and TRIA is a problem
for Congress, not the judiciary.
Republic of Iran, 67 F.4th 428, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2023). So, if TRIA
specifically allows attachments that the civil-forfeiture statute
specifically prohibits, TRIA prevails.
20
VI
Neither sovereign immunity nor the prior exclusive
jurisdiction doctrine barred the attachment proceedings
pursued by the Owens and Levin plaintiffs. We reverse the
order quashing these plaintiffs’ writs of attachment.
So ordered.