BROWN v. STC OPCO, LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SUZANNE BROWN CIVIL ACTION

v. NO. 25-2859

STC OPCO, LLC d/b/a ST.

CHRISTOPHER’S HOSP. FOR

CHILDREN and TOWER HEALTH.

MEMORANDUM RE: PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS

Baylson, J. September 25, 2025

Plaintiff Suzanne Brown (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action asserting violations of the

Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and the Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance

(“PFPO”). Defendants STC OpCo, LLC (d/b/a St. Christopher’s Hospital for Children) and Tower

Health seek partial dismissal of her claims (“Defendants”). Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss

is DENIED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On or about January 22, 2021, Defendants allegedly hired Plaintiff as the Director of

Pharmacy Services at St. Christopher’s Hospital. Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”) ¶ 24, ECF

11. In this role, Plaintiff allegedly implemented policies and procedures relating to drug storage

reviews to check for expiration dates. Id. ¶ 26.

In or around September 2022, Plaintiff allegedly hired Uzoamaka Atuegwu (believed to be

in her 30s) as an Assistant Director. Id. ¶ 27. Ateugwu was allegedly responsible for ensuring the

drug reviews were done and the required paperwork for the drug reviews were completed. Id. ¶

28. In or around October 2023, Tower Health allegedly hired Stephanie Goldman (believed to

also be in her 30’s) as the Director of Pharmacy for Pottstown Hospital. Id. ¶ 29. Allegedly,

approximately two weeks after Goldman was hired, her title was changed to Regional Director of

Pharmacy. Id. ¶ 30. This was allegedly a newly created position title, and Defendants allegedly

did not post the position or inform Plaintiff or her older colleagues of the open position, preventing

them from applying for the position. Id. ¶¶ 30–32.

In or around November 2023, the Pennsylvania Department of Health allegedly conducted

an inspection on the pharmacy at St. Christopher’s Hospital where Plaintiff worked. Id. ¶ 33. The

inspector allegedly found a liquid medication that had expired (per the records that the pharmacy

technician made) but allegedly had not actually expired (per the manufacturer’s expiration date on

the bottle). Id. ¶¶ 34–35. Nevertheless, the inspector allegedly noted that the liquid medication

had expired. Id. ¶ 36.

On or about November 17, 2023, Plaintiff allegedly met with Tyler Shugarts, St.

Christopher Hospital’s Chief Transformation Officer overseeing Pharmacy, and Pamela

Hernandez, Corporate Vice President of Human Resources. Id. ¶ 37. Shugarts and Hernandez

allegedly terminated Plaintiff because the inspector noted that the liquid medication was expired

even though allegedly the medication was not actually expired. Id. ¶¶ 38, 40. Allegedly, Shugarts

even noted that he did not think that the inspector knew what they were doing. Id. ¶ 39. Plaintiff

allegedly had not received any prior warnings or disciplines before her termination, and her most

recent performance evaluation allegedly received top scores of “Outstanding.” Id. ¶¶ 41–42.

Plaintiff allegedly was 61 years old at the time of her termination. Id. ¶ 44.

Following Plaintiff’s termination, Defendants allegedly promoted Goldman to Corporate

Vice President of Pharmacy and Atuegwu to Director of Pharmacy Services at St. Christopher’s

Hospital. Id. ¶ 43.

On May 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC that was dually

filed with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (“PHRC”). Id. ¶¶ 16–17. Plaintiff did

not file an administrative complaint with the Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations

(“PhilaCHR”). See id. ¶ 20 n.1. On March 5, 2025, the EEOC issued the parties a Determination

and Notice of Rights, closing its investigation of Plaintiff’s Charge and providing Plaintiff with a

right to sue with respect to her federal claims. Id. ¶ 18.

On June 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint, bringing age discrimination claims under the

ADEA (Count I), the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”) (Count II), and the PFPO

(Count III). ECF 1. On August 1, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion for Partial Dismissal of

Plaintiff’s Complaint on the grounds that (a) Plaintiff’s state law PHRA claims were time-barred;

and (b) Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies for her PFPO claims. ECF 9. On August

19, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, bringing age discrimination claims under the

ADEA (Count I) and the PFPO (Count II). ECF 11. Plaintiff did not assert PHRA claims in her

Amended Complaint. Id.

On August 29, 2025, Defendants filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint (ECF 13), which Plaintiff opposed on September 12, 2025 (ECF 15).

II. THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

A. Defendants’ Contentions

Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss focuses specifically on Plaintiff’s PFPO claims, and

that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies for those claims. ECF 13-1. Defendants

argue that because Plaintiff did not file a complaint with the PhilaCHR and only filed claims with

the EEOC and the PHRC, her PFPO claims were not administratively exhausted. Id.

Defendants note a split in the decisions in this district, whereby there are two lines of cases.

Id. at 5–6. The first line of cases concludes that the administrative exhaustion requirement under

the PFPO can be met by filing with the EEOC and/or the PHRC, if the facts and allegations are

the same as those at issue in the PFPO claims. Id. (citing Higgins v. MetLife Inc., 687 F. Supp.

3d 644, 650 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (Beetlestone, J.)). On the other hand, the second line of cases finds

that PFPO claims can only be exhausted by filing a complaint with the PhilaCHR. Id. at 6 (citing

Alvarado-Jones v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, LLC, No. 2:25-CV-1505, 2025 WL 1710055, at *5

(E.D. Pa. June 18, 2025) (Kearney, J.)). Defendants argue that a growing number of judges in this

district have adopted the second view over the last few years, and therefore, the Court should adopt

the second view. Id. (collecting cases).

Defendants further argue that the statute obligates claimants to exhaust administrative

remedies for PFPO claims with the PhilaCHR before filing. Id. at 6–9. Defendants point to Phila.

Code § 9-1122(1)-(2), which states, in relevant part:

(1) If a complainant invokes the procedures set forth in this Chapter, that person’s right of

action in the courts of the Commonwealth shall not be foreclosed. If within one (1)

year after the filing of a complaint with the [PhilaCHR], the [PhilaCHR] dismisses the

complaint or has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the complainant is

a party, the [PhilaCHR] must so notify the complainant. On receipt of such a notice the

complainant may bring an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

based on the right to freedom from discrimination granted by this Chapter.

(2) An action under this Section shall be filed within two years after the date of notice from

the [PhilaCHR] closing the case. Any action so filed shall be served on the [PhilaCHR]

at the time the complaint is filed in court. The [PhilaCHR] shall notify the complainant

of this requirement.

Phila. Code § 9-1122(1)-(2).

Defendants argue the conditional word “if” means the PFPO “expressly requires” certain

procedural steps for exhaustion before suing, including filing a complaint with the PhilaCHR, if

the PhilaCHR dismisses the complaint or has not entered into a conciliation agreement within a

year of the filing of the complaint, the PhilaCHR must notify the complainant, and within two

years of receipt of the notice, the individual may file PFPO claims in court. ECF 13-1 at 7–9

(citing Phila. Code §§ 9-1112(1), 9-1122(1)).

Lastly, Defendants argue the PFPO’s language mirrors provisions in Title VII and the

PHRA, which have been interpreted as requiring administrative exhaustion of claims at the EEOC

and the PHRC, respectively, prior to filing suit. Id. at 9–11.

B. Plaintiff’s Contentions

Plaintiff also recognizes the decisions are not consistent in this district. ECF 15-1 at 4.

Plaintiff notes, however, the majority of the case law in this district supports the first view—the

claimant can administratively exhaust claims under the PFPO by filing with the EEOC and/or the

PHRC even if the claimant does not file with the PhilaCHR. Id. at 5–6 (citing Higgins v. MetLife

Inc., 687 F. Supp. 3d 644 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (Beetlestone, J.)); see also Richards v. Foulke Associates,

Inc., 151 F. Supp. 2d 610, 616 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (O’Neill, J.) (predicting that the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court would interpret the PFPO as requiring Philadelphia employees to exhaust

administrative remedies “through either the [PhilaCHR] or the PHRC”); Medlock v. Children’s

Hosp. of Philadelphia, No. 25-124, Slip. Op. at pp. 3-4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2025) (Diamond, J.)

(ECF 15-2). Notably, Plaintiff does not dispute that her PFPO claim must be administratively

exhausted. ECF 15-1 at 4.

Plaintiff further points to several cases from Pennsylvania state courts which support the

position that the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies under the PFPO is met by filing

with the EEOC and/or the PHRC. Id. at 6–7, 9–10; see, e.g., Marriott Corp. v. Alexander, 799

A.2d 205, 208 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) (“Employee is required to exhaust administrative remedies

available through the [PhilaCHR] or [PHRC] before filing a civil action under the [PFPO].”)

(emphasis added); Jones v. Foods on First III, Inc., No. 177 EDA 2024, 2025 WL 2448126, at *7

(Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 26, 2025) (“Although not binding on this Court, we find the thorough and

well-reasoned analysis provided by the district court in Higgins persuasive, and therefore hold that

the PFPO does not require a complainant to file a complaint with the Philadelphia Commission

prior to filing a suit in state court if a submission relating to the same conduct has been made with

the PHRC.”); see also Ellis v. Moran Foods, No. 2305 EDA 2023, 2025 WL 2048838 (Pa. Super.

Ct. July 22, 2025) (non-precedential) (discussing administrative exhaustion requirement under the

PHRA and PFPO claims).

In footnotes, Plaintiff argues the plain text of Section 9-1122(1) does not require a claimant

to invoke the administrative procedures before pursuing the PFPO claims in court. ECF 15-1 at 8

n.2. Plaintiff points to the word “if” and notes that the text does not provide the inverse, namely

that a claimant must invoke the procedures under the PFPO to pursue a right of action in court or

that a claimant may not bring an action in court without receipt of notice from the PhilaCHR. Id.

at 8 nn.2, 3 (citing Higgins, 687 F. Supp. 3d at 652-53). Rather, Section 9-1122(1) provides that

a claimant may still seek judicial recourse after invoking the procedures of the PFPO. Id. at 8–9.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must include

sufficient facts in the complaint that, accepted as true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A complaint is insufficient if it

suggests only the “mere possibility of misconduct” or is a “[t]hreadbare recital[ ] of the elements

of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678–79 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), and so it will not suffice if it is “devoid of

further factual enhancement,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). Thus, in considering a

motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all factual allegations as true and views them in a light most

favorable to the plaintiff, Doe v. Univ. of Sciences, 961 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2020), but may not

“assume that [the plaintiff] can prove facts that it has not alleged[,]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563

n.8 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983)).

IV. DISCUSSION

The parties are correct that there is a split in the decisions in this district. There is no Third

Circuit case on point. However, I agree with Plaintiff that the exhaustion requirement under the

PFPO can be met by filing with the EEOC and/or the PHRC. As noted, the majority of the case

law in this district finds that a claimant can administratively exhaust claims under the PFPO by

filing with the EEOC and/or the PHRC even if the claimant does not file with the PhilaCHR. See,

e.g., Higgins, 687 F. Supp. 3d at 651 (collecting cases).

Moreover, Phila. Code § 9-1112(1) explicitly states: “Any person claiming to be aggrieved

by an unlawful employment, public accommodation or housing and real property practice may

make, sign and file with the [PhilaCHR] a verified complaint in writing which shall state the name

and address of the person or persons alleged to have committed the unlawful practice and the

particulars thereof. The complaint shall also contain such other information as may be required

by the [PhilaCHR].” Phila. Code § 9-1112(1). The presence of “may” with “make, sign, and file”

a “verified complaint” (compared to “shall” later in the statute) indicates that it is permissive, not

mandatory, for a claimant to file a complaint with the PhilaCHR. Indeed, the statute plainly says

that no dual filing with the PHRC is permitted. See Phila. Code §9-1112(4) (“The [PhilaCHR]

shall not accept a complaint from any person who has filed a complaint with the [PHRC] with

respect to the same grievance.”).

Furthermore, the undersigned previously concluded that a PFPO claim can be

administratively exhausted simply by filing an administrative claim with the EEOC and/or the

PHRC, even if the claimant does not file with the PhilaCHR. Newsome v. City of Phila., No. 2:19-

CV-5590, 2021 WL 2810289, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2021) (Baylson, J.) (relying on Vandegrift v.

City of Phila., 228 F. Supp. 3d 464 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (Kearney, J.)). As Defendants note, Judge

Kearney’s later opinion in Alvarado-Jones held that PFPO claims can only be exhausted by filing

a complaint with the PhilaCHR. See ECF 13-1 at 14–15; Alvarado-Jones, 2025 WL 1710055, at

*5 (concluding PFPO claims can only be exhausted by filing a complaint with the PhilaCHR).

Although this may be opposite of Judge Kearney’s opinion in Vandegrift (relied on in Newsome),

this is irrelevant. As discussed, the more established line of cases in this district, as well as a plain

reading of the statutory language, indicates that the statutory language is permissive. See Phila.

Code §§ 9-1112(1), 9-1122(1). Therefore, a PFPO claim can be administratively exhausted by

filing an administrative claim with the EEOC and/or the PHRC, even if the claimant does not file

with the PhilaCHR. ECF 15-1. Here, Plaintiff timely filed a Charge with the EEOC and PHRC

on May 20, 2024 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16–17), and thus the Court will not dismiss the Complaint.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss (ECF 13) is DENIED.

An appropriate order follows.

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