McBroom v. Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

BENJAMIN MCBROOM, M35692, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 25-cv-1309-DWD

)

ILLINOIS DEPT. OF CORR., )

LATOYA HUGHES, )

SALVADORE A. GODINEZ, )

JEREMIAH BROWN, )

MRS. BICE, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Benjamin McBroom, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(IDOC) currently detained at Lawrence Correctional Center (Lawrence), brings this civil

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional

rights. Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is now before the Court for preliminary review

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen

prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b).

Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law

is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture,

the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v.

Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff alleges that he has severe and permanent injuries to his right hand from

a car crash in 2008. (Doc. 1 at 3). He claims that due to his injuries, repetitive movements

of his right hand (such as writing) lead to serious pain and could lead to irreparable

injury. (Doc. 1 at 4). To best mitigate issues, he believes it is necessary to limit writing,

and to only write with ergonomic pens. (Doc. 1 at 4). He explains that during a prior

incarceration, and while he was in the county jail prior to his current incarceration, he

was afforded direct access to a typewriter or computer. (Doc. 1 at 4-7). Upon his recent

admission to the IDOC, Plaintiff was not afforded any accommodations at Graham

Correctional Center. (Doc. 1 at 6-7).

At Lawrence, Plaintiff submitted a request slip under the ADA/RA1 to Defendant

Bice, the ADA Coordinator. (Doc. 1 at 7). He alleges that he has yet to receive a response,

and he has not had any direct contact with Bice. (Doc. 1 at 7). In addition to contacting

Bice, Plaintiff has also asked his counselor (a non-party) for assistance drafting

grievances, but on August 28, 2024, the counselor denied his request and simply

suggested he draft shorter grievances or seek the help of a fellow inmate. (Doc. 1 at 8).

Plaintiff alleges that this has hindered his ability to file numerous grievances. (Id.).

Nevertheless, on August 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed an emergency grievance about his

desire for accommodations related to his injury. (Doc. 1 at 9). Plaintiff alleges that the

only suitable accommodation would be an in-cell typewriter. (Id.). Defendant Brown

1 The Court will refer to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132, 12203, as the “ADA” and

the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, as the “RA”.

deemed the grievance an emergency on September 9, 2024, but the next day a non-party

grievance officer recommended that the grievance be denied because it did not specify

an incident date. (Doc. 1 at 10). Plaintiff characterizes this denial as procedurally

improper, arguing that because his issue of non-accommodation is ongoing he believes

the grievance rules do not require a particular incident date. He also argues that the

grievance should have been processed by the ADA coordinator, instead of the grievance

officer. (Doc. 1 at 11). He states that Defendant Brown signed off on the grievance on

September 14, 2024, thus beginning the clock for him to appeal. (Doc. 1 at 11). Ultimately,

the Administrative Review Board denied the grievance as untimely. Plaintiff argues that

this was also improper. (Doc. 1 at 11). As a result of this series of events, he argues the

grievance process was wholly unavailable.

Furthermore, he argues that the problems he faces are not grievable because he

has learned there is a 2012 policy that bans inmates in maximum security prisons from

personally possessing typewriters. (Doc. 1 at 7, 12). He alleges that the policy was

formulated by former director, Defendant Godinez, and that it is still in force under acting

director, Defendant Hughes. (Doc. 1 at 12). Plaintiff argues that the ban was instituted

on false pretenses to protect prison security, but that there was never a sufficient

justification to implement the policy, and there are safe typewriters available for the

prison to purchase. (Doc. 1 at 12-13). He specifically claims that Godinez implemented

the policy as a pretext based on security, when in fact the real purpose of the policy is to

suppress inmate litigation by maximum security inmates who are the “most litigious and

tenacious segment of the IDOC population, and those most likely to be on appeal of

serious criminal charges, as well as most likely to have suffered violations of their civil

rights at the hands of IDOC officials.” (Doc. 1 at 12-13).

Plaintiff argues that there is no legitimate security justification for banning his

personal possession of a typewriter, particularly where a typewriter vendor offers “safe”

typewriters that mitigate the risk of the typewriter parts being used as weapons. (Doc. 1

at 13). He also argues that Lawrence has a medium security wing where typewriters are

allowed. This is significant he claims, because he has a non-violent history, and

defendants could reclassify him to this area to accommodate his possession of a

typewriter. (Doc. 1 at 13).

Without accommodations, Plaintiff has been reliant on typewriters in the prison

law library. (Doc. 1 at 13-14). He claims that the prison law librarian has allowed him to

use the typewriters on an informal basis, but that the permission could be revoked at any

time. Limited access frustrates his ability to prepare legal documents. He also states that

prison law library access is intermittent at best, and he can only use the typewriters for

legal work but cannot use them for other forms of communication (such as letters or

journaling). Without a typewriter, Plaintiff also has a limited ability to fill-out request

slips, which are required to access programs and services. (Doc. 1 at 15). Overall, he

argues that without accommodations, he is unable to access programs and services such

as “legal and non-legal mail and correspondence, grievances, State and Federal courts,

unstructured in-cell recreation such as creative writing and journaling, educational

opportunities, law library research and consultations, and even PREA complaints[.]”

(Doc. 1 at 15).

Plaintiff goes on to allege that on March 13, 2025, the typewriters became

permanently unavailable, and the only option is now to use a computer for a fee. (Doc.

1 at 16). He alleges that even if he had more time to use the computer and it was free, it

would not be an adequate accommodation, because it cannot be used for things like

addressing envelopes or filling out request forms. (Id.). Aside from the computer

situation, Plaintiff also alleges that he cannot properly write with flexible “seg pens” and

he does not have appropriate ergonomic seating in his cell. (Doc. 1 at 16-17). If he were

to be provided with a typewriter, he argues that he would need an unlimited supply of

ink ribbons and correction ribbons. (Doc. 1 at 17-18).

Plaintiff contends that the lack of accommodations have already caused him

serious physical pain on occasions when he has been forced to write by hand. (Doc. 1 at

16). He also alleges emotional and mental harm which he attributes at least in part to the

lack of accommodation, alleging that he has been forced to start taking daily medications

to address his PTSD, major depression, and anxiety disorder. (Doc. 1 at 19). He claims a

prison doctor has instructed him to begin writing with his left hand, but he believes this

will cause neurological and psychological harm. (Id.).

Plaintiff argues that without an accommodation, his ability to represent himself in

multiple legal actions has been hindered. He explains that he was forced to accept the

representation of the state appellate defender’s office for his criminal appeal, which he

claims has limited the issues presented on appeal. (Doc. 1 at 20-21). He also claims that

he was hindered in state court child custody proceedings, and a malicious prosecution

case in the Central District of Illinois. (Doc. 1 at 22-23). He argues that in a 2022 case in

the Central District of Illinois, he missed the opportunity to file a response to a pending

motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 1 at 23). Finally, he argues that in a case filed last

year before the undersigned, the case should have been resolved differently absent legal

error. Specifically, he argues that if he had been able to file an amended complaint, the

amended pleading would have precluded dismissal. (Doc. 1 at 24).

At the end of the pleading, Plaintiff enumerated a list of six claims against all

defendants, and a seventh claim solely against Defendants Godinez and Hughes. (Doc.

1 at 25). He seeks declaratory, compensatory, and injunctive relief. (Doc. 1 at 26). In

support of the complaint, Plaintiff submitted a one-page excerpt of his medical records,

affidavits, grievance documentation, an excerpt from the offender orientation manual,

correspondence with a typewriter vendor, and a memorandum concerning law library

access. (Doc. 1 at 27-39).

The claims as presented by Plaintiff and adopted by this Court are:

Claim 1: Violation of the ADA due to lack of accommodations;

Claim 2: Violation of the RA due to lack of accommodations;

Claim 3: Violation of the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual

punishment clause by exhibiting deliberate indifference to

Plaintiff’s condition, causing him physical and

mental/emotional suffering;

Claim 4: Violation of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise clause due

to Plaintiff’s inability to write and draw;

Claim 5: Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee to

familial association;

Claim 6: Violation of the First Amendment by hindering Plaintiff’s

access to the Court’s;

Claim 7: First Amendment retaliation by Defendants Hughes and

Godinez in response to and in anticipation of past, present,

and future inmate litigation.

(Doc. 1 at 25). The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings

and orders unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is

mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order is considered dismissed

without prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it

does not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face”).

DISCUSSION

Claims 1-2

Under the ADA and RA, a Plaintiff must allege that he is a qualified individual

with a disability, who was denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities at

the prison, by reason of his disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132; 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The ADA

and RA also require a prison to reasonably modify its policies or practices to avoid

discrimination based on disability. 28 C.F.R § 35.130(b)(7); 28 C.F.R. §41.53. Practically

speaking, the two statutes are the same for purposes of initial review. See e.g., Shaw v.

Kemper, 52 F.4th 331, 334 (7th Cir. 2022). The Seventh Circuit has recognized that

disability discrimination under the RA and the ADA can be “established in three different

ways: ‘(1) the defendant intentionally acted on the basis of the disability, (2) the

defendant refused to provide a reasonable modification, or (3) the defendant's rule

disproportionally impacts disabled people.’” A.H. by Holzmueller v. Ill. High School Assoc.,

881 F.3d 587, 592-93 (7th Cir. 2018). The proper defendant for an ADA or RA claim is the

Department of Corrections or the Director. Jaros v. Ill. Dept. of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 670 n.2

(7th Cir. 2012) (the department or the director of the department are appropriate

defendants for ADA/RA claims). An inmate seeking money damages under the ADA or

RA must also establish that the entity acted with deliberate indifference to his situation.

See e.g., Shaw v. Kemper, 52 F.4th 331, 334 (7th Cir. 2022) (to recover money damages,

plaintiff must identify intentional misconduct, and not mere negligence, by a named

defendant); Bernard v. Ill. Dept. of Corr., 2023 WL 2018915 at *7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 2023) (in

the ADA and RA contexts, courts evaluate knowledge and deliberate indifference

attributable to the prison entity).

Here, Plaintiff names all defendants in association with his ADA or RA claims, but

the proper defendant is the Department of Corrections. Thus, all defendants other than

the Illinois Department of Corrections are dismissed from Claims 1 and 2.

Plaintiff alleges that he has been discriminated against by the denial of an in-cell

typewriter, that this is the only possible accommodation that would sufficiently address

his needs, and that without this accommodation, he has been denied access to the

programs, services, and activities of the prison. He alleges that because of his disability

and the lack of a typewriter, he has been unable to access the grievance process, to

adequately prepare legal documents, to draft written request forms for many services at

the prison, to write to his family or to journal, and to express himself artistically. Though

he emphasizes that he wants a typewriter, he also mentions the desire to draw in his cell,

and states that the accommodation for any form of handwriting would be an ergonomic

pen. He tries to tack in that he needs an ergonomic chair, but this particular request is

insufficiently detailed and is not clearly associated with his alleged disability (a

permanent hand injury).

Plaintiff argues that the prison has not responded to his requests about an

accommodation, he has been unable to reach the ADA coordinator, the ADA coordinator

did not respond to his grievance, and prison employees have refused to help him draft

grievances. He also claims that the prison has a ban on personal typewriters in the

maximum security area of the prison.2 Plaintiff alleges that the prison could secure

typewriters that do not pose a security threat, but they have not even attempted to contact

an eligible vendor to secure or offer these products for purchase.

At this early juncture, the Court will allow Plaintiff to proceed on Claims 1 and 2

against IDOC concerning his access to a typewriter because Plaintiff alleges that it is

significantly impeding many aspects of his ability to function in the prison. However,

this should not be taken as an indication that the Court is finding a typewriter to be the

only necessary or appropriate accommodation. See Hildreth v. Butler, 960 F.3d 420, 431

(7th Cir. 2020) (finding that accommodations other than a personal in-cell typewriter

were adequate to accommodate an inmate’s Parkinson’s disease-related handwriting

impairments, and to ensure his ability to access the courts). For now, the Court’s initial

review merely indicates that Plaintiff may have a plausible claim about a need for an

2 Plaintiff argues in the complaint that he should be reclassified to medium security given his non-violent

history, so that he may be in the medium security area of Lawrence where he could possess a typewriter.

However, in the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, he now states he is housed in the medium security

area.

accommodation, but not that a typewriter is or is not the solution. The Court is also not

definitively determining that the resources Plaintiff currently has are inadequate.

Plaintiff claims he cannot access the grievance process, he cannot adequately prepare

legal work, and he is deprived of other pleasantries like journaling or writing to family,

but his filing of this suit and documents in others suggests that despite impediments he

is managing to produce plenty of written work. Ultimately, it may be determined that

the present available resources are sufficient.

Claim 3

In Claim 3, Plaintiff seeks to hold the Defendants accountable for deliberate

indifference to his need for accommodation. This is redundant of his desire for monetary

relief on his ADA and RA claims in Claim 1, so IDOC will be dismissed from Claim 3.

As for Defendants Hughes and Godinez, Plaintiff does not explain how either

individual was made personally aware of his situation but failed to act. Personal

responsibility for a direct harm is a key to § 1983 liability. Matz v. Klotka, 769 F.3d 517,

528 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[I]ndividual liability under § 1983 requires personal involvement in

the alleged constitutional deprivation”); see also Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 806,

810 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]o be liable under § 1983, the individual defendant must have

caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.”). Plaintiff only associates these

two with the prohibition on typewriters in maximum security facilities, and he already

has an enumerated claim for this at Claim 7, so Claim 3 will be dismissed as insufficiently

pled against Defendants Godinez and Hughes.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Brown became aware of his issue when he deemed

a grievance an emergency in the fall of 2024. Although he ultimately faults the prison for

mishandling this grievance by denying it for lack of an incident date, the mere

mishandling of a grievance is insufficient to state a claim. See e.g., Owens v. Hinsley, 635

F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011) (the alleged mishandling of a grievance by a person who did

not otherwise cause or participate in the underlying conduct states no claim).

Finally, Plaintiff faults Defendant Bice as the ADA coordinator, but he readily

admits they have never communicated directly, nor does he indicate if he knows that she

ever received any correspondence from him. The mere allegation that Plaintiff attempted

to contact a prison official for assistance is insufficient to establish personal involvement

or responsibility for purposes of a § 1983 claim. Therefore, Claim 3 is inadequately pled

as to Bice.

Claims 4-5

Plaintiff faults all Defendants for restricting his First Amendment rights by

limiting his ability to journal and engage in art therapy, and for hindering his ability to

communicate with his family in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The problem

with these claims is that aside from the accommodations he desires, Plaintiff has not

associated these issues with any of the individual defendants. A significant portion of

Plaintiff’s complaint is freeform narrative, without clear ties between his factual

allegations and the named defendants. This is problematic because, as the Court already

explained above, the key to personal liability under § 1983 is personal knowledge and

involvement in an alleged harm. The general assertion that one or more defendants

engaged in constitutional violations is not adequately specific. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d

574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff’s allegations concerning his ability to journal, draw, or

communicate with family do not go beyond the generic ‘one or more defendants harmed

me’ formulation, and are insufficient as pled. Claims 4 and 5 are dismissed against all

defendants.

Claim 6

Inmates have a constitutional right to access the courts, including the right to have

“basic scribe materials,” such as paper and writing utensils. See Christopher v. Harbury,

536 U.S. 403, 414-15 (2002); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996); Gentry v. Duckworth,

65 F.3d 555, 558 (7th Cir. 1995). To state a claim of denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff

must allege that he was, or is, suffering an ‘actual injury’ by being ‘frustrated’ or

‘impeded’ in bringing a non-frivolous claim regarding his criminal conviction, sentence

or conditions of confinement. Lewis, 518 U.S. 353-55. Moreover, the injury must be a

specific hinderance related to a lawsuit, Owens v. Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 565 (7th Cir. 2017),

and cannot be a speculative, future harm, Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 969-70 (7th Cir.

2006).

In relation to Claim 6, Plaintiff discusses six specific actions wherein he alleges he

has been harmed, as well as prospective claims he has not yet been able to file. The

prospective claims are not sufficient because speculative future harm is not sufficient to

establish an access to courts claim, particularly where as here, Plaintiff clearly is able to

file at least some materials. On the whole, Plaintiff is arguing that things in his various

cases are not going the way he wants them to go because it has been difficult for him to

communicate with counsel in those matters, or because he has experienced delays or

limitations in what he can prepare. In two of the cases that Plaintiff highlights, he alleges

he was unable to file desired documents, but the inability to file documents did not cause

Plaintiff to lose out on a meritorious claim. Plaintiff complains that in McBroom v. Landers,

et al., Case No. 22-cv-3073 (C.D. Ill.), he was unable to file a summary judgment response,

but a review of the publicly accessible docket sheet indicates that Plaintiff did file a

response, and merely missed out on a supplemental response after multiple extensions

have been granted. Additionally, Plaintiff has now filed an appeal in that case. Thus, it

does not appear that this juncture that his access issues deprived him of an ability to

present his position or to continue to pursue it. As for the previous case before the

undersigned, Plaintiff argues he could have filed an amended complaint to cure the issue,

but the issue was a premature filing prior to exhaustion, which is not curable by

amendment. McBroom v. Brown, et al., Case No. 24-cv-2167 (S.D. Ill.). Thus, Plaintiff did

not miss out on a meritorious issue in that case. All other cases Plaintiff explicitly

mentioned present scenarios where he is dissatisfied, but not where he has explicitly been

prevented from addressing a meritorious issue.

Regardless of if Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a specific hinderance to a

meritorious claim, Claim 6 is also deficient for the same reasons as Claims 4-5. Plaintiff

has not associated these allegations in the complaint with any individual defendants.

Instead, the problem is attributed solely to the lack of accommodations, which are already

being addressed in Claims 1 and 2. To the extent that Plaintiff believes he has some

additional claims against individual defendants concerning his access to the courts, he

would need to better explain the role that individuals have played in denying his access

to the courts. For now, Claim 6 is dismissed as insufficiently pled.

Claim 7

In Claim 7, Plaintiff faults Defendants Godinez and Hughes for implementing a

typewriter policy preventing maximum security inmates from possessing personal

typewriters, a policy he alleges is retaliatory. A successful claim for First Amendment

retaliation requires that a plaintiff show, “(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First

Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment

activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity was ‘at least a motivating

factor’ in the Defendants’ decision to take the retaliatory action.” Bridges v. Gilbert, 557

F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008)).

“To make a prima facie showing of causation the plaintiff must show only that the

defendant’s conduct was a sufficient condition of the plaintiff's injury.” Greene v. Doruff,

660 F.3d 975, 980 (7th Cir. 2011). Then the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut

plaintiff’s prima facie showing by establishing that “his conduct was not a necessary

condition of the harm—the harm would have occurred anyway.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff has not identified an act of protected speech that he engaged in that

allegedly led to this policy. In fact, it seems unlikely that he could identify an incident of

his own speech that led to the policy given that he claims the policy was implemented in

2012, prior to his current incarceration. Even if Plaintiff established protected speech and

an action likely to deter future First Amendment activity, the causal link he sets forth, is

pure speculation. Plaintiff alleges, without any support, that the typewriter policy was

implemented to punish maximum security inmates who are most likely to be litigious.

This is speculative and Plaintiff does not point to any evidence to support his assertion

of causation. The Court does not find it plausible that this policy was implemented as a

pretext to quash litigation. Because Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged the first or third

elements of a retaliation claim, Claim 7 is dismissed as inadequately pled.

Motion for a Preliminary Injunction

Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction discusses many aspects of

complaint, and is accompanied by a supporting memorandum. (Doc. 11, Doc. 11-1). In

some respects, the motion and memorandum are more detailed than Plaintiff’s

complaint, adding new factual allegations and new more elaborate descriptions of his

theories for relief. For example, Plaintiff alleged in the complaint that he wished to be

transferred from the maximum-security area of Lawrence to the medium-security area

because he believes this may allow him to possess a personal typewriter. However, the

motion is still quite vague in the sense that it does very little to tie the issues explained

within to actions of the individual defendants. Plaintiff explains in the motion that he

has now repeatedly tried to contact Defendants Brown and Bice, but this is broader than

what he alleged in the complaint. A motion for injunctive relief is not an appropriate

way to amend the factual allegations of the complaint, so to the extent Plaintiff may be

attempting to broaden or alter his allegations in the complaint via this motion, he cannot

do so.

Preliminary injunctive relief is meant to preserve the status quo until litigation can

further resolve the merits of a claim. Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 2020) (a

preliminary injunction is meant to preserve the status quo, and if it seeks a mandatory

act, it shall sparingly be issued). If injunctive relief is warranted, the Prison Litigation

Reform Act provides that the injunction must be “narrowly drawn, extend no further

than necessary to correct the harm ...,” and “be the least intrusive means necessary to

correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). Typically, preliminary injunctive relief may

only issue if it is related directly to a pending claim and defendant, whereas relief beyond

the bounds of the claims and parties is inappropriate. See e.g., Tatum v. Hunter, Case No.

22-2411 (S.D. Ill. 2023) (Doc. 16) (denying injunctive relief, including a request for a

transfer, where the injunctive relief sought was not narrowly tailored and did not align

with the claims in the case) aff'd in Tatum v. Hunter, Case No. 23-2253 (7th Cir. May 16,

2024); Daniels v. Dumsdorff, et al., Case No. 19-cv-394 (S.D. Ill. 2019).

For reasons explained in the Analysis section of this Order, many of Plaintiff’s

operative claims have been dismissed as insufficiently pled, and all claims against

individual defendants have been dismissed. This significantly narrows the scope of

injunctive relief that could potentially be considered as related to a pending claim and

defendant. Essentially, given that only Claims 1 and 2 survive against IDOC, Plaintiff is

currently only potentially eligible for injunctive relief related to his ADA and RA claims.

Plaintiff alleges in the motion that despite being moved to the medium-security area, he

is still without accommodations that he needs, and this is limiting his access to programs

and services the prison offers. He alleges he has repeatedly tried to broach this topic with

local prison officials, but he has not been gaining any meaningful traction. Although the

Court finds that the likelihood of success on these claims is perhaps speculative at this

point given the doubts discussed in the analysis of Claims 1 and 2, it will at least direct

the prison to respond to Plaintiff’s Motion solely on the issue of access to a typewriter or

other suitable accommodations that would allow him to accomplish basic tasks at the

prison. Although the Court dismissed all claims against Defendant Brown, the Court will

keep Brown as a party to the case because he may be the most appropriate party to

implement any injunctive relief if any is afforded.

DISPOSITION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Claims 1 and 2 survive solely against the

Illinois Department of Corrections. By contrast, Claims 3-7 are dismissed without

prejudice as insufficiently pled. The Clerk of Court shall TERMINATE Defendants

Godinez, Hughes, and Bice.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to prepare for Defendants Illinois Department

of Corrections and Jeremiah Brown (Warden in official capacity only solely for purpose

of implementing injunctive relief if any is ordered): (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and

Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons).

The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint (Doc. 1), and this

Memorandum and Order to Defendants’ place of employment as identified by Plaintiff.

If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the

Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate

steps to effect formal service on Defendant, and the Court will require Defendant to pay

the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the

employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not

known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for

sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation

of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be

maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendant is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the

Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Pursuant

to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendant need only respond to the issues stated in this

Merits Review Order.

If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment

of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,

regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).

Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to inform the Clerk

of Court and each opposing party of any address changes; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later

than 14 days after a transfer or other change of address occurs. Failure to comply with

this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in

dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter the standard HIPAA Order in this case

because it will likely involve the exchange of medical records.

A ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 11) is

DEFERRED, and the Defendants are DIRECTED to respond to the motion as limited by

this Order within 21 days of returning executed waivers of service.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Expedite and for Service (Doc. 12) is GRANTED by the

issuance of this Order in so much as this order accomplishes the screening of his case and

sets next steps to evaluate the request for preliminary injunctive relief.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 25, 2025 /s David W. Dugan

________________________

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your

lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved,

the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will

likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers,

but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all of the defendants

have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing important

information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to wait until

counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the defendants

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’

counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not

submit any evidence to the Court at his time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.

The Court wishes to remind the Plaintiff that litigation is often viewed a series of hurdles

that the Plaintiff must clear to get to another hurdle. Initial screening is such a hurdle, but

it is a very low one for the Plaintiff to clear. As noted above, surviving initial screening

only requires the bare statement of a claim that, if proven, could entitle Plaintiff to some

relief. At trial, he will need to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the facts alleged

actually occurred and that those facts satisfy the legal requirements for recovery. Trial is

the highest and most difficult of hurdles for any Plaintiff to clear.