FILIPOWSKI v. STACK

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

LEONARD FILIPOWSKI,

Civil Action No: 25-1666 (SDW) (SDA)

Plaintiff,

OPINION

v.

BRIAN STACK, individually and September 25, 2025

in his official capacity as Mayor of

Union City and as State Senator;

PAUL SARLO, individually and in

his official capacity as State Senator;

JAMES MCGREEVY; CITY OF

UNION CITY; CITY OF JERSEY

CITY; NEW JERSEY STATE

POLICE; JOHN DOES 1-99,

individually and in their official

capacities as Police Officers and/or

other government officials,

Defendants.

WIGENTON, District Judge.

Before this Court are three pending motions (D.E. 23; 25; 31) filed by Defendants Brian

Stack, Paul Sarlo, the City of Union City, the City of Jersey City, and the New Jersey State Police

to dismiss Plaintiff Leonard Filipowski’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint (D.E. 1 (Compl.) pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and the Colorado River abstention doctrine. Jurisdiction

is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391. This

opinion is issued without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the

reasons stated herein, the motions to dismiss are GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

Plaintiff Leonard Filipowski is a self-described independent journalist who operates under

the moniker “Leroy Truth.” (Compl. ¶ 8.) He alleges that, beginning in late 2023, he investigated

corruption by New Jersey public officials, particularly Defendant Brian Stack, who serves as both

Mayor of Union City and a State Senator. (Id. ¶¶ 9; 17.) Plaintiff contends that Defendants

engaged in a coordinated campaign to suppress his speech and religious exercise through

intimidation, removal from public forums, and the filing of criminal complaints. (See generally

id.) Three principal incidents anchor the Complaint:

• Union City Board of Commissioners Meeting (July 16, 2024)

Plaintiff attended a municipal board meeting presided over by Mayor Stack. (Id. ¶ 24.)

During the public comment portion, Plaintiff refused to remain at the podium, despite repeated

directives from police officers. (Id. ¶¶ 26–28.) He was arrested and charged with disorderly

conduct. (Id. ¶¶ 29–36.)

• New Jersey State Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing (February 20, 2025)

On or about February 20, 2025, Plaintiff attempted to speak critically about a pending bill

and Senator Stack during the public comment portion of a New Jersey State Senate Judiciary

Committee hearing. (Id. ¶¶ 38–40.) Senator Sarlo admonished him to remain professional and on

topic. (Id. ¶ 41.) Senator Stack cut off Plaintiff’s microphone, ruled him out of order, and directed

New Jersey State Troopers to remove him. (Id. ¶¶ 42–45.)

1 The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff’s Complaint and accepted as true solely for purposes of these motions.

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

• Monumental Baptist Church (March 2024)

Plaintiff attended a church service in Jersey City where former Governor James

McGreevey was present. (Id. ¶¶ 48–49.) At the pastor’s request, and with alleged involvement

from McGreevey, Jersey City police officers escorted Plaintiff out of the service. (Id. ¶ 52.)

Beyond these events, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Stack and his associates filed multiple

municipal criminal complaints against him in retaliation for his reporting, many of which were

dismissed. (Id. ¶ 22.) He alleges that these incidents, taken together, amount to violations of his

rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as

under state law. (Id. ¶¶ 63–110.)

Plaintiff filed this action on March 5, 2025, naming as defendants: Mayor/Senator Brian

Stack (in his individual and official capacities), Senator Paul Sarlo, James McGreevey, the City of

Union City, the City of Jersey City, the New Jersey State Police, and John Does 1–99. The

Complaint pleads counts for First Amendment free speech, free exercise, retaliation, conspiracy,

and Monell liability, as well as state-law tort claims. Three sets of motions to dismiss followed:

(1) the New Jersey Attorney General, on behalf of the NJSP and Senators Stack and Sarlo, filed a

motion asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity, legislative immunity, and failure to state a

claim; (2) Jersey City moved to dismiss on grounds including lack of state action and failure to

plead Monell liability; and (3) Union City and Mayor Stack (in his municipal capacity) moved to

dismiss based on abstention, qualified immunity, and failure to state a claim. Plaintiff filed no

opposition. Although under Local Civil Rule 7.1 the Court may treat motions as unopposed, the

Third Circuit requires courts to analyze Rule 12(b)(6) motions on the merits rather than grant them

solely as sanctions for non-response. See Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir.

1991) (district court must examine whether complaint states a claim even if unopposed); see also

Elozua v. State of New Jersey, Civ. No. 4-2029, 2006 WL 2403934, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2006)

(“The Court . . . must address an unopposed motion to dismiss a complaint on the merits.”)

Accordingly, this Court proceeds to review the sufficiency of the Complaint under the governing

standards.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

An adequate complaint must be “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This Rule “requires more than labels and conclusions,

and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted); see also Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231

(3d Cir. 2008) (stating that Rule 8 “requires a showing, rather than a blanket assertion, of an

entitlement to relief” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court must conduct

a three-step analysis. First, it must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a

claim.” Oakwood Lab’ys LLC v. Thanoo, 999 F.3d 892, 904 (3d Cir. 2021) (alteration in original)

(quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). Second, the court

“disregard[s] threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, legal conclusions, and

conclusory statements.” Id. (quoting James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 681 (3d Cir.

2012)). Third, the court assumes the veracity of all well-pleaded factual allegations, “constru[es]

them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in the

plaintiff’s favor.” Lutz v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 49 F.4th 323, 328 (3d Cir. 2022). “If,

after completing this process, the complaint alleges ‘enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable

expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ the necessary elements of a claim, then it

plausibly pleads a claim.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Determining whether the allegations in a complaint are “plausible” is “a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 679. If the “well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct,” the complaint should be dismissed for failing to “show[] that the

pleader is entitled to relief” as required by Rule 8(a)(2). Id.

III. DISCUSSION

A. New Jersey State Police

The Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court against a state and its arms absent

consent or valid abrogation. The NJSP is an arm of the State. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against

the NJSP are therefore barred. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66–71 (1989)

(neither a State nor its agencies are “persons” under § 1983). Moreover, Ex parte Young permits

prospective injunctive relief only against state officials, not the state agency itself. 209 U.S. 123

(1908). Because amendment cannot cure these defects, all claims against the NJSP are dismissed

with prejudice.

B. Senators Stack and Sarlo: Absolute Legislative Immunity (Hearing Conduct)

Plaintiff challenges acts taken during a State Senate committee hearing: recognizing and

regulating a speaker, enforcing relevancy/decorum, cutting a microphone, and directing sergeants-

at-arms (here, State Troopers assigned to the hearing) to restore order. State legislators are entitled

to absolute legislative immunity for “legitimate legislative activity.” Tenney v. Brandhove, 341

U.S. 367, 372–79 (1951); Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54–55 (1998). Managing a

legislative hearing, including controlling who may speak, for how long, and in what manner, is

paradigmatically legislative in nature. See also Youngblood v. DeWeese, 352 F.3d 836, 840–42

(3d Cir. 2003) (state legislator immune for acts within the sphere of legislative activity). Plaintiff’s

contrary characterization that the conduct was retaliatory or viewpoint-based does not pierce

absolute legislative immunity. Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54 (“Whether an act is legislative turns on the

nature of the act itself, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it.”); Tenney,

341 U.S. at 377 (Absolute immunity “would be of little value if [legislators] could be subjected to

the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the

hazard of a judgment against them based upon a jury's speculation as to motives.”)

Accordingly, claims against Senators Stack and Sarlo based on the February 20, 2025

hearing are dismissed with prejudice. To the extent Plaintiff sues those defendants in their official

legislative capacities for damages, such claims are also barred by the Eleventh Amendment and

Will.

C. First Amendment — Union City Meeting

Government may impose reasonable, content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions

in a limited public forum, including rules of decorum at public meetings. See Eichenlaub v. Twp.

of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 281–82 (3d Cir. 2004) (upholding removal of speaker who refused to

follow meeting rules); Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 197–200 (3d Cir. 2008). Requiring

speakers to use a podium is a classic, content-neutral “manner” rule that advances order and

audibility. Plaintiff pleads no facts showing the rule was applied to him because of his viewpoint.

Plaintiff’s retaliatory-arrest theory independently fails. Under Nieves v. Bartlett, the

existence of probable cause generally defeats a First Amendment retaliatory-arrest claim. 587 U.S.

391, 400–02 (2019). Plaintiff’s own allegations reflect repeated, lawful directives to comply with

decorum (speak from the podium) and his refusal to do so. Those facts establish at least arguable

probable cause for a disorderly-conduct or failure-to-obey offense during a public meeting,

foreclosing retaliatory-arrest liability under Nieves.

Because the alleged conduct does not plausibly state a constitutional violation, Plaintiff’s

free-speech and retaliation claims against Union City and Mayor Stack (in his municipal role)

arising from the July 16, 2024 meeting are dismissed. As explained below, these claims fail for

additional reasons.

D. First Amendment — Jersey City / Church Removal (State Action; Free Exercise)

Plaintiff alleges he was removed from a church service at the pastor’s request, with

assistance from Jersey City police, and with “involvement” by Former Governor James

McGreevey. Private property owners may exclude individuals, and use of police assistance to

enforce private property rights does not itself transform private action into state action. See

Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 587 U.S. 802, 808–15 (2019); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,

407 U.S. 551, 567–70 (1972) (no First Amendment right to access private property). Plaintiff

pleads no non-conclusory facts showing that McGreevey, a private individual, was a state actor or

that the City jointly engaged in viewpoint discrimination rather than routine trespass enforcement

at the owner’s request.

The free-exercise claim fares no better. Plaintiff identifies no government law or policy

that burdened religious practice. Rather, he alleges a private church exercised its right to exclude

him. The First Amendment constrains government, not private churches deciding who may attend

services. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521 (1976). The church episode therefore does

not state a free-exercise claim against Jersey City, McGreevey, or the John Doe Defendants under

§ 1983.

Accordingly, the church-based free-speech and free-exercise claims are dismissed, as are

the § 1983 claims against McGreevey and the John Doe Defendants.2

E. Qualified Immunity (Individual-Capacity Claims)

Even if Plaintiff had alleged underlying constitutional violations, which he has not, the

individual defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity. The doctrine shields officials

unless existing precedent placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. District

of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).

No clearly established law confers a right to disregard a podium/decorum rule at a public meeting

or to continue speaking after being ruled out of order in a legislative hearing. See, e.g., Eichenlaub,

385 F.3d at 281–85 (removal at meeting); cf. Steinburg v. Chesterfield Cnty. Planning Comm’n,

527 F.3d 377, 385–86 (4th Cir. 2008). Nor does Nieves permit retaliatory-arrest claims where

probable cause existed, or at least was arguable. The individual-capacity claims are therefore

independently dismissed with prejudice on qualified-immunity grounds.

F. Monell (Union City, Jersey City)

A municipality is not vicariously liable under § 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436

U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Liability attaches only if a constitutional injury was caused by an official

policy, an entrenched custom, or a failure to train amounting to deliberate indifference. City of

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388–92 (1989). Plaintiff’s Monell allegations consist of

generalized conclusions (e.g., “content-based restrictions,” “policy of allowing public officials . .

. to direct law enforcement actions against critics,” “failure to train”) untethered to well-pleaded

2 Although Defendant McGreevey has not appeared or moved to dismiss and the John Doe Defendants have not been

identified, the Court may dismiss sua sponte under Rule 12(b)(6) where the deficiencies are apparent on the face of

the complaint. Bryson v. Brand Insulations, Inc., 621 F.2d 556, 559 (3d Cir. 1980). Plaintiff alleges McGreevey acted

in concert with police officers to remove him from church services, but pleads no non-conclusory facts establishing

that McGreevey acted under color of state law. Accordingly, the claims against McGreevey are dismissed.

facts showing a pattern, a policymaker’s decision, or deliberate indifference. Because Plaintiff has

not plausibly alleged an underlying constitutional violation by municipal actors, the Monell claims

fail for that reason as well.

G. Conspiracy (42 U.S.C. § 1983)

A § 1983 conspiracy requires factual allegations of an agreement among state actors to

violate constitutional rights and an actual deprivation. Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox

Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 178–79 (3d Cir. 2010). Plaintiff pleads conclusions about

“coordination” but alleges no concrete facts (who, what, when, where) showing a meeting of the

minds. Because the underlying constitutional claims fail, the conspiracy claim fails as well. Id.

The § 1983 conspiracy claim is therefore dismissed.

H. State-Law Claims (False Arrest/Imprisonment; Malicious Prosecution)

To plead false arrest or imprisonment under New Jersey law, a plaintiff must plausibly

allege detention without probable cause. See Mesgleski v. Oraboni, 748 A.2d 1130, 1138 (N.J.

Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000). For malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must plausibly allege initiation

of criminal proceedings without probable cause and with malice, and a favorable termination. See

Lind v. Schmid, 337 A.2d 365, 368 (N.J. 1975). As explained above, the pleaded facts establish at

least arguable probable cause for the meeting-related arrest, which defeats both state and federal

claims. The Complaint also fails to attribute the initiation of particular prosecutions to particular

defendants with non-conclusory facts or to allege malice. Finally, claims against public entities

and employees are subject to the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, including notice requirements and

discretionary-act immunities, which Plaintiff has not pleaded around. See N.J.S.A. § 59:8-8; §

59:3-2. The state-law claims are therefore dismissed.

I. Non-Suable Departments; Redundant Official-Capacity Claims

The “Union City Police Department” and “Jersey City Police Department” are

administrative arms of their municipalities and not separate suable entities under § 1983. To the

extent the Complaint purports to bring claims against those administrative arms that are separate

from the claims against the Cities, those claims are dismissed with prejudice as duplicative of

claims against the Cities. Likewise, claims against Mayor Stack in his mayoral capacity are

duplicative of claims against Union City and are dismissed. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.

159, 165–66 (1985).

J. Abstention (Alternative Ground—Union City Defendants)

The Union City Defendants also invoke Colorado River abstention in light of a parallel

state-court action. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800

(1976). Because the Court dismisses on the merits, it need not reach abstention. If it did, the

parallel proceedings and risk of piecemeal litigation would provide an alternative basis to decline

jurisdiction as to those defendants.

K. Leave to Amend

Plaintiff has not opposed the motions or requested leave to amend. Leave should be freely

given when justice so requires, but need not be granted where amendment would be futile. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The following dismissals are with

prejudice because amendment cannot cure the legal bars: (i) all claims against the NJSP; (ii) claims

against Senators Stack and Sarlo arising from the legislative hearing; and (iii) any claims against

the Union City and Jersey City Police Departments (to the extent they are even pled). All

remaining claims are dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim.

If Plaintiff believes he can cure the deficiencies consistent with Rule 11, he may move for

leave to amend within 30 days of this Opinion and accompanying Order, attaching a proposed

amended complaint that specifically pleads facts (not conclusions) addressing the defects

identified herein. After 30 days, the case will be dismissed with prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are each GRANTED. An

appropriate order follows.

/s/ Susan D. Wigenton x

SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.

Orig: Clerk

cc: Stacey D. Adams, U.S.M.J.

Parties