Opinion

Haddox v. Central Freightlines, Inc.

Court
District Court, N.D. Oklahoma
Filed
Sep 25, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 39.4%

“[W]hen experts employ established methods in their usual manner, a district court need not take issue under Daubert; however, where established methods are employed in new ways, a district court may require further indications of reliability.”

How later courts described this case

  • “[W]hen experts employ established methods in their usual manner, a district court need not take issue under Daubert; however, where established methods are employed in new ways, a district court may require further indications of reliability.”
  • evidence must be both relevant and reliable
  • “Causation usually is determined as a question of fact and not of law.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

DANNY HADDOX, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 18-CV-266-SEH-CDL

CENTRAL FREIGHTLINES, INC.;

NICHOLAS ROSHON MOORE,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are Defendants Central Freightlines, Inc. and Nicholas

Roshon Moore’s (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’

Expert, Daniel Phillips [ECF No. 61], and Motion in Limine with Respect to

Anticipated Testimony by Plaintiffs’ Expert Daniel Phillips [ECF No. 83].

Defendants argue that Phillips, an accident reconstructionist, is not qualified

to provide the expert testimony he proffers, that his testimony will not help

the jury, and that his opinions are unreliable. The Court agrees and will

preclude Phillips’s anticipated testimony from trial.

I. Background

This case arises from a fatal automobile accident that occurred on

September 22, 2017. [ECF No. 2 at ¶¶ 8-10]. Blake Haddox was traveling

southbound on a motorcycle as Defendant Moore drove a semi-truck in a

northbound lane and turned left across traffic. [Id.]. The two collided, and

Haddox died as a result. [Id. at ¶ 16]. Plaintiffs plan to present the testimony

and opinions of Daniel Phillips as an expert in accident reconstruction. [ECF

No. 69 at 2]. Defendants move to prohibit his testimony. [ECF No. 61].

Phillips’s report indicates he has a wide range of expert opinions. [ECF

No. 69-2 at 15–16]. The Court finds that many of his opinions pass on the

credibility of witnesses, provide unqualified statements of fact from an

accident he did not witness, and ultimately opine about the cause of the

accident. For example, Phillips’s opinions include:

 “Mr. Moore’s testimony concerning the location of the southbound

traffic is clearly in error.”

 “Mr. Haddox had his headlight illuminated upon approach.”

 “Mr. Moore’s decision to turn across the path of approaching traffic

was causal to the crash.”

[ECF No. 69-2 at 15–16].

The Court will perform its gatekeeping function in analyzing Phillips’s

proffered opinions.

II. Discussion

Admissibility of expert witness testimony is evaluated under Federal Rule

of Evidence 702, which permits a qualified expert to testify and render an

opinion when the witness “is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,

experience, training, or education” and “it is more likely than not that:”

(a) The “expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will

help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact

in issue;”

(b) The “testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;”

(c) The “testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods;

and”

(d) The expert has reliably applied “the principles and methods to the

facts of the case.”

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Pursuant to Rule 702, the Court must perform a “gatekeeping role ... of

ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is

relevant to the task at hand.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,

509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). The objective of this “gatekeeping requirement ... is

to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional

studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of

intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant

field.” Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). “When

an objection to an expert’s testimony is raised, the court must perform

Daubert gatekeeper duties before the jury is permitted to hear the evidence.”

Bright v. Ohio Nat’s Life Assur. Corp., 11-CV-475-GKF, 2013 WL 12327512,

at *1 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 9, 2013) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589; Kumho Tire,

526 U.S. at 149).

In exercising its gatekeeper duties, a district court must undertake a two-

step analysis. Mathis v. Huff & Puff Trucking, Inc., 787 F.3d 1297, 1307

(10th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). “First, the court must determine whether

the expert is qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education

to render an opinion.” Id. (cleaned up). “If so qualified, the Court must then

determine whether the expert’s opinion is reliable under the principles set

forth in Daubert and Kumho Tire and relevant, in that it will assist the trier

of fact.” Lippe v. Howard, 287 F.Supp.3d 1271, 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2008)

(citations omitted). The party offering the expert testimony has the burden to

prove that the expert is qualified and that his opinions are based in sound

methodology and sufficient facts. Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212, 1222

(10th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

A. Phillips is qualified to testify as an accident reconstructionist,

but unqualified to testify about “human factors” or make

credibility determinations.

The first step in the Daubert inquiry is to determine whether Phillips is

qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education to render an

opinion. Lippe, 287 F.Supp.3d at 1277–78. An expert’s qualifications must

provide “a foundation for a witness to answer a specific question.” Id. at 1279

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). An expert’s qualifications

must be both “(i) adequate in a general, qualitative sense (i.e., knowledge,

skill, experience, training or education as required by Rule 702) and (ii)

specific to the matters he proposes to address as an expert.” Id. (quotation

and internal quotation marks omitted).

Defendants argue that Phillips is unqualified to testify about “human

factors,” unqualified to provide an “opinion as to whether Moore had a

protected green arrow when he proceeded to make his turn,” and unqualified

to make credibility determinations. [ECF No. 61 at 6]. Notably, Defendants’

attacks do not relate to Phillips’s qualifications as an accident

reconstructionist.

Plaintiffs attach Phillips’s curriculum vitae to their response. [See ECF

No. 69-1]. Phillips earned a Bachelor of Science degree in mathematics with a

minor in physics from the University of North Texas, and a Master of Science

degree in mathematics from Texas A&M University. [Id. at 1]. He is fully

accredited by the Accreditation Commission of Traffic Accident

Reconstruction and has worked as an accident reconstructionist for over 20

years. [Id. at 1, 3]. Phillips also has received specialized training in accident

reconstruction. [Id. at 1–6]. Therefore, the Court finds Phillips qualified by

knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education to render opinions about

accident reconstruction.

However, the opinions proffered by Phillips extend beyond the realm of an

accident reconstructionist. The Court agrees with Defendants that Phillips is

unqualified to testify about “human factors.” His curriculum vitae does not

reflect any specific training in this area. And during his deposition, Phillips

acknowledged that his training in “human factors” stems from “some

coursework at Northwestern University,” what has been “provided by Crash

Safety Solutions,” and that which is “intrinsic … within reconstruction.” [See

ECF No. 61-2 at 4:19–22].1 Additionally, as discussed in more detail below,

the Court agrees that Phillips is unqualified to make credibility

determinations.

B. Phillips’s proffered opinions are neither relevant nor reliable.

Because the Court has found Phillips qualified to testify as an accident

reconstructionist, it must now determine whether his opinions are reliable

and relevant. Lippe, 287 F.Supp.3d at 1278.

Evidence or testimony must “assist the trier of fact to understand the

evidence or to determine a fact in issue. This condition goes primarily to

relevance. Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is

not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (quotations and

citations omitted). “The touchstone of admissibility of expert testimony is its

helpfulness to the trier of fact.” Wilson v. Muckala, 303 F.3d 1207, 1219 (10th

Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

1 For clarity, the Court will cite to the CM/ECF record page number as opposed to

the deposition page number for any deposition testimony referenced throughout this

order.

Defendants contend Phillips’s testimony will not aid the jury. [ECF No. 61

at 7]. One area of his proffered testimony concerns whether an eyewitness,

Bruce Gourd, could view the traffic light at the time of the accident. [ECF No.

69-2 at 15 (“Mr. Gourd’s stated vantage point upon approach would allow for

him to observe the traffic lights including the absence of the left turn

arrow.”)]. Plaintiffs assert that Phillips’s testimony and his recreation of the

accident scene using 3D models will help the jury parse through conflicting

testimony from individuals present at the scene of the subject accident. [ECF

No. 69 at 6–7]. The Court is not persuaded that Phillips’s testimony about

whether Gourd could view the traffic light at the time of the incident is

helpful to the jury. Gourd is listed as one of Plaintiffs’ witnesses. [ECF No.

137]. The Court does not find it helpful for an expert to explain what Gourd

observed when Gourd can tell the jury himself.

Additionally, the Court does not believe Phillips’s other opinions or

proposed testimony are helpful to the jury. “No special skill, knowledge, or

expertise is needed to understand and draw conclusions from facts about

common experiences.” Navarrete v. Wiebe, No. CIV-13-708-D, 2014 WL

4716087, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Sep. 22, 2014). The Court is confident the jury

will be fully equipped to form its own conclusions about the weight of Gourd’s

testimony, other fact witnesses’ testimony, and the ultimate issues in this

case. See Stewart v. Brotherhood Mut. Ins. Co., No. 16-CV-488-JED-FHM,

2018 WL 4092018, at *1 (July 10, 2018) (excluding opinion testimony about

the ultimate cause of an accident). Further, the facts here and the applicable

traffic rules are “easily understood and within the common experience of

jurors in Oklahoma, where private motor vehicle travel is the primary mode

of transportation.” Navarrete, 2014 WL 4716087 at *2.

Moreover, many of Phillips’s opinions are statements of fact that are

adequately covered by fact witnesses who were at the scene the night of the

accident. For example, Phillips offers opinions that “Mr. Haddox was

traveling southbound in the left lane of S. Memorial Drive immediately prior

to the crash”; “Mr. Haddox had his headlight illuminated upon approach”;

“Mr. Moore was attempting to turn left at the subject intersection”; and “[t]he

independent witnesses were traveling in opposite directions ….” [ECF No. 69-

2 at 15]. These are all factual statements that do not require expert

testimony.

Finally, Phillips’s proposed opinions impermissibly invade the province of

the jury. His opinions include, for example: “Mr. Moore’s decision to turn

across the path of approaching traffic was causal to the crash”; “[t]he

independent witness statements are consistent with one another and indicate

that Mr. Haddox had a green light upon approach”; and “Mr. Moore’s

testimony concerning the light sequence is not consistent with either of the

independent witnesses.” [ECF No. 69-2 at 15–16]. “Expert testimony

concerning the credibility of witnesses is prohibited, because the jury can

make its own determinations of witness credibility and expert testimony on

this issue is ‘prejudicial and unfairly influences the jury.’” Morris v. City of

Tulsa, No. 19-CV-073-CVE-JFJ, 2020 WL 7360283, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 15,

2020) (quoting United States v. Hill, 749 F.3d 1250, 1258 (10th Cir. 2014)).

For these reasons, Phillips’s proposed testimony about which witnesses to

believe is inadmissible. Additionally, causation is an issue of fact for the jury

and, as noted above, specialized knowledge is not required in this case for the

jury to reach a decision. See Schovanec v. Archdiocese of Okla. City, 188 P.3d

158, 173 (Okla. 2008) (“Causation usually is determined as a question of fact

and not of law.”).

For all the reasons set out above, the Court concludes that Phillips’s

opinions will not assist the jury and are therefore not relevant.

It is unnecessary for the Court to consider the reliability of Phillips’s

opinions when it has concluded his opinions are not relevant. Lippe, 287

F.Supp.3d at 1278 (evidence must be both relevant and reliable). However,

the Court will address this factor because the parties briefed the issue.

In assessing reliability, the Court must focus “solely on principles and

methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at

595. Daubert cited four factors that aid in making a reliability determination:

(1) Whether a theory has been or can be tested or falsified, (2)

whether the theory or technique has been subject to peer review

and publication, (3) whether there are known potential rates of

error with regard to specific techniques, and (4) whether the

theory or approach has “general acceptance.”

Bitler v. A.O. Smith Corp., 400 F.3d 1227, 1233 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94). However, Daubert recognized that many

factors will “bear on the inquiry” and explicitly chose not to make a

“definitive checklist or test.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593; see also Kumho Tire

Co. at 150–151 (“[Daubert] made clear that its list of factors was meant to be

helpful, not definitive.”). A trial judge has “considerable leeway in deciding in

a particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert

testimony is reliable.” Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152. Whether other courts

are familiar with and have accepted a methodology is relevant in determining

the reliability of expert testimony. See Att’y Gen. of Okla. v. Tyson Foods,

Inc., 565 F.3d 769, 780 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[W]hen experts employ established

methods in their usual manner, a district court need not take issue under

Daubert; however, where established methods are employed in new ways, a

district court may require further indications of reliability.”).

Defendants argue Phillips’s opinions are not reliable because they are

based on speculation and conjecture. [ECF No. 61 at 12–13]. Plaintiffs

respond that Phillips’s methodology is based on sufficient facts and data, that

he reviewed an extensive list of documents to formulate his report, and that

he input the facts and data into a Virtual CRASH simulation. [ECF No. 69 at

7]. According to Plaintiffs, these factors render Phillips’s opinions reliable.

[Id.]. Focusing on Phillips’s principles and methodology, the Court disagrees.

Throughout his report, Phillips relies on unreliable data to reach his

opinions. For example, his report states, “an exact impact speed of the

motorcycle cannot be determined with the available evidence” but the next

sentence provides, “[a] subjective analysis of the damage using my experience

does not suggest impact speeds over 30 mph.” [ECF No. 69-2 at 13]. Phillips

fails to explain what his subjective analysis takes into consideration. Further,

he acknowledged in his deposition that the exact speed of the motorcycle

cannot be determined from the evidence. [ECF No. 61-2 at 11:17–20].

Nevertheless, Phillips provides an opinion that “the physical evidence does

not indicate excessive speed by Mr. Haddox.” [ECF No. 69-2 at 13]. It appears

Phillips unilaterally decided that Haddox was not travelling at an excessive

speed.

Further, Phillips opines, “Mr. Haddox made a timely reaction to the

intruding tractor-trailer but was unable to avoid a collision.” [ECF No. 69-2

at 15]. His report states there was “pre-braking for either 42 or 62 feet” but

does not indicate how he determined these distances. [Id. at 13]. Phillips

testified that the evidence of Haddox braking is from witness Andrew Little’s

report that indicated “Mr. Haddox was unable to stop in time ….” [ECF No.

61-2 at 5:19–22]. However, Little’s report states in total:

Deceased was heading south on memorial going thru intersection

at 51st Expressway and memorial when semi pulled out and he

clipped the trailor [sic]. Approximate speed was around 55 mph.

Semi driver OBVIOUSLY didn’t see us coming! I was riding 10 ft

back in outer lane, deceased was in inner lane. No helmet! Semi

was heading north on Memorial and turning onto expressway

heading west, we had a green light!

[ECF No. 69-6 at 1]. Little’s report makes no mention of stopping or braking. 2

Id. Phillips’s report does not reflect that he reviewed any other statement,

interview, or deposition of Little. [ECF No. 69-2 at 2–3]. Phillips also testified

he had no way to know where Haddox was located when he began to react to

the impending crash. [ECF No. 61-2 at 13:23–14:5]. Therefore, Phillips’s

conclusions that Haddox made a timely reaction and engaged his brakes for

either 42 or 62 feet are not explained or supported by any scientific fact or

reliable expert analysis and cannot assist the jury in its fact finding.

Phillips’s opinion that “[t]here is no reason to think Mr. Haddox was

inattentive or slow to react” is similarly unreliable. [ECF No. 69-2 at 14]. He

does not explain how he devised this opinion. His report contains no

2 The report states that “police materials indicated that [Little] informed the

officer(s) that he “slammed on his front break, but almost couldn’t get stopped in

time.” [ECF No. 69-2 at 13]. However, it’s unclear whether Little was referencing

his own successful braking attempt, or the decedent’s unsuccessful braking attempt

with this comment. The report does not state where in “police materials” this

statement could be found.

information indicating he has a way to determine when or how Haddox

reacted. Thus, this opinion is also unreliable.

Nor is Phillips’s opinion that “Mr. Moore intruded into the southbound

lanes approximately 2.7 to 3.3 seconds before impact” reliable. [ECF No. 69-2

at 15]. He reaches this conclusion by stating:

Analysis of the turning path of the tractor-trailer using typical

acceleration values would indicate that Mr. Moore’s travel took

approximately 10-12 seconds from the stop bar to the point of

impact. However, when the front of the tractor-trailer began to

penetrate the southbound lanes would only be approximately 2.7

to 3.3 seconds.

[Id. at 14]. Nowhere does Phillips reference in his report the mass of Moore’s

truck or the load he was hauling. And Phillips does not explain what he

considers to be a “typical acceleration value” or how such a value could be

reliably derived from available evidence. Once again, this opinion is

unreliable.

The only opinions in Phillips’s report that may be helpful to the jury are:

11. Mr. Haddox collided with the passenger side of the truck

tractor in the left lane of southbound S. Memorial Drive.

12. Mr. Haddox collided with the front of the trailer in the left

lane of southbound S. Memorial Drive.

13. Mr. Moore continued forward, running over the motorcycle

and dragging it to the northwest.

14. Mr. Moore continued forward, running over Mr. Haddox and

dragging him to the northwest for approximately 40 feet.

[ECF No. 69-2 at 15]. However, Phillips does not explain how he reached

these conclusions. The information containing the lane Haddox was in when

he collided with the semi-truck contradicts the Tulsa Police Department’s

diagram indicating Haddox was travelling in the center lane, not the left turn

lane when he hit the semi-truck. [See ECF No. 69-2 at 4]. And Phillips does

not explain how he came to this different conclusion. Further, Phillips does

not explain how he reached the conclusion that Moore ran over Haddox and

dragged him for 40 feet. [See id. at 15]. Phillips potentially reached this

conclusion by reviewing photographs from the accident scene. [See id. at 5–7].

However, his report is devoid of any reasoning or measurements and states

that “the faint tire mark referenced in police records is likely unrelated to the

subject crash.” [Id. at 13]. In the absence of any explanation of how Phillips

reached his conclusions, the Court cannot assume these conclusions are

reliable. Fact witnesses who were present at the scene of the accident will be

able to provide testimony that covers the same topics as Phillips’s report.

The Court concludes that Phillips’s opinions are not relevant and are

unreliable. Therefore, his testimony is inadmissible.

III. Conclusion

Although the Court finds Phillips qualified to testify as an accident

reconstructionist, it nonetheless concludes that his testimony should be

precluded from trial. As reflected above, his testimony will not aid the jury,

impermissibly encroaches upon the jury’s role, and is not reliable.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Strike

Plaintiffs’ Expert Daniel Phillips [ECF No. 61] is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion in Limine with

Respect to Anticipated Testimony by Plaintiffs’ Expert Daniel Phillips [ECF

No. 83] is DENIED as moot.

DATED this 25th day of September, 2025.

Raw F. bl

Sara E. Hill

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

15

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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