The opinion
350 September 25, 2025 No. 41
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
In re:
Complaint as to the Conduct of
Gregory Mark Abel,
OSB No. 031784,
Respondent.
(OSB 2366) (SC S071019)
En Banc
On review of the decision of a trial panel of the Disciplinary
Board.*
Argued and submitted February 27, 2025.
David J. Elkanich, Buchalter, Portland, argued the cause
and filed the briefs for respondent. Also on the briefs was
David A. Bernstein.
Susan R. Cournoyer, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel,
Tigard, argued the cause and filed the answering brief on
behalf of the Oregon State Bar.
PER CURIAM
Respondent is suspended from the practice of law for 30
days, commencing 60 days from the date of filing of this
decision.
______________
* Trial panel opinion dated March 11, 2024.
Cite as 374 Or 350 (2025) 351
PER CURIAM
The Oregon State Bar charged respondent with a sin-
gle violation of Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 8.4(a)(3)
(professional misconduct to engage in misrepresentation
that reflects adversely on lawyer’s fitness to practice law),
relating to statements that he made in a demand letter. A
trial panel of the Disciplinary Board determined that respon-
dent had made a knowing, material misrepresentation, and
it suspended him from the practice of law for 90 days. On
review, respondent argues that the Bar did not prove the
alleged violation because it did not sufficiently prove that
he had acted with knowledge; he alternatively argues that
a public reprimand is the appropriate sanction. We conclude
that the Bar proved the alleged violation of RPC 8.4(a)(3),
and we suspend respondent for 30 days.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We review the record de novo. Bar Rules of Procedure
(BR) 10.6. Upon doing so, we may adopt, modify, or reject
the decision of the trial panel. Id. Except as to respondent’s
mental state at the time of the conduct in question, the facts
are essentially undisputed.
Respondent was admitted to the Oregon State Bar
in 2003, after practicing for several years in Washington
State. Since 2005, he has been a partner in his current firm,
focusing on both civil practice and criminal defense primar-
ily in Jackson County.
In July 2021, respondent began a pro bono represen-
tation involving a financial dispute between two brothers,
Mark, respondent’s client, and Jon. The dispute arose from
an insurance payout following the destruction of the broth-
ers’ deceased mother’s home in the Almeda forest fire in
September 2020. Before their mother’s death, Mark already
had lived in the home for several years, and his mother at
some point had added him to the title. After she died, in
2019, Mark continued living in the home, and he lost all
his belongings in the fire. At that time, both Mark and his
mother (but not Jon) were the named insureds on the home-
owner’s policy; Jon, however, had been making payments on
the policy.
352 In re Gregory Mark Abel
Almost a year later, Mark—who by that time was in
a dire financial situation and without permanent housing—
sought assistance regarding the homeowner’s policy from a
local legal aid program, which referred the case to respon-
dent pro bono. Mark told respondent that he had tried to
file an insurance claim, but the insurance company had told
him that—although only he and his mother were the listed
named insureds—Jon had already filed a claim. Then, in
September 2020, the company had sent two checks to Jon
in Washington State, issued collectively to Mark, Jon, and
their mother (for $455,224.15 and $19,350.00, respectively).
Mark told respondent that Jon then had come to Oregon
and taken Mark to the bank where Jon and their mother—
before her death—had established a joint account. Jon had
printed the mother’s name on the checks, noting “deceased,”
and also had Mark endorse the checks, and then deposited
them into the joint account. At some point in time, Mark
learned that the home ownership had changed before his
mother died to a joint tenancy held by Jon and their mother
(but not Mark), with a right of survivorship to Jon, but the
record does not show that Mark ever told respondent about
that change. Mark brought to a meeting with respondent
copies of both the insurance checks and his communications
with the insurance company. Respondent, in turn, told Mark
to contact local law enforcement, to report Jon’s actions.
Respondent next took steps to verify the informa-
tion that Mark had provided. He located a small estate pro-
bate filing for the mother, filed by Jon, but it had not listed
the home and had not been amended to list the insurance
checks, which respondent thought would have been required,
because the mother had been named as a beneficiary on the
checks issued after her death.1 He also called the insurance
company and verified that the checks had been issued to
Jon, Mark, and their mother, and that they had cleared. He
did not, however, independently verify the home ownership
status and so did not learn about Jon’s joint tenancy and
right of survivorship.2
1
The mother’s will had had disposed of all her property equally to Mark and
Jon (with Jon as the personal representative).
2
The record does not show when respondent learned about Jon’s joint ten-
ancy (if at all, prior to the trial panel hearing).
Cite as 374 Or 350 (2025) 353
On or shortly after the date of his meeting with
Mark, respondent dictated a demand letter to Jon, dated
Tuesday, July 20, 2021. The letter explained that respon-
dent’s law firm represented Mark regarding the insurance
payout on the policy on which Mark and his mother, but not
Jon, were listed as named insureds. The letter then stated:
“[Y]our seizure of the $455,224.15 check and the $19,350.00
check is Grand Larceny. We are preparing a file in cooperation
with [Deputy District Attorney] Markiewicz of the Jackson
County District Attorney’s Office. Once we have assembled
the file, Mr. Markiewicz will submit it to the Grand Jury for
prosecution and be considered A-Felonies.[3]
“This matter can be resolved by submitting $237,302.00
[(one-half of the insurance proceeds)] to this office by
Monday, July 26, 2021. If we do not receive this amount
by this deadline, we will proceed accordingly. In review of
the checks, it also appears that the check[s] * * * have the
[mother’s name] on them. Of course, it is a felony to sign
the [mother’s] name * * * after she is deceased. * * * It is a
forgery to sign the name of a deceased person.
“These are serious legal matters for which you should con-
sult competent legal counsel immediately licensed in the
State of Oregon. This amount of money cannot just walk
away, and we are in discussion with [the] Jackson County
Sheriff’s Office and the District Attorney’s Office about pro-
ceeding in this case. We have an obvious Civil Lawsuit but
if you are Indicted by a Grand Jury first, our case becomes
much easier. If you have retained counsel in this matter,
please have them contact me immediately.
“THIS LETTER CONTAINS A REQUIREMENT
THAT IF NOT MET WILL RESULT IN AN ACTION
BEING FILED AGAINST YOU IN THE JACKSON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT. IF YOU DO NOT MEET
THE DEADLINE STATED ABOVE, THE SENDER
WILL PROCEED AS INDICATED.
“HEREIN FAIL NOT”
(Boldface type in original; emphases added.)
Respondent “look[ed at]” the draft demand letter
within the next two days, but did not review it carefully, as he
3
At that time, Markiewicz was a Deputy District Attorney in Jackson County
who was professionally acquainted with respondent.
354 In re Gregory Mark Abel
was talking with his legal assistant at the same time about
the preferred means of sending the letter.4 He then signed
the letter and emailed it to Jon; he also sent it through regu-
lar mail and had it hand-delivered by a process server.
Upon receipt of respondent’s demand letter, Jon
understood it to mean that a case already had been filed
against him by the Jackson County District Attorney’s
Office, that he was being accused of several crimes, and
that his arrest was imminent. He immediately wrote to
the Jackson County District Attorney, Heckert, enclosing
a copy of respondent’s demand letter and asking whether
it amounted to “extortion.” When Heckert received Jon’s
inquiry, she asked Markiewicz whether he had communi-
cated with respondent about the subject of the demand let-
ter. Markiewicz then called respondent and confirmed that
they had not spoken—at all—about Mark’s claims against
Jon prior to respondent having sent his letter. Markiewicz
and respondent also discussed the standard protocol in
Markiewicz’s office, to the effect that citizen complaints are
first taken to law enforcement for investigation.5
Markiewicz summarized his call with respondent
to Heckert, who then wrote back to Jon. Heckert told Jon
that respondent never had approached the district attorney’s
office; that that office was not “working in cooperation” with
respondent or Mark; and that the district attorney’s office
responded only to law enforcement inquiries.6 Heckert’s let-
ter also opined that respondent’s demand letter had made
implications that were “not factually accurate”; that she
found the letter to be “very unprofessional and misleading”;
and that Jon could complain to the Bar if he thought that
respondent’s conduct had been unprofessional.
4
Respondent testified that he did not “actually have an independent memory
of reading the letter,” but he did remember signing it.
5
Respondent thereafter again tried to persuade Mark to report the incident
to law enforcement, and respondent also spoke to both the sheriff’s office and a
local police department -- but was told that law enforcement must speak directly
with Mark.
6
Specifically, Heckert stated that Mark could report the events to a law
enforcement agency; that agency would investigate and then submit a report to
her office; a deputy district attorney then would review and decide if a crime
could be proved; if so, and if the case involved a felony, it would be presented to a
grand jury.
Cite as 374 Or 350 (2025) 355
Jon then filed a grievance with the Bar, which ulti-
mately resulted in the Bar filing a formal complaint against
respondent, in April 2023. The Bar’s complaint alleged
a single violation of RPC 8.4(a)(3), based on the following
statements from respondent’s demand letter:
• Jon’s “seizure” of the checks was “Grand Larceny”;
• “We are preparing a file in cooperation with [Deputy
District Attorney] Markiewicz of the Jackson County
District Attorney’s Office.”
• “Once we have assembled the file, Mr. Markiewicz will
submit it to the Grand Jury for prosecution and be con-
sidered A-Felonies.”
• “This amount of money cannot just walk away, and we
are in discussion with [the] Jackson County Sheriff’s
Office and the District Attorney’s Office about proceed-
ing in this case.”
A trial panel hearing was held in December 2023,
at which respondent represented himself and testified
extensively. Respondent acknowledged that, at the time
when he had dictated and sent the demand letter, he had
not yet conferred with Markiewicz about filing charges and
had not himself begun to contact law enforcement, but had
told Mark to do so before (and after) sending the letter. He
described the situation as having been “rushed” and the let-
ter as not “well thought out” and using poor grammar. He
explained that he had drafted the letter “how I talk”—as in,
he described “this is what’s happening, but in a prolonged
sense, not in * * * a presen[t] sense.” Specifically, when he
made the statements that the Bar identified in its complaint,
he meant to describe what “would happen” in due course—
that is, he would work with the district attorney’s office to
assess whether charges should be filed; if so, that office would
present to a grand jury; and the resulting charges likely
would involve A-level felonies or what he colloquially had
described as “Grand Larceny.” Respondent also explained
that he had mentioned Markiewicz specifically because he
had recently spoken with him about an unrelated matter.
And he testified that his purpose in drafting and sending
the letter was twofold—to prompt Jon to consult counsel,
356 In re Gregory Mark Abel
so that respondent could engage with that counsel, and to
move quickly toward obtaining relief for Mark.7
The trial panel concluded that respondent had vio-
lated RPC 8.4(a)(3) as alleged—that is, that he had made
knowingly false and material misrepresentations that
reflected adversely on his fitness to practice. In doing so, the
trial panel assessed respondent’s testimony about his admit-
tedly clumsy wording in the demand letter, but it made no
express credibility finding. Rather, the panel concluded that
the actual words that respondent used—which the panel
characterized as containing “significant threats”—had been
knowingly false when made and that “any reasonable per-
son” would have understood that the described actions in
fact had been taken and that the described events either
had occurred or shortly would occur. The panel further con-
cluded that, even if, as respondent had testified, he meant to
convey only a threatened action in the future, that did not
matter to the panel’s assessment under RPC 8.4(a)(3). That
was so, the panel explained, because analyzing the meaning
of respondent’s statements involved an “objective” inquiry,
rather than a “subjective” one—focusing on what a reason-
able person would have understood respondent’s words to
mean. The panel ultimately imposed a 90-day suspension.
Respondent then requested review in this court.
II. MISCONDUCT ALLEGATION
RPC 8.4(a)(3) provides that it is professional mis-
conduct for a lawyer to “[e]ngage in conduct involving dis-
honesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation that reflects
adversely on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law[.]” We have
explained that, under that rule, “[a]n affirmative represen-
tation amounts to a misrepresentation” if it is false, know-
ingly made, and material—that is, if it would or could sig-
nificantly influence the recipient’s decision-making process.
In re Herman, 357 Or 273, 287, 348 P3d 1125 (2015) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). The parties’ dispute focuses
on whether the statements in respondent’s demand letter,
as identified in the Bar’s complaint, were knowingly made.
The Bar must establish the alleged misconduct, including
the knowing requirement, by clear and convincing evidence,
7
We discuss those aspects of respondent’s testimony in greater detail below.
Cite as 374 Or 350 (2025) 357
BR 5.2, which means evidence that “the truth of the facts
asserted is highly probable,” In re Nisley, 365 Or 793, 801,
453 P3d 529 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).
On review, respondent again acknowledges that the
key disputed statements in his demand letter were inac-
curate—that is, at the time when he wrote the letter, he
(1) had not yet consulted with the Jackson County District
Attorney’s Office or otherwise with Markiewicz; (2) had no
information about whether Markiewicz would submit his
allegations to a grand jury for consideration of A-felony
charges; and (3) had not yet spoken to the Jackson County
Sheriff’s Office. And, importantly, he also acknowledges
that he knew at that time that those actions and events—as
described by the actual words that he had used in his let-
ter—had not in fact occurred (and might never occur).
But, relying on his own testimony about what he
had meant to convey—to describe what would happen in the
future—he contends that the Bar did not satisfy its burden
of proof as to the “knowledge” requirement of RPC 8.4(a)(3),
for two reasons. First, he asserts, the trial panel incorrectly
applied an objective standard to the question whether he
had “knowingly” made false statements, when a subjective,
“actual knowledge” standard should instead apply. Second,
he continues, when a subjective standard is correctly applied,
his uncontroverted testimony established that he did not act
with knowledge. For its part, the Bar does not appear to dis-
agree that “actual knowledge” is required; instead, it con-
tends that, when respondent’s testimony is weighed against
the actual words used, coupled with other supporting facts
in the record, the Bar sufficiently proved that he had acted
with actual knowledge.
We begin by noting our agreement with the par-
ties that a knowing misrepresentation under RPC 8.4(a)(3)
requires actual knowledge. As background, although that
rule itself does not set out any accompanying mental state,
this court long has construed what is now RPC 8.4(a)(3) to
require the Bar to prove a “knowing” mental state, such that
inadvertent false statements do not violate the rule. See In re
Skagen, 342 Or 183, 203-04, 149 P3d 1171 (2006) (explaining
that reckless conduct may breach the lawyer-client contract,
358 In re Gregory Mark Abel
but does not violate rule); In re Sassor, 299 Or 570, 576, 704
P2d 506 (1985) (lawyer who knew that he had no authority
to endorse a check engaged in misrepresentation, even if he
did not intend to keep the proceeds). And significantly, when
assessing relevant proof, the court’s inquiry focuses on the
lawyer’s intended meaning or actual knowledge at the time
of making the disputed statement. See Nisley, 365 Or at 805
(court’s inquiry required determining the “intended mean-
ing” of lawyer’s disputed statements); In re Fitzhenry, 343 Or
86, 103, 162 P3d 260 (2007) (inquiry focused on what lawyer
“actually knew” when he made the disputed statements); In
re Merkel, 341 Or 142, 150, 138 P3d 847 (2006) (in assess-
ing competing inferences that may be drawn from lawyer’s
ambiguous statements, court must determine what lawyer
“meant to convey”); In re Lawrence, 337 Or 450, 470, 98 P3d
366 (2004) (in context of lawyer’s truncated statement in
response to the Bar’s inquiry, when a “full[ ]” response was
required, court must determine what the lawyer knew “in her
own mind” and whether she knew that she had omitted mate-
rial facts that would have informed the Bar’s assessment of
her conduct (emphasis in original)). Stated another way,
the “knowledge” requirement asks whether the lawyer had
actual knowledge, in their own mind, that the disputed state-
ment was false when made. It does not ask what a reason-
able person would have understood the statement to mean.
See also generally RPC 1.0(h) (defining “knowingly,” “known,”
or “knows”—when used within the Rules of Professional
Conduct—as “denot[ing] actual knowledge of the fact in ques-
tion,” which may be inferred from the circumstances).
The key question, therefore, is whether the Bar
proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent
had acted with actual knowledge when he made the false
statements in his demand letter. Here, the parties’ argu-
ments diverge. Respondent relies primarily on his testimony
about what had been in his mind when he dictated and sent
the demand letter—that he had meant to communicate what
“was going to happen” (if no settlement were reached) in the
future and that his primary goal had been for Jon to consult
counsel. (Emphasis added.) He emphasizes that no other
evidence addressed what actually had been in his own mind
at the time; that the trial panel made no adverse credibility
Cite as 374 Or 350 (2025) 359
finding respecting his testimony; and, ultimately, that the
panel gave credence to his testimony when it concluded that
a reasonable person nonetheless would have understood his
statements to mean something different from what he had
meant. For its part, the Bar relies on the actual wording of
respondent’s statements, viewed in the context of the entire
demand letter and other parts of the record, to assert that it
sufficiently proved that respondent’s testimony about what
he had meant to convey was not believable and, to the con-
trary, he had meant to falsely convey to Jon that a prosecu-
tion effort was well underway when he knew that none of
the described steps in fact had been taken.
Our case law provides a framework for assessing
whether the Bar sufficiently proved that respondent had
acted with actual knowledge, when respondent testified to
contrary. First, in the absence of credibility findings from the
trial panel, we may assess subjective factors that are observ-
able from the record—for example, whether a lawyer testified
in an evasive as opposed to a candid manner. See In re Walker,
293 Or 297, 303, 647 P2d 468 (1982) (so demonstrating).
And, if the panel did enter credibility findings, to the extent
that the record permits, we also may assess any observable
subjective factors. See Fitzhenry, 343 Or at 104 (confirming,
“even on a cold record,” the trial panel’s subjective credibility
assessment—in that the lawyer’s testimony “often appeared
evasive, hyper-technical, argumentative, and guarded”).
Second, regardless of whether any credibility find-
ing were made,
“[a]s part of our de novo review in disciplinary cases, we can
and do assess credibility based on objective factors, such
as the inherent probability or improbability of testimony,
whether testimony is internally consistent or inconsistent,
whether the testimony is corroborated or contradicted, and
so on.”
Id. That is, we independently review the record to make
credibility determinations when needed, based on a variety
of objective factors.8
8
Fitzhenry includes a helpful discussion about assessing trial panel cred-
ibility findings (as noted, though, the trial panel here did not make any cred-
ibility findings). See 343 Or at 103 n 13 (when trial panel has made express
360 In re Gregory Mark Abel
Fitzhenry provides a useful example. That case
involved an allegation that a private company’s general
counsel had made a knowing misrepresentation when
he signed a management representation letter that con-
tained false statements about a particular transaction. Id.
at 88-89. The lawyer had testified to the trial panel that
he had reviewed the letter for only the limited purpose of
confirming legal issues and had not had “in mind” details
about the particular transaction when he signed; he also
denied having known about the company’s failure to secure
a fixed purchase commitment regarding the transaction.
Id. at 103-05. We reviewed relevant aspects of the record
to assess the lawyer’s testimony “given the context of the
surrounding circumstances,” ultimately relying on several
objective considerations to determine that certain aspects
of his testimony had not been believable. See id. at 104-06
(evidence showed “flurry of special efforts” that the lawyer
and others had made to secure a stronger purchase com-
mitment; management letter had conspicuously listed the
disputed transaction, such that the lawyer could not have
failed to see it, particularly given that it undeniably had
involved a legal issue); id. at 107 (it “defie[d] belief” that
the lawyer could have seen the reference to the disputed
transaction and not had “in mind” what he knew from his
relatively recent involvement and his knowledge about the
need to secure a commitment); see also In re Long, 368 Or
452, 472, 491 P3d 783 (2021) (agreeing with trial panel that
lawyer’s testimony was not credible, based on evidence that
persuasively countered that testimony); Lawrence, 337 Or
at 469 (based on other evidence, lawyer’s testimony about
her intended meaning of a purportedly false statement was
“implausible”); In re Dinerman, 314 Or 308, 315-16, 840 P2d
50 (1992) (rejecting lawyer’s claim that he had been “simply
demeanor-based credibility assessment, based on its own “subjective observa-
tions of a witness’s demeanor and the manner in which the witness testifies,”
court defers to the panel’s “superior position to assess credibility on that basis”);
see also In re Gustafson, 333 Or 468, 470, 41 P3d 1063 (2002) (court gives weight
to trial panel credibility findings, although lawyer’s testimony that court deems
credible can be sufficient to establish facts). However, when a trial panel makes
a credibility assessment based on “objective factors involving the intrinsic believ-
ability of competing inferences or evidence -- e.g., the inherent improbability of
certain testimony, the existence of corroboration, and so on -- this court owes no
deference to that assessment, but the panel’s discussion may be enlightening and
have persuasive force.” Fitzhenry, 343 Or at 103 n 13.
Cite as 374 Or 350 (2025) 361
negligent” in not more closely reviewing an agreement that
he had signed and concluding, based on other evidence, that
lawyer had knowingly made false statements to secure a
loan for a client).9
We now apply that framework, to determine whether
respondent acted with actual knowledge when he included
the following false statements in his demand letter:
• “We are preparing a file in cooperation with [Deputy
District Attorney] Markiewicz of the Jackson County
District Attorney’s Office.”
• “Once we have assembled the file, Mr. Markiewicz will
submit it to the Grand Jury for prosecution and be con-
sidered A-Felonies.”
• “This amount of money cannot just walk away, and we
are in discussion with [the] Jackson County Sheriff’s
Office and the District Attorney’s Office about proceed-
ing in this case.”10
We begin with respondent’s testimony. Respondent
testified to the trial panel that the use in his demand letter
of the present-tense—as in, “we are preparing a file” and
“we are in discussion with” law enforcement and the district
attorney’s office—had meant to convey actions that would be
taken in the future. (Emphases added.) As he put it:
“The word ‘are.’ It’s how I talk. I’ve been saying for some
time we are having a hearing on this matter. The hearing
9
The Bar alternatively cites cases involving ambiguous statements and our
framework for assessing competing inferences to determine a lawyer’s intended
meaning. See Merkel, 341 Or at 149-50 (to assess competing inferences, court
may consider relative strength of each inference and may consider all surround-
ing circumstances, including reactions of others that may shed light on the rea-
sonableness of each inference); see also Nisley, 365 Or at 808-09 (court rejected
lawyer’s proffered narrow reading of ambiguous statement, because surrounding
context supported broader reading). But, unlike Merkel and Nisley, this case does
not involve ambiguous statements. The actual wording of respondent’s state-
ments was not ambiguous, and respondent acknowledges that the actual words
used were inaccurate and that he knew that to be so at the time. The question
is whether the evidence establishes that respondent meant to convey the false
message that the words themselves stated (as the Bar argues) or, instead, that he
meant to convey a different message (as he argues).
10
We mention the fourth statement noted in the Bar’s complaint -- about the
commission of “Grand Larceny” -- later below; on review, the Bar’s primary focus
is on the three statements just noted.
362 In re Gregory Mark Abel
wasn’t until today. It was true when I said it, and it’s still
true today.
“If I say to you[,] ‘We are going to the West Coast
Conference Tournament,’ your question to me could be
when, but it’s still a correct statement. ‘Are’ can be used a
lot of ways.
“And it wasn’t * * * well thought out, but it’s how I talk.
I was speaking * * * into the dictation. I was speaking and
thinking and trying to say this is what * * *—talking to law
enforcement, this is what’s happening, but in a prolonged
sense, not in a * * * presen[t] sense.”
He further testified:
“[T]he reason for dictating the letter the way I did is
in the same mode in my head. That’s exactly what I was
thinking at the time. Here’s what’s going to happen. That’s,
in my mind, how I thought I said it. It wasn’t sworn. It
wasn’t even reviewed very well, and it was sent out.”
He relatedly explained that his use of “will”—as in, that
Markiewicz “will” submit the matter to a grand jury for
prosecution as A-felonies—was to a similar effect:
“ ‘Will’ is the same. ‘Will’ is not—if I had said ‘this had
happened,’ that would be different. ‘Will’ means it’s coming
next. ‘Will’ is in the future.”11
As respondent put it, the misunderstanding about what he
had meant to convey reduced to “poor grammar.”
As a subjective observation, and contrary to our
assessment of the lawyer’s testimony in Fitzhenry, noth-
ing about respondent’s testimony itself was “evasive” or
“guarded.” 343 Or at 104. Instead, his nature in testifying
throughout the proceedings generally supported the notion
that the less-than-precise wording used in his demand
letter is “how [he] talk[s].”12 But, as we will explain, once
assessed against the actual wording of the false statements
in his demand letter—importantly, viewed in the context of
11
Respondent added that, although he specifically had named Markiewicz in
his demand letter (because they had recently spoken about a different case), he
just as easily could have generically referred to the district attorney.
12
Respondent appeared both as a witness for the Bar in its case-in-chief and
also as a witness for himself, in his defense.
Cite as 374 Or 350 (2025) 363
the full letter and also in light of another objective consider-
ation—respondent’s testimony was not believable.
Respondent’s demand letter began by reciting
some preliminary information about his representation of
Mark, the insurance policy, and the checks. It then asserted
that Jon’s “seizure” of the insurance checks was “Grand
Larceny”—a crime that does not exist in Oregon, but that
framed potential implications for Jon in strikingly serious
terms. Indeed, the letter itself later expressly character-
ized the involved matters as “serious” and subject to indict-
ment.13 Next, the letter made the first two false statements
set out above: that “we are preparing a file in cooperation”
with Markiewicz and that, once “we have assembled the file,
Markiewicz would present it to “the Grand Jury” for prose-
cution, to be considered “A-felonies.” Building on the asser-
tion that Jon had engaged in “Grand Larceny,” those state-
ments conveyed to Jon the false and threatening message
that a prosecution effort was in fact underway.
Next, respondent’s demand letter required payment
of one-half the insurance proceeds, due within six days, or
“we will proceed accordingly.” Although the latter phrasing
arguably suggests—as respondent testified—that he had
meant to describe future events, the letter then immediately
stated that it appeared that the checks had the mother’s
name on them and that it was a “forgery” to sign the moth-
er’s name on the checks after her death.
The demand letter then advised Jon to consult coun-
sel, followed by the final false statement noted in the Bar’s
complaint—that respondent was in discussion with both the
sheriff’s office and the district attorney’s office about pro-
ceeding accordingly. And the following sentence stated that,
“if you are Indicted by a Grand Jury” before an “obvious”
civil action moves forward, then “our case becomes much
13
The Oregon Criminal Code now classifies what traditionally was treated as
“larceny” as “theft” in varying degrees; the potential Oregon “crime” that respon-
dent described was first-degree theft, ORS 164.015 (theft); ORS 164.055 (first-
degree theft). Respondent acknowledged below that he had relied on a dictionary
definition when choosing the words “Grand Larceny,” and he did not dispute that
Oregon does not have that crime. See generally State v. Azar, 372 Or 163, 175, 547
P3d 788 (2024) (legislature in 1971 eliminated “the traditionally distinct crime[ ]
of larceny” and other crimes, “consolidat[ing] them into one crime called ‘theft’ ”).
364 In re Gregory Mark Abel
easier.” Collectively, those statements built upon the let-
ter’s earlier false and threatening statements—as the Bar
puts it, “ratchet[ing] up the pressure” on Jon to immediately
make payment, by misleading him into thinking that the
Jackson County criminal justice system was being activated
against him. Ultimately, respondent’s letter closed with this
urgent message, in boldface and uppercase type:
“THIS LETTER CONTAINS A REQUIREMENT
THAT IF NOT MET WILL RESULT IN AN ACTION
BEING FILED AGAINST YOU IN THE JACKSON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT. IF YOU DO NOT MEET
THE DEADLINE STATED ABOVE, THE SENDER
WILL PROCEED AS INDICATED.
“HEREIN FAIL NOT”
(Boldface type in original.)
In sum, the full context of respondent’s demand
letter shows that he sought to misrepresent certain mate-
rial facts about the criminal process to Jon, with the goal
of increasing the pressure on Jon to make immediate pay-
ment to Mark. The letter did so by conveying a clear sense
of urgency in relation to an impending criminal prosecution.
And even if, as respondent argues, his goal was to prompt
Mark to consult counsel, the letter viewed in full—includ-
ing its structure in setting out repeatedly false statements
and increasingly threatening and urgent wording—strongly
supports the Bar’s contention that respondent’s testimony
about having meant to describe only possible future events
was not believable.
Other evidence in the record supports that assess-
ment—namely, the fact that respondent was an experienced
litigation attorney in both the civil and criminal arenas. He
therefore would have understood the import of including
wording that threatened criminal prosecution in a demand
letter relating to a potential civil action, particularly when
sent to a person whom he knew to be unrepresented. See
generally In re Hedrick, 312 Or 442, 446, 822 P2d 1187 (1991)
(court did not believe lawyer’s testimony that probate peti-
tion inadvertently had referred to a “last will” when he had
learned about a later will between preparation and filing of
the petition; lawyer “had to have known” when he filed the
Cite as 374 Or 350 (2025) 365
petition that it had falsely referred to a superseded will as
the current will; lawyer’s related failure to disclose the later
will was inconsistent with his professed lack of knowledge
(emphasis in original)).
Respondent points to an additional fact that he
thinks supports his testimony about what he had meant to
convey, relating to the haste with which he had prepared and
sent the demand letter. Before the trial panel, he described
having dictated the letter quickly and then returning to it
a day or two later, when he saw it in a review basket. As he
was “looking at” the letter, his legal assistant raised con-
cerns about Mark’s financial situation, and so their conver-
sation turned to the appropriate means to quickly deliver
the letter to Jon. At one point, respondent testified that he
did not “actually have an independent memory of reading
the letter,” but he did remember signing it. Respondent
described that entire situation as having been “rushed.”
We do not disbelieve that testimony, and we do not disagree
that those circumstances arguably support respondent’s
argument about why he had been less than careful when
he drafted the letter. But, at the same time, those circum-
stances are not dispositive as to what he meant to convey
through his statements—that is, that he merely had meant
to describe future events, as opposed to sending a knowingly
false, threatening message to Jon.
After reviewing the record de novo, we are per-
suaded that respondent made knowingly false statements
about an impending criminal prosecution in his demand
letter, in an effort to convey that Jon needed to act imme-
diately. More specifically, the actual words that respondent
chose to use, coupled with other statements made through-
out the letter, the manner in which he structured the let-
ter, and its immediate and threatening tone—all viewed in
light of respondent’s extensive litigation experience—collec-
tively lead us to conclude that the Bar proved by clear and
convincing evidence that respondent had acted with actual
knowledge when he made material statements that were
false and that reflected adversely on his fitness to practice,
in violation of RPC 8.4(a)(3). We turn to the question of
sanction.
366 In re Gregory Mark Abel
III. SANCTION
As noted at the outset, respondent seeks a public
reprimand, but the Bar requests a 90-day suspension, as the
trial panel imposed. In determining the appropriate sanc-
tion, we follow our methodology of applying the American
Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
(1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards), first identifying
the nature of the duty violated; respondent’s mental state
at the time of the violation; and the extent of any actual or
potential injury caused by his misconduct, all to help assess
a preliminary sanction. We then apply aggravating and
mitigating factors to determine whether the preliminary
sanction should be adjusted, followed by analyzing applica-
ble case law. Nisley, 365 Or at 815. As explained below, we
suspend respondent from the practice of law for 30 days.
A. Duty Violated
In knowingly making the false and material state-
ments in his demand letter, respondent violated his duty to the
legal system, because he falsely communicated that aspects of
the local criminal justice system already had been activated
against Jon, in an effort to prompt an immediate favorable
response. ABA Standard 6.0; see also In re Leonard, 308 Or
560, 571, 784 P2d 95 (1989) (stating, in misrepresentation
case, that duty to maintain integrity in professional activities
“is one of a lawyer’s most basic obligations to the public”).
B. Mental State
We already have concluded that respondent acted
with actual knowledge when he drafted and sent his demand
letter containing false and material statements. See also
generally ABA Standards at 17 (defining “knowledge” for
purposes of sanction as “the conscious awareness of the
nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but with-
out the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a partic-
ular result”). As our discussion above confirms, respondent
was consciously aware when he wrote his demand letter
that it contained false, material statements, and he acted
with actual knowledge when he nonetheless chose to include
those statements in a letter structured to convey a false and
threatening message to Jon.
Cite as 374 Or 350 (2025) 367
C. Injury
In sending his demand letter containing knowing
false and material statements, respondent caused actual
injury to Jon. Jon testified that the letter had caused him
considerable lack of sleep and that he had worried that his
arrest was imminent; upon receipt, he immediately took
steps to assess whether the information described was accu-
rate. Respondent’s misconduct also caused injury to the pro-
fession, because his tactics understandably caused Jon to
perceive respondent’s conduct as a member of the legal pro-
fession in a negative light. See ABA Standards at 7 (defining
“injury”).
D. Preliminary Sanction
The ABA Standards provide that suspension is gen-
erally appropriate when a lawyer “knows that false state-
ments * * * are being submitted to [a] court” and “causes
injury or potential injury to a party to the legal proceeding,”
ABA Standard 6.12, but that reprimand is generally appro-
priate when a lawyer “knowingly engages in any other con-
duct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresen-
tation[,] and that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to
practice law[,]” ABA Standard 5.13. Because respondent did
not make knowing false statements to a court, we conclude
that a reprimand is the appropriate preliminary sanction.
E. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
The parties agree that two aggravating factors apply.
First, respondent has substantial experience in the law—
in both civil and criminal practice—having been licensed
in Oregon since 2003 and in Washington since 1999. ABA
Standard 9.22(i). In the context of the conduct at issue, which
involved the selected wording for a demand letter in a civil
action that encompassed multiple references to local crimi-
nal law processes, we give that factor significant weight.
Second, respondent has a prior disciplinary
record—a 2018 complaint to which he stipulated to a pub-
lic reprimand in 2019. ABA Standard 9.22(a). That com-
plaint involved an allegation of current and former client
conflicts, RPC 1.7(a); RPC 1.9(a), arising from a dependency
368 In re Gregory Mark Abel
proceeding in which respondent had represented both the
father and the mother (who had divergent interests) for about
a month, including at an initial hearing, without seeking
or obtaining written informed consent. In re Abel, 33 DB
Rptr 175 (2019). Given the differing nature of that isolated
instance of misconduct, for which respondent stipulated to
a public reprimand, we give that factor little weight. See In
re Jones, 326 Or 195, 200, 951 P2d 149 (1997) (in weighing
prior offenses, court considers relative seriousness of prior
offense and resulting sanction, similarity of offenses, num-
ber of prior offenses, relative recency of prior offense, and
timing of earlier sanction in relation to new misconduct).
The trial panel also applied the “vulnerability of
victim” aggravating factor, ABA Standard 9.22(h), because
Jon had been unrepresented. We decline to apply that factor.
Although he was unrepresented, Jon was an educated, highly
trained professional who, upon receipt of a demand letter, was
able to take action in response to the letter. His immediate
response in contacting Heckert also shows that he had the
knowledge and capacity to immediately reach out to the legal
officer in the best position to advise whether the statements
in respondent’s demand letter were accurate. Simply stated,
neither Jon’s personal characteristics, nor any particular cir-
cumstances in the context of the case, rendered him a vul-
nerable victim under ABA Standard 9.22(h), notwithstand-
ing his status as an unrepresented party. See In re Spencer,
355 Or 679, 700, 330 P3d 538 (2014) (rejecting Bar’s argu-
ment that client had been a vulnerable victim because she
was an “unsophisticated client in desperate financial circum-
stances”; client was not an unsophisticated purchaser and
had owned property, worked as a comptroller, and regularly
handled financial matters); cf. In re Maurer, 364 Or 190, 203,
431 P3d 410 (2018) (court applied factor when lawyer repre-
sented husband in acrimonious dispute with self-represented
wife, who had a “somewhat fragile personality” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); In re Ramirez, 362 Or 370, 377,
383, 408 P3d 1065 (2018) (applying factor when client was not
legally sophisticated, had limited resources, was impaired by
alcohol dependence, and needed immediate assistance).14
14
Each party seeks application of an additional factor -- with the Bar urg-
ing that we apply the aggravating factor of refusal to acknowledge the wrongful
Cite as 374 Or 350 (2025) 369
We apply one mitigating factor that the trial panel
did not apply: the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive.
ABA Standard 9.32(b). Respondent represented Mark on a
pro bono basis; he genuinely thought that Mark was legally
entitled to one-half of the disputed insurance proceeds; and,
in drafting and sending his demand letter, he sought to set
in motion a means of securing some financial relief for Mark
as quickly as possible. Respondent had no financial or other
personal interest at stake, and the record confirms that his
intent was to act in what he thought was Mark’s best inter-
est. See In re Gildea, 325 Or 281, 298-99, 936 P2d 975 (1997)
(applying factor when lawyer who violated several rules had
acted throughout in good faith and had attempted to further
his client’s best interests at all times).
To summarize: We apply two aggravating circum-
stances—substantial experience in the practice of law
and prior disciplinary record—giving the former signifi-
cant weight, but the latter little weight. We also apply one
mitigating circumstance, absence of a dishonest or selfish
motive. On balance, those factors point to either a public
reprimand or a short suspension.
F. Case Law
Our case law confirms that a short suspension is
appropriate. For example, in Leonard, 308 Or at 571-72,
we imposed a 35-day sanction on a lawyer who had vio-
lated the predecessor rule to RPC 8.4(a)(3), when he made
a misrepresentation regarding a lease that he had modified
after the new owners had signed it. We reasoned that the
lawyer’s “knowing” state of mind and selfish motive, and
the owners’ vulnerability, warranted a suspension, but sev-
eral mitigating factors tempered the length. Id.; see also
Walker, 293 Or at 308 (imposing 30-day sanction on lawyer
who misrepresented to a court the status of a will; sanction
warranted notwithstanding lawyer’s motivation to protect
the personal representative, as opposed to protecting him-
self); In re Obert, 336 Or 640, 649-52, 653-56, 89 P3d 1173
nature of the conduct, ABA Standard 9.22(g), and respondent urging that we
apply the mitigating factor of full and free disclosure to the Disciplinary Board or
cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, ABA Standard 9.32(e). We conclude
that application of either factor would not affect our ultimate determination as to
sanction, and we therefore do not address those arguments.
370 In re Gregory Mark Abel
(2004) (imposing 30-day sanction for, among other miscon-
duct involving multiple clients, knowing failure to disclose
to a client the dismissal of the client’s appeal, due to the
lawyer’s negligence; lawyer had violated his duty of candor
and caused actual injury, but multiple mitigating factors
outweighed the aggravating factors).
We have imposed sanctions closer to 60 days in
misrepresentation cases involving more serious misconduct,
as well as additional violations or aggravating factors. For
example, in In re Spencer, 335 Or 71, 80-81, 89, 58 P3d 228
(2002), we suspended for 60 days a lawyer who intentionally
had submitted a vehicle registration form containing a mis-
representation to help his clients illegally register a recre-
ational motor vehicle and also had failed to return another
client’s documentation. Multiple aggravating factors—but
only two mitigating factors—applied. Id. at 86-87. Similarly,
in Dinerman, 314 Or at 314-16, 319, we suspended for 63
days a lawyer who acted with a dishonest motive and know-
ingly made false statements to help a client secure a bank
loan, and who took other actions to help the client engage in
fraudulent and illegal conduct. In imposing the 63-day sus-
pension, we noted a 10-year time lapse since the misconduct
had occurred with no intervening disciplinary issues (sug-
gesting that a longer sanction otherwise would have been
warranted). Id. at 318-19; see also In re Magar, 312 Or 139,
141-42, 817 P2d 289 (1991) (60-day suspension for lawyer
who had endorsed insurance proceeds check with co-payee’s
name, despite knowing that the co-payee had not authorized
him to do so); In re Greene, 290 Or 291, 297-99, 620 P2d 1379
(1980) (60-day suspension for deliberately making misrep-
resentations (by nondisclosure) to court; this court weighed
“serious” intentional conduct against lawyer’s lack of bad
motive and lack of harm to beneficiaries).
Our review of the case law persuades us that a
30-day suspension is appropriate in this case. Respondent’s
misconduct arose from a single incident, as opposed to con-
tinuing or compounding misconduct over time, and it arose
from respondent’s sincere desire to act in his client’s best
interests and to immediately secure financial relief that
his client undisputably needed (and to which respondent
Cite as 374 Or 350 (2025) 371
genuinely thought that his client was legally entitled). But,
respondent—an experienced civil and criminal practi-
tioner—nonetheless chose to draft and send a demand letter
to an unrepresented person that knowingly conveyed a false
and urgent message threatening criminal prosecution for
serious crimes. That misconduct violated respondent’s duty
to the legal system, harmed the legal profession, and caused
actual injury.
IV. CONCLUSION
We conclude that the Bar proved by clear and con-
vincing evidence that respondent acted with actual knowl-
edge when he included false and material statements in his
demand letter that reflected adversely on his fitness to prac-
tice law, in violation of RPC 8.4(a)(3). We suspend respon-
dent for 30 days.
Respondent is suspended from the practice of law
for 30 days, commencing 60 days from the date of filing of
this decision.