United States v. Sudiata Stinson

USCA11 Case: 24-11993 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2025 Page: 1 of 10

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-11993

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SUDIATA NEKET ZANJA STINSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 2:23-cr-14040-JEM-1

____________________

Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and KIDD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Sudiata Stinson appeals his 188-month sentence of imprison-

ment for distributing fentanyl. He argues that his sentence is sub-

stantively unreasonable. After careful review, we affirm.

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2 Opinion of the Court 24-11993

I. BACKGROUND

In December 2022, a 24-year-old woman in Vero Beach,

Florida, died after overdosing on fentanyl. Facebook messages, wit-

ness statements, and video surveillance indicated that Stinson likely

sold fentanyl to the woman the night of her overdose, but Stinson

was never charged in connection with this death. However, Stin-

son’s suspected involvement prompted an undercover police in-

vestigation into his alleged drug activity, during which Stinson

twice sold fentanyl to a confidential source. Thereafter, Stinson

pleaded guilty to an indictment charging him with two counts of

distributing fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and

(b)(1)(C).

Stinson’s Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”) provided

a base offense level of 18, as he was held responsible for at least 16

grams but less than 24 grams of fentanyl. United States Sentencing

Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(11) (Nov. 2023). But the PSI

increased Stinson’s offense level to 32 because he had three predi-

cate controlled substance convictions that qualified him as a career

offender. Id. § 4B1.1(b)(3). The PSI further applied a two-level re-

duction for acceptance of responsibility, id. § 3E1.1(a), and a

one-level reduction for timely notifying the government of his in-

tention to plead guilty, id. § 3E1.1(b). Stinson’s total offense level

was 29. The PSI also placed Stinson in a criminal history category

of VI based on 13 criminal history points and his status as a career

offender. Id. § 4B1.1(b). With a total offense level of 29 and a crim-

inal history category of VI, the PSI provided an advisory guideline

range of 151 to 188 months of imprisonment.

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24-11993 Opinion of the Court 3

Stinson objected to the PSI, challenging, in relevant part, the

inclusion of facts detailing his purported involvement in drug over-

doses. The government opposed these objections and submitted a

sentencing memorandum that requested that Stinson receive a

188-month sentence. As relevant here, it advocated for the inclu-

sion of the 2022 overdose in the PSI and for the consideration of

this information at sentencing, as it (1) “show[ed] that it [wa]s likely

that fentanyl” distributed by Stinson “killed a young woman . . . a

few months before the charged” conduct; and (2) “even if that fen-

tanyl did not kill the decedent, [Stinson] was interviewed about the

incident” and “continued to sell this deadly substance” even after

he knew that he was being investigated in connection with an over-

dose death. The government additionally submitted victim impact

statements from the decedent’s family.

Stinson filed a position paper and moved for a downward

variance, requesting a 144-month sentence. As relevant here, he

highlighted his difficult upbringing, which he also detailed in his

presentence interview. Stinson explained that he was raised by a

single mother and “grew up poor” in “bad neighborhoods[] sur-

rounded by drugs” until the age of eight, at which time child pro-

tective services removed him from the home after an incident of

abuse. Stinson then lived with his grandmother and “[t]hings got

better,” but he was returned to his mother’s care at the age of 15

and “the madness started all over again,” leading to his getting

“caught up” in “the streets” as a young adult.

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4 Opinion of the Court 24-11993

At sentencing, the district judge stated that he had reviewed

the parties’ filings, including the government’s victim impact state-

ments, and adopted the PSI’s guideline calculations. As to Stinson’s

factual challenges to the PSI, the government noted that the parties

had stipulated to the following facts about the 2022 overdose: “af-

ter the decedent was found . . . [Stinson] was investigated and in-

terviewed and confronted with the messages [and] . . . he denied

any involvement in the decedent's passing away.” While the gov-

ernment did not call any witnesses at the hearing, it indicated that

the decedent’s family, who had “file[d] several written statements

for the [c]ourt’s consideration,” was present in the courtroom.

In advocating for a 188-month sentence, the government

acknowledged Stinson’s “troubled upbringing” but noted that he

“[wa]s not a young man anymore” and had sold drugs around peo-

ple “who might look to him as a role model,” including his son,

who participated in one of the transactions underlying the instant

case. It further emphasized the heightened danger associated with

fentanyl. The government contended that Stinson “ha[d] clearly

shown that he[] [was] not going to be deterred,” as he continued to

sell drugs despite previously serving lengthy sentences for similar

crimes, being on probation at the time of the instant offenses, and

being questioned in connection with the overdose death.

Stinson’s counsel then reemphasized Stinson’s “traumatic”

upbringing and asserted that, due to Stinson’s career-offender des-

ignation, a sentence within the calculated guideline range would

be more than double in length to those previously served, so a

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24-11993 Opinion of the Court 5

downward variance would result in a sufficient prison term. The

district judge responded that this “argument [wa]s not well taken,”

and suggested that Stinson’s criminal history “show[ed] that he

was[] [not] given enough the last time” or that he “did[] [not] get

[a] sufficient sentence to deter him.” The district judge then further

stated:

Wouldn’t you think that the fact that he was con-

fronted by the police after a person that he had been

communicating with about the sale of drugs and ap-

parently sold drugs to died of a fentanyl over-

dose . . . and then a matter of months later he is again

selling fentanyl to police officers? Isn’t

that—wouldn’t that be some sort of deterrence?

Wouldn’t that be some sort of “Wake up, Buddy”?

Stinson’s counsel agreed but only “if all the other circumstances

had changed.”

The district judge acknowledged that Stinson had been

“raised in a bad home,” but did not find appropriate Stinson’s at-

tempt to compare the impact of his childhood trauma to the

post-traumatic stress experienced by Vietnam war veterans, alt-

hough Stinson’s counsel asserted “that the level of violence [wa]s

such that the comparison [wa]s close.” Further, while he expressed

his condolences to the family in the courtroom, Stinson’s counsel

asserted that it was unknown “whose drugs killed that young lady,”

noting that “[m]ost drug addicts have more than one dealer.” The

district judge interjected that it was “know[n] that [Stinson] was a

source of supply for her,” and, while he could have been one of

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6 Opinion of the Court 24-11993

many, Vero Beach’s drug activity was of a small scale compared to

the boroughs of New York City. Following brief additional argu-

ment from his counsel, Stinson allocuted and “sen[t] [his] condo-

lence[s] out.”

After considering the parties’ statements, the PSI, the guide-

line range, and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the district judge

concluded that “a sentence within the guideline range [wa]s suffi-

cient but not excessive to punish [Stinson] and to possibly serve as

a deterrent to other persons.” As such, the district judge sentenced

Stinson to 188 months of imprisonment on each count, to run con-

currently, and 3 years of supervised release. Stinson objected to the

reasonableness of the imposed sentence, and this appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a sentence for substantive reasonableness,

we consider the totality of the circumstances under a deferential

abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51

(2007). “A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to af-

ford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant

weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant fac-

tor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the

proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir.

2010) (en banc) (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Section § 3553(a)’s “overarching” instruction to courts is

that any sentence must be sufficient but not greater than necessary

to comply with the purposes of sentencing. Kimbrough v. United

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24-11993 Opinion of the Court 7

States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007); see Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. These sen-

tencing purposes include the need to reflect the seriousness of the

offense, promote respect for the law, sufficiently punish the of-

fense, deter criminal conduct, and protect the public from the de-

fendant’s future criminal conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). A court

must also consider the offense’s nature and circumstances, the de-

fendant’s history and characteristics, the types of sentences availa-

ble, the applicable guideline range, any pertinent policy statements

from the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted

sentencing disparities between similarly situated defendants, and

the need to provide restitution to any of the defendant’s victims.

Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)–(7).

We will not vacate a sentence solely because we could rea-

sonably conclude that a different sentence was more appropriate.

Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Rather, we will vacate a sentence only when

“we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the district

court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the

§ 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range

of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Irey,

612 F.3d at 1190 (citation modified).

Stinson argues that the district court improperly assumed his

culpability in the overdose death and gave this uncharged conduct

significant weight without the government “present[ing] actual

proof that [he] was the responsible party.” He maintains that “[t]he

court’s focus on the overdose skewed the rest of [its] § 3553(a) anal-

ysis,” resulting in an overemphasis on his “repeat criminal history”

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8 Opinion of the Court 24-11993

despite its already being accounted for in his guideline range. Stin-

son further asserts that the district court failed to afford adequate

weight to the mitigating factors he presented, including his expo-

sure “to poverty, drugs, [and] violence” at an early age.

Stinson is correct that the government did not provide suffi-

cient evidence to hold him responsible for the 2022 overdose, and

its unsupported assertions regarding this theory were insufficient

to establish his culpability. See United States v. Washington, 714 F.3d

1358, 1361–63 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[A]n attorney’s factual assertions

at a sentencing hearing do not constitute evidence that a district

court can rely on.”). Nevertheless, the government’s failure to

prove this uncharged conduct does not require us to vacate Stin-

son’s sentence because there is no indication that the district court

assumed that Stinson was responsible for this overdose, or that it

was otherwise swayed by improper factors at sentencing.

As an initial matter, it was arguably improper for the district

court to consider victim impact statements from the decedent’s

family, as Stinson repeatedly maintained his innocence with re-

spect to her death. However, the court noted its consideration of

these letters only in passing, making no reference to their content

or the weight attributed to the statements. The record does not

otherwise indicate that the court was persuaded by evidence be-

yond the scope of the stipulation made by the parties regarding the

overdose investigation. Indeed, rather than focusing on Stinson’s

alleged culpability, the court expressed that it was troubled by the

fact that Stinson continued to sell drugs despite serving previous

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prison sentences for similar crimes and being questioned by police

in connection with a death investigation, which should have been

a “[w]ake up” call as to the potential consequences of his actions.

There was “no limitation on the information concerning

Stinson’s background, character, and conduct” that the district

court could “receive and consider for the purposes of imposing an

appropriate sentence.” United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 827

(11th Cir. 2010) (citation modified). And the court was permitted

to contemplate uncharged conduct, such as Stinson’s behavior fol-

lowing the overdose investigation, “as it relate[d] to [his] history

and characteristics . . . as well as the need to promote respect for

the law, afford adequate deterrence, and protect the public.” United

States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022) (discussing an

upward variance). As such, it was reasonable for the district court

to select a sentence that reflected its desire to adequately punish

the offense and deter Stinson, as well as others who distribute dan-

gerous substances like fentanyl, from future drug activity. See id.;

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

The weight allocated to each § 3553(a) factor is also left to

the discretion of the district judge. In light of the nature of the

crime and Stinson’s criminal history, the court was permitted to

give substantial weight to the need for punishment and deterrence

over other factors discussed at sentencing. United States v.

Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254–55, 1259–60, 1262–63 (11th Cir.

2015). Moreover, throughout the sentencing hearing, the district

court considered and rejected many of Stinson’s arguments in favor

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10 Opinion of the Court 24-11993

of a downward variance, including the impact of his traumatic

childhood, and the failure to address every mitigating factor does

not indicate that the court “erroneously ‘ignored’ or failed to con-

sider th[at] evidence.” United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833

(11th Cir. 2007). Additionally, Stinson’s 188-month sentence was

within the calculated guideline range and well below the cumula-

tive statutory maximum of 40 years, which further supports its rea-

sonableness. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C); see United States v. Croteau,

819 F.3d 1293, 1309–10 (11th Cir. 2016); Belfast, 611 F.3d at 827

(“Under [the] advisory guidelines regime, judicial fact-finding

about relevant conduct that supports a sentence within the statu-

tory maximum . . . does not violate the Sixth Amendment.”).

Stinson also contends that his sentence created an unwar-

ranted disparity with other “‘career offender’ fentanyl sellers in

Florida and across the nation.” We need not address this argument,

however, because Stinson “failed to make it in his opening brief,

and an appellant in a criminal case may not raise an issue for the

first time in a reply appellate brief.” United States v. Castillo, 899 F.3d

1208, 1215 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation modified).

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court acted within

its discretion when imposing Stinson’s 188-month, within-guide-

line sentence.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM Stinson’s sen-

tence.