Nur v. Hyatte

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

MUSTAFA NUR,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:23-CV-512-JD

WILLIAM HYATTE, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Mustafa Nur, a prisoner without a lawyer, is proceeding in this case against

Warden William Hyatte, Investigator Montrel McGee, and Disciplinary Hearing Officer

(“DHO”) Angel Goodridge “in their personal capacity for money damages for denying

him due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in connection with the

disciplinary proceeding initiated on August 12, 2020[.]” ECF 35 at 6. The defendants

filed a motion for summary judgment. ECF 56. Nur filed a response, and the defendants

filed a reply. ECF 64, 65, 66. The summary judgment motion is now fully briefed and

ripe for ruling.

Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the

evidence is such that a reasonable [factfinder] could [find] for the nonmoving party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To determine whether a genuine

issue of material fact exists, the court must construe all facts in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Heft v.

Moore, 351 F.3d 278, 282 (7th Cir. 2003). However, a party opposing a properly

supported summary judgment motion may not rely merely on allegations or denials in

its own pleading, but rather must “marshal and present the court with the evidence she

contends will prove her case.” Goodman v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th

Cir. 2010).

The defendants provide Nur’s disciplinary hearing records and an affidavit from

Investigator McGee, the Investigator with Internal Affairs/Division of Investigations

and Intelligence at Miami Correctional Facility (“MCF”), which show the following

facts: On August 12, 2020, Investigator McGee was in the staff shoeshine area getting a

shoeshine from Nur when an inmate named Danny Perez dropped a laundry bag next

to Nur. ECF 57-1 at 2. After Nur finished the shoeshine and left the room, Investigator

McGee picked up the laundry bag, noticed it was heavier than anticipated, and opened

the laundry bag to find a pillowcase containing tobacco and numerous cellphones. Id.

Investigator McGee called Nur back into the room and asked him about the bag, and

Nur denied knowing anything about the bag or its contents. Id. Investigator McGee

took the laundry bag to the investigations office, photographed its contents, and placed

it into a secure evidence locker. Id. Investigator McGee then interviewed Perez while

other correctional officers searched Nur’s cell and brought his possessions to the

investigations office. Id. Investigator McGee searched Nur’s property and found

another cell phone and six address books within Nur’s mattress. Id. at 3. These items

were also photographed and placed in a secure evidence locker. Id.

The next day, Investigator McGee continued his investigation into the trafficking

and possession charges against Nur. ECF 57-1 at 3. Nur was moved to the

administrative segregated housing unit pending the resolution of the investigation in

order to cut off any potential trafficking from outside the prison until they could

determine who was involved. Id. According to Nur, the cell where he was housed in the

administrative segregated housing unit had poor lighting and was “covered in

excrement and other bodily fluids unable to be identified.” ECF 64-1 at 5. Investigator

McGee attempted to speak with Nur on September 18, 2020, but Nur refused to speak

with him. ECF 57-1 at 3. That same day, Investigator McGee issued two Reports of

Investigation of Incident against Nur – one for “Trafficking” and one for “Possession.”

Id.; ECF 57-2 at 1; ECF 57-3 at 1. He also issued a Report of Conduct for the

“Trafficking” charge. ECF 57-1 at 3; ECF 57-2 at 2. On September 22, 2020, Investigator

McGee concluded his investigation and issued a Report of Conduct for the “Possession”

charge. ECF 57-1 at 3; ECF 57-3 at 2.

On September 24, 2020, Nur received copies of the two Reports of Conduct for

the “Trafficking” and “Possession” charges, along with two Notices of Disciplinary

Hearing. ECF 57-2 at 2-3; ECF 57-3 at 2-3. For the “Possession” charge, Nur pleaded

“not guilty” and requested: (1) a lay advocate; (2) “DVR” of the incident; (3) fingerprints

and DNA testing from the phone; (4) a witness statement from an inmate named

Whiteside; and (5) a photograph of his mattress. ECF 57-3 at 3. For the “Trafficking”

charge, Nur also pleaded “not guilty” and requested: (1) a lay advocate; (2) “DVR” of

the incident; (3) fingerprints and DNA testing from the bag; and (4) a witness statement

from Perez, the inmate who was accused of dropping off the bag. ECF 57-2 at 3.

On October 5, 2020, Nur was informed in writing by Screening Officer Carol

Perkins that his request for certain evidence was denied because: (1) MCF did not have

the capability to perform DNA testing or fingerprinting; (2) there were no pictures of

the mattress taken; and (3) a statement from Whiteside could not be obtained because

he no longer was incarcerated at MCF and was unable to be reached. ECF 57-2 at 4; ECF

57-3 at 4-6. Screening Officer Perkins did obtain a witness statement from Perez, who

stated he was not connected to the laundry bag containing contraband and had carried

a trash bag rather than a laundry bag into the staff shoeshine area. ECF 57-2 at 5. On

October 7, 2020, Nur was informed in writing that his requests for “DVR” of the

incident were denied for not being specific enough, as there were no cameras in the staff

shoeshine area. ECF 57-2 at 6, 20; ECF 57-3 at 7.

On October 9, 2020, the disciplinary hearings for both the “Trafficking” and

“Possession” charges were held by DHO Goodridge outside of Nur’s cell in the

segregated housing unit. ECF 54 at 37-38, 54. A lay advocate was present for both

hearings. Id. Following the hearings, DHO Goodridge found Nur guilty on both

charges. Regarding the “Possession” charge, DHO Goodridge issued a Report of

Disciplinary Hearing noting that Nur alleged an inmate named Whiteside was

responsible for possessing the cellphones, and that she found Nur guilty based on the

staff reports and pictures. ECF 57-3 at 8. She imposed penalties of a loss of 180 credit

time days and a demotion of his credit class. Id. Regarding the “Trafficking” charge,

DHO Goodridge issued a second Report of Disciplinary Hearing noting Nur claimed he

never touched the bag with the contraband inside and finding him guilty based on the

staff reports and pictures. ECF 57-2 at 8. She again imposed penalties of a loss of 180

credit time days and a demotion of his credit class. Id.

On October 10, 2020, Nur filed appeals for both the “Trafficking” and

“Possession” charges. ECF 57-2 at 9; ECF 57-3 at 10. On October 21, 2020, while Nur’s

appeals were pending, he was moved to a different cell and was no longer housed in

the administrative segregated housing unit. ECF 57-1 at 4.

On November 17, 2020, Warden Hyatte denied Nur’s appeal regarding the

“Trafficking” charge and noted Nur could still appeal that decision to the final

reviewing authority. ECF 57-2 at 10. On November 24, 2020, Warden Hyatte denied

Nur’s appeal regarding the “Possession” charge. ECF 57-3 at 11. Nur appealed both

decisions to the Central Office. ECF 54 at 45-46.

On December 28, 2020, the Central Office granted Nur’s appeal for the

“Possession” charge and vacated all sanctions that were previously imposed. ECF 57-3

at 13. On December 29, 2020, Nur’s “Possession” charge was designated for a rehearing

at MCF. Id. at 14. On January 21, 2021, following a new screening and rehearing before a

new DHO, Nur was found “not guilty” of the “Possession” charge. ECF 54 at 46-49. All

previous sanctions related to the “Possession” charge were vacated and never

reimposed. Id. at 49-50.

On January 15, 2021, the Central Office denied Nur’s appeal for the “Trafficking”

charge. ECF 57-2 at 11. However, on July 29, 2021, after further review of his appeal, the

Central Office granted Nur’s appeal on the “Trafficking” charge and designated it for

rehearing. Id. at 12.

On September 30, 2021, Nur underwent a second screening process in connection

with the rehearing on the “Trafficking” disciplinary charge. ECF 57-2 at 15. This time,

Nur requested that Investigator McGee be present for cross-examination. Id.

Investigator McGee was not available for the hearing, so he provided written answers

to the questions posed to him. ECF 57-1 at 4; ECF 57-2 at 18.

On November 23, 2021, the disciplinary rehearing for the “Trafficking” charge

was held by a new DHO. ECF 57-2 at 24-25. Following the rehearing, Nur was again

found guilty of the “Trafficking” charge. Id. at 24. The DHO issued a Report of

Disciplinary Hearing, noting she found him guilty based on the “conduct report and

pictures of evidence” and issuing penalties of a loss of 180 credit time days and a

demotion of his credit class. Id. On November 24, 2021, Nur appealed his conviction for

the “Trafficking” charge. ECF 57-2 at 26. On January 18, 2022, Warden Hyatte granted

Nur’s appeal of his “Trafficking” charge and vacated all of the previously imposed

sanctions. Id. at 27. Because neither party disputes these facts, the court accepts them as

undisputed.

The defendants argue summary judgment is warranted in their favor because:

(1) Nur did not have a protected liberty interest at stake which afforded him due

process protections; and, regardless, (2) Nur was afforded the due process protections

outlined by the Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). The

defendants also argue they are entitled to qualified immunity for both of these reasons.

The defendants’ arguments will be addressed in turn.

I. Protected liberty interest

The Fourteenth Amendment provides state officials shall not “deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . ..” U.S. Const. amend.

XIV, § 1. While “[t]he Constitution itself does not create an interest in avoiding transfer

within a correctional facility,” the Supreme Court has determined that “the Fourteenth

Amendment provides to inmates a liberty interest in avoiding placement in more

restrictive conditions, such as segregation, when those conditions pose an atypical and

significant hardship when compared to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Townsend

v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 771 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484–86

(1995)). The Seventh Circuit has previously concluded that inmates can have a liberty

interest in avoiding placement in disciplinary segregation, but “have no liberty interest

in avoiding transfer to discretionary segregation—that is, segregation imposed for

administrative, protective, or investigative purposes.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing Lekas

v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 608–09 & 608 n.4 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[R]eassignment from the

general population to discretionary segregation does not constitute a deprivation of a

liberty interest.”). This is because there is nothing “atypical” about discretionary

segregation, which is “an ‘ordinary incident of prison life’ that inmates should expect to

experience during their time in prison.” Id.

Here, it is undisputed Nur was moved to the administrative segregated housing

unit on August 13, 2020, pending the resolution of the investigation into the

“Possession” and “Trafficking” charges, and was moved to a different cell and no

longer housed in the administrative segregated housing unit on October 21, 2020, while

his appeals were pending. ECF 57-1 at 3-4. The defendants argue that, because Nur was

only held in discretionary segregation and was never held in disciplinary segregation,

he never had any protected liberty interest. ECF 57 at 3-5. However, since the Seventh

Circuit’s decision in Townsend, recent cases have questioned the conclusion that

placement in discretionary segregation can “never implicate a liberty interest.” See

Williams v. Brown, 849 Fed. Appx. 154, 157, n.3 (7th Cir. 2021) (emphasis added). Rather,

courts have considered whether placement in discretionary segregation can create a

protected liberty interest where the period of confinement is significant and the

conditions in the cell are unusually harsh. See e.g., Earl v. Racine County Jail, 718 F.3d 689,

691 (7th Cir. 2013) (“When an inmate is placed in conditions more restrictive than those

in the general prison population, whether through protective segregation like suicide

watch or discretionary administrative segregation, his liberty is affected only if the

more restrictive conditions are particularly harsh compared to ordinary prison life or if

he remains subject to those conditions for a significantly long time.”); Isby v. Brown, 856

F.3d 508, 524 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Prisoners do not have a constitutional right to remain in

the general population, but both the duration and the conditions of the segregation must

be considered in determining whether due process is implicated.”) (internal quotation

marks, parenthesis, and citations omitted; emphasis in original); Marion v. Columbia

Correction Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697-98 & nn.2–3 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e have explained that

a liberty interest may arise if the length of segregated confinement is substantial and the

record reveals that the conditions of confinement are unusually harsh.”). Nur argues he

had a protected liberty interest because the cell in which he was held in the

administrative segregated housing unit had poor lighting and was “covered in

excrement and other bodily fluids unable to be identified.” ECF 64-1 at 4-5.

Here, it is a close call whether Nur had a protected liberty interest. However, the

court does not need to answer this question, as it is clear from the record that the

defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because it was not “clearly established” at

the time of Nur’s disciplinary hearings in 2020 that he had a protected liberty interest

affording him due process protections.

“Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability when

performing discretionary functions so long as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). To overcome a qualified immunity defense, “a plaintiff must

show the deprivation of a constitutional right, and must also show that the right was

clearly established at the time of the violation.” Walker v. Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030, 1037

(7th Cir. 2002) (citing Alvarado, 267 F.3d at 652). To show that a right is clearly

established, the burden is on the plaintiff to “demonstrate that existing caselaw at the

time of the events in question ‘placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond

debate.’” Dockery v. Blackburn, 911 F.3d 458, 466 (7th Cir. 2018). A violation is only

clearly established where: (1) a closely analogous case establishes that the conduct is

unconstitutional; or (2) the violation is so obvious that a reasonable state actor would

know that his actions violated the Constitution. Siebert v. Severino, 256 F.3d 648, 654–55

(7th Cir. 2001). “[A] defendant cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right

unless the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the

defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was violating it.” Plumhoff v. Rickard,

572 U.S. 765, 778–79 (2014).

In Jackson v. Anastasio, No. 23-1703, 2025 WL 2437947 (7th Cir. Aug. 25, 2025), the

Seventh Circuit determined the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity under

circumstances substantially similar to those here. Specifically, the plaintiff in Jackson

alleged he was placed in disciplinary segregation for three months in a cell that, unlike

the general population cells, “had feces and urine on the walls, constant noise with

inmates banging on cell doors, water contaminated with bacteria that causes

Legionnaire’s disease, and roaches and mice.” Id. at *3. The Court concluded Jackson

had ”raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether” his confinement for three

months in disciplinary segregation under the conditions he alleged was an “atypical or

significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” under Sandin. Id.

at *7. However, the Court concluded that, even though there was a genuine dispute

regarding whether Jackson had a protected liberty interest, the defendants were

nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity because the plaintiff’s right was not “clearly

established” in March 2020. Id. at *8-10. Specifically, the Court concluded Jackson had

not identified any caselaw showing it was “clearly established” in March 2020 that

housing an inmate in disciplinary segregation for three months with conditions like

those alleged by Jackson created a protected liberty interest. Id. at *9-10. Rather, the

court noted the jurisprudence regarding what presents “an atypical and significant

hardship” is “not at all clear except at the fringes,” and did not clearly establish in 2020

that housing an inmate in disciplinary segregation for three months with the conditions

alleged by Jackson created a protected liberty interest. Id. at 9-10. The court concluded

that, taking as true that Jackson “was subjected to three months in appalling conditions

of solitary confinement,” the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because

Jackson’s right to due process protections was not clearly established at the time. Id.

Here, the Seventh Circuit in Jackson held it was not clearly established in March

2020 that housing an inmate in disciplinary segregation for three months in a cell that

contained feces and urine on the walls created a protected liberty interest that

implicated due process concerns. Similarly, Nur has not identified any caselaw showing

it was clearly established at the time of his disciplinary proceedings in 2020 that

housing an inmate in discretionary segregation for approximately 70 days in a cell with

poor lighting and feces on the walls created a protected liberty interest implicating due

process concerns. In fact, the law in Nur’s case is even less “clearly established” than in

Jackson, as the plaintiff in Jackson was housed in disciplinary segregation while Nur was

only housed in discretionary segregation while his disciplinary charges were being

investigated. While the Supreme Court concluded in 1995 that an inmate in disciplinary

segregation could have a protected liberty interest under certain circumstances, the

caselaw in 2020 was unclear whether inmates in discretionary segregation could ever

have a protected liberty interest. See Williams, 849 Fed. Appx. at 157, n.3 (noting that

“some cases suggest that nonpunitive segregation can never implicate a liberty

interest,” but “more recent cases question that conclusion.”).

In his summary judgment response, Nur acknowledges he does not have any

“analogous cases” from 2020 showing the conditions he described created a protected

liberty interest. Rather, he argues the constitutional violation was so obvious that a

reasonable state actor would have known his actions violated the Constitution. See ECF

64-1 at 14-15. But the relevant caselaw at the time shows it was not “obvious” in 2020

that placing an inmate in discretionary segregation for 70 days in a cell with the

conditions alleged by Nur created a protected liberty interest. Rather, the relevant

caselaw from 2020 shows the jurisprudence regarding what duration and conditions

were needed to create a protected liberty interest in an inmate’s placement in

disciplinary segregation was “not at all clear except at the fringes.” Jackson, 2025 WL

2437947, at *9; Obriecht v. Raemisch, 565 F. App’x 535, 540 (7th Cir. 2014) (no liberty

interest where defendant “submitted a declaration recounting deplorable conditions (in

particular having to sleep on a mattress placed directly on the wet floor)” but was

“released from segregation after only 78 days,” as “[a] confinement of that length does

not implicate a liberty interest”); Whitfield v. Atchingson, No. 13-cv-653-SMY-RJD, 2017

WL 3707180, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2017) (no liberty interest where disciplinary

segregation lasted three months with conditions including a steel door, cellmates with

mental health issues, unpleasant odors, constant noise, and other inmates throwing

feces at him); Lisle v. Welborn, 933 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2019) (no liberty interest where

inmate was housed in a disciplinary segregation cell for four months with poor

ventilation, rusty bars, corroded feces in the toilet, and inadequate cleaning supplies).

And, as discussed, the caselaw was even less clear when dealing with discretionary

segregation rather than disciplinary segregation. Thus, because it was not “clearly

established” in 2020 that placing an inmate in discretionary segregation for 70 days in a

cell with poor lighting and feces on the walls while his charges were being investigated

created a protected liberty interest raising due process concerns, the defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. Summary judgment is warranted in favor

of the defendants for this reason.

II. Due process protections under Wolff

Even assuming Nur had a protected liberty interest affording him due process

protections that was “clearly established” at the time of his disciplinary hearings,

summary judgment is alternatively warranted in favor of the defendants because they

provided Nur with each of the due process protections afforded to him under Wolff.

In Wolff, the Supreme Court determined the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees

prisoners the following procedural due process rights prior to being deprived of a

protected interest through a prison disciplinary hearing: (1) advance written notice of

the charges; (2) an opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision-maker; (3) an

opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in defense, when

consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals; and (4) a written statement by

the fact-finder of evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Wolff,

418 U.S. at 563-73. Additionally, due process requires that before an inmate is deprived

of a protected interest, there must be “some evidence” in the record to support the

deprivation. Superintendent, Mass Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).

The record shows the defendants provided Nur each of the due process

protections afforded to him under Wolff. First, due process entitled Nur to advanced

written notice of the charges against him at least 24 hours before his disciplinary

hearings to inform him of the charges and enable him to prepare a defense. See Wolff,

418 U.S. at 564. Here, it is undisputed Nur received conduct reports and hearing notices

detailing both the “Trafficking” and “Possession” charges against him around

September 24, 2020, signed the notices and requested evidence on that same day, and

his hearings were held over two weeks later on October 9, 2020. ECF 54 at 29, 50-52;

ECF 57-2 at 2-3; ECF 57-3 at 2-3. In his response, Nur argues he was not informed of the

charges against him prior to being placed in the administrative segregated housing unit.

ECF 64-1 at 9. This is true, as Nur was moved into the administrative segregated

housing unit on August 13, and did not receive the written notices until September 24.

But Wolff only provides that Nur needed to be given written notice of the charges

against him at least 24 hours before his hearing, not before his transfer to the

administrative segregated housing unit. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564. It is undisputed Nur

received written notices informing him of the charges against him well in advance of his

hearings, and Nur provides no authority indicating due process required he be given

written notice of the charges against him before he was moved into the administrative

segregated housing unit. Thus, Nur has not shown the defendants violated his due

process rights by denying him advanced written notice of the charges against him.

Second, due process entitled Nur an opportunity to be heard before an impartial

decision maker. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 571. Hearing officers “are entitled to a

presumption of honesty and integrity” absent clear evidence to the contrary. Piggie v.

Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003); see Perotti v. Marberry, 355 F. App’x 39, 43 (7th

Cir. 2009) (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). “[T]he constitutional standard

for impermissible bias is high.” Piggie, 342 F.3d at 666. The presumption is overcome—

and an inmate’s right to an impartial decision-maker is breached—in rare cases, such as

when the hearing officer has been “directly or substantially involved in the factual

events underlying the disciplinary charges, or in the investigation thereof.” Id. at 667.

Here, it is undisputed Nur’s disciplinary charges were screened by Ms. Perkins,

his disciplinary hearings were conducted by DHO Goodridge, and his appeals were

considered by Warden Hyatte. ECF 57-2 at 3, 8, 10; ECF 57-3 at 3, 8, 11. There is no

evidence that any of these three parties had any involvement in the underlying

incidents on August 12, 2020, or the investigation that followed. Nur argues that DHO

Goodridge was not an impartial decision maker because she refused to provide the

video evidence he requested (ECF 64-1 at 9), but it is undisputed DHO Goodridge

informed Nur in advance of the hearings that his request for video footage was too

vague because there was no camera in the shoeshine area. ECF 57-2 at 6. Nur does not

dispute that there was no camera in the shoeshine area, and there is no evidence he ever

requested any other video footage from DHO Goodridge after she informed him his

request was too vague. Nur also argues DHO Goodridge was not an impartial decision

maker because she did not call McGee as a witness at the hearing (ECF 64-1 at 9-10), but

it is undisputed Nur did not list McGee as a potential witness or otherwise request any

testimony from him in advance of the hearing.1 Because Nur was given an opportunity

at the screening stage to list the witnesses he wished to call at the hearing and did not

list McGee as a potential witness, DHO Goodridge did not show “impermissible bias”

by deciding not to call McGee as a witness at the hearing. ECF 57-2 at 3; ECF 57-3 at 3.

Screening Officer Perkins, DHO Goodridge, and Warden Hyatte are “entitled to a

presumption of honesty and integrity absent clear evidence to the contrary,” and Nur

has not designated any such evidence showing these parties were impartial. See Piggie,

342 F.3d at 666. Thus, Nur has not shown the defendants violated his due process rights

by denying him an opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision maker.

Third, due process entitled Nur to an opportunity to call witnesses and present

evidence at his hearings. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566-69. Here, Nur requested for his

hearings: (1) a lay advocate; (2) “DVR” of in the incident, (3) fingerprints and DNA

testing from the phone and bag; (4) a witness statement from Whiteside; (5) a witness

statement from Perez; and (6) a photograph of his mattress. ECF 57-2 at 2; ECF 57-3 at 2.

Nur was provided with a lay advocate and a witness statement from Perez, and it is

undisputed the defendants notified Nur in writing in advance of his hearings that the

remaining evidence he requested was not available because (1) his request for “DVR”

was too vague because there was no camera in the shoeshine area, (2) there were no

pictures of his mattress taken, (3) a statement from Whiteside could not be obtained

1 Nur concedes he did not list McGee as a potential witness in advance of the hearing because he

feared reprisal and did not want to give McGee more time to fabricate evidence against him. ECF 64-1 at

11.

because he no longer was incarcerated at MCF and could not be reached, and (4) MCF

did not have the capability to perform DNA testing or fingerprinting. ECF 57-2 at 4-7;

ECF 57-3 at 4-7. Thus, the undisputed evidence shows Nur was informed in advance of

his hearings that some of the evidence he requested was unavailable, and the

defendants provided Nur with all of the evidence he requested that they were capable

of providing. Nur does not dispute any of the reasons he was provided for the evidence

he requested being unavailable. He suggests video evidence would have been

exculpatory (ECF 64-1 at 11), but he does not dispute there was no camera in the

shoeshine area and does not explain what other video evidence would have been

relevant. Nur also argues he should have been allowed to call McGee as a witness at the

hearing (ECF 64-1 at 11), but as discussed he did not list McGee as a potential witness

during the screening process. Because the undisputed evidence shows the defendants

notified Nur in advance of his hearings that some of the evidence he requested was

unavailable, and provided Nur with all the evidence and witness testimony he

requested that they were capable of providing, Nur has not shown the defendants

violated his due process rights by denying him the opportunity to call witnesses or

present evidence at his hearings.

Fourth, due process entitled Nur to a written statement from DHO Goodridge of

the evidence she relied upon and the reasons for her disciplinary actions. See Wolff, 418

U.S. at 564-65. It is undisputed DHO Goodridge provided Nur with two Reports of

Disciplinary Hearing, which informed Nur that DHO Goodridge found him guilty of

both the “Possession” and “Trafficking” charges based on the “staff reports” and

“pictures.” ECF 57-2 at 8; ECF 57-3 at 8. Nur argues these reports are “disputed”

because the evidence she relied upon was either illegally obtained or fabricated. ECF 64-

1 at 12. But, while Nur contests the contents of DHO Goodridge’s written statements, he

does not dispute DHO Goodridge provided him with written statements informing him

of the evidence she relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary actions for both of

his hearings. There is no evidence these written statements were inadequate or

otherwise violated Nur’s due process rights. Therefore, Nur has not shown the

defendants violated his due process rights by denying him a written statement by the

fact-finder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.

Lastly, to satisfy due process, there must be “some evidence” in the record to

support the guilty findings. Hill, 472 U.S. at 454. In the context of a prison disciplinary

hearing, “the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could

support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. at 455-56 (emphasis

added); see also Eichwedel v. Chandler, 696 F.3d 660, 675 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The ‘some

evidence’ standard . . . is satisfied if there is any evidence in the record that could

support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.”). The “some evidence”

standard is “a ‘meager threshold.’” Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 849 (7th Cir. 2011)

(quoting Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 2007)). Once the Court finds “some

evidence” supporting the disciplinary conviction, the inquiry ends. Id. This Court may

not “reweigh the evidence underlying the hearing officer’s decision” or “look to see if

other record evidence supports a contrary finding.” Rhoiney v. Neal, 723 F. App’x 347,

348 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000)).

Here, it is undisputed DHO Goodridge found Nur guilty of the “Trafficking”

and “Possession” charges based on the “staff reports” and “pictures.” ECF 57-2 at 8;

ECF 57-3 at 8. This includes McGee’s report stating he witnessed Perez leave a laundry

bag next to Nur that contained tobacco and cell phones, McGee’s report stating he

found an additional cell phone in Nur’s mattress, and photographs of the laundry bag,

cellphones, and other contraband. ECF 57-2 at 1-2, 28; ECF 57-3 at 1-2. This easily

satisfies the “some evidence” standard for both the “Trafficking” and the “Possession”

charges. See Jones, 637 F.3d at 849. Nur argues repeatedly that this evidence was all

fabricated by McGee, but the court cannot reweigh the evidence at this stage. See

Rhoiney, 723 F. App’x at 348. Because the staff reports and pictures satisfy the meager

“some evidence” standard, Nur has not shown his due process rights were violated

because there was inadequate evidence to support the guilty finding. Therefore, the

undisputed facts show Nur was afforded each of the due process protections afforded

to him under Wolff.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, the undisputed facts show the defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity because it was not “clearly established” at the time of Nur’s disciplinary

hearings in 2020 that he had a protected liberty interest affording him due process

protections. Alternatively, even assuming Nur had a protected liberty interest affording

him due process protections that was “clearly established” in 2020, summary judgment

remains appropriate for the defendants because the undisputed facts show the

defendants provided Nur each of the due process protections afforded to him under

Wolff. For both of these reasons, summary judgment is warranted in favor of the

defendants.

For these reasons, the court:

(1) GRANTS the defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF 56); and

(2) DIRECTS the clerk to enter judgment in favor of the defendants and against

Mustafa Nur and to close this case.

SO ORDERED on September 22, 2025

/s/JON E. DEGUILIO

JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT