The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
RICHARD A HUFFT,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 25-CV-057-JFH-SH
THE TRUSTEE FOR CHILD SUPPORT
PAYMENTS FOR THE STATE OF
MISSOURI and SHARA A. MARTIN,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is a “Motion to Vacate the Order Overruling Plaintiff’s Objection to the
Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate and Adopting the Report and Recommendation
Deny Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 60(b)(4)” (“Motion to Vacate”) filed pro se by Plaintiff Richard A. Hufft (“Plaintiff”). Dkt.
No. 43. Defendant Shara A. Martin (“Defendant Martin”) filed a response in opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate. Dkt. No. 44. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate
is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On July 31, 2025, this Court entered an Order [Dkt. No. 41] adopting the Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”) [Dkt. No. 32] entered by United States Magistrate Judge Susan E.
Huntsman, overruling Plaintiff’s Objection [Dkt. No. 39] to the R&R, and denying Plaintiff’s
Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Dkt. No. 18]. On August 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant
Motion to Vacate. Dkt. No. 43.
DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 provides a mechanism for the Court to relieve a party
from a final judgment or order under the following circumstances:
1. mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
2. newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence,
could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b);
3. fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
4. the judgment is void;
5. the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is
based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated;
or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or
6. any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). As indicated by this narrow list, relief under Rule 60(b) is extraordinary and
limited to certain exceptional circumstances. Massengale v. Oklahoma Board of Examiners in
Optometry, 30 F.3d 1325, 1330 (10th Cir. 1994); Bud Brooks Trucking, Inc. v. Bill Hodges
Trucking Co. Inc., 909 F.2d 1437, 1440 (10th Cir. 1990). “A litigant shows exceptional
circumstances by satisfying one or more of Rule 60(b)'s six grounds.” Van Skiver v. United States,
952 F.2d 1241, 1243-44 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 828, 113 S.Ct. 89, 121 L.Ed.2d 51
(1992). The district court has substantial discretion in deciding a Rule 60(b) motion. Pelican
Production Corp. v. Marino, 893 F.2d 1143, 1145–46 (10th Cir.1990). “Not a substitute for a
direct appeal, a rule 60(b) motion addresses matters outside the issues on which the judgment was
entered.” Nutter, 885 F.Supp. at 1450 (citing Brown v. McCormick, 608 F.2d 410, 413 (10th
Cir.1979). “It is not the opportunity for the court to revisit the issues already addressed in the
underlying order or to consider arguments and facts that were available for presentation in the
underlying proceedings.” Id. (citing Van Skiver, 952 F.2d at 1243).
Plaintiff argues that the Court’s Order is “void on its face for a combination of denial of
due process of law and fraud on the Court.” Dkt. No. 43 at 10. Plaintiff specifically cites to Rule
60(b)(4) in his Motion to Vacate. A judgment is void for Rule 60(b)(4) purposes if the “rendering
court was powerless to enter it,” such as where the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction or
jurisdiction over the parties. V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220, 224 (10th Cir.1979); In re
Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation, 502 F.2d 834, 842 (10th Cir. 1974). Rule 60(b)(4) is
narrow and “applies only in the rare instance where a judgment is premised either on a certain type
of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process that deprives a party of notice or the
opportunity to be heard.” Choice Hospice, Inc. v. Axxess Tech. Sols., Inc., 125 F.4th 1000, 1014
(10th Cir. 2025) (citing United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 271 (2010)).
Regarding fraud, Rule 60(b)(3) allows a court to relieve a party from a final judgment based
on “fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(3). The party relying on Rule 60(b)(3) “must, by adequate proof, clearly substantiate the
claim of fraud, misconduct or misrepresentation.” Zurich N. Am. v. Matrix Serv., Inc., 426 F.3d
1281, 1290 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Wilkin v. Sunbeam, 466 F.2d 714, 717 (10th Cir.1972)).
Moreover, the challenged behavior must substantially have interfered with the aggrieved party’s
ability to fully and fairly be heard. See id. (citing Woodworker’s Supply, Inc. v. Principal Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 170 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1999)).
In support of his contention that the Court’s Order is void, Plaintiff first argues that the
Order “falsely states” that Defendant Martin filed “a response in opposition” to Plaintiff’s Motion
for Preliminary Injunction, when the filing was actually titled an “objection.” Id. Plaintiff argues
that this amounts to “an impermissible alteration and/or modification of the Rules of Civil
Procedure . . .” requiring the Order to be vacated. Id. Pursuant to the Local Rules for the Northern
District of Oklahoma, a party opposing a motion may file a “response.” LCvR7-1(e). Although
Defendant Martin’s pleading was titled an “objection,” the substance of the pleading opposed
Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Dkt. No. 29. Courts may look to the substance of
a pleading, or the relief sought, rather than a pleading’s title or its form. See e.g., United States v.
Baker, 718 F.3d 1204, 1206 (10th Cir. 2013). The Court’s reference to the pleading as a “response”
was permissible, in conformity with local rules, and in no way impacted Plaintiff’s opportunity to
be heard. For these reasons, this argument fails.
Next, Plaintiff argues that the Court’s “reliance” on Defendant Martin’s response
constituted a “denial of due process” because the response “contain[ed] unverified and
undocumented statements of counsel.” Dkt. No. 43 at 11. Plaintiff further characterizes statements
in the response as “misleading.” Id. However, Plaintiff fails to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that any statement in the response is misleading. The only example Plaintiff provides is
a statement in the response that characterizes Plaintiff’s request in the Motion for Preliminary
Injunction as asking the Court to “enjoin the defendants from continuing litigating a criminal
complaint against [him] until such time as this Court rules and determines the issues pled in [his]
Complaint.” Dkt. No. Dkt. No. 43 at 11 (citing Defendant Martin’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion
for Preliminary Injunction, Dkt. No. 29 at 2). However, as Defendant Martin points out, this was
a direct quote from Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. See Dkt. No. 18 at 2. This
clearly runs contrary to the statement being misleading. Additionally, Plaintiff has not pled or
shown how any alleged misrepresentation substantially interfered with his ability to fully and fairly
be heard. For these reasons, this argument fails.
Next, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Martin’s response “represents both a denial of due
process of law and a compound fraud on this Court by imposing on this Court to accept as true
that the so-called criminal proceedings are lawful, which they are not.” Dkt. No. 43 at 11. Plaintiff
then reasserts argument from his brief in support of his Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Id.
Plaintiff’s unsupported assertions of “denial of due process” and “fraud” are not sufficient under
the extraordinary standard of Rule 60(b). Specifically, Plaintiff has failed to provide any proof
whatsoever of fraud and further does not allege that he was deprived of the opportunity to be heard.
For these reasons, this argument fails.
Next, Plaintiff argues that the Court’s finding that Plaintiff’s objections were not
sufficiently specific to trigger the Court’s de novo review of the R&R is “fraud on this Court as
Plaintiff’s objection clearly and unambiguously detailed violations . . . .” Dkt. No. 43 at 12.
Plaintiff then reasserts argument set forth in his objection to the R&R. Id. First, a claim of fraud
under Rule 60(b)(3) is fraud perpetrated by an opposing party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3). What
Plaintiff complains of here is a finding of the Court. Therefore, Rule 60(b)(3) is plainly
inapplicable. Furthermore, as this addresses an issue in the underlying Order, Rule 60(b) relief is
not appropriate. See Nutter, 885 F.Supp. at 1450. For these reasons, this argument fails.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the Motion to Vacate is warranted because “[t]he Court
misapplied the Younger abstention doctrine.” Dkt. No. 43 at 12. Again, a Rule 60(b) motion must
address matters outside the issues on which the order was entered and is not an opportunity to
revisit the issues addressed in the underlying order. See Nutter, 885 F.Supp. at 1450. As the
Younger abstention doctrine was an issue addressed in the underlying order, it is not properly for
consideration under Rule 60(b). For this reason, this argument fails.
CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate [Dkt. No. 43] is
DENIED.
Dated this 24th day of September 2025.
JOHN F. HEIL, III
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE