Wilderness v. Neal

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

LAVONTE WILDERNESS,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:23-CV-207-PPS

L. HASKELL, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Lavonte Wilderness, a prisoner without a lawyer, is proceeding in this case on

three claims. First, he is proceeding “against Sergeant Larry Haskell and Officer

Marshall Sanders in their personal capacities for monetary damages for using excessive

force against him in violation of the Eighth Amendment on or about March 24, 2021[.]”

ECF 34 at 5. Second, are his claims “against Officer Chelsea Grams, Officer Shantanae

Frazie[r], Officer Andreana Ramos, Sergeant Erica Hilliker, Officer Cassandra Guydon,

and Officer Anthony Sims in their personal capacities for monetary damages under the

Eighth Amendment for failing to intervene in the use of excessive force by Sergeant

Haskell and Officer Sanders[.]” Id. Third are his claims “against Sergeant Haskell and

Officer Sanders in their personal capacities for monetary damages for violating his

rights under the First Amendment by retaliating against him for his statements

indicating that he intended to file a grievance[.]” Id. at 6. Both Wilderness and the

defendants now seek summary judgment. ECF 96,1 ECF 102.

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a

reasonable [factfinder] could [find] for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Excessive force claim against Sgt. Haskell and Officer Sanders

Wilderness claims Haskell and Sanders used “excessive force against him in

violation of the Eighth Amendment on or about March 24, 2021[.]” ECF 34 at 5. The

defendants argue summary judgment is warranted in their favor on this claim because

they used force in a good-faith effort to maintain and restore discipline. ECF 103 at 3-5.

The problem with the argument is that I would have to accept their version of the

events in order to grant summary judgment in their favor. Of course, that’s not how it

works.

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain” on prisoners. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (citation omitted). In order

to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must put forth evidence that “support[s] a

1 Wilderness’ summary judgment motion provides evidence and asks the Court to enter

summary judgment in his favor but does not include any arguments explaining why summary judgment

is warranted in his favor on any of his claims. See ECF 96.

reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain[.]” Id. at 322. The core requirement

for an excessive force claim is that the defendants “used force not in a good-faith effort

to maintain or restore discipline, but maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”

Hendrickson v. Cooper, 589 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). In determining

whether the intent was malicious, relevant factors include how much force was needed

versus how much was actually used; the extent of injury inflicted; whether the force

was needed because of a risk to someone’s safety; and whether the officers made efforts

to limit the severity of the force. McCottrell v. White, 933 F.3d 651, 663 (7th Cir. 2019).

The parties provide substantially different versions of the relevant facts thus

precluding summary judgment either way. First, Sgt. Haskell provides an affidavit, in

which he attests to the following facts: On March 24, 2021, Officer Sanders was

attempting to place restraints on Wilderness in order to “switch out the showers.” ECF

102-1 at 1. Officer Sanders secured one of Wilderness’ arms in handcuffs and was

attempting to cuff up the other arm when Wilderness snatched his arms away from the

cuff port and into the shower with the handcuff secured to one arm. Id. Officer Sanders

ordered Wilderness to turn around and place his hands outside of the cuff port but

Wilderness refused. Id. Officer Sanders then deployed a one-second burst of OC spray

against Wilderness and asked Sgt. Haskell for assistance. Id. Sgt. Haskell ordered

Wilderness to cuff up, and Wilderness complied. Id. at 2. Sgt. Haskell did not deploy

OC spray on Wilderness. Id. Sgt. Haskell and Officer Grams then escorted Wilderness to

the medical unit for decontamination. Id. During the escort, Wilderness tried to

headbutt Officer Grams. Id. Sgt. Haskell attempted to reach out his arm to prevent

Wilderness from headbutting Officer Grams, at which time Wilderness bit Sgt. Haskell’s

left arm and would not let go. Id. Sgt. Haskell used his knee to bring Wilderness to the

ground, but Wilderness continued biting his arm. Id. Sgt. Haskell used an open-handed

palm strike, which caused Wilderness to release his teeth grip. Id. Sgt. Haskell then

helped Wilderness off the ground and finished escorting him to the medical unit. Id. at

2-3.

Wilderness tells an entirely different story. He says he was in the shower when

Officer Sanders ordered him to “butterfly cuff-up” his wrists. ECF 108-2 at 2.

Wilderness informed Officer Sanders he had a sprained wrist, at which point Officer

Sanders forcibly placed Wilderness’ left wrist in handcuffs and violently twisted his

right wrist. Id. Wilderness pulled his wrists away in pain and informed Officer Sanders

he would be filing a grievance and a lawsuit, at which point Officer Sanders became

angry and pulled out a cannister of OC spray. Id. Wilderness walked toward the cuff

port to submit to restraints, whereupon Officer Sanders deployed OC spray into his

face. Id. Wilderness never refused to be placed in hand restraints. Id. Officer Sanders

then left and returned with Sgt. Haskell, and as Wilderness approached the cuff port

and again “invoked his First Amendment right[s]” both officers sprayed him once again

with OC spray until they emptied both cannisters. Id. at 3. Wilderness was cuffed by

Officer Sims and removed from the shower. Id. All of the defendants in this lawsuit

were present outside of the shower as Wilderness was placed in leg restraints and

stomach chains. Id. As the correctional officers began escorting Wilderness toward the

exit, Sgt. Haskell violently twisted Wilderness’ wrist, which caused him to “reflex[]” in

pain. Id. at 3-4. Wilderness never attempted to headbutt any officer. Id. Sgt. Haskell then

threw Wilderness to the ground, and Sgt. Haskell and Officer Sanders began punching

and kicking him 30 or 40 times each while he was in hand and leg restraints. Id. Sgt.

Haskell also stepped on Wilderness’ hand and broke a bone. Id. Wilderness started

seeing blood and going unconscious, at which point he got scared and bit Sgt. Haskell

on the arm to deter some of the punches. Id. Eventually, Officer Sanders and Sgt.

Haskell picked Wilderness up off the ground and began escorting him again while

continuing to punch him in his ribs. Id. at 4-5. Additional officers arrived and finished

escorting Wilderness to the medical unit. Id. at 5.

As one can see, the parties tell radically different versions of the same event.

Here, a reasonable jury could credit Wilderness’ version of events and conclude Officer

Sanders and Sgt. Haskell used excessive force by spraying him with entire cannisters of

OC spray while he was not actively resisting and striking him repeatedly while he was

in hand and leg restraints. See Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1270 (7th Cir. 1984) (the use

of OC spray “in small amounts may be a necessary prison technique if a prisoner refuses

after adequate warnings” to comply with an order) (emphasis added) (citation omitted);

Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496, 504 (7th Cir. 2004) (force “without penological

justification” is excessive) (citation omitted); Payne v. Allen, No. 23-CV-598, 2025 WL

901560, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 2025) (a reasonable jury could conclude a correctional

officer used excessive force against an inmate by striking him in the chest and spraying

him with OC spray while he was not actively resisting). Of course, a reasonable jury

could also credit Sgt. Haskell’s version of events and conclude the amount of force used

was done in a good faith effort to restore order after Wilderness headbutted Officer

Grams and bit Sgt. Haskell. The surveillance footage of this incident does not discredit

either party’s version of events, as it shows only a small portion of the escort and does

not show what transpired in the shower. Accordingly, because there are disputed

material facts whether Sgt. Haskell and Officer Sanders used excessive force against

Wilderness, summary judgment is not warranted in favor of either party.

Failure to intervene claim against Officer Grams, Officer Frazier, Officer Ramos, Sgt.

Hilliker, Officer Guydon, and Officer Sims

Wilderness is proceeding against Officer Grams, Officer Frazier, Officer Ramos,

Sgt. Hilliker, Officer Guydon, and Officer Sims “for failing to intervene in the use of

excessive force by Sergeant Haskell and Officer Sanders[.]” ECF 34 at 5. State actors

“who have a realistic opportunity to step forward and prevent a fellow [state actor]

from violating a plaintiff’s rights through the use of excessive force but fail to do so”

may be held liable for failure to intervene. Miller v. Smith, 220 F.3d 491, 495 (7th Cir.

2000) (citing Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994)). A bystander officer may be

held liable for the excessive force of another officer if the bystander officer: “(1) had

reason to know that a fellow officer was using excessive force or committing a

constitutional violation, and (2) had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the

act from occurring.” Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 472 (7th Cir. 2009).

Here, there is insufficient evidence in the record by which a reasonable jury

could conclude that Officer Grams, Officer Frazier, Officer Ramos, Sgt. Hilliker, Officer

Guydon, and Officer Sims had a realistic opportunity to prevent Sgt. Haskell and

Officer Sanders from using excessive force against Wilderness. Specifically, Wilderness

attests to the following facts: After Sgt. Haskell and Officer Sanders sprayed him with

OC spray in the shower and he washed the OC spray from his face, Officer Sims

appeared at the cuff port, placed his hands in restraints, and escorted him from the

shower. ECF 108-2 at 3. Wilderness attests that Officer Sims first appeared at the cuff

port only after the application of OC spray, and there is no evidence indicating where

Officer Sims or the other defendants were located during the application of OC spray.

Once Wilderness was escorted out of the shower by Officer Sims, the other defendants

were “standing by” outside of the shower. Id. Officer Sims and Officer Grams then

began escorting Wilderness toward the exit door, at which point Sgt. Haskell twisted

Wilderness’ wrist. Id. There is no evidence Officer Sims and Officer Grams were aware

Sgt. Haskell had twisted Wilderness’ wrist. At some point during the escort, Sgt.

Haskell threw Wilderness to the ground and Sgt. Haskell and Officer Sanders began

punching and kicking Wilderness while he was on the ground. Id. at 4. Wilderness

attests that Sgt. Haskell was on his “right side” and Officer Sanders was on his “left

side” during this use of force, but he does not explain where any of the other

defendants were located. Id. Sgt. Haskell and Officer Sanders then picked Wilderness

up from the ground and walked him outside. Id.

Thus, Wilderness alleges Sgt. Haskell and Officer Sanders used excessive force

against him on three occasions: (1) by spraying him with OC spray in the shower; (2) by

twisting his wrist during the escort from the shower; and (3) by throwing him to the

ground and repeatedly striking and kicking him. Because there is no evidence

indicating where any of the defendants were located during the first and third

applications of force, no reasonably jury could conclude they had a realistic opportunity

to prevent those acts from occurring. See McCracken v. Kirby, No. 3:23-CV-908-PPS-AZ,

2025 WL 2417725, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 20, 2025) (because it was unclear from the record

where the defendant was located when the use of force occurred, no reasonable jury

could conclude the defendant had a realistic opportunity to prevent that use of force).

And while Wilderness alleges that Officer Sims and Officer Grams were present during

the second application of force, there is no evidence they knew Sgt. Haskell was going

to twist Wilderness’ wrist or had any opportunity to prevent that use of force from

occurring. See Marshall v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, No. 3:11-CV-332, 2015 WL 1455165, at *6

(N.D. Ind. Mar. 30, 2015) (two escorting officers did not have a “realistic opportunity to

prevent” a third escorting officer from stomping on the plaintiff’s foot during the escort,

as there was no evidence they knew the officer was going to stomp on the plaintiff’s

foot or had any chance to prevent it from happening). Thus, because there is insufficient

evidence in the record by which a reasonable jury could conclude that any of the

defendants had a realistic opportunity to prevent Sgt. Haskell and Officer Sanders from

using excessive force against Wilderness, summary judgment is warranted in favor of

the defendants on this claim.

First Amendment retaliation claim

Wilderness is proceeding against Sgt. Haskell and Officer Sanders “for violating

his rights under the First Amendment by retaliating against him for his statements

indicating that he intended to file a grievance[.]” ECF 34 at 6. Specifically, Wilderness

alleged in his complaint that he told the officers he intended to file a grievance about

the rough manner in which he had been handled, and they responded by spraying him

with pepper spray and severely beating him while he was not posing a security risk.

An allegation of First Amendment retaliation requires the plaintiff to show that

“(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment;2 (2) he suffered a

deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the

First Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the Defendants’ decision to

take the retaliatory action.” Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012) (quotation

marks and citations omitted). To satisfy the third element, Wilderness must show,

based on admissible evidence, “a causal link between the protected act and the alleged

retaliation.” Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations

omitted). A plaintiff can meet that burden by providing circumstantial evidence, which

includes evidence: (1) of “suspicious timing” of the defendants’ adverse action; and

(2) that the defendants’ proffered reason for the adverse action was pretextual. Galvan v.

Indiana, 117 F.4th 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2024) )internal quotations omitted).

The defendants argue summary judgment is warranted in their favor on this

claim because their conduct was motivated entirely by a need to regain control over

Wilderness and was not motivated in any way by Wilderness’ First Amendment

activity. ECF 103 at 6-7. In response, Wilderness attests that Sgt. Haskell and Officer

Sanders deployed OC spray on him in retaliation for him invoking his First

2 The defendants concede that filing a grievance is protected First Amendment activity.

Amendment rights because they deployed OC spray against him immediately after he

stated he would file a grievance and when he was not actively resisting. ECF 108-2 at 2-

3.

Here, a reasonable jury could credit Wilderness’ testimony and conclude his

protected First Amendment activity was “at least a motivating factor” in the

defendants’ decision to spray him with OC spray and use excessive force against him.

Specifically, Wilderness has provided circumstantial evidence by which a reasonable

jury could conclude the defendants acted with a retaliatory motive, as he testified that

(1) the defendants acted with “suspicious timing,” as they used excessive force against

him immediately after he threatened to file a lawsuit, and (2) the defendants’ proffered

reason for using force was pretextual, as he was not actively resisting at the time of their

use of force. See Galvan, 117 F.4th at 939; Loudermilk v. Best Pallet Co., LLC, 636 F.3d 312,

314-15 (7th Cir. 2011) (a worker who handed his supervisor a note complaining of

workplace discrimination and was immediately fired had established an inference of

causation by way of suspicious timing); Richards v. Perttu, 96 F.4th 911, 919–20 (6th Cir.

2024) (an “inference of retaliatory motive” precluded summary judgment where the

defendant took a retaliatory action “immediately after” the inmate attempted to file a

grievance). Therefore, summary judgment is not warranted in favor of either party on

this claim.

Qualified immunity

Lastly, Sgt. Haskell and Officer Sanders argue they are entitled to qualified

immunity because their actions did not violate any clearly established law. ECF 103 at

7-9. Specifically, they reference their above arguments and state “the specific

circumstances discussed above demonstrate that all the Defendants acted reasonably

and appropriately within the scope of their responsibility as correctional officers when

confronted with unsafe circumstances as well as a direct physical assault by the plaintiff

on Sgt. Haskell.” Id. at 9. But this argument asks the court to construe the facts in favor

of the defendants. As discussed above, there are disputed material facts regarding

whether Sgt. Haskell and Officer Sanders acted “reasonably and appropriately.” See

Walker v. Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030, 1037 (7th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that disputed

material facts regarding the elements of a constitutional claim preclude dismissal based

on qualified immunity); Smith v. Finkley, 10 F.4th 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2021) (holding that

where the “qualified immunity decision depends upon and cannot be separated from”

factual disputes, “which are integral to the merits of [the plaintiff’s] claim,” summary

judgment on qualified immunity grounds is inappropriate).

If a factfinder were to credit Wilderness’ version of events, it would be clear to a

reasonable officer that Sgt. Haskell’s and Officer Sanders’ alleged conduct of (1)

emptying cannisters of OC spray and repeatedly striking an inmate who was

handcuffed and not actively resisting, and (2) using excessive force against an inmate

immediately after he stated he would file a grievance, was unlawful. See Saucier v. Katz,

533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001), overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223

(2009) (“The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly

established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted.”). Thus, Sgt. Haskell and Officer Sanders

cannot avoid trial on grounds of qualified immunity.

For these reasons, the court:

(1) DENIES Wilderness’ summary judgment motion (ECF 96);

(2) GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the defendants’ summary judgment

motion (102);

(3) DISMISSES Officer Grams, Officer Frazier, Officer Ramos, Sergeant Hilliker,

Officer Guydon, and Officer Sims from this lawsuit; and

(4) REMINDS the parties this case is now proceeding on Wilderness’ remaining

claims:

a. against Sergeant Haskell and Officer Sanders in their personal

capacities for monetary damages for using excessive force against him

in violation of the Eighth Amendment on or about March 24, 2021; and

b. against Sergeant Haskell and Officer Sanders in their personal

capacities for monetary damages for violating his rights under the First

Amendment by retaliating against him for his statements indicating

that he intended to file a grievance.

SO ORDERED on September 22, 2025.

/s/ Philip P. Simon

JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT