Farias v. O'Malley

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 24-CV-61193-VALLE

CONSENT CASE

CHRISTOPHER I. FARIAS,

Plaintiff,

v.

FRANK BISIGNANO,1

Commissioner of the Social

Security Administration,

Defendant.

____________________________/

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff Christopher I. Farias’ Motion for Summary

Judgment (ECF No. 14) (“Plaintiff’s Motion”) and Defendant Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 18) (“Defendant’s Motion”)

(collectively, the “Motions”). Pursuant to Administrative Order 2023-18, this case is before the

undersigned for all proceedings, including trial and entry of final judgment. See (ECF No. 5 at 1).

Accordingly, after due consideration of the record, the Motions, Defendant’s Response

(ECF No. 19), Plaintiff’s Reply (ECF No. 20), and being otherwise fully advised on the matter,

Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED, and the Administrative Law

Judge’s decision (the “ALJ’s Decision”) is AFFIRMED for the reasons set forth below.

1 Frank Bisignano was named Commissioner of the Social Security Administration in May 2025.

Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Frank Bisignano is

substituted for Martin O’Malley as Defendant in this suit. No further action is necessary to continue

this suit by reason of the last sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g).

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In August 2021, Plaintiff protectively filed applications for a child’s disability benefits and

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act (the

“Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (R. 10, 229-44).2 In the applications, Plaintiff alleged a disability

onset date of August 29, 1999, at age 9. Id. Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially and again

upon reconsideration. (R. 10-22, 59, 67-68, 75). Plaintiff requested a hearing, which was held

telephonically, before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Angela Neel on December 7, 2023.

(R. 10, 36-52 108, 190-10). Plaintiff, accompanied by counsel, and a Vocational Expert (“VE”)

testified at the hearing. (R. 36-52). On February 9, 2024, the ALJ issued her Decision denying

Plaintiff’s applications and finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act.

(R. 7-27). Thereafter, Plaintiff sought review of the ALJ’s Decision. (R. 225-28).

On June 5, 2024, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, rendering the

ALJ’s Decision the Commissioner’s “final decision.” (R. 1-6); see Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129,

131 (11th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the ALJ’s Decision. (ECF No. 1); see

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Both parties have moved for summary judgment, and the Motions are ripe for

adjudication.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Judicial review of the ALJ’s Decision is limited to whether there is substantial evidence in

the record as a whole to support the ALJ’s finding and whether the ALJ applied the correct legal

standards in making her determination. Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019); Carson

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 440 F. App’x 863, 864 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable

2 All references are to the record of the administrative proceeding. See (ECF No. 7).

person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154 (quoting

Consol. Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Carson, 440 F. App’x at 864 (quoting

Crawford v. Comm’r, 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004)); accord Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007,

1011 (11th Cir. 1987) (noting substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla, but less than a

preponderance”). A court, however, “may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or

substitute [its] judgment for that of the [ALJ].” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176,

1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Even if evidence preponderates against the ALJ’s Decision,

the Court must affirm “if the decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Bloodsworth v. Heckler,

703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Within this narrow role, however,

courts do not act as automatons. MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986),

abrogated on other grounds by Harner v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 38 F.4th 892 (11th Cir. 2022).

Rather, they “must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable

and supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (citation omitted).

To qualify for benefits, a claimant must be disabled within the meaning of the Act. See 42

U.S.C. §§ 423 (standard for DIB), 1382 (standard for SSI). A claimant is disabled if he is unable

“to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected

to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A),

1382c(a)(3)(A). A “physical or mental impairment” is one that “results from anatomical,

physiological or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(D).

To determine eligibility, the ALJ employs a five-step sequential evaluation:

(1) Is the person presently unemployed?

(2) Is the person’s impairment severe?

(3) Does the person’s impairment meet or equal one of the specific impairments

set forth in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart. P, Appendix 1 (the “Listings”)?

(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation?

(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy?

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). An affirmative answer to any of the above questions

leads either to the next question or, on Steps 3 and 5, to a finding of disability. McDaniel v. Bowen,

800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). A negative answer to any question, other than Step 3, leads

to a determination of “not disabled.” Id.

Importantly, the burden of proof rests on the claimant through Step 4. Phillips v. Barnhart,

357 F.3d 1232, 1241 n.10 (11th Cir. 2004). At Step 4, the ALJ must consider: (i) the claimant’s

residual functional capacity (“RFC”); and (ii) the claimant’s ability to return to his past relevant

work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). The regulations define RFC as that which

an individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his impairments. 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a). The ALJ will “assess and make a finding about [the claimant’s RFC]

on all the relevant medical and other evidence” in the case. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).

The RFC assessment is used to determine whether the claimant can return to his past relevant work

under Step 4, and if so, “the ALJ will conclude that the claimant is not disabled.” Phillips, 357 F.3d

at 1238 (citations omitted). If a claimant cannot return to his past relevant work or there is no past

relevant work, then the ALJ proceeds to Step 5. Id.

At Step 5, the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience to

determine whether the claimant “can make an adjustment to other work.” 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v); Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1239 (citation omitted). The ALJ must

determine if there is other work available in significant numbers in the national economy that the

claimant can perform. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1239. If the claimant can make the adjustment to other

work, the ALJ will determine that the claimant is not disabled. Id. Conversely, if the claimant

cannot make the adjustment to other work, the ALJ will determine that the claimant is disabled. Id.

The ALJ may determine whether the claimant can adjust to other work in the national economy by

either: (1) applying the Medical Vocational Guidelines (contained within 20 C.F.R. Part 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 2); or (2) using a Vocational Expert, who can opine on whether someone with

the claimant’s limitations can obtain employment in the national economy. Id. at 1239-40.

III. THE ALJ’S DECISION

In February 2024, after reviewing the evidence and conducting the sequential analysis, the

ALJ concluded that Plaintiff “was not under a disability within the meaning of the [Act] from August

29, 1999, through the date of this [D]ecision.” (R. 11).

At Step 1, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity

since August 29, 1999, the alleged onset date. (R. 13).

At Step 2, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had severe impairments of anxiety and autistic

disorder with Asperger syndrome. Id. Conversely, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s overweightness,

unspecified mood disorder, and alleged scoliosis were not severe impairments. Id.

At Step 3, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of any one of the Listings. (R. 14-15).

At Step 4, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform a full range of work at

all exertional levels with various non-exertional (mental) limitations. (R. 15-20). More specifically,

the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff: (i) cannot operate a motor vehicle; (ii) can perform simple tasks

and make simple work-related decisions; (iii) can frequently interact with supervisors; and (iv) can

occasionally interact with coworkers and the general public. (R. 15). Because Plaintiff never

worked and thus had no past relevant work, the ALJ proceeded to Step 5 of the sequential analysis.

(R. 20, 21).

At Step 5, the ALJ found that, based on Plaintiff’s RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant

numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, such as a food service worker, meat

clerk, and package sealer, all unskilled jobs with a medium exertional level and an SVP of 2. (R. 21).

Thus, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is capable of making a successful adjustment to other work

that exists in significant numbers in the national economy and therefore had not been under a

disability from the alleged onset date through the date of the Decision. (R. 22).

IV. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in: (i) finding Plaintiff did not meet Listing

12.10 for autism spectrum disorder; (ii) evaluating Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and symptoms

from his autism disorder; (iii) failing to resolve an apparent conflict between the RFC/VE’s

testimony and the DOT job description for one of the three jobs identified by the VE at Step 5; and

(iv) failing to make a factual determination as to whether the two remaining non-conflicting jobs

identified by the VE at Step 5 exist in significant numbers in the national economy. See generally

(ECF No. 14). For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned finds that the ALJ applied the

proper legal standards and that her Decision is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the

ALJ’s Decision is affirmed.

A. The ALJ Properly Determined that Plaintiff Did Not Meet or Equal Listing 12.10

At Step 3 of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have an

impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled any one of the Listings. (R. 14-15).

In making this determination, the ALJ addressed Listing 12.06 (anxiety and obsessive-compulsive

disorders) and Listing 12.10 (autism spectrum disorder). (R. 14). Plaintiff challenges only the ALJ’s

determination as to Listing 12.10. (ECF No. 14 at 9-13).

As to Listing 12.10, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not satisfy Paragraph B because he

did not have an extreme limitation in one, or marked limitation in two, of the listed areas of mental

functioning: (i) understanding, remembering, or applying information; (ii) interacting with others;

(iii) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and (iv) adapting or managing oneself.

(R. 14-15). The ALJ found that Plaintiff had no limitations in the first and third areas but had

moderate limitations in the second (interacting with others) and mild limitations in the fourth

(adapting or managing oneself) areas. Id. Plaintiff argues, however, that substantial evidence

supports finding an “extreme limitation” in one of these two areas, or “marked limitations” in both.

(ECF No. 14 at 10).

1. Legal Standards

At Step 3 of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has an

impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals an impairment in the

Listings. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). The Listings specify certain physical and mental

impairments that are considered “severe enough to prevent an individual from doing any gainful

activity, regardless of his or her age, education, or work experience.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525(a),

416.925(a). The Listings serve to “streamline[ ] the decision process by identifying those claimants

whose medical impairments are so severe that it is likely they would be found disabled regardless of

their vocational background.” Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 153 (1987).

A claimant bears the burden of proving that an impairment meets or equals a Listing. Barron

v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 227, 229 (11th Cir.1991). More specifically, the claimant must provide medical

evidence to establish that the claimed impairments meet the very specific criteria identified in the

Listing, and its duration requirement. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525(c), 416.925(c). Thus, an impairment

that meets only some of the Listing requirements, no matter how severe, does not qualify. Prince v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 551 F. App’x 967, 969 (11th Cir. 2014); Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S.

521, 530 (1990). Rather, to “equal” a Listing, the medical findings must be “at least equal in severity

and duration to the criteria” of a Listing. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1526(a), 416.926(a). Ultimately, if the

claimant’s impairments meet or equal a Listing, the claimant will be found disabled at Step 3.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d).

2. The ALJ Properly Found that Plaintiff Did Not Meet Listing 12.10

Relevant here, Listing 12.10 (autism spectrum disorder) requires that the claimant establish

the requirements of Paragraphs A and B, which provide:

A. Medical documentation of both of the following:

1. Qualitative deficits in verbal communication, nonverbal communication,

and social interaction; and

2. Significantly restricted, repetitive patterns of behavior, interests, or

activities.

AND

B. Extreme limitation of one, or marked limitation of two, of the following areas of

mental functioning (see 12.00F):

1. Understand, remember, or apply information (see 12.00E1).

2. Interact with others (see 12.00E2).

3. Concentrate, persist, or maintain pace (see 12.00E3).

4. Adapt or manage oneself (see 12.00E4).

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.10.

As discussed below, the undersigned finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s

determination that Plaintiff’s autism disorder did not meet all the requirements of Paragraph B of

Listing 12.10 because Plaintiff had only mild and moderate limitations in two of the four areas of

mental functioning.

a. Interacting with Others

In finding that Plaintiff had a “moderate limitation” in the area of interacting with others,3

the ALJ stated:

In interacting with others, [Plaintiff] has a moderate limitation. During a mental

status examination, [Plaintiff] reported he felt uncomfortable speaking in crowds

(1F/5). In addition, during an exam, [Plaintiff] was withdrawn with poor eye contact,

slow/soft speech, and flat affect (1F/6). During intellectual testing, [Plaintiff]’s father

reported the claimant did not speak until age three, and he had difficulties making

friends, speaking in class, maintaining eye contact, and relating to others (2F/1).

Further, [Plaintiff] testified he has social difficulties, and he could not speak in class

or give presentations. In contrast, [Plaintiff] reported he did not have any problems

getting along with family, friends, neighbors, or others (4E/5). Additionally, he

consistently reported he was doing well with his medications throughout the period

at issue (5F/8-10, 12-13, 16-17, 19, 21, 23, and 25-26; 6F/2, 4, 6, 8, 10-11, 13, 15;

and 7F/1-3, 5, 7).

(R. 14).

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s reports and the medical and other evidence supported no

more than a mild and a moderate limitation in two of the four areas of mental functioning in

Paragraph B. Plaintiff asserts, however, that the ALJ did not sufficiently credit the following

medical and other evidence in her Decision: (i) Plaintiff’s Function Report, dated September 2021

(R. 281-88); (ii) Third-Party Function Report completed by Plaintiff’s father, dated February 2022

(R. 289-96); (iii) Intellectual Report by consultative examiner Addys Prieto, dated January 2011

(R. 412-15); and (iv) Plaintiff’s testimony during the administrative hearing (R. 40-47). (ECF No.

14 at 4-9). For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned disagrees.

3 Social Security regulations define the ability to “interact with others” as the ability to “relate to and

work with supervisors, co-workers, and the public,” by, for example, “cooperating with others;

asking for help when needed; handling conflicts with others; stating own point of view; initiating or

sustaining conversation; understanding and responding to social cues (physical, verbal, emotional);

responding to requests, suggestions, criticism, correction, and challenges; and keeping social

interactions free of excessive irritability, sensitivity, argumentativeness, or suspiciousness.”

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, § 12.00(E)(2).

First, throughout her consideration of Listing 12.10, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s statements

in his Function Report, that he: (i) did not need special reminders to take care of his personal needs

or to take his medications; (ii) had no problems getting along with family, friends, neighbors, or

others; (iii) could count change, handle a savings account, and use a checkbook; (iv) could follow

spoken and written instructions “pretty well;” (v) handled stress and changes in routine “not so

well;” and (vi) had no problem with personal care, prepared meals, performed housework, and

shopped in stores for food and video games. (R. 14-15). The ALJ also considered the Third-Party

Function report by Plaintiff’s father. (R. 20). As to the father’s Third-Party Function Report, the

ALJ wrote:

The undersigned finds the statements of [Plaintiff]’s father unpersuasive, as they are

inconsistent with the record and the record does not support the statements (5E). In

terms of supportability, [Plaintiff]’s father relied on subjective complaints and

symptoms, which the undersigned finds inconsistent with the overall record. Further,

these statements do not outweigh the accumulated medical evidence regarding the extent

to which [Plaintiff]’s impairments limit his functional abilities. Ultimately, these

statements are not persuasive for the same reasons set forth above in finding [Plaintiff]’s

allegations to be less than wholly consistent with the objective medical evidence.

(R. 20). The ALJ’s Decision, read as a whole, belies Plaintiff’s arguments that the ALJ failed to

consider the challenged Function Reports. See MacGregor, 786 F.2d at 1053 (noting that the court

“must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and

supported by substantial evidence”); Raper v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 89 F.4th 1261, 1265 (11th Cir.

2024) (noting that an ALJ’s decision should be read as a whole).

Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to properly consider the results in the Intellectual

Report (by clinical psychologist Addys Prieto) fares no better. See (ECF No. 14 at 4-5). The ALJ

explained:

In 2011, in January, during intellectual testing, [Plaintiff]’s father reported

[Plaintiff] did not speak until age three, and he had difficulties making friends,

speaking in class, maintaining eye contact, and relating to others (2F/1). In

addition, behavioral observations revealed no psychomotor impairments,

purposeful but poorly articulated speech at times, orientation to person, place, and

time, and a congruent mood and affect. [Plaintiff] used few words to express

himself, and he avoided eye contact throughout the evaluation. Further, [Plaintiff]

did not easily establish rapport until his father left the room, when [Plaintiff] began

to engage and establish rapport. [Plaintiff] obtained a verbal IQ score of 92, a

performance IQ score of 100, and a full-scale IQ score of 96, placing him within

the average range of intellectual functioning (2F/2).

(R. 17). Later, the ALJ reiterated, in part:

In January 2011, Consultative Examiner, Addys Prieto, Psy.D., noted [Plaintiff]’s

intelligence fell in the average range of intellectual functioning and diagnosed

[Plaintiff] with Asperger disorder (2F/2-3). Dr. Prieto’s findings of a full-scale IQ

score of 96, avoidance of eye contact, and poor speech articulation at times support

her notes (2F/2). Although Dr. Prieto did not provide specific opinion, the

undersigned finds her diagnosis persuasive because it is consistent with the medical

evidence.

(R. 20).

As well, the ALJ’s Decision, read as a whole, reflects the ALJ’s thorough consideration of

Plaintiff’s hearing testimony and the medical evidence of record. The ALJ accurately summarized

Plaintiff’s hearing testimony as follows:

[Plaintiff] testified to the following: His autism prevents him from working due to

sensory issues. He watches television and movies during the day. He does

household chores sometimes. He takes medication for anxiety with no side effects.

He listens to audiobooks, biographies. He is not sure if he could do a simple job

not working with people. He lives with his father but spends most of his time by

himself. He plays video games. He told his healthcare providers everything was

okay because it is hard for him to talk, and he did not want to talk to the providers.

He tried a job as a busboy but found it overwhelming. When he was in school, he

had social difficulties; he could not speak in class or give presentations due to

anxiety. His anxiety causes aches between his legs and overwhelming emotion. A

job interview would be very difficult for him. He does not have the energy to go

outside. He does not drive, other drivers on the road make him nervous. Therapy

did not help his symptoms.

(R. 16). As discussed in greater detail in Section IV(B)(2), below, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s

statements about the intensity and limiting effects of his symptoms, were not consistent with the

record. Instead, the ALJ found that:

As for [Plaintiff]’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects

of his symptoms, they were inconsistent with the record. [Plaintiff]’s allegations

that he could not work due to his autism, as well as his anxiety, do not fully

synchronize with the record (Hearing Testimony). For example, he consistently

reported he was doing well with his medications throughout the period at issue

(5F/8-10, 12-13, 16-17, 19, 21, 23, and 25-26; 6F/2, 4, 6, 8, 10-11, 13, 15; and 7F/1-

3, 5, 7). In addition, [Plaintiff] obtained a verbal IQ score of 92, a performance IQ

score of 100, and a full-scale IQ score of 96, placing him within the average range

of intellectual functioning (2F/2). Further, he had normal mental status

examinations during the relevant period (3F/55-56, 66, 69-70; 4F/5-6, 31; and 5F/6-

7).

Id. Moreover, in addition to Plaintiff’s consistent reports to his doctors that he was doing well on

his medication, mental status examinations also consistently reflected Plaintiff’s mood as

“euthymic” (i.e., stable, normal, and balanced, with no mood disturbances). (R. 14-15); see

https://www.healthline.com/health/euthymic#How-to-identify-a-euthymic-mood (last visited Sept.

24, 2025). Plaintiff appeared calm and cooperative, with normal language and no observed

symptoms of anxiety. (R. 543-44, 547, 551, 555, 565, 570, 618, 622, 626, 630, 634, 639, 643, 647-

48, 652, 656-57, 661).

Against this factual backdrop, the undersigned finds the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff

has a moderate limitation in his ability to interact with others is supported by substantial evidence.

Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ did not adequately consider certain evidence is an invitation for

this Court to reweigh the evidence. The undersigned declines to do so. See Winschel, 631 F.3d at

1178. Rather, the undersigned reviews the evidence to determine whether the ALJ’s finding of a

moderate limitation in this category is supported by substantial evidence and whether the ALJ

applied the proper legal standards. The answer to both questions is yes.

b. Adapt or Manage Oneself

In finding that Plaintiff had a “mild limitation” in the area of adapting or managing himself,4

the ALJ stated:

As for adapting or managing oneself, [Plaintiff] has experienced a mild limitation.

[Plaintiff] reported he handled stress and changes in routine “not so well” (4E/7).

During intellectual testing, [Plaintiff] had impaired judgment (2F/2). In addition,

[Plaintiff] testified therapy did not help his symptoms. In contrast, [Plaintiff] reported

he had no problem with personal care, he prepared meals, performed housework, and

shopped in stores (4E/2-4). Further, he consistently reported he was doing well with

his medications throughout the period at issue (5F/8-10, 12-13, 16-17, 19, 21, 23, and

25-26; 6F/2, 4, 6, 8, 10-11, 13, 15; and 7F/1-3, 5, 7). Moreover, he had normal mental

status examinations during the relevant period (3F/55-56, 66, 69-70; 4F/5-6, 31; and

5F/6-7). In summary, [Plaintiff]’s reports and the medical evidence support no more

than mild limitation.

(R. 15).

The evidence discussed in Section IV(A)(2)(a) above supports the ALJ’s finding that

Plaintiff has only a mild limitation in this area and is incorporated herein. In brief, Plaintiff and his

father reported that Plaintiff follows written and spoken instructions “pretty well” and gets along

with authority figures “very well.” (R. 286, 294-95). Plaintiff scored within the average range of

intellectual functioning on the WAIS-III psychological test. (R. 413). Moreover, despite Plaintiff’s

social difficulties, Plaintiff could perform personal activities of daily living (e.g., house chores,

simple cooking, pet care) and self-care. (R. 414). Accordingly, the undersigned finds the ALJ’s

consideration of the evidence, as discussed previously, supports the ALJ’s determination that

4 Social Security regulations define the ability to “adapt or manage oneself” as the ability to “regulate

emotions, control behavior, and maintain well-being in a work setting,” by, for example, “responding

to demands; adapting to changes; managing your psychologically based symptoms; distinguishing

between acceptable and unacceptable work performance; setting realistic goals; making plans for

yourself independently of others; maintaining personal hygiene and attire appropriate to a work

setting; and being aware of normal hazards and taking appropriate precautions.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404,

Subpt. P, § 12.00(E)(4).

Plaintiff has a mild limitation in his ability to adapt or manage himself, and her Decision is supported

by substantial evidence.

Plaintiff has not established that he met or equaled the criteria in Paragraph B of Listing

12.10.

B. The ALJ Properly Evaluated Plaintiff’s Subjective Complaints

Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and

his responsiveness to medication. (ECF No. 14 at 1, 13-18). The undersigned, however, finds no

error in the ALJ’s Decision.

1. Legal Standards

A claimant’s statements about his symptoms, without more, are insufficient to establish

disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), 416.929(a) (a claimant’s statements regarding pain or

other symptoms do not establish disability if unsupported by objective medical evidence that

claimant’s medical impairment could reasonably be expected to produce pain or other symptoms as

alleged). Thus, when a claimant attempts to show disability through his own testimony, the ALJ

follows a two-step process: “Step one is to determine whether the individual has a medically

determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms.”

Contreras-Zambrano v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 724 F. App’x 700, 703 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing

SSR 16-3p). “Step two is to evaluate the intensity and persistence of an individual’s symptoms,

such as pain, and determine the extent to which an individual’s symptoms limit [his] ability to

perform work-related activities.” Id. at 703-04; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c), 416.929(c); see also

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(e), 416.945(e). In conducting this two-step inquiry, the ALJ considers

“whether there are any inconsistencies in the evidence and the extent to which there are any conflicts

between [a claimant’s] statements and the rest of the evidence, including [the claimant’s] history,

the signs and laboratory findings, and statements by [the claimant’s] medical sources or other

persons about how [the claimant’s] symptoms affect [him].” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(4),

416.929(c)(4). A claimant’s symptoms, including pain, will be determined to diminish his capacity

for basic work activities to the extent that his alleged functional limitations due to symptoms, such

as pain, “can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other

evidence.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(4), 416.929(c)(4).

When the ALJ discredits a claimant’s subjective statements, the ALJ must provide “explicit

and adequate reasons for doing so.” Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561-62 (11th Cir. 1995);

Whitmore v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 855 F. App’x 641, 643 (11th Cir. 2021); see also Woodall v.

Kijakazi, No. 20-CV-60822, 2023 WL 3161751, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2023), report and

recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 3168471 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 28, 2023) (remanding for ALJ to

“explain his reasons for either accepting claimant’s testimony or articulate adequate reasons to reject

it”). “Failure to articulate the reasons for discrediting subjective testimony requires, as a matter of

law, that the testimony be accepted as true.” Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir.

2002) (citing Cannon v. Bowen, 858 F.2d 1541, 1545 (11th Cir. 1988)). Conversely, the Court will

not disturb a clearly articulated finding about subjective complaints that is supported by substantial

evidence. Venturella v. Kijakazi, 21-CV-61838, 2022 WL 4110699 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 2022), report

and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 4110339 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2022) (citing Whitmore, 855 F.

App’x at 643). In reviewing the ALJ’s subjective symptom evaluation, the question is not “whether

[the] ALJ could have reasonably credited [Plaintiff’s] testimony, but whether the ALJ was clearly

wrong to discredit it.” Werner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 421 F. App’x 935, 939 (11th Cir. 2011).

2. The ALJ Properly Evaluated Plaintiff’s Subjective Statements

Here, after referencing the proper legal standards (i.e., 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929, and

SSR 16-3p) and accurately summarizing Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ concluded that although

Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged

symptoms, Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these

symptoms were “not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.”

(R. 16). The ALJ explained:

As for [Plaintiff]’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his

symptoms, they were inconsistent with the record. [Plaintiff]’s allegations that he could

not work due to his autism, as well as his anxiety, do not fully synchronize with the record

(Hearing Testimony). For example, he consistently reported he was doing well with his

medications throughout the period at issue (5F/8-10, 12-13, 16-17, 19, 21, 23, and 25-26;

6F/2, 4, 6, 8, 10-11, 13, 15; and 7F/1-3, 5, 7). In addition, [Plaintiff] obtained a verbal IQ

score of 92, a performance IQ score of 100, and a full-scale IQ score of 96, placing him

within the average range of intellectual functioning (2F/2). Further, he had normal mental

status examinations during the relevant period (3F/55-56, 66, 69-70; 4F/5-6, 31; and 5F/6-

7).

(R. 16). The ALJ ultimately concluded that:

[T]he evidence of record supports the above residual functional capacity. It is

reasonable to limit [Plaintiff] to a range of unskilled work with restrictions on his

interactions. However, the nature of his treatment, the findings made during the

[Plaintiff]’s treatment, and [Plaintiff]’s own statements about his limitations do not

support a more restrictive finding. For example, [Plaintiff] consistently reported he

was feeling good, denied symptoms, and had normal mental status examinations

throughout the period at issue. While [Plaintiff] is limited to some degree, the

record does not support that he is limited to the extent alleged.

(R. 20).

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s evaluation is flawed because the ALJ failed to adequately

consider: (i) Plaintiff’s testimony that his autism prevents him from working due to “sensory

issues” and that he struggled to speak with his healthcare providers (referencing (R. 42, 44));

(ii) the Function Reports, which reflected that Plaintiff could not handle stress well (referencing

(R. 287, 295)); (iii) the Intellectual Report by the consultative examiner, noting Plaintiff’s

“impaired judgment” (referencing (R. 414)); and (iv) medical evidence showing Plaintiff’s

continued difficulty going in public due to his anxiety (referencing (R. 642, 656)). (ECF No. 14

at 14-15, 17).

The undersigned has previously discussed the ALJ’s consideration of this evidence, finding

no error. See Sections IV(A)(2)(a), (b) supra. The undersigned reaches the same conclusion here.

By way of example, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to consider Plaintiff’s

testimony regarding his sensory issues and reluctance to speak with healthcare providers, the

ALJ’s Decision notes that “[Plaintiff’s] autism prevents him from working due to sensory issues.

. . . [Plaintiff] told his healthcare providers everything was okay because it is hard for him to talk,

and he did not want to talk to the providers.” (R. 16). Indeed, the ALJ’s thorough, chronological,

4-page, single-spaced summary of Plaintiff’s medical visits, including mental status examination

results, between 2009 and 2023, provide substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s determination

that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were “not entirely consistent” with the medical and other

evidence in the record. See (R. 16-20). Among other evidence, the ALJ discussed: (i) Plaintiff’s

statements that he could concentrate and keep up in school, was feeling well and getting A’s, and

had stable symptoms (R. 17) (citing Exh. 1F); (ii) medical visits where Plaintiff consistently

appeared well-groomed, with appropriate thought process, euthymic mood, and no outward

symptoms of anxiety (R. 17-18) (citing Exhs. 1F, 3F); and (iii) Plaintiff’s repeated reports that his

medications were controlling his symptoms (R. 16) (citing to Exh. 5F at 8-9, 12-13, 16, 19, 21, 23,

25; Exh. 6F at 2, 4, 6, 8, 10-11,13, 15; and Exh.7F at 1-3, 5, 7); (R. 19) (citing to Exh. 3F at 47,

60, 76, 84, 109, 114, 118; Exh. 4F at 1, 7-8, 10-12, 13-14, 16-17, 19-21, 22-23, 25-26, 28-29, 33-

34, 36-37, 38-40).

Once again, the undersigned rejects Plaintiff’s invitation to reweigh the evidence. The

question for the undersigned is not “whether [the] ALJ could have reasonably credited [Plaintiff’s]

testimony, but whether the ALJ was clearly wrong to discredit it.” Werner, 421 F. App’x at 939.

Against this legal and factual backdrop, the undersigned finds that the ALJ provided adequate and

explicit reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective statements. See Foote, 67 F.3d at 1561-62.

Accordingly, the ALJ applied the proper legal standards in evaluating Plaintiff’s statements, and the

ALJ’s determination is supported by substantial evidence.

C. The ALJ’s Failure to Resolve an Apparent Conflict was Harmless Error

Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to resolve an apparent conflict in

reasoning skill levels (“RSL”) between the RFC/VE’s testimony and the DOT job description for

one of three jobs identified by the VE at Step 5. (ECF No. 14 at 18-21). Relatedly, Plaintiff asserts

that the case must be remanded for the ALJ to make a factual determination whether the two

remaining non-conflicting jobs identified at Step 5 exist in significant numbers in the national

economy. Id. at 21-27. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned finds that any error in the

ALJ’s Step 5 determination is harmless and remand is unwarranted.

Here, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had no past relevant work and proceeded to Step 5.

(R. 20-21). At Step 5, the ALJ posed a hypothetical question to the VE that included Plaintiff’s

limitation to performing simple tasks and making simple work-related decisions. (R. 48). In

response to this hypothetical, the VE identified three jobs that such an individual could perform:

(i) food service worker, with an RSL of 3 and 50,300 available jobs in the national economy (DOT

319.677-014); (ii) meat clerk, with an RSL of 2 and 64,600 available jobs (DOT 222.684-010); and

(iii) package sealer, with an RSL of 2 and 27,900 available jobs (DOT 920.685-074). (R. 21, 49).

Relevant to Plaintiff’s argument, although an individual limited to simple tasks can perform

jobs with an RSL of 1 or 2,5 the Eleventh Circuit has determined that such an individual cannot

perform jobs with an RSL of 3.6 See Viverette v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 13 F.4th 1309, 1317 (11th

Cir. 2021) (finding “that there is an apparent conflict between an RFC limitation to simple, routine,

and repetitive tasks and level 3 reasoning”). In light of the Court’s ruling in Viverette, Plaintiff

argues that the case must be remanded for the ALJ to determine whether the two remaining jobs

(meat clerk and package sealer) exist in significant numbers in the national economy. As discussed

below, after considering the facts of this case and the applicable law, the undersigned concludes that

Viverette does not require remand and that the ALJ’s error at Step 5 is harmless in light of the two

remaining non-conflicting jobs, which exist in significant numbers in the national economy.

1. Legal Standards

Pursuant to SSR 00-4p, the ALJ must resolve any apparent conflict between the RFC/VE

testimony and the DOT. 2000 WL 1898704 (Dec. 4, 2000). In relevant part, SSR 00-4p provides:

Occupational evidence provided by a VE or VS generally should be consistent with

the occupational information supplied by the DOT. When there is an apparent

unresolved conflict between VE or VS evidence and the DOT, the adjudicator must

elicit a reasonable explanation for the conflict before relying on the VE or VS

evidence to support a determination or decision about whether the claimant is

disabled. At the hearings level, as part of the adjudicator’s duty to fully develop the

record, the adjudicator will inquire, on the record, as to whether or not there is such

consistency.

Neither the DOT nor the VE or VS evidence automatically “trumps” when there is a

conflict. The adjudicator must resolve the conflict by determining if the explanation

5 See, e.g., Peterson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-10086, 2021 WL 3163662, at *3 (11th Cir. July

27, 2021) (finding “that there was no apparent conflict between an RFC limitation to simple, routine,

repetitive tasks and the DOT’s description of jobs requiring level two reasoning”); Valdez v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 808 F. App’x 1005, 1009 (11th Cir. 2020) (same).

6 An RSL of 3 requires the individual application of “commonsense understanding to carry out

instructions furnished in written, oral, or diagrammatic form” and the ability to “[d]eal with problems

involving several concrete variables in or from standardized situations.” DOT, App’x C, 1991 WL

688702 (4th ed. Rev’d 1991).

given by the VE or VS is reasonable and provides a basis for relying on the VE or

VS testimony rather than on the DOT information.

2000 WL 1898704, at *2.

The Eleventh Circuit addressed SSR 00-4p in Washington v. Commissioner of Social

Security, 906 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2018). In Washington, the Court held that an ALJ has an

affirmative duty under SSR 00-04p “to identify, explain, and resolve” apparent conflicts between

DOT data and VE testimony. Id. at 1356. The ALJ’s “duty is not fulfilled simply by taking the VE

at his word that his testimony comports with the DOT when the record reveals an apparent conflict

between the VE’s testimony and the DOT.” Id. at 1362. Rather, “if a conflict is reasonably

ascertainable or evident, the ALJ is required to identify it, ask about it, and resolve it in his opinion,”

even if the conflict is not identified by the parties. Id. at 1363, 1366. Moreover, an “apparent

conflict” is “more than just a conflict that is made apparent by the express testimony of the VE. It

is a conflict that is reasonably ascertainable or evident from a review of the DOT and the VE’s

testimony.” Id. at 1365. At a minimum, a conflict is apparent if a “reasonable comparison of the

DOT with the VE’s testimony suggests that there is a discrepancy, even if, after further investigation,

that turns out not to be the case.” Id.

In a subsequent case, Viverette v. Commissioner of Social Security, the Eleventh Circuit held

that an apparent conflict exists between an RFC limitation to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks

and an RSL of 3. 13 F.4th at 1317. The court further held that, on the record before it, remand was

necessary for the ALJ to make a factual determination on whether the remaining non-conflicting

jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. at 1318. Notably, the “record before

it” included two circumstances relevant to its determination, neither of which is present in Plaintiff’s

case. First, the court noted that elimination of the conflicting job reduced the number of remaining

available jobs in the national economy by more than 80%—a loss of 104,000 from the 125,000 jobs

initially identified by the VE. Id. Given that only 21,000 (about 20%) non-conflicting jobs

remained, the court was “hesitant” to make the “significant numbers” determination, noting that

“[w]here additional (or more specific) agency fact-finding is needed, remand is the appropriate

disposition.” Id. Second, the court found the VE’s testimony to be unreliable as to one of the

remaining non-conflicting jobs because the VE may have included other occupations with an RSL

greater than 1 or 2. Id. at 1319. Under these circumstances, the court found that this error was not

harmless. Id. at 1318.

“A harmless error—that is, one that does not affect the ALJ’s ultimate decision—does not

constitute a ground for reversal.” Sarli v. Berryhill, 817 F. App’x 916, 917 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing

Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir. 1983)). The purpose of the harmless error rule is to

avoid wasting time and preserve judicial resources. See Mays v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1362, 1364 (5th

Cir.1988). Thus, a factual error by an ALJ may be subject to harmless error analysis. Clark v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-CV-501-FtM-99DNF, 2019 WL 1091244, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 8,

2019) (citing Diorio, 721 F.2d at 728). Moreover, incorrect application of the regulations may result

in harmless error where the correct application would not contradict the ALJ’s ultimate findings.

Caldwell v. Barnhart, 261 F. App’x 188, 190 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “[T]he burden of

showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.”

Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009).

2. The ALJ’s Error at Step 5 is Harmless

Under the facts of this case, any error at Step 5 in not resolving the apparent RSL conflict

between the RFC/VE’s testimony and the DOT for the food service worker position is harmless

because the VE identified two other non-conflicting occupations (meat clerk and package sealer),

with 92,500 jobs in the national economy (65% of the initial job pool identified at Step 5) that

remained available to Plaintiff after the conflicting jobs were eliminated. (R. 21).

Plaintiff relies on Viverette and post-Viverette case law to support his argument that remand

is required for the ALJ to make the factual determination of whether the remaining jobs exist in the

national economy in “significant numbers.” See (ECF Nos. 14 at 21-22, 20 at 4-5). The undersigned

is aware of these cases (and others) where courts in this Circuit, mainly in the Middle District of

Florida, have remanded for such a determination pursuant to Viverette. As discussed below,

however, the undersigned does not find these cases persuasive on the record before the Court and

declines to follow them.7 Indeed, the cases cited by Plaintiff take a brightline/hardline approach in

applying Viverette, remanding cases where the apparent conflict excluded any number of jobs and

the ALJ had not initially determined whether the remaining jobs, separately or combined, existed in

“significant numbers.” See Hurst v. O’Malley, No. 23-00137-N, 2024 WL 4342792, at *12 (S.D.

Ala. Sept. 27, 2024). A close reading of Viverette, however, does not require “so rigid a rule.” Id. at

*13. Rather, the undersigned “is persuaded by the Commissioner’s argument and by district courts

considering a similar argument, that the Eleventh Circuit has ‘left the door open’ for federal courts

to evaluate whether the remaining jobs exist in significant numbers, such that the ALJ’s error was

harmless, where the number of positions under consideration, after excluding the error-tainted job,

are remarkably higher than the relatively low number of positions in Viverette.” Id. (quoting

7 Of the many cases cited by Plaintiff where courts routinely remanded to the ALJ for a “significant

numbers” determination, only one is from the Southern District of Florida. In Lagrandeur v.

O’Malley, No. 23-CV-60829, 2024 WL 4881024, at *3-4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 24, 2024), despite first

acknowledging that as few as between 800 to 2,000 jobs have been found to constitute a “significant

number” in the national economy, the Magistrate Judge nonetheless remanded for the ALJ to

determine whether 310,000 remaining jobs from the initial pool of 360,000 was a “significant

number.” Id. at 3. For the reasons discussed in this Order, the undersigned respectfully disagrees

that remand was warranted and finds this case unpersuasive.

Thompson v. O’Malley, No. CV623-001, 2024 WL 996745, at *4 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2024) (finding

harmless error after excluding 101,000 conflicting jobs, leaving 300,000 jobs remaining)).

Here, unlike in Viverette—where only 21,000 (or 20% of the initial job pool) (at most)

remained after the conflicting job was removed—92,500 jobs (or 65% of the initial job pool)

remained available in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform.8 (R. 21). Under these

circumstances, and in the absence of any other uncertainty in the VE’s testimony, the undersigned

concludes, like many other post-Viverette courts in this Circuit and District, that Viverette does not

categorically preclude the undersigned from finding that the two remaining jobs (meat packer and

package sealer) exist in significant numbers in the national economy. See, e.g., Hay v. Kijakazi, No.

20-CV-62288, 2023 WL 8719154, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 17, 2023) (finding error would be harmless

after excluding 47,000 conflicting jobs, leaving 221,000 jobs remaining); Mesa v. Kijakazi, No. 21-

CV-20424, 2022 WL 4369733, at *14 (S.D. Fla. May 11, 2022), report and recommendation

adopted, 2022 WL 4366950 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2022) (finding error would be harmless after

excluding 13,000 jobs, leaving 306,800 jobs remaining); Denmark v. Kijakazi, No. 20-CV-2852-

AEP, 2022 WL 831903, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 21, 2022) (finding harmless error after excluding

8 Relatedly, the Eleventh Circuit has previously held that jobs with less than 92,500 positions were

available in significant numbers in the national economy. See, e.g., Valdez, 808 F. App’x at 1010

(finding that 78,000 available jobs in the national economy was substantial evidence to support the

ALJ’s finding on Step 5); Allen v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 600, 603 (11th Cir. 1987) (concluding that

80,000 jobs in national economy constituted a significant number of jobs); Atha v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 616 F. App’x 931, 935 (11th Cir. 2015) (concluding that 23,800 jobs nationally was a

significant number of jobs); see also Tellier v. Colvin, No. 15-CV-663-J-JBT, 2016 WL 7438048,

at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2016) (concluding that error harmless because two occupations provided

68,000 jobs in the national economy); Bacon v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 861 F. App’x 315, 320 (11th

Cir. 2021) (pre-Viverette case finding harmless error where the ALJ identified other jobs the claimant

could perform); Wooten v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 787 F. App’x 671, 674 (11th Cir. 2019) (same);

Estate of White v. Saul, No. 19-CV-61745, 2020 WL 5351064, at *18 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 26, 2020),

report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 5291966 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 4, 2020) (same); Jules v.

Berryhill, No. 18-CV-60963, 2019 WL 4737602, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 2019) (same). These

cases remain binding precedent.

72,000 jobs, leaving 551,000 jobs remaining); Rodriguez v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 21-CV-

3002-DNF, 2022 WL 4364506, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2022) (finding harmless error after

excluding more than 115,000 jobs, leaving 220,000 (or 64%) jobs remaining); Hurst, 2024 WL

4342792, at *13 (finding harmless error after excluding 236,000 jobs, leaving 423,000 (or 64%) jobs

remaining); Thompson, 2024 WL 996745, at *5 (finding harmless error after excluding 101,000

jobs, leaving 300,000 jobs remaining).

Thus, in the absence of binding precedent to the contrary, the ALJ’s determination at Step 5

that Plaintiff was capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that existed in significant

numbers in the national economy remains supported by substantial evidence, even after excluding

the 50,300 food service worker positions, where 92,500 non-conflicting jobs that Plaintiff could

perform remained available. See Thompson, 2024 WL 996745, at *5. The undersigned also finds

that remanding this case to the ALJ to confirm that 92,500 remaining jobs is a significant number of

available jobs would be an exercise in futility. See, e.g., Hay, 2023 WL 8719154, at *11; Denmark,

2022 WL 831903, at *8; Mays, 837 F.2d at 1364. Thus, any error is harmless and the ALJ’s Decision

is affirmed. See, e.g., Hurst, 2024 WL 4342792, at *13; Mesa, 2022 WL 4369733, at *14.

V. CONCLUSION

In sum, for the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion (ECF No. 14) is DENIED,

Defendant’s Motion (ECF No. 18) is GRANTED, and that the ALJ’s Decision is AFFIRMED.

DONE AND ORDERED at Chambers, in Fort Lauderdale, Florida on September 24, 2025.

ALICIA O. VALLE Pee

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

cc: All Counsel of Record

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