The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN
DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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MOUHAMAD BEYDOUN,
Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
25-CV-02435 (OEM) (LKE)
-against-
CITY OF NEW YORK; SERGEANT ADONIOS
CONSTANTATO, OFFICER SHINGRU WANG,
and JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-10,
Defendants.
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ORELIA E. MERCHANT, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Mouhamad Beydoun (“Plaintiff”) commenced this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against the City of New York (“the City”), the New York Police Department (“NYPD”), NYPD
Sergeant Adonios Constantatos, NYPD Officer Shingru Wang, and John and Jane Does 1-10. ECF 1.
Plaintiff alleges that he was “severely restrained and injured by handcuffs” and “falsely arrested and
detained” by NYPD officers during a rally and march in support of Palestine in May 2024 in Bay
Ridge. Id. Only the City has appeared in this action. ECF 6.
Before the Court is the City’s fully briefed motion to stay this action pending the conclusion
of a Civilian Complaint Review Board (“CCRB”) investigation into related allegations and adjourn
sine die all deadlines and conferences in this action.1 For the following reasons, the City’s motion is
denied.
DISCUSSION
In lieu of filing an answer to the complaint, the City requests a stay of this action in its entirety
pending the conclusion of a CCRB “into the underlying allegations in this case regarding Plaintiff.”
Mot. at 1. The City argues that this action should be stayed for three primary reasons: (1) the pending
1 The City’s Letter Motion to Stay (“Mot.”), ECF 7; Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to Stay (“Opp.”), ECF 8. The City
opted not to file a reply.
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CCRB investigation limits the parties’ access to discovery as documents generated by the CCRB are
protected by the deliberative process privilege; (2) the City cannot resolve legal representational issues
as to the individual defendants while the CCRB investigation continues, the outcome of which “may”
affect its decision;2 and (3) Plaintiff would not suffer any prejudice from a stay because the conclusion
of the CCRB investigation may help identify the Jane and John Does and streamline discovery. Id. at
2-3. Plaintiff opposes a stay of this action, arguing that other evidence in the possession of the City
that are unconnected to the CCRB investigation could be produced, the findings of the CCRB are not
necessary for Corporation Counsel to make a determination as to whether it can represent the officers,
and that public policy considerations favor Plaintiff’s legitimate interest in the expeditious resolution
of this action. Opp. at 2-3.
The Court’s “power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to
control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel, and for litigants.” Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 96 (2d Cir.
2012) (citing Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). The party moving for a stay must
“establish a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward.” United States v. Town
of Oyster Bay, 66 F. Supp. 3d 285, 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). “[A]bsent a showing of undue prejudice
upon” the defendant, “there is no reason why plaintiff should be delayed in its efforts to diligently
proceed to sustain its claim.” Louis Vuitton Malletier., 676 F.3d at 97 (citations omitted). In
evaluating a motion to stay civil proceedings, courts consider the following five factors:
(1) the private interests of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously with the civil
litigation as balanced against the prejudice to the plaintiffs if delayed; (2) the private
interest of and burden on the defendants; (3) the interests of the courts; (4) the interests
2 Pursuant to N.Y. Gen. Mun. L. § 50–k, the Office for Corporation Counsel for the City of New York (“Corporation
Counsel”) may only represent the officer-defendants if it determines that they were acting within the scope of their
public employment, in the discharge of their duties, and in accordance with the rules and regulations of their employing
agency.
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of persons not parties to the civil litigation; and (5) the public interest.
Rankine v. Levi Strauss & Co., 674 F. Supp. 3d 57, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 2023).
A stay of proceedings is considered an “extraordinary remedy,” for which a movant bears the
burden of “showing [ ] undue prejudice . . . or interference with his constitutional rights.” Louis
Vuitton Malletier, 676 F.3d at 97-98. Here, there is only a pending disciplinary proceeding. There
are not any Fifth Amendment concerns that would be presented if there was a pending criminal
indictment. See El v. Black, 23-CV-10317 (JAV), 2025 WL 1314240, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2025)
(citing Louis Vuitton Malletier, 676 F.3d at 98-99); cf. Citibank. N.A. v. Hakim, 92-CV-6233, 1993
WL 481335 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (noting that “district courts generally grant the extraordinary remedy of
a stay only after the defendant seeking a stay has been indicted”). The Court finds that none of the
reasons proffered by the City weighs in favor of a stay.
First, the mere existence of an investigation is insufficient to trigger the application of the cited
privilege. See Muniz v. City of New York, 12-CV-719 (TPG), 2012 WL 3104898, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July
17, 2012). Further, at this juncture, there is no discovery or privilege dispute properly before the Court.
Thus, the Court cannot assess the applicability or scope of the deliberative process privilege as to any
documents. Rodriguez v. City of New York, 24-CV-06289 (NCM) (TAM), 2025 WL 458243, at * 2
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2025) (stating that the court is unable to assess asserted privilege “as to any
documents or portions thereof before the plaintiff has them, the City has identified them, and the
parties have presented the dispute to the Court”); Muniz, 2012 WL 3104898, at *1 (the significance of
the privilege at this point is purely speculative). The City has not presented any information regarding
the documents that may implicate the deliberative process privilege. Although the City may
preemptively seek to assert that privilege as to any documents generated or produced during the CCRB
investigation, the deliberative process privilege is a “qualified limitation” on discovery. Rodriguez,
2025 WL 458243, at * 2.
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The deliberative process privilege is a narrow privilege that permits agencies to shield from
disclosure in-house drafts of materials that are ‘predecisional.’” Saint-Fort v. City of New York, 22-
CV-6879 (NRM) (MMH), 2023 WL 2771606, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2023) (quoting United States
Fish and Wildlife Service v. Sierra Club, Inc., 592 U.S. 261, 267-68 (2021). However, “even
predecisional, deliberative documents pertaining to the CCRB investigation are not definitively
shielded from discovery,” Capellan v. City of New York, 20-CV-00867, 2020 WL 13904618, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2020) (emphasis added). In any event, the determination of the appropriate
application of the privilege is left to the Court—it is not for the City to make a unilateral decision on
discovery and privilege issues.
The City’s conclusory concern of an “informational deficit” is unavailing. That the CCRB
investigation is ongoing does not bar discovery to otherwise proceed on other fronts, including initial
disclosures, even if supplemental discovery may be necessary after the conclusion of the CCRB
investigation. Indeed, Local Civil Rule 83.10, applicable to actions brought in the Southern District,
contemplates “limited discovery” for scenarios where a civil case is filed against the City and/or
NYPD employees when a CCRB investigation is pending. While “any CCRB records . . . shall be
suspended” for 30 days after the investigation is complete, the City nonetheless must serve on Plaintiff
initial disclosures, documents from the District Attorney’s office, and documents obtained from the
court file. S.D.N.Y. Local R. 83.10(e)(1)(B). Thus, “there is no indication that the Rule’s
contemplated stay applies to other discoverable documents . . . and certainly not to the entire action.”
Saint-Fort, 2023 WL 2771606, at *4 n. 7 (noting that while Local Rule 83.10 is not binding to actions
brought in the Eastern District, its discovery guidelines provided helpful guidance).
Second, the status of legal representation for the individual defendants does not weigh in favor
of a stay. The City is correct that N.Y. Gen. Mun. L. § 50-k(2) requires the City to “provide for the
defense” of an officer in a Section 1983 action if that officer “was acting within the scope of his public
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employment and in the discharge of his duties” at the time of the underlying events and “was not in
violation of any rule or regulation of his agency at the time the alleged act or omission occurred.”
Further, N.Y. Gen. Mun. L. § 50-k(5) provides that if the events that give rise to the civil action are
“also the basis of a disciplinary proceeding by the employee’s agency against the employee,”
corporation counsel “may” decline to represent an officer until the disciplinary proceeding “has been
resolved.” However, as observed by Rodriguez, El, and Saint-Fort, that corporation counsel has yet
to make a representation determination for the individual defendants is an insufficient basis to grant a
stay of this civil action. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 2025 WL 458243, at *3 (“[A] stay of the proceedings is
not a remedy commensurate with the City’s need to make [a representation] determination.”); El, 2025
WL 1314240, at *2 (“The need to obtain representation is common to many civil litigants. Here, the
defendant officer can represent himself or seek private counsel should Corporation Counsel elect not
to represent him.”); Saint-Fort 2023 WL 2771606, at *2 (“[T]he City cites no cases—and the Court
has found none—in which a court has indefinitely stayed a civil action because one of the parties had
not yet acquired representation.). Indeed, nothing in the statute “contemplate[s] staying the parallel
federal civil action pending the resolution of the disciplinary proceeding.” Saint-Fort, 2023 WL
2771606, at *4. The City cites no authority that it must make its determination as to the representation
of the individual officers based on the findings or recommendations of the CCRB. Moreover, the
City’s assertion that it is unable to communicate with the officers is misplaced because the officers are
not the only avenues for the City to investigate the allegations Plaintiff levies in his complaint.
The Court is receptive to the City’s concern about potential conflicts of interest: should
corporation counsel now represents the officers but later it is revealed that the officers violated NYPD
procedures, corporation counsel would be conflicted off of the entire case, causing the City and the
individual officers to find outside counsel. But even the City’s reliance on Muniz in this respect is
inapposite as Muniz granted a stay only as to the individual defendants, reasoning that the risk of
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conflicts of interest did not warrant a complete stay of the action. See Muniz, 2012 WL 3104898, at
*2 (tailoring stay to “accommodate[] [individual defendants’] interest in having the issue of their
representation clarified when the action goes forward against them”). Here, the individual defendants
may retain counsel through their union or privately retained counsel and enter an appearance in this
action while the City determines whether its counsel will represent them—a decision that may not be
made by the completion of the CCRB. See Saint-Fort v. City of New York, 22-CV-06879, 2023 WL
2771606, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2023) (noting that “the individual defendants to this action can
simply enter an appearance through their own counsel (either through the Police Benevolent
Association, or privately retained) while Corporation Counsel determines whether it can represent the
officers”). Thus, this does not weigh in favor of a stay, particularly where the individual defendants
“may end up being [the City’s] adversary in this action.” Id. at *2; accord Rodriguez, 2025 WL
458243, at *3.
Third, as Plaintiff aptly asserts, he has a “legitimate interest in the expeditious resolution of
this action.” Opp. at 2-3 (citing El, 2025 WL 1314240, at *2; then citing Rodriguez, 2025 WL 458243,
at *3); see also Rankine, 674 F. Supp. 3d at 68 (in determining whether to stay litigation, courts
consider “the private interests of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously with the civil litigation as
balanced against the prejudice to the plaintiffs if delayed”). “Discovery during the early stages of
litigation is material to any resolution of this case, in part to safeguard the memories of witnesses and
the preservation of documents.” Rodriguez, 2025 WL 458243, at *3 (cleaned up). This is particularly
true here, where the underlying conduct occurred more than a year ago, and a “CCRB investigation
can be a time-consuming and protracted process.” Saint-Fort, 2025 WL 2023 WL 2771606, at* 3.
Unable to provide an estimate as to when the CCRB investigation related to this case is likely to
conclude, the City requests an indefinite stay of all deadlines and conferences in this case pending
conclusion of the CCRB investigation into the underlying incident. Accordingly, the prejudice to
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plaintiff, who has an interest in expeditious resolution of this action, weighs against a stay.
Furthermore, the interests of the public and the courts weigh against a stay. Adjudicating the
merits of a case regarding allegations of police misconduct is deeply intertwined with the public’s
interest and trust in its law enforcement. Likewise, the Court’s interest lies in controlling its docket
with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Therefore, the relevant factors
collectively weigh against a stay of this action.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the City’s motion is denied. The City shall file an answer or
otherwise respond to the complaint by October 22, 2025.
SO ORDERED.
/s/
ORELIA E. MERCHANT
United States District Judge
September 22, 2025
Brooklyn, New York
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