The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SHAWNTA L. BROWN, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-CV-1266
:
Petitioner : (Judge Neary)
:
v. :
:
WARDEN OF FPC-LEWISBURG, :
:
Respondent :
MEMORANDUM
This is a habeas corpus case filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner, Shawnta
L. Brown, argues that the United States Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has improperly
deemed him ineligible for time credits under the First Step Act (“FSA”). The
petition will be denied.
I. Factual Background & Procedural History
Brown is serving a 248-month sentence of imprisonment imposed by the
United States District Court for the Western District of New York for conspiracy to
possess and distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
846(a)(1) and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). (Doc. 7-2 at 1). He is currently housed in the
Lewisburg Federal Prison Camp (“FPC-Lewisburg”) in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania.
Brown filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus on July 20, 2024, and it was
received and docketed on July 29, 2024. (Doc. 1). Brown asserts that the BOP has
improperly deemed him ineligible for time credits under the FSA and seeks a writ
of habeas corpus compelling the BOP to deem him eligible for time credits and
apply such credits to his sentence. (Id.) The case was initially assigned to United
States District Judge Malachy E. Mannion. Respondent responded to the petition
on August 26, 2024, arguing that the petition should be denied because Brown failed
to exhaust administrative remedies and because he is statutorily ineligible for time
credits under the FSA. (Doc. 7). Brown filed a reply brief on September 5, 2024,
making the petition ripe for review. (Doc. 6). The case was reassigned to the
undersigned on January 21, 2025.
II. Discussion
The FSA allows eligible inmates who successfully complete “evidence-based
recidivism reduction programs” (“EBRRs”) or productive activities (“PAs”) to
receive earned time credits to be applied toward time in pre-release custody or
supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A). An inmate may earn ten days of credit
for every thirty days of successful participation. Id. Eligible inmates who have been
assessed at a minimum or low risk of recidivism who do not increase their risk of
recidivism over two consecutive assessments may earn an additional five days of
credit for every thirty days of successful participation. Id.
Inmates who have been convicted of certain enumerated offense are
ineligible to receive credits under the FSA. See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D). Among
other offenses, if a petitioner has been convicted of “unlawful possession or use of a
firearm during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime” in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), he is ineligible to receive time credits under the FSA.
18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D)(xxii).
Brown is serving consecutive sentences for possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and another
offense. (See Doc. 7-2 at 1). Based on his Section 924(c) conviction, the BOP has
deemed him ineligible for FSA time credits.
Brown argues that he should not be deemed ineligible for FSA credits
because his conviction should not be considered a crime of violence. (Doc. 1 at 1).
Section 3632(d)(4)(D)(xxii), however, bars an inmate from receiving FSA time
credits if he has been convicted of “unlawful possession or use of a firearm during
and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.” (18 U.S.C. §
3632(d)(4)(D)(xxii) (emphasis added). Thus, it is immaterial whether his conviction
qualifies as a crime of violence: he is barred from receiving FSA credits because he
was convicted of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.
Brown additionally argues that it is improper for the BOP to deem him
ineligible for FSA time credits because his Section 924(c) sentence is being served
consecutively with his other sentence, and thus he should only be deemed ineligible
to receive FSA time credits for the number of months for which he is serving a
sentence for his Section 924(c) conviction. (Doc. 8).
Brown is incorrect. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3584(c), “multiple terms of
imprisonment ordered to run consecutively or concurrently shall be treated for
administrative purposes as a single, aggregate term of imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. §
3584(c).1 The petition will accordingly be denied because the BOP has correctly
deemed Brown ineligible for FSA credits because he is serving a sentence for
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c).2
III. Conclusion
The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. An appropriate order shall
issue.
/S/ KELI M. NEARY
Keli M. Neary
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated: September 22, 2025
1 Brown repeatedly notes that the Chevron doctrine has been overruled and
that federal courts no longer defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes.
(Docs. 1, 8). But the Chevron doctrine is irrelevant in this case. The relevant
statutes are not ambiguous and clearly bar Brown from receiving FSA time credits.
This conclusion is not altered by Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369
(2024).
2 The court does not address respondent’s alternative argument that Brown
failed to exhaust administrative remedies.