Craig v. Wetzel

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RUBEN CRAIG, III,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:21-cv-02020

V. (SAPORITO, J.)

SECRETARY JOHN WETZEL, et

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Ruben Craig, now incarcerated at SCI-Smithfield,

proceeds pro se on claims arising from injuries he sustained from other

prisoners at SCI-Dallas in November 2019. Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment (Doc. 54) is ripe for adjudication. For the reasons

described below, the Court grants summary judgment on all claims

except Craig’s Eighth Amendment claims against defendants John

Wetzel and Frank Depeiro.

I. BACKGROUND

Briefly summarized, Craig's complaint (Doc. 1) alleges that he was

attacked by unknown prisoners at SCI-Dallas on November 3, 2019. He

was temporarily placed in protective custody, but he alleges that various

defendants failed to properly investigate the incident despite his

insistence that he was still in danger. On November 20, he was released

from protective custody despite his objections. Defendant Depeiro

intentionally placed him in “B Block,” an area of the prison that did not

have surveillance cameras, was not well-monitored by staff, and was

disproportionately populated with violent inmates. The following day, he

was “repeatedly stabbed in the head and face” by unknown inmates. He

alleges that he has suffered permanent scarring, tinnitus, sinus injuries,

vision problems, and post-traumatic stress disorder.

Craig asserts violations of his Eighth Amendment right to be free

from cruel and unusual punishment, his First Amendment right “to

Petition Government for Redress of Grievances,” his Fourteenth

Amendment right to “Equal Treatment as a Similarly Situated Person,”

and his due process rights. The defendants include then-Secretary of

Corrections John Wetzel, then-Superintendent of SCI-Dallas Kevin

Ransom!, and nine employees affiliated with SCI-Dallas: Deputy

! Superintendent Ransom died while this case was pending. He has

not yet been dismissed because 90 days have not elapsed since the

defendants filed and served a statement noting his death. See (Doc. 76

(statement filed June 30, 2025)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1).

olf

Superintendent Miller, Hearing Examiner Charles McKeown, Depeiro,

Treverton, Kevin Fagen, Williams, Bohinski, John Doe #3, and John Doe

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is now ripe for

adjudication.* Craig has also moved for summary judgment, but briefing

on that motion has been delayed pending Craig’s receipt of supplemental

records from the DOC. See (Doc. 86).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary

judgment should be granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

2 Williams and Bohinski were initially named as John Does #1 and

#2, but were later identified through discovery. See (Doc. 35). Because

Does #3 and #4 have not been identified, those defendants will be

dismissed. See Blakeslee v. Clinton Cnty., 336 F. App’x 248, 250 (3d Cir.

2009) (“If reasonable discovery does not unveil the proper identities...

the John Doe defendants must be dismissed.”); Cole v. RHU Officers John

Doe, No. CIV. 1:04-CV-1218, 2005 WL 2648342, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 17,

2005).

° Defendants did not reply to Craig’s brief in opposition to summary

judgment (Doc. 85). Their request for additional time to do so, premised

on the mistaken assertion that Craig had not filed a brief, was denied as

moot, and they sought no further relief related to a potential reply. See

(Docs. 87, 88).

3 i

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might affect the outcome

of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A

dispute of material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence “is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all

inferences “should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party, and where the non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the

movant’s, then the non-movant’s must be taken as true.” Pastore v. Bel]

Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994). The party seeking

summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the

district court of the basis for its motion,” and demonstrating the absence

of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes such a showing, the non-movant

must set forth specific facts, supported by the record, demonstrating that

“the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to

the jury.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52.

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court must first

determine if the moving party has made a prima facie showing that it is

entitled to summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex, 477 U.S.

ade

at 331. Only once that prima facie showing has been made does the

burden shift to the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a

genuine dispute of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex, 477

U.S. at 331. Both parties may cite to “particular parts of materials in the

record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored

information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those

made for the purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory

answers or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).

TIT. MATERIAL Facts?4

Construing all disputed facts in favor of Craig, the non-movant, the

evidence indicates as follows:

4 Craig’s brief in opposition incorporates, by reference, arguments

and record citations made in support of his own motion for summary

judgment. See (Doc. 85 at 30). However, many of Craig’s citations refer

only to Bates numbers of discovery documents, or descriptions of the

documents (e.g., “PRC Hearing Report 20NOV19”), without any

indication of whether or where those documents appear in the record.

Consistent with the directive that pro se filings be liberally construed,

the Court has attempted to identify the evidence in the record

corresponding to Craig’s citations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) (in addition

to properly cited materials, “[t]he court... may consider other materials

in the record”). Where the supporting evidence is not apparent, the fact

is not accepted for purposes of the motion, and any contradictory

statement by the defendants is deemed admitted. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e); M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1.

he 5 i

A. November 3, 2019 Incident

On November 3, 2019, while incarcerated at SCI-Dallas, Craig was

involved in an altercation in his cell. An incident report, written by

defendant Trevethan, indicated that Craig reported to the infirmary “all

beat up,” with bruises on his hands. Questioned by Trevethan, Craig said

that he “fell in the yard,” but refused to answer any further questions.

Surveillance video showed that Craig had not been in the yard, and

Trevethan concluded that Craig had been fighting with his cellmate, who

also had injuries “consistent with” a fight. Craig, who was “bleeding

profusely,” was taken to the hospital, where he received “sutures and

surgical staples.” He was also given antibiotics after showing symptoms

of infection and a wound that “medical professionals identified as a bite

wound.” See (Doc. 85-1 at 3). When he returned from the hospital, he was

sent to the Restricted Housing Unit (RHU).

Craig was charged with “fighting” and “lying to [an] employee,” and

a disciplinary hearing was held on November 7. In contrast to his initial

claim that he fell, Craig provided oral and written statements that two

or three unidentified prisoners entered his cell while he was “dozling] off”

2 @

and assaulted him with a metal object>. Craig said that he “had no reason

to believe [his cellmate] was involved, and [does] not think he was even

present.” He also disputed that his hands were bruised. Although Craig

could not identify the assailants or a reason for the attack, he stated that

he had “no reason to suspect that this is over.” Ultimately, he was found

guilty of fighting, but not guilty of the charge of lying to staff.

On November 15, Craig filed a prison grievance complaining that

the administration at SCI-Dallas, and the DOC generally, “creatled] an

environment where . . . attacks [on prisoners are] prevalent.” Specifically,

Craig cited the November 3 incident as “one of a number of recent

attacks” resulting from staff opening the doors to prisoners’ cells; that

cameras should have been installed on his block rather than in “staff

areas’; and that he had been improperly housed with cellmates “having

histories of deviant, assaultive behavior.” See (Doc. 85-1 at 3).

5 Craig, citing to his written statement, claims that he “attested”

that his assailants were “armed with locks in socks” and attacked him

“after the guards let the attackers into his cell.” However, in the written

statement itself, Craig did not mention locks, and said that he “vaguely

recall[ed his] door opening” while he “doze[d] off,” but did not see who

opened the door. See (Doc. 77-4 at 3-4, 6; Doc. 80 at 8, § 11). To the extent

Craig’s description exceeds what is reflected in the statement, that

description is unsupported by evidence and is not considered.

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B. Release from RHU

The decision of when Craig would be released from the RHU was

made by the Program Review Committee (“PRC”). On November 20,

Craig attempted to speak to defendant Miller, the head of the PRC, but

she “passed by” his cell and would not speak to him even though he “tried

to tell her it was urgent.” Unknown to Craig, the PRC had already

determined that he would be released from the RHU that day. Craig

became aware of the decision and told defendant Williams that he

“wanted to be transferred to another jail.” Williams replied: “well, just

tell me what block you want to be transferred to here and we'll try to keep

you safe.” Craig requested to be placed on A Block. Craig also talked to

Depeiro, who told Craig that he would be transferred to “a block where I

could feel I’m safe,” and Craig again requested A Block. (Craig Dep.

15:16-16:1, 45:15-46:11, 52:14-53:6). However, at approximately 6:30 or

7-00 p.m., Craig was transferred from the RHU to B Block. The receiving

guards told Craig that Depeiro had made the decision to place him on B

Block despite his request for A Block. Ud, 17:4-20, 54:4-24).

The distinction between A Block and B Block was significant to

Craig because “A block has almost no incidents, no violence, whereas B

ee

block is perpetually violent.” Craig testified that there were fewer staff

observation areas on B Block (which Depeiro and some residents referred

to as “the Jungle”), and thus less of a deterrent for inmate violence.

Further, Depeiro often placed “more problematic and dangerous

prisoners” on B Block, and “more docile and complaint” prisoners on A

Block®. (Craig Dep. 18:2-20:7; Craig Aff. 4] 4, 6 (Nov. 22, 2022)).

The following morning, Craig “told [Depeiro] I needed to be moved

off [B] block, I didn’t feel safe.” Depeiro told Craig to “deal with it” and

“made a comment about, you know, ‘Welll,] get a knife like everyone else

does,’ and walked away.” 45 minutes later, Craig was seen “bleeding from

his face with a laceration and a bruise and lump on his forehead . . .

consistent with an assault.” The prison’s report indicates that Craig

“refused to give any information regarding his injuries.” See (Doc. 74-6).

However, Craig asserts that he told Superintendent Ransom and a

lieutenant that he was “stabbed in the face by several people” (Craig Dep.

The Court does not accept as fact, for summary judgment

purposes, Craig’s speculation that the motivation for Depeiro “cherry-

picking” prisoners included “maximizing the safety and comfort of his

staff and hilm]self.” See (Doc. 80 at 3, § 4(c)). Even accepting Craig’s

allegation that more dangerous prisoners were concentrated on B Block,

Craig’s testimony and affidavits do not establish a basis for his personal

knowledge of Depeiro’s motivation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).

7 9 Z

57:10-58:2), and that he told prison medical staff he had been “stabbed

multiple times with a makeshift metal knife.” He asserts that he suffered

a deviated septum, hearing loss, and permanent tinnitus, among other

injuries. (Doc. 80 at 28 (Craig Aff. June 28, 2025)).

C. Conditions at SCI-Dallas

The DOC’s own data indicates that between 2018 and 2020 at SCI-

Dallas, there were at least 93 significant incidents of “inmate-on-inmate”

violence, and 123 incidents of violence “in block” (where Craig’s

November 21 assault occurred).7 Further, at the time Craig was attacked,

there were no surveillance cameras covering the housing units. A DOC

document titled “Declaration of Emergency for Construction or Repair

Work,” dated August 1, 2019, roughly four months before Craig’s assault,

describes the following “emergency” at SCI-Dallas: “The existing camera

system at the facility is an analog camera system that does not cover the

7 Craig contends that SCI-Dallas, in general, is more violent than

SCI-Mercer and SCI-Phoenix, based the frequency of violent incidents

relative to the listed capacities of each prison. See (Doc. 79: Doc. 85-1 at

17-18). For purposes of the instant motion, the material fact is that the

DOC had documented numerous instances of inmate-on-inmate violence

at SCI-Dallas, including in the parts of the prison where Craig was

attacked.

a 10 is

housing units. A new IP camera system must be installed in the housing

units to provide adequate security coverage . . . [I]t is critical for the

safety and security of staff and inmates to have this completed as soon as

possible.” The declaration was signed as “approved,” and a DOC

administrator had “confirmed that funding will be made available.” (Doc.

85-1 at 19). In an interrogatory response, defendant Wetzel stated: “We

did not have cameras on the housing unit [in 2019] due to budget

constraints. We began a project to install cameras around this time or

shortly thereafter.” (Doc. 40-6 at 17, § 2). Aside from this statement, no

party has presented evidence specifying when the camera installation

began or when the cameras became operational.8

D. Administrative Remedies

The DOC provides a three-part procedure for inmate grievances:

initial review by a Grievance Officer, appeal to the Facility Manager, and

5 Craig claims that camera installation was not completed until

“late 2022.” The allegation of that specific time of completion is not

considered, as it appears to rely on evidence that is not in the record. See

(Doc. 80 n.36). Nonetheless, to the extent defendants would argue that

the commencement of a “project to install cameras [in 2019] or shortly

thereafter” should defeat an inference of deliberate indifference, the lack

of evidence on this point suggests an issue for trial.

7 Ta. -

final appeal to the Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals

(“SOIGA”). Craig filed at least seven grievances related to the subject of

this complaint. As relevant here®, these included Grievance No. 838907,

which complained specifically of Depeiro’s decision to place him on B

Block, and Grievance No. 840060, which complained of failure by the

DOC and SCI-Dallas to curtail inmate-on-inmate violence. Both

grievances were denied on initial review and by the facility manager.

Craig submitted final level appeals for Grievance No. 838907 on January

26, 2025, and for Grievance No. 838907 on January 28, 2025. See (Doc.

85-1 at 9-10, 14-15).

On February 4, with those appeals pending, Craig was transferred

from SCI-Dallas to SCI-Mercer for a court hearing, but he was

° Craig argues at length regarding all seven of his grievances. See

(Doc. 85 at 10-30). For brevity, the Court’s discussion is limited to two

grievances relevant to the claims that survive this motion, ie., the Eighth

Amendment claims against Wetzel and Depeiro. Although Wetzel himself

does not appear to have been named in any grievance, Grievance No.

840060 described Craig’s claim that the DOC’s lack of security measures

to address inmate-on-inmate violence constituted deliberate indifference

to his safety. See Williams v. Beard, 482 F.3d 637, 640 (3d Cir. 2007) (to

exhaust administrative remedies, the grievance in question must “alert

prison officials to [the] problem,” but need not “provide personal notice to

a particular official that he may be sued”) (quoting Jones v. Bock, 549

U.S. 199, 219 (2007)).

12 =

“marooned” at SCI-Mercer through August 25 because of restrictions on

prison transfers during the COVID-19 pandemic. See (Doc. 80 at 13, 15).

On February 19, Grievance Review Officer Amanda West issued notices

of “Action Required” for both grievances, indicating that Craig’s appeals

were subject to dismissal because he did not include copies of the lower-

level responses. The notice granted Craig 15 working days in which to

submit the documentation, as “a courtesy of this office.” Despite Craig’s

transfer to SCI-Mercer, each form contains the notation “Current SCI:

DAL.” (Doc. 85-1 at 10, 15).

Craig did not receive the Action Required notices until he returned

to SCI-Dallas. On September 3, after his return to SCI-Dallas, Craig re-

filed his final grievance appeals. He explained that he had been located

at SCI-Mercer “without [his] property,” and was thus unable to respond

to the “Action Required” notice, despite requests to staff to have his

property forwarded from SCI-Dallas. (Doc. 85 at 15). Nonetheless, Craig’s

final appeals were both dismissed on September 28, 2020, on the basis

that “[tlhis office sen[t] you an action required notice dated 2/19/20

advising that you had 15 working days to provide the remaining required

documentation: however, the documents weren't received until 9/10/20.”

= 18

(Doc. 85-1 at 10, 15).

IV. DIscUSssION

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendants request summary judgment on the basis that Craig

failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Under the Prison Litigation

Reform Act (““PLRA”), prisoners complaining about the conditions of their

confinement must exhaust available administrative remedies before

filing suit in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The PLRA requires

proper exhaustion, meaning plaintiffs must administratively grieve their

claims in accordance with the procedural rules of the prison in which they

are incarcerated. Downey v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 305 (3d Cir.

2020) (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006)). However, the

prisoner is only required to exhaust administrative remedies that are

“available.” See Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 268 (3d Cir. 2018)

(citing Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93 (2006)). A prison grievance process is

unavailable, and thus may be deemed exhausted: (1) when the remedy

“operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently

unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates”; (2) when it is “so

opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use”; or (3)

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“when prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a

grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or

intimidation.” See Hardy v. Shaikh, 959 F.3d 578, 584-87 (3d Cir. 2020)

(quoting Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643 (2016)).

The DOC’s grievance policy does not specifically address the

situation where an Action Required notice is appropriately! generated

but not delivered to the complainant. See (Doc. 74-8 at 7-41 (DC-ADM

804)). The policy indicates that an inmate who is “transferred . . . prior to

the appeal process being completed . . . may continue to pursue the

grievance or appeal by notifying the Facility Manager of the facility

where the grievance was originally filed.” See (id. at 29, § 2(B)(2)()).

Craig sought help from staff at SCI-Mercer, but there is no evidence that

he notified the Facility Manager of SCI-Dallas. However, the policy also

requires that an appeal to final review be “responded to within 30

working days of receipt unless otherwise extended.” (Jd. at 27, §

2(B)(2)(a)). One court found that SOIGA violated this rule when it failed

to deliver an Action Required notice to the prisoner within 30 days, and

10 Craig does not dispute that he failed to submit the appropriate

documentation with his initial appeals, or that the Action Required

notices were justified.

Be

thus the prisoner had exhausted all available remedies. See Kendrick □□

Hann, No. 1:19-CV-1642, 2022 WL 13978767, at *2, 6-7 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 21,

2022) (quoting Shifflett v. Korszniak, 934 F.3d 356, 365 (3d Cir. 2019) (“As

soon as a prison fails to respond to a properly submitted grievance or

appeal within the time limits prescribed by its own policies, it has made

its administrative remedies unavailable . . .”)).

Ultimately, given that Craig did not receive the Action Required

notices, and that the grievance policy provides no clear procedure for this

circumstance, the Court finds a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether further administrative remedies were “unavailable.” See

Kendrick, 2022 WL 13978767, at *6-7; Miller v. McClure, No. 2:17-CV-

01457, 2020 WL 1049750, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2020) (exhaustion

“excused” where a prisoner who learned of an Action Required notice

after the applicable deadline “forwarded ‘everything right away”); see

also Small v. Camden Cnty., 728 F.3d 265, 273 (3d Cir. 2013)

(administrative remedies unavailable where the grievance policy “did not

contemplate” the appropriate procedure when a prisoner does not receive

a response).

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B. Eighth Amendment Claims

Turning to the merits, the parties’ briefing is primarily devoted to

Craig’s Eighth Amendment claims premised on deliberate indifference to

his risk of assault by other prisoners. Defendants argue that Craig’s

evidence does not show a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, or if

it did, that various defendants were not personally involved. For the

following reasons, Craig’s claim cannot proceed against defendants

Ransom, Miller, McKeown, Treverton, Fagen, Williams, and Bohinski.

In general, “[p]rison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners

from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (citation omitted). To state a failure to protect claim

under the Eighth Amendment, “the inmate must show that he is

incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,”

and the prison official must exhibit deliberate indifference, meaning that

the officials “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health

or safety.” Jd. at 837. A defendant can rebut a prima facie demonstration

of deliberate indifference by showing that he did not have the requisite

level of knowledge or awareness of the risk, or that, although he did know

of the risk, he took reasonable steps to prevent the harm from occurring.

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Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 133 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Farmer,

511 U.S. at 844).

First, Craig imputes deliberate indifference from various

defendants’ knowledge of his statements about the November 3 assault.

He stated cryptically that he had “no reason to suspect that this is over,”

but he provided no facts to support that speculation. This single,

unexplained altercation would not itself show an ongoing, substantial

risk of serious harm sufficient to show deliberate indifference. See Allam

v. McGinley, No. 1:20-CV-00933, 2021 WL 253978, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Jan.

26, 2021) (description of a “single incident” of violence, combined with

other vague allegations that “merely articulated a generalized fear of

harm,” was insufficient) (citations omitted). Moreover, prison staff

investigated the incident and found, contrary to Craig’s shifting

allegations, that his injuries arose from a fight with his cellmate. Craig

claims there was “no evidence” for that conclusion, but this ignores that

his cellmate was found with injuries consistent with a fight. Craig

disagrees with the investigative findings of the prison staff, but that

disagreement does not show deliberate indifference by the investigators,

the hearing officer, or any other defendant who was later informed about

-18-

this incident.

Craig’s later complaints from the RHU are also insufficient to

impute deliberate indifference. His November 15 grievance complained

that cameras had been installed in “staff areas” rather than housing

units, and that unspecified prior cellmates had “histories of deviant,

assaultive behavior.”!! His oral complaints to officers on the day of his

release from the RHU provided no further detail, other than that he did

not feel “safe.” These vague and general complaints would not put a

defendant on notice of a specific, substantial risk of serious harm.!3 Thus,

11 The November 15 grievance also complained that the November

3 incident was “one of a number of recent attacks” resulting from staff

opening the doors to prisoners’ cells. However, as noted above (n. 5), there

was no apparent basis for Craig to allege this given that he claimed to be

asleep when his door was opened and unaware of who opened it.

12 Craig also objects that the procedure of his release from the RHU

violated prison policy, but “a prison policy manual does not have the force

of law and does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” See

Jordan v. Rowley, No. 1:16-CV-1261, 2017 WL 2813294, at *2 (M.D. Pa.

June 29, 2017) (quotations and citations omitted).

13 See Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 371 (3d Cir. 2012) (‘the risk

that an inmate with a history of violence might attack another inmate

for an unknown reason” is insufficient for a failure-to-protect claim);

Blackstone v. Thompson, 568 F. App’x 82, 83-84 (3d Cir 2014)

(nonprecedential); Bracey v. Harlow, No. CV 11-04 E, 2013 WL 12203244,

at *8-9 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2013) (isolated prior fights among inmates did

(continued on next page)

ie 19 Mi

to the extent these complaints were presented, directly or indirectly, to

defendants Ransom, Miller, McKeown, Treverton, Fagen, Williams, and

Bohinski, they do not support an inference of deliberate indifference, and

those defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

C. Depeiro

However, the evidence supports a viable Eighth Amendment claim

against Depeiro. On this record, Depeiro is differently situated from the

other defendants, because he alone directed that Craig be placed on B

Block after his release from the RHU. Further, Depeiro’s knowledge of

the risk was not merely based on Craig’s generalized complaints or

statements that he did not feel “safe.” Viewed in the light most favorable

to Craig, the record indicates that Craig was to be placed on A Block for

his safety, but Depeiro used his authority as unit manager to overrule

that recommendation. The evidence that Depeiro advised Craig to “get a

knife like everyone else does” on B Block, and that Depeiro routinely

placed more violent prisoners on that block (and referred to it as “the

Jungle”), combined with the alleged lack of staff presence on the block,

not establish a sufficient “pattern of violence to put officials on notice” of

a substantial risk to the plaintiff) (listing cases).

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all support an inference that Depeiro knew Craig’s placement there

would pose a concrete, substantial risk of serious harm. Although Depeiro

would not have been able to identify the potential assailant(s), that is not

dispositive of deliberate indifference, given his particularized knowledge

of the conditions in B Block to which Craig was exposed. See Farmer, 511

U.S. at 843 (“[I]t does not matter whether the risk comes from a single

source or multiple sources, any more than it matters whether a prisoner

faces an excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or because

all prisoners in his situation face such a risk.”); Riley v. Jeffes, 777 □□□□

143, 145-48 (3d Cir. 1985).

Defendants assert Depeiro’s entitlement to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity applies to federal and state actors unless (1) the

facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate a

violation, and (2) the alleged right was clearly established at the time of

the violation. Thomas v. City of Harrisburg, 88 F.4th 275, 281 (3d Cir.

2023) (citation omitted). A clearly established right is one so apparent

that “every reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is

unlawful.” James v. N.J. State Police, 957 F.3d 165, 169 (3d Cir. 2020)

(quoting Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018)).

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“[T]he right to be protected against violence inflicted by other

inmates is clearly established.” Williams v. Smith, 507 F. App’x 260, 263

(3d Cir. 2012). A reasonable prison official would know that intentionally

placing an inmate in a dangerous and poorly monitored area of the prison

and telling him to defend himself by “get[ting] a knife like everyone else

does” would be unlawful. Evidence of such conduct forecloses any

entitlement to qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage. See,

e.g., Burk v. Runk, No. 1:19-CV-01358, 2021 WL 6126233, at *8 (M.D. Pa.

Dec. 28, 2021) (“Because Burk has made a showing sufficient to overcome

Defendants’ Rule 56 motion as to the merits of his failure-to-protect

claim, he has ‘also made a showing sufficient to overcome any claim to

qualified immunity.”) (quoting Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 142 n.15);

Wilson v. Gromel, No. 3:18-CV-1637, 2023 WL 2088429, at *6-7 (M.D. Pa.

Feb. 17, 2023).

D. Wetzel

The evidence also supports a viable claim against Secretary Wetzel

based on the absence of surveillance cameras, or other adequate security

measures, on the housing units at SCI-Dallas. Clearly, the absence of

surveillance cameras on a prison housing unit does not automatically

~ FF -

create an Eighth Amendment claim for any prisoner injured there.14

However, in this case, the August 2019 Emergency Declaration explicitly

acknowledged that cameras “must be installed” on the SCI-Dallas

housing units “to provide adequate security coverage . . . It is critical for

the security and safety of staff and inmates to have this completed as

soon as possible.” This evidence, along with the data regarding inmate

assaults at SCI-Dallas, supports an inference that Craig was

“incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm”

at SCI-Dallas in November 2019. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

This same evidence supports an inference of deliberate indifference

by Wetzel specifically. “If an Eighth Amendment plaintiff presents

M4 See, e.g., Lee v. Link, No. 17-CV-2528, 2018 WL 1156154, at *3

(E.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2018) (“Although prison blind spots undoubtedly create

a risk of danger to inmates, making prison officials’ knowledge of a blind

spot relevant to the deliberate indifference inquiry, knowledge of the

existence of a blind spot, standing alone, does not support the reasonable

inference that prison officials knew of a substantial risk of serious harm

to inmate safety.”).

15 Defendants argue that Wetzel lacked the requisite “personal

involvement” with Craig, but the evidence supports an inference of

Wetzel’s “participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence” in the

constitutional violation. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d

Cir. 1988). The fact that Craig did not speak to Wetzel, or that Wetzel did

not know of the facts of Craig’s case in advance, is not dispositive. See,

(continued on next page)

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evidence showing that a substantial risk of inmate attacks was

longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison

officials in the past, and the circumstances suggest that the defendant-

official being sued had been exposed to information concerning the risk

and thus must have known about it, then such evidence would permit a

trier of fact to find that the defendant-official had actual knowledge of

the risk.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842-43. Such is the case here. Taking all

facts and reasonable inferences in Craig’s favor, the record indicates that

Wetzel participated!® in the decision not to install cameras in the housing

units of SClI-Dallas prior to November 2019, and through that

participation, would have known of the DOC’s acknowledgement that not

having cameras was an imminent emergency for inmate security. As

e.g., Jeffes, 777 F.2d at 146-47 (permitting claims against “high’ prison

officials having the responsibility and duty to take affirmative corrective

action”).

16 Craig argues that all defendants were generally “aware of the

dangers associated with having no surveillance . . . as evidenced by the

2019 Emergency Declaration . . .”. However, there is no evidence that any

named defendant at SCI-Dallas was specifically aware of the declaration,

and as noted above, awareness of general “dangers” of not having

surveillance cameras would be insufficient. See Victor v. Wetzel, No. 1:20-

CV-425, 2020 WL 23743878, at *6-7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2020); Link, 2018

WL 1156154, at *3.

24 i.

noted, the lack of cameras is not itself dispositive: what is important is

the absence of evidence that Wetzel, and the officials under his command,

sought to alleviate the “emergency” of Craig’s substantial risk of serious

harm between August 2019, when the emergency was acknowledged, and

November 2019, when Craig was assaulted.

On this record, Wetzel is not entitled to qualified immunity. In

general, federal courts afford the decisions of prison administrators,

particularly those of state prisons, considerable deference. See Turner v.

Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987) “Running a prison is an inordinately

difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the

commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province

of the legislative and executive branches of government.”). Matters of

institutional security “are peculiarly within the province and professional

expertise of corrections officials, and . .. courts should ordinarily defer to

their expert judgment in such matters.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547-

48 (1979). However, the record, construed in the light most favorable to

Craig, does not suggest a “judgment” to forgo cameras for some

alternative means of security. Rather, the record indicates that as of

November 2019, nothing had been done to ameliorate the “emergency”

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documented more than three months before.

As noted, a prisoner’s right not to be “violently assaulted in prison,”

and prison officials’ corresponding duty to take “reasonable measures to

guarantee the safety of the inmates,” are beyond dispute. See Farmer,

511 U.S. at 832-34. The existence of budget constraints would not

supersede this obligation: “the cost of protecting a constitutional right

cannot justify its total denial.” Bounds vy. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977):

see also Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d

326, 336-37 (3d Cir. 1987). Thus, even accounting for budget issues, it is

clearly established that prison officials must take reasonable measures

to ameliorate known conditions posing a substantial risk of inmate-on-

inmate violence.!” Therefore, Wetzel is not entitled to summary judgment

See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832: see, e.g., Ryan v. Burlington Cnty.

N.J., 708 F. Supp. 623, 630-33 (D.N.J.), aff’d, 889 F.2d 1286 (3d Cir. 1989)

(denying qualified immunity to a prison board based on prisoners’ clearly

established right to a “safe prison environment” free from inmate

violence); Barefield v. Dunn, 688 F. Supp. 3d 1026, 1095 (M.D. Ala. 2023)

(qualified immunity inappropriate because the relevant officials “were on

notice that taking no action when knowingly faced with an indisputably

excessive risk of inmate-on-inmate violence from conditions of

confinement constitutes a violation of the Eighth Amendment.”); Wilson

v. Dunn, 618 F. Supp. 3d 1253, 1281-83 (N.D. Ala. 2022) (prison

defendants’ failure to “create” or “enforce” policies to remedy known

conditions of widespread violence violated a clearly established right).

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on Craig’s Eighth Amendment claim.

E. First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Claims

Craig asserts violations of three other constitutional rights, which

he does not directly address in his briefing: his First Amendment right

“to Petition Government for Redress of Grievances,” his Fourteenth

Amendment right to “Equal Treatment as a Similarly Situated Person,”

and his due process rights. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment

on all of these claims.

As described in his complaint, Craig’s First Amendment claim is

premised on “the breakdown in the grievance system resulting in his

assault.” However, “[vliolations of grievance procedures do not give rise

to a cognizable claim under section 1983,” because prison inmates do not

have a constitutionally protected right to a grievance process. Jwanicki v.

Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 582 F. App’x 75, 81 (3d Cir. 2014); Jackson v.

Gordon, 145 F. App’x 774, 777 (3d Cir. 2005). Next, Craig appears to

allege an equal protection claim, but he has not presented evidence of any

“similarly situated” inmates, nor shown that he was intentionally treated

differently from other inmates because of membership in a protected

class. See Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 305 (3d Cir. 2016).

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To the contrary, Craig’s contentions of systemic issues at SCI-Dallas

undermine any claim of intentional discrimination against him

personally.

Finally, Craig asserts a violation of his due process rights, which

the Court construes as a challenge to the disciplinary proceedings that

followed the November 3 assault. Although the record is unclear, it

appears that Craig’s sanction was initially intended to be 30 to 60 days

in disciplinary segregation, which was shortened due to his early release

by the PRC. See (Doc. 74-4 at 6); (Craig Dep. 46:21-47:5). Placement in

disciplinary segregation for this length of time would not implicate a

liberty interest giving rise to a due process claim. See Smith v. Mensinger,

293 F.3d 641, 653 (3d Cir. 2002) (seven months in disciplinary segregation

was insufficient to trigger a due process violation: “[Clonfinement in

administrative or punitive segregation will rarely be sufficient, without

more, to establish the kind of ‘atypical’ deprivation of prison life

necessary to implicate a liberty interest.”) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515

U.S. 472, 486 (1995)). Nor has Craig presented evidence of any flaw in

the disciplinary proceedings, aside from his disagreement with the

hearing examiner's findings. See, e.g., McKeithan v. Beard, 322 F. App’x

« HS «

194, 199 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Due process requires only that a prisoner have

an opportunity to rebut the allegedly false accusations and evidence.”).

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons described above, defendants’ motion for summary

judgment will be granted in part, and the case will proceed only on Craig’s

Eighth Amendment claims against Wetzel and Depeiro. An appropriate

order follows.

Dated: September 22, 2025 s/Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.

JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.

United States District Judge

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