The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
EASTERN DIVISION
DERRICK SINGLETON, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v. Case No. 1:24-cv-1081-CLM
JOHN Q. HAMM, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs are a trio of former Alabama prisoners. They sue current
and former members of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles
(“Board”) and the Alabama Department of Corrections (“DOC”) for failing
to end their incarceration during the time period required by Alabama’s
Mandatory Release Law, Ala. Code § 15-22-26.2. The Board and DOC ask
the court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims. For the reasons stated below, the
court GRANTS IN PART Defendants’ motions to dismiss (docs. 30, 32).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs allege they spent too much time in prison because the
Board and DOC violated Alabama’s Mandatory Release Law. So the court
begins by discussing what that law is and how it works before explaining
Plaintiffs’ factual allegations.
1. The Mandatory Release Law
As part of its effort to combat recidivism and prison overcrowding,
Alabama enacted the original Mandatory Release Law in 2015. The
original Mandatory Release Law “shortened the carceral sentences of
everyone to whom it applies, converting the last months of their sentences
from terms of incarceration into terms of parole.” (Doc. 1, p. 13). To do so,
the original Mandatory Release Law provided:
§ 15-22-26.2. Mandatory supervision period on a straight sentence.
(a) A convicted defendant sentenced to a period of
confinement under the supervision of the Department of
Corrections shall be subject to the following provisions,
unless the defendant is released to a term of probation or
released on parole under the provisions of Chapter 22 of Title
15:
(1) If the defendant is sentenced to a period of five years or
less, he or she shall be released to supervision by the Board
of Pardons and Paroles no less than three months and no
more than five months prior to the defendant’s release date;
(2) If the defendant is sentenced to a period of more than five
years but less than 10 years, he or she shall be released to
supervision by the Board of Pardons and Paroles no less than
six months and no more than nine months prior to the
defendant’s release date; or
(3) If the defendant is sentenced to a period of 10 years or
more, he or she shall be released to supervision by the Board
of Pardons and Paroles no less than 12 months and no more
than 24 months prior to the defendant’s release date.
(b) The provisions of this section shall not apply to a
defendant convicted of any sex offense involving a child, as
defined in Section 15-20A-4.
(c) Prior to the defendant’s release to supervision pursuant
to this section, notice of such release shall be provided to the
victim and interested parties through the victim notification
system established pursuant to Section 15-22-36.2 and
under the provisions of Section 15-22-36.
(Doc. 1, p. 13) (emphasis added). The original Mandatory Release Law did
not apply to (1) individuals whose crimes of conviction occurred before
January 30, 2016; (2) individuals already released on parole; (3)
individuals released to probation; (4) individuals convicted of a sex offense
involving a child; and (5) individuals serving life sentences.
The Alabama Legislature tasked DOC with the job of releasing
eligible prisoners to the Board’s supervision. Plaintiffs allege that the
Legislature’s use of the mandatory “shall” in §§ 15-22-26.2(a)(1)-(3)
stripped DOC of any discretion to refuse to release an eligible individual
onto supervised release. They claim the original Mandatory Release Law
only provided DOC with discretion in determining when to release eligible
individuals onto supervised release within the range of months the
statute provides. These so-called “mandatory release ranges” are
summarized in the table below:
Sentence Range (in years) Original Mandatory Release
Range (in months)
0 < x < 5 3-5
5 < x < 10 6-9
10 < x 12-24
Plaintiffs also allege that the original Mandatory Release Law did
not give the Board discretion about whether to supervise released
individuals. According to Plaintiffs, “the Board has no legal authority to
decline to accept [an eligible] individual onto parole; it is required to
supervise that individual.” (Doc. 1, p. 16).
Five years after the original Mandatory Release Law went into
effect, Alabama lawmakers passed a bill amending the Mandatory
Release Law. The amended Mandatory Release Law, which became
effective in January 2023, added a retroactivity provision that made the
law applicable to all eligible prisoners regardless of their offense dates. It
also shortened the mandatory release range for inmates sentenced to
imprisonment for a term of greater than 10 years from 12-24 months to
10-12 months. The amended mandatory release ranges are reflected in
the table below, which highlights the change in red:
Sentence Range (in years) Amended Mandatory Release
Range (in months)
0 < x < 5 3-5
5 < x < 10 6-9
10 < x 10-12
Aside from the changes mentioned above, the amended Mandatory
Release Law mimics the original Mandatory Release Law.
2. Plaintiffs’ Alleged Overdetention
Plaintiffs Derrick Singleton, Ray Traylor, and Deandra Whitehead
are former Alabama prisoners. Each claims that he or she was eligible for
supervised release before the end of their sentences under the Mandatory
Release Law but were nonetheless kept in prison longer than allowed
because of the policies and practices (or lack thereof) of DOC and the
Board. Plaintiffs’ complaint provides the following table illustrating their
alleged overdetention:
Plaintiff Required Actual Length of
Release Date Release Date Overdetention
Derrick December 28, 2023 February 27, 61 days
Singleton 2024
Ray Traylor December 24, 2023 December 26, 2 days
2023
Deandra October 12, 2023 February 13, 124 days
Whitehead 2024
(Doc. 1, p. 5).
Defendants are current and former members of the Board and DOC.
According to Plaintiffs, the Mandatory Release law requires the Board
and DOC members “to maintain policies and practices to ensure that all
eligible individuals are released from [DOC] custody to supervision by the
Board by their latest mandatory release dates.” (Doc. 1, p. 30). Yet
Plaintiffs contend the Board and DOC failed to abide by their statutory
mandates, resulting in systemic overdetention.
Plaintiffs’ complaint provides several actions and inactions by the
Board and DOC that resulted in overdetention. For example, Plaintiffs
allege that Defendants (1) maintain a policy or practice “that the [DOC]
will not release any individual to supervision by the Board on mandatory
release unless and until [the Board] approves the individual’s home plan,”
(2) maintain “a policy or practice of releasing individuals from the [DOC’s]
custody to supervision of the Board on mandatory release only twice a
month” on Tuesdays, and (3) maintain a policy or practice “of denying
mandatory release to eligible individuals who have previously violated
parole or probation.” (See Doc. 1, p. 32, 36-37). Plaintiffs allege these
policies and practices, among others, contributed to their overdetention.
3. Plaintiffs’ Claims and Defendants’ Motions
Plaintiffs sue DOC and Board members in their individual
capacities for numerous constitutional rights violations, negligence, and
false imprisonment. Plaintiffs plead five counts in total, which the court
summarizes below:
• Count I: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Violation of Substantive Due
Process Under the Fourteenth Amendment;
• Count II: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Violation of the Eighth
Amendment’s Prohibition on Cruel and Unusual
Punishment;
• Count III: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Violation of the Ex Post
Facto Clause;
• Count IV: Violation of Ala. Code § 6-5-170 for False
Imprisonment;
• Count V: Negligence Under Alabama State Law.
(Doc. 1, p. 46-54). Plaintiffs base Counts I, II, IV, and V on their
overdetention alone. Plaintiffs Singleton and Traylor bring Count III (§
1983 claim for violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause), arguing that because
they were sentenced to terms of imprisonment greater than 10 years, they
were supposed to be released 12-24 months before the end of their
sentences under the original Mandatory Release Law. But since the
amended Mandatory Release Law applies retroactively, their mandatory
release range was reduced to 10-12 months, effectively keeping them in
prison for up to 12 more months. Plaintiffs Singleton and Traylor argue
this change in the Mandatory Release Law violates the Ex Post Facto
Clause. Plaintiffs seek class certification for each of their claims.
The Board and DOC ask this court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims
(docs. 30, 32). According to Defendants, Plaintiffs claims must be
dismissed because, among other things, they lack standing and fail to
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead
enough facts to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). A claim is plausible on
its face when a plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. When considering the motion, the court accepts
all factual allegations of the complaint as true and construes them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282,
1284 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
This tenet, of course, is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678. “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679.
Courts should limit their “consideration to the well-pleaded factual
allegations, documents central to or referenced in the complaint, and
matters judicially noticed.” La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d
840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004).
DISCUSSION
As discussed above, DOC and the Board ask the court to dismiss
Plaintiffs’ claims for various reasons. Two of those arguments are
controlling and require dismissal. First, Plaintiffs lack standing to bring
their claims against the Board because Plaintiffs cannot establish
traceability between the Board and their alleged overdetention. Second,
Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against DOC members are barred because the
federal habeas corpus statute provides Plaintiffs’ specific—and only—
federal remedy for unlawful detention (here, overdetention).
A. Plaintiffs’ Standing to Sue the Board (Counts I-V)
The Board argues that, because the Mandatory Release Law does
not give its members authority to identify inmates eligible for supervisory
release, calculate mandatory release ranges, or order release, Plaintiffs
lack standing to bring claims for their alleged overdetention. Standing “is
an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement
of Article III,” so the court addresses the issue of standing first. See
Diamaio v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 520 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
“To establish Article III standing, the plaintiff must show a causal
connection between [its] injury and the challenged action of the
defendant.” Lewis v. Governor of Ala., 944 F.3d 1287, 1296 (11th Cir. 2019)
(en banc) (internal quotations omitted). This requirement, known as
“traceability,” asks a simple question: Who caused the plaintiff’s injury?
The Mandatory Release Law provides a simple answer. DOC has
custody over inmates eligible for supervisory release, so DOC bears the
duty of releasing inmates on time. The Board merely receives released
inmates. So only DOC—not the Board—could have caused Plaintiffs’
alleged overdetention. See Ala. Code § 15-22-26.2(a)(1)-(3) (stating that a
convicted defendant “under the supervision of the Department of
Corrections . . . shall be released to the supervision of the Board of Pardons
and Paroles”). Because the Board did not—and could not—overdetain
Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs cannot trace their alleged overdetention to the Board.
Eleventh Circuit precedent supports this conclusion. Consider for
example Lewis v. Governor of Ala., 944 F.3d 1287 (2019). In that case, a
group of plaintiffs sued the Alabama Attorney General, seeking to enjoin
an Alabama law that set a standard minimum wage and preempted local
laws that provided a higher minimum wage. Id. at 1292-93. Sitting en
banc, the court held that the plaintiffs could not establish standing
because there was no “traceable” injury flowing from the actions of the
Alabama Attorney General. Id. at 1299. Indeed, the challenged statute
didn’t “require (or even contemplate) ‘enforcement’ by anyone, let alone
the Attorney General.” Id. That fact alone “count[ed] heavily against
plaintiffs’ traceability argument” and ultimately doomed it. See id.
The Eleventh Circuit doubled down on this reasoning in City of S.
Miami v. Governor of Florida, 65 F.4th 631, 640-41 (11th Cir. 2023).
There, a group of organizations sued the Florida Governor and Attorney
General, seeking to enjoin Florida’s anti-sanctuary city law. Id. at 634.
The problem for the organizations was, in part, that neither the Florida
Governor nor the Attorney General played an enforcement role under the
statute. Id. at 641. So just like in Lewis, the organizations could not
establish a traceable injury. Instead, “any injury stem[med] from local law
enforcement” because only local law enforcement had a duty to enforce the
challenged statute. See id.
Our Plaintiffs have the same traceability problem as the Lewis and
City of S. Miami plaintiffs. As explained above, the Board could not have
caused Plaintiffs’ injuries because the Board does not play an enforcement
role under the Mandatory Release Law. Plaintiffs attempt to side-step
this issue in their Response Brief by asserting that the Board’s standing
arguments “rely on facts contrary to those alleged in the complaint and
depend on evidence extrinsic to the complaint.” (Doc. 37, p. 32). But that’s
not true. The court need not—and does not—look any further than the
Mandatory Release Law’s plain language to see that Plaintiffs lack
standing against the Board. Plaintiffs cannot create from whole cloth
duties for the Board that the statute does not provide. The Mandatory
Release Law shoulders DOC—and only DOC—with the job of releasing
inmates eligible for supervisory release. That means the Board could not
have caused Plaintiffs’ overdetention, and under Eleventh Circuit
precedent, Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are not traceable to the Board. So
the court must dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against the Board.
B. Plaintiffs’ § 1983 Claims Against DOC (Counts I-ITI)
With the Board out of the equation, DOC asks the court to dismiss
Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against its members, arguing that Plaintiffs’ sole
federal remedy for their alleged overdetention was to file a habeas petition
to seek release during their overdetention—not wait until after their
release to seek money damages under § 19838. The court agrees.
“An inmate convicted and sentenced under state law may seek
federal relief under two primary avenues: ‘a petition for habeas corpus, ...
and a complaint under ... § 1983.” Hutcherson v. Riley, 468 F.3d 750, 754
(11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 578, 579 (2006)).
The habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, authorizes federal courts to grant
habeas remedies to state prisoners who are “in custody in violation of the
Constitution,” while § 1983 authorizes federal courts to grant money
damages and equitable relief against any state actor who deprives a
person of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(8); 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court
borrows the Fifth Circuit’s chart to demonstrate the overlap:
LOjituiousrere) atl
oe Tenk ielojec
longo lores ke te
its) □□
General Remedy
Prisoners
ae o Specific Remedy
speedier
release: Habeas
See Wilson v. Midland County, 116 F.4th 384, 390 (5th Cir. 2024) (en
banc).
Recognizing the overlap, the Supreme Court has held that habeas—
as the more specific remedy—controls. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477, 486-87 (1994); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973). That
means when a current or former prisoner could seek or could have sought
the specific remedy of habeas, he cannot assert claims for general
remedies under § 1983.
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475
(1973) and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997) illustrate the point.
In Preiser, a group of prisoners sued state officials under § 1983 and
sought an injunction restoring good-time credits. 520 U.S. at 475. The
Court determined that if the prisoners were successful in restoring their
good-time credits, the result would have been their earlier release from
custody—a habeas remedy. Id. at 488-90. As a result, the Court held the
federal habeas statute supplied the “exclusive [federal] remedy” for such
claims and denied the prisoners’ § 1983 claims as improper. Id. at 489.
Preiser involved claims for equitable relief. The Court expanded its
reasoning to claims for money damages in Edwards. In Edwards, a state
prisoner brought a § 1983 claim against prison officials, claiming they
illegally revoked his good-time credits. 520 U.S. at 643. Attempting to
differentiate his case from Preiser, Edwards requested monetary damages
instead of equitable relief. See id. at 643-44. Still, the Court rejected his
claims because “a win for the prisoner would ‘necessarily imply the
invalidity of the deprivation of his good-time credits’ and get him out of
prison 30 days sooner.” Crittindon v. LeBlanc, 37 F.4th 177, 194 (2022)
(Oldham, J., dissenting) (quoting Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646). “Thus, under
Preiser and Edwards, a prisoner who sues to get out of jail (or get out of
jail sooner) must use the specific remedy Congress enacted for that
purpose: Habeas.” McNeal v. LeBlanc, 93 F.4th 840, 843 (5th Cir. 2024)
(Oldham, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
Preiser and Edwards foreclose Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims here. DOC
allegedly imprisoned each Plaintiff past the date they were supposed to
be released. Singleton was allegedly overdetained 61 days, Whitehead 124
days, and Traylor 2 days. Each of them could have sought immediate
release by bringing a habeas action in state court. See Ala. Code § 15-21-
1, et seq. (Alabama’s habeas corpus statute). If state habeas relief was not
available, Plaintiffs could have filed a federal habeas action under 28
U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (allowing a state
prisoner to seek federal habeas relief if either he exhausted state remedies
or state remedies were not available). Yet as far as the court can tell, none
of the Plaintiffs did. Instead, Plaintiffs slept on their habeas rights, waited
until they were released from prison, and then brought § 1983 claims
seeking monetary damages. That approach is not permitted under Preiser
and Edwards. Indeed, “[i]t turns Preiser and Edwards upside down to say
that [Plaintiffs’] world flips” on the day of their release such that Plaintiffs
unlock general § 1983 remedies when those remedies were out of reach
during their overdetention. See McNeal, 93 F.4th at 843 (Oldham J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
It’s true, as Plaintiffs point out, that Plaintiffs are not challenging
the “validity of their convictions or sentences.” (Doc. 37, p. 37-38). But that
doesn’t matter. The prisoners in Preiser and Edwards did not challenge
their underlying convictions or sentences either; they sought release from
prison. In both cases, the Court determined the prisoners’ only remedy
was habeas. That conclusion does not suddenly change upon a prisoner’s
release. So Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against DOC are not cognizable and
must be dismissed.
C. Plaintiffs’ Remaining State Law Claims (Counts IV and V)
Plaintiffs’ base their remaining claims against DOC for negligence
and false imprisonment in state law. While the court doesn’t have original
jurisdiction over these claims, the court has discretion whether to exercise
1 Not only does 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) require state prisoners to first seek state habeas relief, if
available, federalism dictates that if a state executive agency is allegedly violating a state
legislative mandate, then the state’s judiciary should get the first crack at deciding the dispute.
supplemental jurisdiction over them. See 28 U.S.C. § 1867(c); Raney v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (11th Cir. 2004). The Eleventh
Circuit has “encouraged district courts to dismiss any remaining state
claims when, as here, the federal claims have been dismissed prior to
trial.” Id. at 1089. Having dismissed all federal claims, the court finds that
Plaintiffs’ state-law claims are best left for the state courts to decide—
particularly when Plaintiffs allege that the state executive branch failed
to follow a directive of the state legislative branch. See United Mine
Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966). So the court will
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and dismiss Plaintiffs’ state-
law claims without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(8).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the court will GRANT IN PART the Board and
DOC’s motions to dismiss (docs. 30, 32). The court will DISMISS
WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ claims against the Board in Counts
I-V but because Plaintiffs lack standing to bring those claims, the court
does not grant Plaintiffs leave to amend them. The court will DISMISS
WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against DOC in Counts I-
III. The court will decline to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction
over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims against DOC in Counts IV and V and
DISMISS those claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(8).
DONE and ORDERED on September 22, 2025.
fo, fo Hage
COREY‘L. MAZE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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